

# Studies in Critical Philosophy, by H. Marcuse

a. People / Organizations: [https://monoskop.org/images/5/59/Marcuse\\_Herbert\\_Studies\\_in\\_Critical\\_Philosophy\\_1973.pdf](https://monoskop.org/images/5/59/Marcuse_Herbert_Studies_in_Critical_Philosophy_1973.pdf)

b. Quotes:

c. General Notes:

- The Foundation of Historical Materialism (pg. 1)
  - "For, if I may anticipate, we are dealing with a philosophical critique of political economy and its philosophical foundation as a theory of revolution" (pg. 3)
    - "We are dealing with a philosophical critique of political economy, for the basic categories of Marx's theory here arise out of his emphatic confrontation with the philosophy of Hegel (e.g. labour, objectification, alienation, supersession, property). This does not mean that Hegel's 'method' is transformed and taken over, put into a new context and brought to life. Rather, Marx goes back to the problems at the root of Hegel's philosophy (which originally determined his method), independently appropriates their real content and thinks it through to a further stage." (pg. 4)
      - "This is not invalidated by the fact that its sense and purpose are not at all philosophical but practical and revolutionary: the overthrow of the capitalist system through the economic and political struggle of the proletariat" (pg. 4)
    - "What must be seen and understood is that **economics and politics have become the economic-political basis of the theory of revolution through a quite particular, philosophical interpretation of human existence and its historical realization**. The very complicated relationship between philosophical and economic theory and between this theory and revolutionary praxis, which can only be clarified by an analysis of the whole situation in which historical materialism developed, may become clear after a full interpretation of the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts*. I only want to introduce this process in my paper" (pg. 4)
      - "The theory is in itself a practical one; **praxis does not only come at the end but is already present in the beginning of the theory**. To engage in praxis is not to tread on alien ground, external to the theory" (pg. 5)
    - "Marx himself describes their purpose as the critique of political economy - a 'positive' critique, and thus one which, by revealing the mistakes of political economy and its inadequacy for the subject, also provides it with a basis to make it adequate for its task. The positive critique of political economy is thus a critical foundation of political economy. Within this critique the idea of political economy is completely transformed: it becomes the science of the necessary conditions for the communist revolution. This revolution itself signifies - quite apart from economic upheavals - a revolution in the whole history of man and the definition of his being" (pg. 5)
      - "Political economy is criticized as the scientific justification or concealment of the total 'estrangement' and 'devaluation' of human reality represented in capitalist society - as a science which treats man as 'something unessential'" (pg. 5)
        - "As a result of this 'alienation' of the worker and of labour, the realization of all man's 'essential powers' becomes the loss of their reality; the objective world is no longer 'truly human property' appropriated in 'free activity' as the sphere of the free operation and self-confirmation of the whole of human nature. It is instead a world of objects in private possession which can be owned, used or exchanged and whose seemingly unalterable laws even man must obey - in short, the universal 'domination of dead matter over mankind'" (pg. 6)
          - ◆ "It is the alienation of man, the devaluation of life, the perversion and loss of human reality." (pg. 7-8)
      - "What we are trying to show is this: from the outset the basic concepts of the critique - alienated labour and private property - are not simply taken up and criticized as economic concepts, but as concepts for a crucial process in human history..." (pg. 8-9)
        - "...the fact that capitalist society calls into question not only economic facts and objects but the entire 'existence' of man and 'human reality' is for Marx the decisive justification for the proletarian revolution as a total and radical revolution, unconditionally excluding any partial upheaval or 'evolution'. The justification does not lie outside or behind the concepts of alienation and estrangement - it is precisely this alienation and estrangement itself. All attempts to dismiss the philosophical content of Marx's theory or to gloss over it in embarrassment reveal a complete failure to recognize the historical origin of the theory: they set out from an essential separation of philosophy, economics and revolutionary praxis, which is a product of the reification against which Marx fought and which he had already overcome at the beginning of his critique." (pg. 10)
      - "In capitalist society labour not only produces commodities (i.e. goods which can be freely sold on the market), but also produces 'itself and the worker as a commodity', the worker becoming 'an ever cheaper commodity the more commodities he creates'" (pg. 10)
        - "So instead of being an expression of the whole man, labour is his alienation; instead of being the full and free realization of man it has become a 'loss of realization'" (pg. 10)
          - "The economic fact of **estrangement and reification is thus grounded in a particular attitude by man (as a worker) towards the object (of his labour)**. 'Alienated labour' must now be understood in the sense of this kind of relation of man to the object, and no longer as a purely economic condition" (pg. 11)
            - ◆ "The *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* are direct evidence of the fact that Marx's theory has its roots in the centre of Hegel's philosophical problematic." (pg. 13)
              - ◇ "We can deduce the following from these definitions of labour: labour is 'man's act of self-creation', i.e. the activity through and in which man really first becomes what he is by his nature as man. He does this in such a way that this becoming and being are there for himself, so that he can know and 'regard' himself as what he is (man's 'becoming-for-himself'). Labour is a knowing and conscious activity: in his labour man relates to himself and to the object of his labour; he is not directly one with his labour but can, as it were, confront it and oppose it {through which, as we shall see, human labour fundamentally distinguishes itself as 'universal' and 'free' production from the 'unmediated' production of, for example, the nest-building animal). The fact that man in his labour is there 'for himself' in objective form is closely related to the second point: man is an 'objective' or, more exactly, an 'objectifying' being. Man can only realize his essence if he realizes it as something objective, by using his 'essential powers' to produce an 'external', 'material', objective world. It is in his work in this world (in the broadest sense) that he is real and effective. 'In creating a world of objects by his practical activity, in his work upon inorganic nature, man proves himself a conscious species being ...' (p. 113). In this activity man shows himself as the human being he is according to his 'species' as distinct from animal, vegetable and inorganic being {we will examine the central concept of objectification at a later stage below). Labour, understood in this way, is the specifically human 'affirmation of being' in which human existence is realized and confirmed." (pg. 13-14)
        - "The definition of man as a 'species being' has done a lot of damage in Marx-scholarship; our passage is so valuable because it exposes the real

origins of Marx's concept of 'species'. Man is a 'species being', i.e. a being which has the 'species' (his own and that of the rest of existence) as its object. The species of a being is that which this being is according to its 'stock' and 'origin'; it is the 'principle' of its being that is common to all the particular features of what it is: the general essence of this being. If man can make the species of every being into his object, the general essence of every being can become objective for him: he can possess every being as that which it is in its essence. It is for this reason (and this is expressed in the second half of the sentence quoted) that he can relate freely to every being: he is not limited to the particular actual state of the being and his immediate relationship to it, but he can take the being as it is in its essence beyond its immediate, particular, actual state; he can recognize and grasp the possibilities contained in every being; he can exploit, alter, mould, treat and take further ('pro-duce') any being according to its 'inherent standard' (p. 114). Labour, as the specifically human 'life activity', has its roots in man's nature as a 'species being'; it presupposes man's ability to relate to the 'general' aspect of objects and to the possibilities contained in it. Specifically human freedom has its roots in man's ability to relate to his own species: the self-realization and 'self-creation' of man. The relationship of man as a species being to his objects is then more closely defined by means of the concept of free labour (free productions)." (pg. 15-16)

- "Man cannot simply accept the objective world or merely come to terms with it; he must appropriate it; he has to transform the objects of this world into organs of his life, which becomes effective in and through them" (pg. 16)
  - "The thesis of nature as a means for man implies more than merely that man is dependent simply for his physical survival on objective, organic and inorganic nature as a means of life, or that under the direct pressure of his 'needs' he 'produces' (appropriates, treats, prepares, etc.) the objective world as objects for food, clothing, accommodation, etc." (pg. 16)
    - ◆ "Man does not have objects merely as the environment of his immediate life activity and does not treat them merely as objects of his immediate needs. He can 'confront' any object and exhaust and realize its inner possibilities in his labour. He can produce 'in accordance with the laws of beauty' and not merely in accordance with the standard of his own needs (p. 114). In this freedom man reproduces 'the whole of nature', and through transformation and appropriation furthers it, along with his own life, even when this production does not satisfy an immediate need. Thus the history of human life is at the same time essentially the history of man's objective world and of 'the whole of nature' ('nature' in the wider sense given to this concept by Marx, as also by Hegel). **Man is not in nature; nature is not the external world into which he first has to come out of his own inwardness. Man is nature. Nature is his 'expression', 'his work and his reality'** (p. 114). Wherever we come across nature in human history it is 'human nature' while man for his part is always 'human nature' too. We can thus see provisionally to what extent consistent 'humanism' is immediately 'naturalism' (pp. 135, 181)" (pg. 17)
- "As a natural being man is an 'objective being', which for Marx is a 'being equipped and endowed with objective (i.e. material) essential powers' (p. 180), a being who relates to real objects, 'acts objectively', and 'can only express his life in real, sensuous objects' (pp. x81ff.). Because the power of his being thus consists in living out (i.e. through and in external objects) everything he is, his 'self-realization' at the same time means 'the establishment of a real, objective world, which is overpowering because it has a form external to him and is thus not part of his being' (p. x80). **The objective world, as the necessary objectivity of man, through the appropriation and supersession of which his human essence is first 'produced' and 'confirmed', is part of man himself**. It is real objectivity only for self-realizing man, it is the 'self-objectification' of man, or human objectification. But this same objective world, since it is real objectivity, can appear as a precondition of his being which does not belong to his being, is beyond his control, and is 'overpowering'. This conflict in the human essence - that it is in itself objective - is the root of the fact that objectification can become reification and that externalization can become alienation. It makes it possible for man completely to 'lose' the object as part of his essence and let it become independent and overpowering. This possibility becomes a reality in estranged labour and private property." (pg. 18)
- "The concept of sensuousness here taken up by Marx (via Feuerbach and Hegel) goes back to Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. There it is said that sensuousness is the human perception through which alone objects are given to us. Objects can only be given to man in so far as they 'affect' to him. Human sensuousness is affectibility. Human perception as sensuousness is receptive and passive. It receives what it is given, and it is dependent on and needs this quality of being given. To the extent to which man is characterized by sensuousness he is 'posited' by objects, and he accepts these prerequisites through cognition. As a sensuous being he is an affixed, passive and suffering being." (pg. 19)
  - "We can now understand why Marx emphasizes that 'man's feelings, passions, etc. .... are truly ontological affirmations of being of [nature]' (p. 165). The distress and neediness which appear in man's sensuousness are no more purely matters of cognition than his distress and neediness, as expressed in estranged labour, are purely economic. Distress and neediness here do not describe individual modes of man's behaviour at all; they are features of his whole existence. They are ontological categories (we shall therefore return to them in connection with a large number of different themes in these Manuscripts)." (pg. 21)
    - "But in Marx it is **this concept of sensuousness (as objectification) which leads to the decisive turn from classical German philosophy to the theory of revolution**, for he inserts the basic traits of practical and social existence into his definition of man's essential being. As objectivity, man's sensuousness is essentially practical objectification, and because it is practical it is essentially a social objectification" (pg. 21)
      - ◆ "We saw that man's sensuousness signified that he is posited by pre-established objects and therefore also that he has a given, objective world, to which he relates 'universally' and 'freely'. We must now describe more closely the way in which he possesses and relates to the world." (pg. 22)
  - "In Feuerbach man's possession of, and relation to, the world remains essentially theoretical, and this is expressed in the fact that the way of relating, which really permits 'possession' of reality, is 'perception'. In Marx, to put it briefly, **labour replaces this perception**, although the central importance of the theoretical relation does not disappear: it is combined with labour in a relationship of dialectical interpenetration" (pg. 22)
    - "Thus we can already discern **the second basic characteristic of objectification: it is essentially a 'social' activity**, and objectifying man is basically 'social' man. The sphere of objects in which labour is performed is precisely the sphere of common life-activity: in and through the objects of labour, men are shown one another in their reality. The original forms of communication, the essential relationship of men to one another, were expressed in the common use, possession, desire, need and enjoyment, etc. of the objective world. All labour is labour with and for and against others, so that in it men first mutually reveal themselves for what they really are. Thus every object on which a man works in his individuality is 'simultaneously his own existence for the other man, the existence of the other man, and that existence for him'" (pg. 23-24)
  - "If the objective world is thus understood in its totality as a 'social' world, as the objective reality of human society and thus as human objectification, then through this it is also already defined as a historical reality. **The objective world which is in any given situation pre-established for man is the reality of a past human life, which, although it belongs to the past, is still present in the form it has given to the objective world**. A new form of the objective world can thus only come into being on the basis, and through the supersession of an earlier form already in existence. The real human and his world arise first in this movement, which inserts the relevant aspect of the past into the present: 'History is the true natural history of man', his 'act of origin' (p. 182), 'the creation of man through human labour' (p. 145). **Not only man emerges in history, but also nature, in so far as it is not something external to and separated from the human essence but belongs to the transcended and appropriated objectivity of man: 'world history' is 'the emergence of nature for man' (ibid.)**. It is only now, after the totality of the human essence as the unity of man and nature has been made concrete by the practical-social-historical process of objectification, that we can understand the definition of man as a 'universal' and 'free' species

being. **The history of man is at the same time the process of 'the whole of nature'; his history is the 'production and reproduction' of the whole of nature, furtherance of what exists objectively through once again transcending its current form.** In his 'universal' relationship to the whole of nature, therefore, nature is ultimately not a limitation on or something alien outside him to which he, as something other, is subjected. It is his expression, confirmation, activity: 'externality is ... the self-externalizing world of sense open to the light, open to the man endowed with senses' (p. 192)" (pg. 24-25)

- "Man 'relates' to himself and whatever exists, he can transcend what is given and pre-established, appropriate it and thus give it his own reality and realize himself in everything. This freedom does not contradict the distress and neediness of man, of which we spoke at the beginning, but is based upon it in so far as it is freedom only as the transcendence of what is given and pre-established. Man's 'life-activity' is 'not a determination with which he directly merges' like an animal (p. 113), **it is 'free activity', since man can 'distinguish' himself from the immediate determination of his existence, 'make it into an object' and transcend it.** He can turn his existence into a 'means' (ibid.), can himself give himself reality and himself 'produce' himself and his 'objectivity'. It is in this deeper sense (and not only biologically) that we must understand the sentence that 'man produces man' (pp. 136, 137) and that human life is genuinely 'productive' and 'life-engendering life' (p. 113)." (pg. 25)
  - "As far as man, through the creation, treatment and appropriation of the objective world, gives himself his own reality, and as far as his 'relationship to the object' is the 'manifestation of human reality' (p. 139), **labour is the real expression of human freedom.** Man becomes free in his labour. He freely realizes himself in the object of his labour: 'when, for man in society, the objective world everywhere becomes the world of man's essential powers- human reality, and for that reason the reality of his own essential powers - ... all objects become for him the objectification of himself become objects which confirm and realize his individuality, become his objects: that is, man himself becomes the object' (p. 140)." (pg. 25-26)
- **"It almost appears, despite all protestations to the contrary, as if we are moving in the field of philosophical investigations, forgetting that these Manuscripts are concerned with the foundation of a theory of revolution and hence ultimately with revolutionary praxis"** (pg. 26)
  - **"The fact from which the critique and the interpretation set out was the alienation and estrangement of the human essence as expressed in the alienation and estrangement of labour, and hence the situation of man in the historical facticity of capitalism.** This fact appears as the total perversion and concealment of what the critique had defined as the essence of man and human labour. **Labour is not 'free activity' or the universal and free self-realization of man, but his enslavement and loss of reality. The worker is not man in the totality of his life-expression, but a nonperson, the purely physical subject of 'abstract' activity.** The objects of labour are not expressions and confirmations of the human reality of the worker, but alien things, belonging to someone other than the worker - 'commodities'. Through all this the existence of man does not become, in estranged labour, the 'means' for his self-realization. The reverse happens: **man's self becomes a means for his mere existence.** The pure physical existence of the worker is the goal which his entire life-activity serves. 'As a result, therefore, man [the worker] only feels himself freely active in his animal functions - eating, drinking, procreating, or at most in his dwelling and in dressing-up, etc., and in his human functions he no longer feels himself to be anything but an animal. What is animal becomes human and what is human becomes animal' (p. 111). **We have seen that Marx describes this estrangement and loss of reality as the 'expression' of a total perversion of the behaviour of man as man:** in his relationship to the product of his labour as an 'alien object exercising power over him' and simultaneously in the relationship of the worker to his own activity as 'an alien activity not belonging to him' (ibid.). This reification is by no means limited to the worker (even though it affects him in a unique way); it also affects the non-worker - the capitalist. The 'dominion of dead matter over man' reveals itself for the capitalist in the state of private property and the manner in which he has and possesses it. It is really a state of being possessed, of being had, slavery in the service of property. He possesses his property not as a field of free self-realization and activity but purely as capital..." (pg. 26-27)
- "It must be emphasized again and again that **in laying the foundations of revolutionary theory Marx is fighting on various fronts: on the one hand against the pseudo-idealism of the Hegelian school, on the other against reification in bourgeois political economy, and then again against Feuerbach and pseudo-materialism.**" (pg. 28)
- A Study on Authority (pg. 49)
  - **"The authority relationship, as understood in these analyses, assumes two essential elements in the mental attitude of he who is subject to authority: a certain measure of freedom** (voluntariness: recognition and affirmation of the bearer of authority, which is not based purely on coercion) **and conversely, submission, the tying of will** (indeed of thought and reason) **to the authoritative will of an Other. Thus in the authority relationship freedom and unfreedom, autonomy and heteronomy, are yoked in the same concept and united in the single person of he who is subject.** The recognition of authority as a basic force of social praxis attacks the very roots of human freedom: it means (in a different sense in each case) the surrender of autonomy (of thought, will, action), the tying of the subject's reason and will to pre-establish contents, in such a way that these contents do not form the 'material' to be changed by the will of the individual but are taken over as they stand as the obligatory norms for his reason and will. Yet bourgeois philosophy put the autonomy of the person right at the centre of its theory: Kant's teachings on freedom are only the clearest and highest expression of a tendency which has been in operation since Luther's essay on the freedom of the Christian man" (pg. 51)
    - **"The concept of authority thus leads back to the concept of freedom: it is the practical freedom of the individual, his social freedom and its absence, which is at stake. The union of internal autonomy and external heteronomy, the disintegration of freedom in the direction of its opposite is the decisive characteristic of the concept of freedom which has dominated bourgeois theory since the Reformation.** Bourgeois theory has taken very great pains to justify these contradictions and antagonisms. The individual cannot be simultaneously free and unfree, autonomous and heteronomous, unless the being of the person is conceived as divisible and belonging to various spheres. This is quite possible once one ceases to hypostatize the I as the 'substance'. But the decisive factor is the mode of this division. If it is undertaken dualistically, the world is split in half: two relatively self-enclosed spheres are set up and freedom and unfreedom as totalities divided between them in such a way that one sphere is wholly a realm of freedom and the other wholly a realm of unfreedom. Secondly, what is internal to the person is claimed as the realm of freedom: the person as member of the realm of Reason or of God (as 'Christian', as 'thing in itself', as intelligible being) is free. Meanwhile, the whole 'external world', the person as member of a natural realm or, as the case may be, of a world of concupiscence which has fallen away from God (as 'man', as 'appearance'), becomes a place of unfreedom. The Christian conception of man as 'created being' 'between' natura naturata and natura naturans, with the unalterable inheritance of the Fall, still remains the unshaken basis of the bourgeois concept of freedom in German Idealism. **But the realm of freedom and the realm of unfreedom are not simply contiguous with or superimposed on each other. They are founded together in a specific relation. For freedom** - and we must hold fast to this astonishing phrase despite its paradoxical nature - **is the condition of unfreedom.** Only because and in so far as man is free can he be unfree; precisely because he is 'actually' (as a Christian, as a rational person) completely free must he 'unactually' (as a member of the 'external' world) be unfree. For the full freedom of man in the 'external' world as well would indeed simultaneously denote his complete liberation from God, his enslavement to the Devil. This thought reappears in a secularized form in Kant: man's freedom as a rational being can only be 'saved' if as a sensual being he is entirely abandoned to natural necessity. **The Christian doctrine of freedom pushes the liberation of man back until it pre-dates his actual history,** which then, as the history of his unfreedom, becomes an 'eternal' consequence of this liberation. In fact, strictly speaking there is no liberation of man in history according to this doctrine or, to put it more precisely, Christian doctrine has good reasons for viewing such a liberation as primarily something negative and evil, namely the partial liberation from God, the achievement of freedom to sin (as symbolized in the Fall)." (pg. 52-53)
  - **"The bourgeoisie fought its greatest battles under the banner of 'Reason' but it is precisely bourgeois society which totally deprives reason of its**

- realization.** The sector of nature controlled by man through rational methods is infinitely larger than in the Middle Ages; society's material process of production has in many instances been rationalized down to the last detail - but as a whole it remains 'irrational'. These antagonisms appear in the most varied forms in the ambivalence of bourgeois relationships of authority: they are rational, yet fortuitous, objective, yet anarchic, necessary, yet bad." (pg. 55)
- "For Calvin, not only man's sensuality but also his reason is ultimately corrupt. This provides the theological justification for an **anti-rationalism which strongly contrasts with Catholic teaching.** In the Catholic doctrine there was still an awareness that reason and freedom are correlative concepts, that man's rationality will be destroyed if it is separated from the free possibility of rational acting and thinking. For Thomas Aquinas, man, as a rational animal, is necessarily also free and equipped with free will..." (pg. 72)
    - "The inner connections between Lutheran and Kantian ethics are plainly apparent." (pg. 79)
  - "...there are as it were **two central points around which the problematic of authority and freedom in Kant's philosophy is concentrated:** firstly, the philosophical foundation itself, under the heading of the autonomy of the free person under the law of duty, and secondly the sphere of the 'application' of ethics, under the heading of the 'right of resistance'" (pg. 79)
    - "To think and to act according to an authority is for Kant characteristic of 'immaturity', a 'self-inflicted immaturity', for which the person is himself to blame." (pg. 80)
      - "For Kant firmly believes that the free autonomy of man is the supreme law. It presupposes the exit of man from the state of immaturity which is his own fault'; this process is, precisely, 'enlightenment'." (pg. 80)
  - "**It is highly significant that almost all the basic concepts of Kant's theory of right are defined by negative characteristics like securing, lesion, restriction, prevention and coercion.** The subordination of individual freedom to the general authority of coercion is no longer 'irrationally' grounded in the concupiscence of the 'created being' and in the divinely ordained nature of government, but grows immanently out of the requirements of bourgeois society as the condition of its existence." (pg. 83)
    - "Thus in the origins of bourgeois society the private and general interest, will and coercion, freedom and subordination, are meant to be united. The bourgeois individual's lack of freedom under the legal authority of the rulers of his society is meant to be reconciled with the basic conception of the essentially free person by being thought of as the mutual self-limitation of all individuals which is of equally primitive origin. The formal purpose of this self-limitation is the establishment of a general community which, in uniting all individuals, becomes the real subject of social existence. **'The general community' is society viewed as the totality of associated individuals.** This in turn has two connotations: (1) A total communality of the kind that reconciles the interests of every individual with the interests of the other individuals - so that there is really a general interest which supersedes private interests. (2) A universal validity of such a kind that the general interest represents a norm equally binding on all individuals (a law). In so far as the interests of the individuals do not prevail 'on their own', and do not become reconciled with each other 'on their own' (in a natural manner), but rather require social planning, the general community confronts the individuals as a priority and as a demand: in virtue of its general 'validity' it must demand recognition and achieve and safeguard this by coercion if necessary." (pg. 87)
      - "When Kant deals with social problems in the context of the 'general community', this already signifies a decisive step in the history of social theory: **it is no longer God but man himself who gives man freedom and unfreedom.** The unchaining of the conscious bourgeois individual is completed in theory: this individual is so free that he alone can abrogate his freedom. And he can only be free if at the same time freedom is taken away from all others: through all-round, mutual subordination to the authority of the law. The bearer of authority (in the sense of being the source of authority) is not God, or a person or a multiplicity of persons, but the general community of all (free) persons in which every individual is both the person delegated and the person delegating." (pg. 87-88)
    - "German Idealism uses bourgeois society as a model for its exposition of the concept of universality: in this sense, its theory signifies a new justification of social unfreedom. The characteristics of real universality are not fulfilled in this society." (pg. 88)
  - "**Freedom for Kant is a transcendental 'actuality', a 'fact'; it is something which man always already has if he wants to become free.** As in Luther, freedom always 'precedes' any free act, as its eternal a priori; it is never the result of a liberation and it does not first require liberation. Admittedly freedom 'exists' for Kant only in activity in accordance with the moral law, but this activity is, in principle, free to everyone everywhere. By the ultimate reference of freedom to the moral law as its only 'reality', freedom becomes compatible with every type of unfreedom; owing to its transcendental nature it cannot be affected by any kind of restriction imposed on actual freedom. Admittedly freedom is also a liberation - man making himself free from all 'empirical' determinants of the will, the liberation of the person from the domination of sensuality which enters into the constitution of the human animal as a 'created being'- but this liberation leaves all types of actual servitude untouched." (pg. 92)
    - "For Kant, every personal and institutional authority has to justify itself in face of the idea of a universal law, which the united individuals have given themselves and which they themselves observe. In the 'external' sphere of social existence this law - as we have seen in the theory of right - justifies not only the authority of the actual system of 'governments' but also authority in general as a social necessity; universal voluntary self-limitation of individual freedom in a general system of the subordination of some and the domination of others is necessary for the peremptory securing of bourgeois society, which is built up on relations of private property. This is the highest rationalization of social authority within bourgeois philosophy. But just as, with the application of the law, rationalization is brought to a standstill in face of the internal contradictions of bourgeois society, in face of its immanent 'injustice', so it is with the origin of legislation itself: 'the possibility of an intelligible property, and thus also of the external Mine and Thine, is not self-evident, but must be deduced from the postulate of practical reason.' The law remains an authority which right back to its origins cannot be rationally justified without going beyond the limits of precisely that society for whose existence it is necessary." (pg. 94)
  - "**Kant had introduced the antagonism between freedom and coercion into the idea of freedom itself: there is only freedom under the (coercive) law. The supersession of this antagonism was sought in the unification of the individual and the general community.** In the sphere of social action this appeared as the voluntary all-round self-limitation of the united individuals through which social existence as a world of free individuals or as 'bourgeois society' became possible for the first time. The 'universality' which lies at the basis of bourgeois society is by no means able to fulfil its function of replacing individual freedom with a general freedom; this fact is the starting point for Hegel's critique of Kant's theory of law..." (pg. 95)
    - "**The problem of freedom in Hegel remains subject to the idea of universality: individual freedom can only become real in a 'general community'.** The task is to define this universality conceptually and to indicate its social reality. The description of bourgeois society in Hegel's philosophy of law is completely based on the recognition that the universality which has come into being in this society does not represent a 'true' universality and thus not a real form of freedom (realized through its supersession). Moreover it cannot represent this, so that the realization of true freedom necessarily leads beyond bourgeois society as such." (pg. 95-96)
      - "The general community is, to begin with, nothing more than the mutual dependence of 'selfish' individuals, a world of private satisfaction of needs" (pg. 96)
    - "Hegel sees civil society basically from the same viewpoint as Kant: as a universal coercive order for the safeguarding (of the property of) free private property owners - an order whose authority may be 'universal' (its claims being recognized by all the individuals organized within it because of their own interests) and legitimate, but which stands and falls with its own basis and presupposition: namely a social order for the peremptory safeguarding of private property. Kant saw this presupposition as necessary for any idea of a 'legitimate' social order; Hegel does not contradict him in this. But in contrast to Kant his picture of bourgeois society is coloured by its negativity" (pg. 96-97)

- "The systematic continuation of the dialectic is something different: it leads to the supersession of civil society by the 'state'. The idea of civil society itself constituting itself as a state is rejected; society and state are separated according to their 'principle'. This is a decisive step for the development of the problem of authority: **civil society, now seen almost in its full problematic, can no longer in itself provide the basis for the social system of authority; it ceases to be the real basis of freedom and thus also of the universal community. The state confronts it as an independent totality and is thus liberated from its negativity and becomes the unconditional bearer of all social authority.** The thorough-going rationalization of the authoritative order is abandoned; the philosophy of absolute reason sets up a completely irrational authority on the foundations of the state. That is a rough outline of what we must now examine in detail as the form taken by the problem of authority in Hegel's philosophy of the state. Hegel, like Kant, sees state and society in the context, first and foremost, of the idea of property" (pg. 97-98)
        - ◆ **"The state, which becomes the sole bearer of the authority of this order, is deprived of any historical genesis as a preceding 'totality' and a 'reality existing in and for itself', and is presented as a sphere independent of individual and society. The systematic dialectic, which merges civil society into the state, silences the historical dialectic. The 'sovereignty' of the state, freed from any personal or social basis, appears as a 'metaphysical' quality, peculiar to the state as such: it 'has its ultimate roots ultimately in the unity of the state as its simple self'. This concept of the 'sovereignty of the state purely as such, without express relation to its human bearers' subsequently became the decisive theoretical weapon. **The elevation of the sphere of the state above bourgeois society makes it possible to subordinate all social authority to the authority of the state as such**" (pg. 99-100)**
- "It is precisely this absorption of all particular individuality and restriction by the will in its state of self-identity which constitutes that 'universality' into which Hegel's theory of freedom debouches. As in Kant, the concept of freedom in Hegel is linked from the outset with the concept of universality, and in the system's final form the concepts of freedom and universality mean almost the same thing. We should need to return to the basis of Hegel's philosophy to unfold the concept of universality; here we must be content to point out the result. **The decisive point is that 'universality' is neither a mere determination of the individual will, nor the universal content of the various combined individual wills. The concept aims rather at an objective spiritual reality, as corresponds with the situation of the problem of freedom within the philosophy of the objective spirit.** 'The universal must not be simply what is thought by the individuals, it must be something existent; as such it is present in the state, it is that which is valid" (pg. 102)
  - **"The authority of the state is thus founded at a level quite beyond the reach of the power of the individual; it is based on the development of a 'world spirit' which has progressed on its road through the centuries up to the truth represented by the state"** (pg. 103)
    - "Hegel's analysis of domination and servitude not only contains the justification of the authority of domination in the sphere of the social struggle: it also provides the dialectic of this authority. The immanent development of the relationship between domination and servitude not only leads to the recognition of servitude as the real 'truth' of domination, but also to the servant's own insight into the lord's real power and thus into its (possible) supersession; it is shown that the authority of the lord is, in the last analysis, dependent on the servant, who believes in it and sustains it" (pg. 109)
- "On the road from Luther to Hegel bourgeois philosophy had increasingly dealt with the authority relationship as a social relationship of domination. It had thereby moved essentially from the centre to the periphery: the fixed centre was the Christian (inner, transcendental) freedom of the person, and the social order only appeared as the external sphere of this freedom. With values apportioned in this manner it was not difficult to accommodate the fact that the external sphere was primarily a realm of servitude and unfreedom, for this did not, after all, affect 'actual' freedom. Liberation always referred only to the inner realm of freedom: it was a 'spiritual' process, through which man became what he had always been in actuality. Since internal freedom always remained the eternal presupposition, or a priori, of unfreedom, external unfreedom could never close this gap: it was eternalized along with its opposite pole." (pg. 128)
  - "Since the eighteenth century there has been no lack of movements within bourgeois philosophy which have protested against this conception. The French Enlightenment made the concern for worldly freedom and the worldly happiness of men into a subject of philosophy: its limits were the limits of social order, which it could not essentially transcend. The only possibility of overcoming this whole conception lay beyond this order. Behind the bourgeois concept of freedom with its unification of inner freedom and outer unfreedom Marx saw the Christian 'cult of the abstract man" (pg. 128)
- Sartre's Existentialism (pg. 157)
  - "Camus does not belong to the existentialist school, but the basic experience which permeates his thought is also at the root of Existentialism" (pg. 159)
    - "The time is that of the totalitarian terror: the Nazi regime is at the height of its power; France is occupied by the German armies. The values and standards of western civilization are co-ordinated and superseded by the reality of the fascist system. Once again, thought is thrown back upon itself by a reality which contradicts all promises and ideas, which refutes rationalism as well as religion, idealism as well as materialism." (pg. 159)
  - "The experience of the 'absurd world' gives rise to a new and extreme rationalism which separates this mode of thought from all fascist ideology. But the new rationalism defies systematization. Thought is held in abeyance between the 'sentiment of absurdity' and its comprehension, between art and philosophy. Here, the ways part. **Camus rejects existential philosophy:** the latter must of necessity 'explain' the inexplicable, rationalize the absurdity and thus falsify its reality. To him, the only adequate expression is living the absurd life, and the artistic creation, which refuses to rationalize ('raisonner le concret') and which 'covers with images that which makes no sense' ('ce qui n'a pas de raison'). **Sartre, on the other hand, attempts to develop the new experience into a philosophy of the concrete human existence: to elaborate the structure of 'being in an absurd world' and the ethics of 'living without appeal'"** (pg. 160)
    - "The experience of the absurdity of the world, of man's failure and frustration, appears as the experience of his ontological condition. As such, it transcends his historical condition. **Sartre defines Existentialism as a doctrine according to which 'existence precedes and perpetually creates the essence'.**" (pg. 161)
  - **"In so far as Existentialism is a philosophical doctrine, it remains an idealistic doctrine:** it hypostatizes specific historical conditions of human existence into ontological and metaphysical characteristics. Existentialism thus becomes part of the very ideology which it attacks, and its radicalism is illusory" (pg. 161)
  - "At the outset, Sartre's concept of the free subject is a reinterpretation of Descartes's Cogito, but its development follows the tradition of German rather than French rationalism. Moreover **Sartre's book is in large parts a restatement of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Mind* and Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit*.**" (pg. 162)
    - "Existentialism thus offers two apparently contradictory aspects: one the modern reformulation of the perennial ideology, the transcendental stabilization of human freedom in the face of its actual enslavement; the other the revolutionary theory which implies the negation of this entire ideology. The two conflicting aspects reflect the inner movement of existentialist thought which reaches its object, the concrete human existence, only where it ceases to analyse it in terms of the 'free subject' and describes it in terms of what it has actually become: a 'thing' in a reified world. **At the end of the road, the original position is reversed: the realization of human freedom appears, not in the res cogitans, the 'Pour-soi', but in the res extensa, in the body as thing.** Here, Existentialism reaches the point where philosophical ideology would turn into revolutionary theory. But at the same point, Existentialism arrests this movement and leads it back into the ideological ontology." (pg. 162-163)

- "[BN] starts with the distinction of two types of being - Being-for-itself (Pour-soi; consciousness, cogito) and Being-in-itself (En-soi). The latter (roughly identical with the world of things, objectivity) is characterized by having no relation to itself, being what it is, plainly and simply, beyond all becoming, change, and temporality (which emerge only with the Pour-soi), in the mode of utter contingency. In contrast, the Being-for-itself, identical with the human being, is the free subject which continually 'creates' its own existence; Sartre's whole book is devoted to its analysis. The analysis proceeds from the question as to the 'relationship' (rapport) between these two types of being. Following Heidegger, subjectivity and objectivity are understood, not as two separate entities between which a relationship must only be established, but as essential 'togetherness', and the question aims at the full and concrete structure of this togetherness" (pg. 163)
    - "The question thus aims at the full and concrete structure of the human being as being-in-the-world. In order to elucidate this structure, the analysis orients itself on certain typical 'human attitudes'. The first of these is the attitude of questioning, the specific human attitude of interrogating, reflecting on himself and his situation at any given moment." (pg. 163-164)
      - "Negativity originates with and constantly accompanies the human being, manifesting itself in a whole series of negations (neantisations) with which the human being experiences, comprehends, and acts upon himself and the world. The totality of these negations constitutes the very being of the subject: man exists 'as perpetually detaching himself from what is' {EN, p. 73}; he transcends himself as well as his objects toward his and their possibilities, he is always 'beyond' his situation, 'wanting' his full reality. By the same token, man does not simply exist like a thing (en soi) but makes himself and his world exist, 'creates' himself and his world at any moment and in any situation." (pg. 164)
    - "There is first of all the identification of the human being with liberty. The series of negations by which man constitutes himself and his world at the same time constitutes his essential freedom...Human freedom thus conceived is not one quality of man among others, nor something which man possesses or lacks according to his historical situation, but is the human being itself and as such..." (pg. 164-165)
    - "Secondly, from the identification of the human being with freedom follows the full and unqualified responsibility of man for his being." (pg. 165)
    - "Thirdly, man is by definition nothing but self-creation. His Being is identical with his activity (action), or rather with his (free) acts" (pg. 165)
      - "Human existence is at any moment a 'project' that is being realized, freely designed and freely executed by man himself, or, man's existence is nothing but his own fundamental project." (pg. 166)
  - "The existentialist dynamics is thus not an aimless and senseless one: the 'project fundamental' which is man's existence aims at the ever lacking coincidence with himself, at his own completeness and totality. In other words, **the Pour-soi constantly strives to become En-soi, to become the stable and lasting foundation of his own being. But this project, which would make the Pour-soi an En-soi and vice-versa, is eternally condemned to frustration, and this ontological frustration shapes and permeates the entire Being of man**" (pg. 166)
    - "Sartre's ontological analysis has herewith reached its centre: the determination of the human being as frustration, Scheitern, 'echec'. All fundamental human relationships, the entire 'human enterprise' are haunted by this frustration. However, precisely because frustration is permanent and inevitable (since it is the ontological characteristic of the human being), it is also the very foundation and condition of human freedom." (pg. 166)
      - "The circle of ontological identifications is thus closed: it combines Being and Nothing, freedom and frustration, self-responsible choice and contingent determination" (pg. 167)
  - "**The other's glance turns me into an object, turns my existence into 'nature', alienates my possibilities, 'steals' my world**" (pg. 168)
    - "The appearance of the Other thus transforms the world of the Ego into a world of conflict, competition, alienation, 'reification'." (pg. 168)
    - "This conception of the Other as the irreconcilable antagonist of the Ego now serves as the basis for Sartre's interpretation of the interhuman relationships" (pg. 169)
  - "The original experience of the Other as the source of alienation and reification calls for two fundamental reactions which constitute the two fundamental types of interhuman relationships: (1) the attempt, on the part of the Ego, to deny the liberty and mastery of the Other and to make him into an objective thing, totally dependent on the Ego; or, (2) to assimilate his liberty, to accept it as the foundation of the Ego's own liberty and thereby to regain the free Ego (EN, p. 430). The first attitude leads to Sadism, the second to Masochism." (pg. 169)
    - "**The conclusion...there is no breaking out of the circle of frustration**" (pg. 170)
  - "We have seen that, **according to Sartre, man, as a Being-for-itself that does not simply exist but exists only in so far as it 'realizes' itself, is essentially act, action, activity.**" (pg. 172)
    - "Behind the nihilistic language of Existentialism lurks the ideology of free competition, free initiative, and equal opportunity. Everybody can 'transcend' his situation, carry out his own project: everybody has his absolutely free choice. However adverse the conditions, man must 'take it' and make compulsion his self-realization. Everybody is master of his destiny. But in the face of an 'absurd world' without meaning and reward, the attributes of the heroic period of bourgeois society assume naturally an absurd and illusory character. Sartre's 'Pour-soi' is closer to Stirner's *Einziger und sein Eigentum* than to Descartes's *Cogito*." (pg. 174-175)
      - "True, man is thrown into a 'situation' which he himself has not created, and this situation may be such that it 'alienates' his freedom, degrades him into a thing. The process of 'reification' appears in manifold forms in Sartre's philosophy: as the subordination of the 'Pour-soi' to the standardized technics of everyday life {EN, pp. 495ff., 594}, and as the interchangeability of the individual (EN, p. 496). But to Sartre reification as well as its negation are only obstacles on which man's freedom thrives and feeds itself: they become parts of the Cogito's existential project, and the whole process once again serves to illustrate the perpetual liberty of the 'Pour-soi' which finds only itself in the most alienated situation" (pg. 175)
  - "But **Sartre's concepts are, in spite of his dialectical style and the pervasive role of the negation, decidedly undialectical.**" (pg. 176)
    - "True, in Sartre's analysis, the development of the subject through its negation into the self-conscious realization of its project appears as a process, but the process-character is illusory: the subject moves in a circle." (pg. 176)
      - "Although the freedom which is operative as the very being of the 'Pour-soi' accompanies man in all situations, the scope and degree of his freedom varies in his different situations: it is smallest and dimmest where man is most thoroughly 'reified', where he is least 'Pour-soi'. For example, in situations where he is reduced to the state of a thing, an instrument, where he exists almost exclusively as body, his 'Pour-soi' has all but disappeared. But precisely here, where the ontological idea of freedom seems to evaporate together with the 'Pour-soi', where it falls almost entirely into the sphere of things - at this point a new image of human freedom and fulfilment arises" (pg. 177)
  - "**Existentialism plays with every affirmation until it shows forth as negation, qualifies every statement until it turns into its opposite, extends every position to absurdity, makes liberty into compulsion and compulsion into liberty, choice into necessity and necessity into choice, passes from philosophy to belles lettres and vice versa, mixes ontology and sexology, etc. The heavy seriousness of Hegel and Heidegger is translated into artistic play.** The ontological analysis includes a series of 'scenes amoureuses', and the existentialist novel sets forth philosophical theses in italics" (pg. 186)
    - "The opposition against Hegel pronounces the essential inadequacy of philosophy in the face of the concrete human existence. Since then, the gap between the terms of philosophy and those of existence has widened. The experience of the totalitarian organization of the human existence forbids to conceive freedom in any other form than that of a free society." (pg. 189)
- Karl Popper and the Problem of Historical Laws (pg. 191)

- "As an antidote against totalitarianism, Popper recommends a pluralistic, gradualistic, and 'piecemeal' approach to history and society..." (pg. 193)
- "These brief comments may serve to indicate one of the major defects of Popper's book. A philosophical analysis which remains abstract to the extent that it never reaches the historical dimension in which mass violence emerges and operates is of little value in explaining and combating it. I shall attempt to show that Popper's generalizations are theoretically untenable - but they also do violence to the empirical facts and events. **To be sure, terror is and remains in all its forms and circumstances a crime against humanity - an instrument of domination and exploitation. This does not change the fact that terror has had very different historical functions and very different social contents:** it has been used for the preservation of the status quo and for its overthrow, for the streamlining of a declining society and for the release of new political and economic forces. Understanding the historical function of terror may be an indispensable weapon for combating it" (pg. 196-197)
- "Popper's rejection of dialectics is not incidental: an anti-dialectical logic is essential to his argument. It is so because dialectical logic is throughout permeated with what he designates as 'historicism': its methods and its notions are shaped in accordance with the historical structure of reality. Far from 'denying the validity of logic', **dialectical logic intends to rescue logic by bridging the gap between the laws of thought and those governing reality - a gap which is itself the result of the historical development. Dialectical logic attempts to accomplish this task by bringing the two manifestations of reality to their actual common denominator, namely, history.** In its metaphysical form, this is also the core of Hegel's dialectic: Subject and Object, Mind and Nature - the two traditional 'substances' - are from the beginning conceived as an antagonistic unity, and the universe as the concrete development of their interrelation." (pg. 206)
- Freedom and its Historical Imperative (pg. 209)
  - "**We can well assume some sort of impulse, instinctive striving for freedom inherent in man**, with Reason superimposed on it by the requirements of the Reality Principle." (pg. 212)
    - "To justify the concept of objective historical imperatives, we have to recognize only one fact (or 'value') as historical datum, namely, that the dynamic of human existence is self-preservation and growth, i.e. not only satisfaction of biological needs but also development of the needs themselves in accordance with the possibilities which emerge in the constant struggle with nature (and with man). And it is also a fact that this struggle with nature has led to ever more and larger possibilities of satisfaction of needs. If this is the case, we can meaningfully speak of growth (in the sense indicated) as a force in history (without any teleological and moral connotations, regardless whether this kind of progress is good or bad, and whether it implies progress in freedom). And then we can meaningfully speak of historical imperatives in as much as the operation of this force depends on changing given social and natural conditions which define specific alternatives of praxis: the 'is' contains the 'ought'; the latter must be freed from this containment by obsolescent, and surmountable, forms of reality. Now we can raise the question whether freedom is implied or postulated by these imperatives. In one sense it certainly is: the individual must be free to acquire the means to attain his end: self-preservation and growth. However, this kind of freedom is variable to the highest degree: in history, it ranges from the mere physical ability to accept and use the means of subsistence, to the power of domination and exploitation. And it includes a rich freedom of choice within a strong framework of repression, of unfreedom. There is one brute fact which must guide any unideological discussion of freedom: since the beginnings of recorded history and to this very day, the liberty of some has always been based on the servitude of others, and the only concept of freedom that corresponded to the facts was the concept of 'inner' freedom, inalienable and practicable even in prison and at the stake. Whether called Christian freedom, or freedom of conscience and worship - this has been to this very day the only freedom available to man as man: 'essential' human freedom. Essential indeed if the body is inessential, and if this is the only freedom which can be claimed as pertaining and as granted to all men, regardless of class, race, religion. Freedom of thought is already of a different order and far less 'real': it is freedom only if translatable into expression, and the latter has been politically restricted throughout history - if not by direct censorship then by withholding, from the larger part of the population, the intellectual and material means which would enable them to develop and express free thought. **If freedom is man's ability to determine his own life without depriving others of this ability, then freedom has never been a historical reality - to this very day**" (pg. 212-213)
  - "The transition from servitude to freedom requires a total transvaluation of values..." (pg. 214)
  - "**There has always been a dual morality in history: that of the status quo, and that of its subversion: affirmation and negation** - not for the sake of negation, but of 'saving' human values invalidated by the affirmation. This revolutionary morality is repressed in all those who have learned (or were forced) to live with this suffering - easily when it is the lot of others out of sight who bear it nicely, less easily when it is the introjection of all the frustrations required by status and business. With the achievements of technical progress under advanced capitalism, this immorality of the beneficiaries of the high and blind standard of living has spread over a large part, probably the majority of the population; thus it has become a vital element in the cohesion and perpetuation of the status quo and its streamlined extension. Under these circumstances, the validity of the imperative seems anything but universal: applicable only to the technically backward peoples of the earth, and even there the imperative seems to be no more than the truism that people will try to subvert intolerable existential conditions." (pg. 216-217)
  - "I suggested that **the essence of human freedom is in the theoretical and practical syntheses which constitute and reconstitute the universe of experience.** These syntheses are never merely individual activities (acts) but the work of a supra-individual historical Subjectivity in the individual - just as the Kantian categories are the syntheses of a transcendental Ego in the empirical Ego. I have intentionally used the Kantian construction of experience, that is to say his epistemology rather than his moral philosophy, in order to elucidate the concept of freedom as historical imperative: freedom originates indeed in the mind of man, in his ability (or rather in his need and desire) to comprehend his world, and this comprehension is praxis in as much as it establishes a specific order of facts, a specific organization of the data of experience. The human mind is constituted in such a way that it subjects the data received by the senses to certain concepts of rigidly universal order in time and space, and this act is the precondition of all activity, practical as well as theoretical. For Kant, the organization of experience is universal because it happens to be the very structure of the human mind: the transcendental a priori rests on the acceptance of a fact. The universality of this structure is a formal one : time and space and the categories constitute the general framework for all experience. Now I suggest that Kant's transcendental construction of experience may well furnish the model for the historical construction of experience. The latter would be distinguished from the former in as much as the forms of intuition in which the sense data appear are political space and political time, and their synthesis takes place under political categories." (pg. 217-218)
    - "**As commodities, things express and perpetuate exploitation, unfreedom** - they are available according to purchasing power, which is in turn determined by the class character of the productive process. The synthesis of the data under political categories is an empirical synthesis, its universality is a relative, historical one, but valid for the entire society in all its branches, in its material and intellectual culture. It transforms everyday consciousness and common sense into political consciousness and political sense. And in this transformation originates the historical imperative of freedom: not only liberation in order to obtain a larger slice of the cake, or in order to participate actively in the administration and management of the established system but replacement of the system itself by one of self-determination on the basis of collective control of the means of production. This socialist formula is not restricted in its applicability to the advanced industrial societies: self-determination and collective control have always been possible alternatives of the organization of the struggle for existence; mutatis mutandis, the imperative of freedom has always been the repressed imperative of history." (pg. 218)
      - "**Today, it is more than ever before an imperative in the sense that it expresses an 'ought' which imposes itself on the individual against inclination (Neigung), personal need, interest.** These needs, satisfactions, interests seem to invalidate the imperative, or at least to make it appear as an abstract idea, relic of a previous political tradition, surpassed and contradicted by the reality of the advanced industrial

societies. There, liberation easily appears as the disruption, even destruction of a material (and cultural) well-being in which even the prevailing inhuman working conditions may seem the lesser (and reducible) evil compared with the terrifying uncertainties and horrors of revolution. The material and intellectual culture which is the mark of oppression in these societies may well continue to integrate the population into the capitalist system, and the latter may well be able to reproduce itself on an enlarged scale through neo-colonial exploitation abroad and militarization at home, plus the profitable conquest of outer space, and the collaboration of the Soviet Union. To be sure, **this kind of progress is the manifestation of the aggravating internal contradictions of the system**, but it can go on for a very long time, ravaging the people, the land, the sea, and the air, polluting the bodies and the minds- with the latter adapting themselves to the situation. So that the final explosion of these contradictions will not be the transition to a higher historical stage but rather to a perfect barbarism where freedom and automatism coincide" (pg. 219)

- **"Conflict between liberty and liberation:** the latter, i.e. self-determination, would indeed reduce, and perhaps even abrogate, those liberties of choice and expression which reproduce, in the individuals who enjoy them, the established system. For self-determination presupposes liberation from this very system. Seen in the light of this system and its very material benefits, liberation appears not only as a subversive but also as a highly abstract, 'intellectual', utopian idea. Triumph of the morality of affirmation, of positivism. Not the 'materialism' of the people is to blame, not the high level of well-being, but that it is precisely the kind of well-being which is required in order to reproduce and protect the existing power structure: the satisfactions are aggressive and yet submissive, administered and yet spontaneous, standardized and yet individual. **This unity of opposites permeates the entire structure: it finds its supreme expression in the fact that the people freely elect the rulers who perpetuate unfreedom**. The liberty of the masters goes hand in hand with the liberty of the slaves - once the latter have accepted the proposition that real self-determination of the one is irreconcilable with that of the other- provided that self-determination means more and other than the free choice of commodities, varieties of alienated labour, and of political bosses" (pg. 219-220)
  - "I believe there is one answer (and not an adequate one), namely, the right is with the victims of this system of well-being, the victims who pay such a large part of the costs and who are excluded from its blessings, the objects of internal as well as external colonization. **For them, freedom means first of all liberation from brutal and corrupt regimes of exploitation, foreign and indigenous. This process will inevitably shatter the cohesion of the societies of well-being**. Confronted with this threat, they mobilize and militarize themselves to protect the right order with brutal force, thereby proving their self-validating hypothesis that freedom demands repression. In fact, they are proving that their own freedom is incompatible with that of the others. But the answer is inadequate because the liberation of the backward people can never be effective and lasting without a corresponding change in the advanced societies, who are capable of meeting and containing the threat for a long time to come." (pg. 220)
    - "Competition is becoming the work of machines: technical, political machines, and the minds which direct the machines are dealing with men as objects, and this reification transforms their mind into a machine. Thus, liberation includes liberation of the machine, of technique and science from their ghastly use - liberation from the men who today determine their use. For **a free society is unimaginable without the progressive automation of socially necessary but dehumanizing labour**." (pg. 222)
- "Unless and until it becomes a vital need, restructuring the thought and action, the rationality and sensibility of the individuals, the chain of exploitation will not have been broken - no matter how 'satisfying' life may be. There is no historical 'law of progress' which could enforce such a break: it remains the ultimate imperative of theoretical and practical reason, of man as his own lawgiver. At the attained stage of the development, this autonomy has become a real possibility on an unprecedented scale. Its realization demands the emergence of a radical political consciousness, capable of shattering the equally unprecedented repressive mystification of facts - it demands the political synthesis of experience as a constitutive act: to recognize the politics of exploitation in the blessings of domination. I believe that, in the militant youth of today, the radical political synthesis of experience is taking place - perhaps the first step toward liberation." (pg. 223)

d. Further Readings:

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