The Dogma of Christ, by E. Fromm

a. People / Organizations:
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b. Quotes:
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c. General Notes:
   - Chapter 1 - The Dogma of Christ (pg. 1)
     - "What psychoanalysis is concerned with is experience; the investigation of its influence on emotional development is its primary purpose." (pg. 5)
       - "The method of applying psychoanalysis to groups cannot be different. The common psychic attitudes of the group members are to be understood only on the basis of their common patterns. Just as individual psychoanalytic psychology seeks to understand the individual emotional constellation, so social psychology can acquire an insight into the emotional structure of a group only by an exact knowledge of its life pattern. Social psychology can make assertions only concerning the psychic attitudes common to all; it therefore requires the knowledge of life situations common to all and characteristic for all." (pg. 5)
     - "The neurotic person is characterized by the fact that he has not succeeded in adjusting himself psychically to his real environment. Through the fixation of certain emotional impulses, of certain psychic mechanisms which at one time were appropriate and adequate, he comes into conflict with reality. The psychic structure of the neurotic is therefore almost entirely unintelligible without the knowledge of his early childhood experiences, for, owing to his neurosis - an expression of his lack of adjustment or of the particular range of infantile fixations - even his position as an adult is determined essentially by that childhood situation. Even for the normal person the experiences of early childhood are of decisive significance. His character, in the broadest sense, is determined by them, and without them it is unintelligible in its totality. But because he has adjusted himself psychically to reality in a higher degree than the neurotic, a much greater part of his psychic structure is understandable than in the case of the neurotic. Social psychology is concerned with normal people, upon whose psychic situation reality has an incomparably greater influence than upon the neurotic. Thus it can forgo even the knowledge of the individual childhood experiences of the various members of the group under investigation; from the knowledge of the socially conditioned life pattern in which these people were situated after the early years of childhood, it can acquire an understanding of the psychic attitudes common to them." (pg. 6)
     - "The present investigation is concerned with a narrowly limited problem of social psychology, namely, the question concerning the motives conditioning the evolution of concepts about the relation of God the Father to Jesus from the beginning of Christianity to the formulation of the Nicene Creed in the fourth century. In accordance with the theoretical principles just set forth, **this investigation aims to determine the extent to which the change in certain religious ideas is an expression of the psychic change of the people involved and the extent to which these changes are conditioned by their conditions of life.** It will attempt to understand the ideas in terms of men and their life patterns, and to show that the evolution of dogma can be understood only through knowledge of the unconscious upon which external reality works and which determines the content of consciousness." (pg. 7)
       - "**Our purpose here is to understand the change in certain contents of consciousness as expressed in theological ideas as the result of a change in unconscious processes**." (pg. 8)
     - "To the extent that society is helpless with respect to nature, the psychic situation of childhood must be repeated for the individual member of the society as an adult. He transfers from father or mother some of his childish love and fear and also some of his hostility to a fantasy figure, to God. In addition, there is a hostility to certain real figures, in particular to representatives of the ruling classes. In the social stratification, the infantile situation is repeated for the individual. He sees in the rulers the powerful ones, the strong, and the wise persons to be revered. He believes that they wish him well; he also knows that resistance to them is always punished; he is content when by docility he can win their praise. These are the identical feelings which, as a child, he had for his father, and it is understandable that he is as disposed to believe uncritically what is presented to him by the rulers as just and true, as in childhood he used to believe without criticism every statement made by his father. The figure of God forms a supplement to this situation; God is always the ally of the rulers. When the latter, who are always real personalities, are exposed to criticism, they can rely on God, who, by virtue of his unreality, only scorns criticism and, by his authority, confirms the authority of the ruling class. In this psychological situation of the infantile bondage of the ruled to the rulers, resides one of the principal guarantees of social stability. The ruled are willing to forgo the satisfaction of certain instinctual impulses in favour of the rulers; they are willing to respect the latter's threats of punishment and to believe in the wisdom of their injunctions. They find themselves in the same situation as that in which, as helpless children, they stood in relation to the father, because the same mechanisms operate now as operated in childhood. This psychic situation becomes established through a great many significant and complicated measures taken by the ruling class, whose function it is to maintain and strengthen in the masses their infantile psychic dependence and to impose itself on their unconscious as a father figure. **One of the principal means of achieving this purpose is religion. It has the task of preventing any psychic independence on the part of the masses, of intimidating them intellectually, of bringing them into the socially necessary infantile docility toward the rulers**. At the same time it has another essential function: it offers the masses a certain measure of satisfaction that makes life sufficiently tolerable for them to prevent them from attempting to change their position from that of obedient son to that of rebellious son." (pg. 12-13)
       - "…**religion serves merely to make it easier for the masses to resign themselves to the many frustrations that reality presents.** The satisfactions religion offers are of a libidinous nature; they are satisfactions that occur essentially in fantasy because, as we have pointed out before, libidinous impulses, in contrast to ego impulses, permit satisfaction in fantasies." (pg. 13)
     - "Let us summarize what has been said thus far. Man strives for a maximum of pleasure; social reality compels him to many renunciations of impulse, and society seeks to compensate the individual for these renunciations by other satisfactions harmless for the society—that is, for the ruling class. These satisfactions are such as in essence can be realized in fantasies, especially in collective fantasies. They perform an important function in social reality. In so far as society does not permit real satisfactions, fantasy satisfactions serve as a substitute and become a powerful support of social stability. The greater the renunciations men endure in reality, the stronger must be the concern for compensation. Fantasy satisfactions have the double function which is characteristic of every narcotic: they act both as an anodyne and as a deterrent to active change of reality. The common fantasy satisfactions have an essential advantage over individual daydreams: by virtue of their universality, the fantasies are perceived by the conscious mind as if they were real. An illusion shared by everyone becomes a reality. The oldest of these collective fantasy satisfactions is religion. With the progressive development of society, fantasies become more complicated and more rationalized. Religion itself becomes more differentiated, and beside it appear poetry, art, and philosophy as the expressions of collective fantasies. To sum up, **religion has a threefold function: for all mankind, consolation for the privations exacted by life; for the great majority of men, encouragement to accept emotionally their class situation; and for the ruling classes, relief from guilt feelings caused by the suffering of those whom they oppress.**" (pg. 16-17)
       - "Dogma is to a large extent conditioned by realistic political and social motives. It serves as a sort of banner, and the recognition of the banner is the avowal of membership in a particular group." (pg. 80)
     - "The figure of the suffering Jesus originated primarily from the need for identification on the part of the suffering masses, and it was only secondarily

determined by the need for expiation for the crime of aggression against the father. The followers of this faith were men who, because of their fate, were imbued with hatred for their rulers and with hope for their own happiness. The change in the economic situation and in the social composition of the Christian community altered the psychic attitude of the believers. Dogma developed; the idea of a man becoming a god changes into the idea of a god becoming a man. No longer should the father be overthrown; it is not the rulers who are guilty but the suffering masses. Aggression is no longer directed against the rulers but against the persons of the sufferers themselves. The satisfaction lies in pardon and love, which the father offers his submissive sons, and simultaneously in the regal, fatherly position which the suffering Jesus assumes while remaining the representative of the suffering masses. Jesus eventually became God without overthrowing God because. He was always God. Behind this there lies a still deeper regression which finds expression in the Homoousian dogma: the fatherly God, whose pardon is to be obtained only through one's own suffering, is transformed into the mother full of grace who nourishes the child, shelters it in her womb, and thus provides pardon. Described psychologically, the change taking place here is the change from an attitude hostile to the father, to an attitude passively and masochistically docile, and finally to that of the infant loved by its mother. If this development took place in an individual, it would indicate a psychic illness. It takes place over a period of centuries, however, and affects not the entire psychic structure of individuals but only a segment common to all; it is an expression not of pathological disturbance but, rather, of adjustment to the given social situation. For the masses who retained a remnant of hope for the overthrow of the rulers, the early Christian fantasy was suitable and satisfying, as was Catholic dogma for the masses of the Middle Ages. The cause for the development lies in the change in the socio-economic situation or in the retrogression of productive forces and their social consequences. The ideologists of the dominant classes strengthened and accelerated this development by suggesting symbolic satisfactions to the masses, guiding their aggression into socially harmless channels. Catholicism signified the disguised return to the religion of the Great Mother who had been defeated by Jahwe. Only Protestantism turned back to the father-god. It stands at the beginning of a social epoch that permits an active attitude on the part of the masses in contrast to the passively infantile attitude of the Middle Ages." (pg. 81-82)

- Chapter 2 - The Present Human Condition (pg. 83)
  - "The danger of an all-destructive war hangs over humanity…" (pg. 83)
  - "Man's character has been moulded by the demands of the world he has built with his own hands. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the social character of the middle class showed strong exploitative and hoarding traits. This character was determined by the desire to exploit others and to save one's own earnings to make further profit from them. **In the twentieth century, man's character orientation shows considerable passivity and an identification with the values of the market.** Contemporary man is certainly passive in most of his leisure time. **He is the eternal consumer;** he "takes in" drink, food, cigarettes, lectures, sights, books, movies; all are consumed, swallowed. The world is one great object for his appetite, a big bottle, a big apple, a big breast. Man has become the suckler, the eternally expectant - and the eternally disappointed. In so far as modern man is not the consumer, he is the trader. Our economic system is centered in the function of the market as determining the value of all commodities and as the regulator of each one's share in the social product. Neither force nor tradition, as in previous periods of history, nor fraud nor trickery govern man's economic activities. He is free to produce and to sell; market day is judgment day for the success of his efforts. Not only commodities are offered and sold on the market; labour has become a commodity sold on the labour market under the same conditions of fair competition. But the market system has reached out further than the economic sphere of commodities and labour. Man has transformed himself into a commodity, and experiences his life as capital to be invested profitably; if he succeeds in this he is "successful" and his life has meaning; if not, "he is a failure". His "value" lies in his sale-ability, not in his human qualities of love and reason nor in his artistic capacities. Hence his sense of his own value depends on extraneous factors - his success, the judgment of others. Hence he is dependent on these others, and his security lies in conformity, in never being more than two feet away from the herd." (pg. 84-85)
  - "Man's social feelings are projected into the state. As a citizen he is willing even to give his life for his fellow men; as a private individual he is governed by egotistical concern with himself. Because he has made the state the embodiment of his own social feelings, he worships it and its symbols. He projects his sense of power, wisdom, and courage into his leaders, and he worships these leaders as his idols." (pg. 86)
  - "In the nineteenth century the problem was that God is dead; **in the twentieth century the problem is that man is dead**. In the nineteenth century inhumanity meant cruelty; **in the twentieth century it means schizoid self-alienation**. The danger of the past was that men became slaves. The danger of the future is that men may become robots. True enough, robots do not rebel. But given man's nature, robots cannot live and remain sane; they become "Golems"; they will destroy their world and themselves because they will be able to stand no longer the boredom of a meaningless life." (pg. 88)
  - "Just as primitive man was helpless before the natural forces, so modern man is helpless before the social and economic forces he himself has created. He worships the works of his own hands, bowing to the new idols, yet swearing by the God who commanded him to destroy all idols. Man can protect himself from the consequences of his own madness only by creating a sane society which conforms to the needs of man, needs which are rooted in the very conditions of his existence. A society in which man relates to man lovingly, in which he is rooted in bonds of brotherliness and solidarity rather than in the ties of blood and soil; a society which gives him the possibility of transcending nature by creating rather than by destroying, in which everyone gains a sense of self by experiencing himself as the subject of his powers rather than by conformity, in which a system of orientation and devotion exists without requiring him to distort reality and to worship idols." (pg. 90)
- Chapter 3 - Sex and Character (pg. 92)
  - See text
- Chapter 4 - Psychoanalysis - Science or Party Line? (pg. 110)
  - "I believe that, if psychoanalysis is to follow and develop the basic discoveries of Freud, it must revise from the standpoint of humanistic and dialectic thinking many of his theories conceived in the spirit of nineteenth-century physiological materialism. Such a translation of Freud into a new key must be based on a dynamic view of man rooted in insights into the specific conditions of human existence. The humanistic aims of Freud, transcending illness and therapy, may then find a new and more adequate expression - but only if psychoanalysis ceases to be governed by a sterile bureaucracy and regains its original daring in the search for truth." (pg. 121)
- Chapter 5 - The Revolutionary Character (pg. 122)
  - "The question was whether they would fight for their ideas in the event that it came to a fight. The premise was that it is one thing to have an opinion and another to have a conviction. Or, to put it differently, anyone can acquire an opinion, just as one can learn a foreign language or a foreign custom, but only those opinions which are rooted in the character structure of a person, behind which there is the energy contained in his character - only those opinions become convictions. The effect of ideas, while these are easy to accept if the majority proclaims them, depends to a large extent on the character structure of a person in a critical situation. **Character**, as Heraclitus said and Freud demonstrated, **is that fate of man. The character structure decides what kind of an idea a man will choose and also decides the force of the idea he has chosen**. This is, indeed, the great importance in Freud's concept of character-that it transcends the traditional concept of behaviour and speaks of that behaviour which is dynamically charged, so that a man not only thinks in certain ways, but his very thought is rooted in his inclinations and emotions." (pg. 123)
    - "For our purpose now it may suffice to say that **the authoritarian character structure is the character structure of a person whose sense of strength and identity is based on a symbiotic subordination to authorities, and at the same time a symbiotic domination of those submitted to his authority. That is to say, the authoritarian character feels himself strong when he can submit and be part of an authority which** (to some extent backed by reality), **is inflated, is deified, and when at the same time he can inflate himself by incorporating those subject to his**

authority. This is a state of sado-masochistic symbiosis which gives him a sense of strength and a sense of identity. By being part of the "big" (whatever it is), he becomes big; if he were alone, by himself, he would shrink to nothing. For this very reason a threat to authority and a threat to his authoritarian structure is for the authoritarian character a threat to himself—a threat to his sanity. Hence he is forced to fight against this threat to authoritarianism as he would fight against a threat to his life or to his sanity." (pg. 124)

- "I think one can describe the fanatic clinically as a person who is exceedingly narcissistic - in fact, a person who is close to psychosis (depression or melancholia, often blended with paranoid trends); a person who is completely unrelated, as any psychotic person is, to the world outside. But the fanatic has found a solution which saves him from manifest psychosis. He has chosen a cause, whatever it may be - political, religious or any other - and he has deified this cause. He has made this cause an idol. In this manner, by complete submission to his idol, he receives a passionate sense of life, a meaning of life; for in his submission he identifies himself with the idol, which he has inflated and made into an absolute." (pg. 126)

- "**The most fundamental characteristic of the "revolutionary character" is that he is independent—that he is free.** It is easy to see that independence is the opposite of symbiotic attachment to the powerful ones above, and to the powerless ones below, as I previously described in speaking about the authoritarian character." (pg. 128)
  - "Independence and freedom are the realization of individuality, not only emancipation from coercion nor freedom in commercial matters. The problem of each individual is precisely that of the level of freedom he has reached. The fully awakened, productive man is a free man because he can live authentically—his own self being the source of his life." (pg. 131)
- "The revolutionary character is the one who is identified with humanity and therefore transcends the narrow limits of his own society, and who is able, because of this, to criticize his or any other society from the standpoint of reason and humanity. He is not caught in the parochial worship of that culture which he happens to be born in, which is nothing but an accident of time and geography. He is able to look at his environment with the open eyes of a man who is awake and who finds his criteria of judging the accidental in that which is not accidental (reason), in the norms which exist in and for the human race. The revolutionary character is identified with humanity. He has also a deep "reverence for life", to use Albert Schweitzer's term, a deep affinity with and love for life." (pg. 132)
  - "Disobedience is a dialectical concept, because actually every act of disobedience is an act of obedience, and every act of obedience is an act of disobedience. What do I mean by this? Every act of disobedience, unless it is empty rebelliousness, is obedience to another principle." (pg. 135-136)
- "To sum up: by "revolutionary character" I refer not to a behavioural concept, but to a dynamic concept. One is not a "revolutionary" in this characterological sense because he utters revolutionary phrases, nor because he participates in a revolution. The revolutionary, in this sense, is the man who has emancipated himself from the ties of blood and soil, from his mother and his father, from special loyalties to State, class, race, party or religion. The revolutionary character is a humanist in the sense that he experiences in himself all of humanity, and that nothing human is alien to him. He loves and respects life. He is a sceptic and a man of faith. He is a sceptic because he suspects ideologies as covering up undesirable realities. He is a man of faith because he believes in that which potentially exists, although it has not yet been born. He can say "No" and be disobedient, precisely because he can say "Yes" and obey those principles which are genuinely his own. He is not half asleep, but fully awake to the personal and social realities around him. He is independent, what he is he owes to his own effort; he is free and not a servant to anyone." (pg. 138)
  - "My assertion is that the sane person in an insane world, the fully developed human being in a crippled world, the fully awake person in a half asleep world—is precisely the revolutionary character. Once all are awake, there need no longer be any prophets or revolutionary characters—there will be only fully developed human beings." (pg. 138-139)

- Chapter 6 - Medicine and the Ethical Problem of Modern Man (pg. 140)
  - "**Authoritarian conscience, or superego, is the internalized power of the father**, **originally; later it is the internalized authority of society.** Instead of being afraid of father punishing me, I have internalized father's commands so that I do not have to wait for the terrible experience; I hear father's voice within me and I do not risk any unpleasant event. I am warned before-hand because father is in me. This concept of the internalized authority of father and of society is valid for what many people call their conscience. Freud's explanation of the psychological mechanism, I think, is most ingenious and very true. The question arises, however: is that all, or is there another conscience that is quite different? Now, **the second type of conscience, which is not internalized authority, I called humanistic conscience, referring to the philosophic or religious humanistic tradition. This conscience is an inner voice that calls us back to ourselve**s. By this "ourselves" is meant the human core common to all men, that is, certain basic characteristics of man which cannot be violated or negated without serious consequences." (pg. 141-142)
  - "The main ethical problems, the main sins of the nineteenth century, I believe, can be listed as follows: First, exploitation—one man was another man's food. Whether this exploitation referred to the worker, to the peasant, or to the Negro in the Congo or in the southern United States, one man used another man for food—not exactly cannibalistically, for he had better food-but he used another man's life energy to feed himself. The second moral problem of the nineteenth century was authoritarianism— men in power felt that by virtue of their power they had the right to command and to restrict other men. That was the authority of the father over his children, so beautifully described in Butler's Way of All Flesh; the authority of men over women; the authority of bosses over workers; and the authority of states over other states, especially over those whose inhabitants were of a different colour. The third problem was inequality. It was considered right that people on this globe and even within the same nation lived under material circumstances of utter inequality—that the sexes were not equal; that races were not equal, in spite of lip service to Christianity, which in its essence is a universal religion predicated on the concept that we all are the children of God. Another vice of the nineteenth century, especially of the middle class, was stinginess, hoarding, saving of feelings and of things. Closely related to this hoarding attitude was an egotistic individualism: "My home is my castle"; "My property is me."" (pg. 145-146)
  - "I believe that the statement, "Man is not a thing", is the central topic of the ethical problem of modern man. Man is not a thing, and if you try to transform him into a thing, you damage him. Or, to quote Simone Weil: "Power is the capacity of transforming a man into a thing because you transform a living being into a corpse." A corpse is a thing. Man is not. Ultimate power-the power to destroy—is exactly the ultimate power of transforming life into a thing. Man cannot be taken apart and put together again; a thing can be. A thing is predictable; man is not. A thing cannot create. Man can. A thing has no self. Man has." (pg. 151)
    - "The problem the psychiatrist and the psychoanalyst are concerned with, however, the problem we should all be concerned with—to understand our neighbour and ourselves—is to understand a human being who is not a thing. And the process of this understanding cannot be accomplished by the same method by which knowledge in the natural sciences can be accomplished. The knowledge of man is possible only in the process of relating ourselves to him. Only if I relate myself to the man whom I want to know, only in the process of relating ourselves to another human being, can we really know something about each other." (pg. 152)
  - "What, then, are the ethical demands of our day? First of all, to overcome this "thingness" —or, to use a technical term, the "reification" of man; to overcome the concept of ourselves and others as things; to overcome our indifference, our alienation from others, from nature and from ourselves. Second, to arrive again at a new sense of "I-ness", of self, of an experience of "I am", rather than succumb to the automaton feeling in which we have the illusion that "I think what I think" , when actually I do not think at all but am rather like someone who puts on a record and thinks that he plays the music of the record. Another aim could be formulated as that of becoming creative. What is creativity? It could mean the ability to create paintings, novels, pictures, works of art, ideas. Of course, that is a matter of learning and of environment, and, I would think, also, of genes; but there is another

creativity which is an attitude, a condition behind all creativity in the first sense. Whereas this first kind of creativity is the ability to transmit the creative experience into the material plane, into the creation of something which can be expressed on canvas or otherwise, creativity in the second sense refers to an attitude that can be defined simply: to be aware and to respond." (pg. 153)

- "This ability to be aware of a reality of a person, of a tree, of anything, and to respond to that reality, is the essence of creativity. I believe that it is one of the ethical problems of our time to educate men and women and ourselves to be aware and to respond. Another aspect of this is the ability to see; to see man in the act of relatedness, rather than to see him as an object. To put it differently, we must lay the foundations for a new science of man in which man is understood not only with the method of natural science, which is proper in its place and proper also for many fields of anthropology and psychology, but also in the act of love, in the act of empathy, in the act of seeing him man-to-man. Overriding all these aims is to put man back into the saddle, of returning means to means and ends to ends, and to recognize that our achievements in the world of intellect and of material production make sense only if they are means to one end: the full birth of man, as he becomes fully himself, fully human." (pg. 154-155)

- Chapter 7 - On the Limitations and Dangers of Psychology (pg. 157)
  - "Undoubtedly the desire to know our fellow men and ourselves corresponds to a deep need in human beings. Man lives within a social context. He needs to be related to his fellow man lest he become insane. Man is endowed with reason and imagination. His fellow man and he himself constitute a problem which he cannot help trying to solve, a secret which he must try to discover." (pg. 159)
  - "In short, psychology tries to give a rational account of the innermost core of an individual soul. But complete rational knowledge is possible only of things; things can be dissected without being destroyed, they can be manipulated without damage to their very nature, they can be reproduced. Man is not a thing; he cannot be dissected without being destroyed, he cannot be manipulated without being harmed, and he cannot be reproduced artificially. While life in its biological aspects is a miracle and a secret, man in his human aspects is an unfathomable secret to himself and to his fellow men. We know our fellow man and ourselves, yet we do not know either him or ourselves—because we are not a thing, and our fellow man is not a thing. The further we reach into the depth of our own being or someone else's being, the more the goal of full knowledge eludes us. Yet we cannot help desiring to penetrate into the secret of man's soul, into the nucleus which is "he"." (pg. 159-160)
    - "...to know ourselves means to overcome the illusions we have about ourselves; to know our neighbour means to overcome the "parataxic distortions" (transference) we have about him. We all suffer, in varying degrees, from illusions about ourselves. We are enmeshed in phantasies of our omniscience and omnipotence which were experienced as quite real when we were children; we rationalize our bad motivations as being born of benevolence, duty, or necessity; we rationalize our weakness and fear as being in the service of good causes, our unrelatedness as resulting from the unresponsiveness of others. With our fellow man we distort and rationalize just as much, except that usually we do so in the opposite direction. Our lack of love makes him appear as hostile when he is merely shy; our submissiveness transforms him into a dominating ogre when he is simply asserting himself; our fear of spontaneity makes him out to be childish when he is really childlike and spontaneous. To know more about ourselves means to do away with the many veils that hide us and our neighbour from our view. One veil after another is lifted, one distortion after another dispelled. Psychology can show us what man is not. It cannot tell us what man, each one of us, is. The soul of man, the unique core of each individual, can never be grasped and described adequately. It can be "known" only inasmuch as it is not misconceived. The legitimate aim of psychology thus is the negative, the removal of distortions and illusions, not the positive, the full and complete knowledge of a human being." (pg. 160)
  - "Stating the limitations of psychology is to point to the danger resulting from ignoring these limitations. Modern man is lonely, frightened, and little capable of love. He wants to be close to his neighbour, yet he is too unrelated and distant to be able to be dose. His marginal bonds to his neighbour are manifold and easily kept up, but a "central relatedness", that from core to core, hardly exists. In search of closeness he wants knowledge; and in search of knowledge he finds psychology. Psychology becomes a substitute for love, for intimacy, for union with others and oneself; it becomes the refuge for the lonely, alienated man, rather than a step toward the act of union. This function of psychology as a surrogate becomes apparent in the phenomenon of the popularity of psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis can be most helpful in undoing the parataxic distortions within ourselves and about our fellow man. It can undo one illusion after another, and thus free the way to the decisive act which we alone can perform: the "courage to be", the jump, the act of ultimate commitment. **Man, after his physical birth, has to undergo a continuous process of birth.** Emerging from mother's womb is the first stage of birth; from her breast is the second; from her arm, the third. From here on, the process of birth can stop; the person may develop into a socially adjusted and useful person and yet remain stillborn in a spiritual sense. If he is to develop into what he potentially is as a human being, he must continue to be born; that is, he must continue to dissolve the primary ties to soil and blood. He must proceed from one act of separation to the next. He must give up certainty and defences, and take the jump into the act of commitment, concern, and love." (pg. 163)
  - "If psychoanalysis is to fulfil its real possibilities, the analyst must overcome his own alienation, must be capable of relating himself to the patient from core to core, and in this relatedness to open the path for the patient's spontaneous experience and thus for the "understanding" of himself. He must not look on the patient as an object, or even only be a "participant observer"; he must become one with him and at the same time retain his separateness and objectivity, so that he can formulate what he experiences in this act of oneness. The final understanding cannot be expressed fully in words; it is not an "interpretation" which describes the patient as an object with its various defects, and their genesis, but it is a global, intuitive grasp; it takes place first in the analyst and then, if the analysis is to be successful, in the patient. This grasp is sudden; it is an intuitive act which can be prepared by many cerebral insights but can never be replaced by them. If psychoanalysis is to develop in this direction, it has, still, unexhausted possibilities for human transformation and spiritual change. If it remains enmeshed in the socially patterned defect of alienation, it may remedy this or that defect, but it will become another tool for making man more automatized and more adjusted to an alienated society." (pg. 164-165)
- Chapter 8 - The Prophetic Concept of Peace (pg. 166)
  - "Man has to experience himself as a stranger in the world, as estranged from himself and from nature, in order to be able to become one again with himself, with his fellow man, and with nature. He has to experience the split between himself as subject and the world as object as the condition for overcoming this very split. His first sin, disobedience, is the first act of freedom; it is the beginning of human history. It is in history that man develops, evolves, emerges. He develops his reason and his capacity to love. He creates himself in the historical process which began with his first act of freedom, which was the freedom to disobey, to say no." (pg. 167)
  - "Peace, in the prophetic vision, is one aspect of the Messianic time; when man has overcome the split that separates him from his fellow men and from nature, then he is indeed at peace with those from whom he was separated. In order to have peace man must find "atonement"; peace is the result of a transformation of man in which union has replaced alienation. Thus the idea of peace, in the prophetic view, cannot be separated from the idea of man's realization of his humanity. Peace is more than a condition of no war; it is harmony and union between men; it is the overcoming of separateness and alienation. The prophetic concept of peace transcends the realm of human relations; the new harmony is also one between man and nature. Peace between man and nature is harmony between man and nature. Man and nature are no longer split; man is not threatened by nature and determined to dominate it: he becomes natural, and nature becomes human. He and nature cease to be opponents and become one. Man is at home in the natural world, and nature becomes part of the human world. This is peace in the prophetic sense." (pg. 171)

d. Further Readings:

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