

Hegel's Ontology and the Theory of Historicity, by H. Marcuse

a. People / Organizations: https://monoskop.org/images/9/9e/Marcuse_Herbert_Hegels_Ontology_and_Theory_of_Historicity.pdf

b. Quotes:

c. General Notes:

- Translator's Introduction, by S. Benhabib (pg. vii)
 - "The philosopher of 1933-34 cannot be completely different than the one before 1933, and this can even be less so, since you have philosophically justified, and expressed your enthusiastic support for the Nazi state and for the Fuhrer" - Marcuse to Heidegger (pg. xi)
 - "This lack of explicit reference to Marx and to historical materialism distinguishes Hegel's Ontology from Marcuse's other writings of this period, which seek a synthesis between Heideggerian existential phenomenology and Marxist theory. This may also be why, with few exceptions, Hegel's Ontology has been by and large ignored in the literature on Marcuse and Critical Theory, and why commentators have chosen to focus on other more accessible essays of this period" (pg. xii)
 - "On the one hand, he criticizes the lack of rigor and sloppiness in the usage of "dialectic" in contemporary philosophy; on the other hand, he argues against vulgar materialist interpretations of Marxism that seek to purge it of its dialectical-Hegelian elements. Such misuses of the dialectic often result in historical mindlessness and fatalism." (pg. xiii)
 - "Marcuse's guiding aim in this period is "coming to one's senses about the origin of dialectics" in a manner that is both philosophically rigorous and politically desirable." (pg. xiv)
 - "Life, as Marcuse interprets Dilthey, means neither a stage of nature nor the opposite of Spirit, logos, or reason, but **the "way in which certain 'facts' exist and are given amidst the totality of the given world (thus also in nature)."** In order to understand the mode of existence of these "facts," one must refer them back to a consciousness that is itself "understandable" [verstehbar], and which experiences [erleben] an "inner world" of meanings as opposed to the "external" and "mute" [stumm] one of causal relations. **These facts exist within a network of effective relations** [ein Wirkungszusammenhang] **constituted by meaning contexts** [Bedeutung]. **The totality of effective relations, of meaning contexts, within which facts exist is history.** "Historicity" designates the mode in which these effective relations become embodied in objectifications [Objektivationen] of Life such as social and cultural institutions and practices, objects and artifacts, states and constitutions, juridical and economic systems, artistic and cultural creations. All these objectifications emerge out of Life and form clusters of meaning, the emergence, development, and passing away of which is history" (pg. xvi-xvii)
 - "According to Marcuse, for Dilthey philosophy is the permanently renewed human attempt at "coming to one's senses" [Selbstbesinnung] about one's historical situation in the world. By "situation" is meant the totality of lived relations and attitudes, while "coming to one's senses" is understood as a mode of being, acting, and becoming grounded in the possibilities and necessities of such a situation" (pg. xvii)
 - "In his first published writings, such as the "Difference between Fichte's and Schelling's Systems of Philosophy" and "Faith and Knowledge," **Hegel defines the task of philosophy as the overcoming of the "bifurcation" [Entzweiung] characteristic of Life and philosophy in the modern period. The oppositions of subject and object, self and world, reason and sensibility, for-itselfness and in-itselfness, knowledge and faith, must be overcome, and philosophy must reveal their unity.** This unity, however, cannot be regained by some dogmatic metaphysics that falls behind the achievements of Kantian critical philosophy. Rather, **one must show the common ground from which these oppositions proceed and in which alone they can subsist.** This is the self-producing and self-sustaining totality of beings out of which alone subjectivity and objectivity, in-itselfness and for-itselfness, can first issue. As opposed to the world of Verstand, which consists of fixed opposites, the totality is only disclosed to Vernunft, to reason" (pg. xxii)
 - "Hegel defines the meaning of Being as "unity," and he views both the lowest and the highest forms of being, a stone as well as the Absolute Idea, as forms of unity, between in-itselfness and for-itselfness - **more precisely, in the case of inanimate beings, as a unity between their in-itselfness and their being-there [Dasein]. Such unity is processual;** it is not given and fixed but is attained and sustained through the motility [Bewegtheit] characteristic of each being. Such motility is intrinsic to beings themselves, for all being contains difference within itself" (pg. xxii)
 - "Essence is disclosed when beings retreat from their present back into themselves; essence is the sphere of "mediation" wherein beings show their existence to be but a "presupposition" [Voraussetzung] that needs repositing" (pg. xxiii)
 - "By grasping being as actuality, as a structure of activity having the power to effectuate itself, to bring itself about, Hegel goes back to Aristotelian ontology and to the Aristotelian category of energeia. The categories of mediation, presupposition, and repositing show the historicity intrinsic to all beings in Hegelian ontology, while **the category of actuality shows how Life and its reality guide Hegel's understanding of being as a form equality-with-self-in-otherness**" (pg. xxiii)
 - ◆ "In the *Logic* Life is treated as the first form of the "Idea," which has not yet reached truth and freedom. Only conceptual thought can realize this highest meaning of being as equality-with-self-in-otherness. Only in the communion of the Absolute Idea with itself, of thought thinking itself, can the true form of the latter be attained." (pg. xxiii)
 - ◆ "Although he has oriented his entire definition of Being toward the phenomenon of Life, he also argues that only cognition and conceptual thought actualize the highest meaning of unifying unity." (pg. xxiii)
 - "Life is that form of being that can only sustain itself by initiating difference, by externalizing itself, and by reabsorbing such difference and externality once more into its unity. Activity is thus central to the mode of being of Life, and it is on account of such activity that Life always unfolds in a "world." An active being changes the externality in which it finds itself in a manner appropriate to its life-form, makes it its own, animates it [verlebendigen]. Desire and labor, therefore, are categories of Life; they describe the activities of a self-conscious being who is also alive." (pg. xxiii-xxiv)
 - "Spirit for Hegel necessarily has a "we-like" [wirhaftige] character, and because Life is the ground from which Spirit emerges, Spirit also unfolds in a "world," transformed by desire and labor, and possessing a "we-like" character. The world of Spirit reveals what Spirit is, namely a process of self-externalizing letting-go [geschehen lassen]. It is through this process that Spirit displays itself and attains power and freedom. Yet Hegel views this self-externalization of Spirit also as the mere "externality" of Spirit. The truth of Spirit, then, is not its externalization [Entausserung] but its inwardization [Verinnerlichung]. **Not history as it is lived through, but history as it is remembered constitutes its truth for Hegel.** Thus, when cognition is defined as an aspect of Life, then historicity follows, when Life is defined as an inadequate form of cognition, history is repressed" (pg. xxiv)
 - "This dualism in the ontological foundation influences Hegel's concept of historicity and is fully manifest in the closing sections of the Phenomenology of Spirit. Here one finds that the two tendencies - one emerging out of the Idea of Absolute Knowledge and leading to the repression of historicity, the other emerging out of the ontological concept of Life and leading to the culmination of historicity - are pushed together. Viewed from the standpoint of Absolute Knowledge, its history appears as a "sacrifice" and "externalization"; history is Spirit "emptied into time." For Absolute Spirit, however, time is necessarily negative; its fulfillment consists in its withdrawal into itself, in the inwardizing of its

- negativity. History, as a process of recollection, is the condition of the possibility of Absolute Spirit, but Absolute Spirit comes to itself only by overcoming its own condition of possibility." (pg. xxiv)
- "In defining being as a structure of equality-with-self-in-otherness Hegel makes the dimension of essence a fundamental constituent of this structure. Such equality-with-self-in-otherness can only come about insofar as beings are capable of mediating their past with their present, of defining their present in a way that opens up to their future. All forms of being, although potentially divided into mere being-thereness and intrinsic being, are not equally capable of such self-mediation and self-relation [Sich-verhalten]. Only beings capable of activity [Tun], and this means primarily living beings, can attain this mode of mediation and self-relation. Spirit, insofar as it is the universal self-consciousness of a being that is alive, is essentially temporal. Spirit does not "fall" into time, but is in time, for Life, out of which Spirit emerges, is through and through temporal." (pg. xxv)
 - "For Enlightenment thinkers, historicity was roughly equivalent to "positivity," to the mere fact that something was given in a certain way in space and time; the given as such had little to do with reason and rationality." (pg. xxvi)
 - "However, as Marcuse notes, one of Hegel's major discoveries in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is that every "given" is a "having become," that every "positivity" is the "product" of a process of negativity, of activity that brings it about. In the language of the Doctrine of Essence, the posit is always already something reposit. But if essence itself is not outside positivity, but shows itself through it as appearance, then the process of becoming of beings, their historicity, is fundamental to their rational comprehension. Reason is not ahistorical but grasps the rationality implicit in historicity. This is the conceptual transformation effected by Hegel, and clearly, even in the absence of the term "historicity," the relations between reason and history, time and the concept, Spirit and its becoming, implied by this transformation are not peripheral but central issues of Hegelian philosophy." (pg. xxvi)
 - "Nonetheless, the fact that in the present work Marcuse nowhere defines "historicity" adds to the obliqueness if not the obscurity of some of his intentions. I have suggested that there is a central ambiguity in this term that reveals Marcuse's unresolved vacillation between Dilthey and Heidegger, between a quasi-materialist, proto-Marxist reading of Dilthey's *Lebensphilosophie* and Heidegger's existential ontology. The issue can be put as follows: According to the Diltheyan reading, the term "historicity" is only meaningful when viewed in relation to Life's objectivations, but according to the Heideggerian analysis, historicity derives from temporality, from the essential being-toward-death and finitude of the individual Dasein" (pg. xxvi)
 - "Certainly what Heidegger is aiming at is avoiding placing the character of historicity on either the subject or the object pole; he is seeking to ground historicity in the temporality of Dasein, which itself can only be understood as a mode of Being-in-the-world." (pg. xxix)
 - "By not distinguishing between temporality and historicity, and within historicity between world-historical time and Dasein's own temporality; by emphasizing the worldliness of historicity; and finally by moving in unproblematic fashion from the 'I' to the 'we', from 'self-consciousness' to the 'people' [das Volk], Marcuse in the present work departs significantly from Heidegger's teaching even if the initial problem, the method, and the categorial framework used are indebted to Heidegger" (pg. xxx)
 - "...I have emphasized the relationship between Life and its objectivations as constitutive of historicity. In the case of Heidegger, as we saw, historicity was grounded in temporality, in the finitude and future-orientation of the individual Dasein. But neither objectivation nor temporality captures that dimension of human existence most closely related to the sense and structure of historicity, namely, narrativity" (pg. xxxiii)
 - "One of Marcuse's central claims concerning contemporary civilization is that the sources of disobedience and revolt dry up in a culture as the collective memory of struggles fades and historical memory, much like consumer goods, is caught in a process of planned obsolescence. This theme of collective memory, which runs through some of Marcuse's later works and was probably formulated under Walter Benjamin's influence, indicates that historicity can be understood neither solely in terms of cultural and institutional objectivations nor in terms of the care and concern of an individual finite being, but must be searched for as well in those shared, communicative, and narrative webs that make up the structure of our lifeworld. In this sense, the present work should not be considered Marcuse's last word on the problem of historicity, a problem that recurs throughout his works but is treated, in *Eros and Civilization* in particular, in the context of narrativity, culture, and collective memory." (pg. xxxiii-xxxiv)
 - Introduction: The Problem of Historicity as the Starting Point and Goal of This Work. The Purpose of the Present Interpretation (pg. 1)
 - "This work attempts to disclose and to ascertain the fundamental characteristics of historicity. Historicity is what defines history and thus distinguishes it from "nature" or from the "economy." Historicity signifies the meaning we intend when we say of something that it is "historical." Historicity signifies the meaning of this "is," namely the meaning of the Being of the historical. With respect to the historical, therefore, the problem is the manner in which it is." (pg. 1)
 - "The question is not history as a science or as the object of a science but **history as a mode of Being.**" (pg. 1)
 - "We inquire into the happening (das Geschehen) or the motility of this form of being. This line of questioning is not arbitrary: it is suggested by the very word "history" (Geschichte). What is historical (geschichtlich), happens (geschicht) in a certain a manner. History will be our problem as a process of happening and as a form of motility. **It will be argued that a specific form of motility is constitutive of the being of the historical**" (pg. 1)
 - "Hegelian ontology is the ground and basis of the theory of historicity developed by Dilthey and thereby the basis of the current tradition of philosophical questioning about historicity." (pg. 2)
 - "...a new interpretation of Hegel's Logic must be attempted, for the traditional interpretations, already widespread in the older Hegelian school, have sought the basic principles of historicity first and foremost in Hegel's *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*" (pg. 3)
 - "The purpose and questions of this work do not aim at an all-sided and complete interpretation of Hegelian logic. Rather, a certain fundamental theme in Hegel's work is traced while others are necessarily pushed to the background. **This theme concerns the unfolding of the concept of Being and the process of happening implied by it.**" (pg. 3)
 - Part 1 - Interpretation of Hegel's Logic in the Light of Its Ontological Problematic: Being as Motility (pg. 8)
 - Chapter 1 - The Analytical and Historical Problem at the Origin of Hegel's First Published Writings (pg. 9)
 - "Hegel defines bifurcation through the opposites of spirit and matter, soul and body, faith and understanding, freedom and necessity (ED, 13), being and not-being, concept and being, finitude and infinity (ED, 16)" (pg. 10)
 - **"In this condition of bifurcation human life flows in a world of rigid oppositions and limitations.** The world is a sphere of univocal and isolated determinations, each of which is cut off and shielded from the other. This is a world of total appeasement in which the "understanding" (Verstand), which Hegel here equates with "common sense," completely dominates." (pg. 10)
 - "In being such and such, it reaches over and beyond itself; it is not self-sufficient but in need of becoming complete." (pg. 11)
 - **Sartre uses this as foundation of the for-itself striving to be in-itself-for-itself (i.e., complete and sufficient)*
 - **"All "being" is a having become (Gewordensein) and a becoming (Werden) of another "being."** All being is related to an unending multiplicity of other beings through its origins, and springing forth out of its origins (entspringenlassend), it reenters a new, unending manifold." (pg. 11)
 - "The absolute is the unity and totality of Being (Sein) which encompasses each individual being (Seiende), in relation to which each being can be determined as this determinateness, and which contains all positings and juxtaposition in itself. **This unity and totality of Being, which lies at the basis of the relativity of beings, is the absolute, free from any reference or relation to another besides itself.** It is the

ground and basis of each relation; all positings and juxtapositions already taken place within its sphere; it is that out of which they spring and to which they lead back" (pg. 12)

- ◆ **"The true absolute unity**, which no longer stands over and against another and which has no other outside it, is the unity of subjectivity and objectivity or of thought and being. **It is the unity of the necessary difference...** That is to say, it appears through difference in general and in a condition of bifurcation." (pg. 18)
- ◇ **"The absolute has its opposite, its otherness, or its negativity in itself..."** (pg. 20)
 - "For this absolute can only be in that it lets this difference happen, in that it bifurcates itself, in that it posits and holds unto this opposition. At its origin, therefore, it is a faculty (ED, 35): the faculty to be its own negative and to act on its negative; for it can only be in that it first becomes objectivity and thereby appears. As this capacity, it is only capable of acting on itself: as posited (by itself), it is only a positing (of itself). Because in positing the opposite of itself, it only posits itself, and is what it can be only through this happening, in all happening it remains by itself, bound to itself via itself. This form of its being and of its motility is a fulfilled unity in a perfect sense. It is freedom and necessity at one and the same time" (pg. 21)
- Chapter 2 - The Attainment of a New Concept of Being through an Analysis of Kant's Concept of Transcendental Synthesis (pg. 22)
 - "We determined that for Hegel the task of philosophy is to attain that original totality out of which the multiplicity of encountered beings emerges and in which it is contained." (pg. 22)
 - **"The absolute is not something "beyond" being. On the contrary, as the "origin" of being it allows it to spring forth out of itself, and as the "original identity," it first gives all that is a unity over and against opposites while remaining present in all the multiplicity of being as this unity.** The absolute as totality, therefore, is not a sum total; it is not the entirety of all beings. It is what constitutes the proper being of all that is. The totality is that Being (Sein) which lies at the ground of all beings (das Seiende), which is present in them, and which gives unity to the multiplicity of all that is." (pg. 22)
 - "It is "equality-with-self that moves itself," the coming-back-to-itself from and the remaining-by-itself in otherness." (pg. 38)
- Chapter 3 - The Absolute Difference within Being: Equality-with-Self-in-Otherness. Being as Motility. (pg. 39)
 - **"The ontological concept of the absolute, understood here as the in-itself synthetic unity of a rational subjectivity, was said to constitute the ground of the multiplicity of beings as their "origin and essence" in still unclarified fashion.** Our next task is to show how beings develop out of this origin and essence in their manifold ways." (pg. 39)
 - *"The Phenomenology of Spirit* and the *Logic* provide this ontological foundation, admittedly proceeding from different assumptions and intentions" (pg. 39)
 - "Let us summarize the situation described by Hegel at this point: the leading principle governing the deduction of the manifold of beings out of the original unity of the absolute must be contained in the "pure essentiality" of beings itself and must be made intelligible in this light. The pure essentiality of beings must therefore be understood as a process of letting-spring-forth (Entspringen-lassen) of the manifold." (pg. 41)
 - **"This simple unity will then be defined as containing distinction in itself, in fact as equality-with-self-in-otherness."** (pg. 41)
 - ◆ **"Over and against the synthesizing I (self-consciousness), the synthesized manifold is essentially "negativity." The manifold is what the I is not, its "other." This synthesis thus is more a self-unification (self-mediation) with the other, a relating of the self to and a maintenance of the self qua unity in face of otherness"** (pg. 41)
 - ◇ **"...being is what it is only in being its other."** (pg. 41-42)
 - "Hegel has now defined the intrinsically synthetic character of the pure category as equality-with-self-in-otherness. **The pure category, which characterizes being in its "simple unity," carries this "absolute difference" in itself.** With this determination one reaches the highest point of Hegelian philosophy which is irrevocable. **Being has the fundamental character of being "split" into two: it is in being other, as equality-with-self in transformation. It carries its negativity within itself, and is negativity in its innermost essence. This fundamentally split and dual character of being is the ground of its motility, of its happening."** (pg. 42)
 - ◆ **and, this is the foundation of neurosis. (cf. W. Giegerich and K. Horney)*
 - "Again it is this duality within being which grounds the multiplicity of beings as various modes of Being, since these are no other than various modes of equality-with-self-in-otherness, modes, that is, through which absolute distinction is concretized, as returning back to self, but also as carrying out and fulfilling the essential duality. Precisely for this reason they are forms of motility. For the "mediation" of being with its otherness "is nothing other than the equality-with-self which generates its own motion," and precisely its "for-itselfness," its "pure negativity" vis-a-vis otherness is "its power to move itself" (PhG, 177. Emphasis added). Because all being can be itself in otherness, and through the negation of itself, it necessarily preserves and asserts itself as what it is in being-other. It is not simply and immediately that which it is. It must display, exhibit, and reveal its being in opposition to negativity" (pg. 43)
 - ◆ "This specific motion of bringing itself forth, of showing itself, constitutes the proper "actuality" of beings. **Being essentially brings itself about, it actualizes itself. This insight into the deepest truth of Being** (which as we shall show is also able to account with great precision for the concrete phenomena of beings), allows Hegel to revive the great discoveries of Aristotelian philosophy by removing the cover which tradition had spread over them. Aristotelian philosophy is set once more on its true path: proceeding from the negativity and dividedness of being as the basis of its motility, progressing until that most actual form of motility and the most actual being - noesis and noesos (Metaphysics A). **Thus the absolute difference within Being is at the same time the ground and the basis of its concretization as the self-development and reintegration (concretum) of this distinction. The development and mediation of this dualism constitute then the motility of Being as a concrete process. This is a "permanent becoming toward Being" and "aliveness"**" (pg. 43)
 - "Hegel already declares absolute difference to be the original fact about being in the sphere of immediacy. "Being" is only as being here or there, as "determined," as burdened with negation. For each determination already means a negation of "pure being" in certain respects." (pg. 45)
 - **"The unity through which we encounter each being, and on the basis of which we address it as this being, is not a "simple" unity but an intrinsically "negative one."** The absolute difference of being is concretized in a specific manner through the unity of the something. It is a unity only in juxtaposition to the manifold of "determinations" circumscribing each being at any given time and by excluding them. (The house is only a house insofar as it is this or that house, in such and such a condition, in such and such a state.) **The pure "in-itselfness" of this specific being can only be a "reality" by being negated; it is itself because it is other than mere being "in-itself," precisely because it is in "otherness."** Each specific being in merely being-there is caught in the difference between "in-itselfness" and "being-there." (pg. 45)
 - ◆ "Being-there becomes a specific something through this process of displaying and producing out of itself its own negativity, and in becoming external to itself through this negativity. What is there excludes its otherness from itself and thereby comes back to itself: **the fundamental determination of being-there is "having become"** (Gewordensein) (E, I, 179 §89). Being-there can only be "one that has become"; it is a "result" (HE, §57)." (pg. 47)
 - **"The (negative) unity of beings is one that happens or occurs. This happening, through which unity is first established, is understood as the sublation and generation of difference, as a mediation with otherness. The unity of beings is constituted through this motility which is not external and which is not caused externally. Its "ground" lies in the "negativity" proper to the Being of beings. This movement is a self-**

- movement: being moves itself and overwhelms its otherness; sublating and mediating this otherness, it seizes upon its determinations.** These determinations are not, as it were, glued unto being, as if they could casually come loose of it and change. Being exists within its determinations by mastering them. This process is carried on and kept going by means of a certain power. Something will first become what it is, a being-there, by appropriating, dominating its otherness and making itself into it. Being has thus become the "middle," carrying and sustaining within itself its own otherness and difference. The absolute difference between in-itselfness and being-there is thus unified, for in-itselfness is viewed as a self-actualizing power (dynamis as potentia). **This concept is at the center of Hegelian ontology,** and the claim that "substance is subject" is based on the concept of "potentia" or "dynamis." (pg. 47-48)
- "Essence sets free the ground on which the mediating and sublating process of the potential in-itselfness is based" (pg. 48)
 - "The genesis of the something has already shown immediate, "simple being" to be a highly complex and concrete process through which a being-there first becomes. The modality of this process provides the key to the structure of the developing entity, whose being had been characterized as a mode of "in-itselfness" (L, I, 1 02). Something is in-itself in being-there: "in-itself" it moves itself around in its otherness. To use that highly plastic expression of the Encyclopedia, it has an "extended field of being" in which it relates itself to others and thereby limits itself (HE, 59; E, I, 180 §91). Even the most immediate being possesses, therefore, a certain potency. **Something is not merely there. It determines itself to be there**" (pg. 48)
 - ◆ **this is a critical assumption...that 'unfolding' of entity constitutes the 'structure' of entity.*
 - **"We can understand being concretely when we view it as a process in and external to itself, as "mediating itself," as a self-becoming.** But such a process is most adequate to a subject in a dual sense: first, because in the course of this movement of determinate being-there something preserves itself as the same; and second, this same being relates itself toward another and is thus "in-itself." (pg. 48)
 - Chapter 4 - Motility as Change: The Finitude of Beings (pg. 50)
 - **"Hegel has defined the mode of being-there of the immediate something as "in-itselfness" and has conceptualized this in-itselfness, in its proper potency, as a mode of subjecthood."** (pg. 50)
 - **Precisely because of its powerlessness immediate being is at the mercy of the motility of its being: it can neither sustain itself in the course of this movement nor can it keep it within its bounds** (ansich halten). Its in-itselfness changes with every determinateness (Bestimmtheit) that impinges upon it. With each determinateness this in-itselfness is sublating and becomes another in-itselfness, another something" (pg. 50-51)
 - "We know now that **the being of something is characterized by the dualism of in-itselfness and being-other** (Anderssein). This being-other will now be characterized more precisely as "being-for-another" (Sein-fur-Anderes). This characterization has the purpose of including change as a constitutive aspect of the Being of immediate beings. Being-other reaches the very in-itselfness of beings. Beings refer to another out of their very self, and fulfill their in-itselfness in the relatedness (Beziehung) to another - being is for-another. At the same time, as we will see later, being will become an other. It will go over into the other." (pg. 51)
 - "If being-other belongs to the in-itselfness of beings, if the latter sustains itself and keeps to itself precisely in its being other, this means that ontologically each being is also "being-for-another." Thus the absolute difference of being leads beyond the seemingly self-enclosed immediate unity of each into "connections" with other beings, which then belong to the in-itselfness of beings. This ontologically appropriate (Seinmassig) interconnectedness of all beings constitutes their concrete multiplicity in the sphere of immediate existence (Dasein). Something and another thing are not juxtaposed to one another: **"Their truth is their relatedness; being-for-another and being-in-itself are therefore ... posited as moments of one and the same,** as determinations (Bestimmungen), which are relations, and which remain in their unity, in the unity of immediate existence (Dasein)" (L, I, 106. Emphasis added)." (pg. 52)
 - "In becoming other the in-itselfness proves itself not to be neutral. It is not a medium which absorbs all otherness into itself; rather it is a unit allowing only specific possibilities to occur. In all its becoming-other, being conforms to this constitution which is its "determination." This remaining-inconformity-with is the mode in which being remains by itself. This is its unity. This remaining-in-conformity-with expresses itself in the being of something once more as the "beginnings" of a power over and against becoming-other, and thus reveals this to be powerlessness. That something does not change itself, but that it becomes another (a being, a something) is grounded in this powerlessness. Immediate being acquires a determination only in that it goes over into another. It reaches the "fullness" of its being first in this going-over." (pg. 52-53)
 - ◆ **be careful with how you interpret this 'conforming' nature.*
 - "It is not at all a happening to and from. It is a pure happening in-itself, immanent to beings themselves. The finite being does not have a history; it is history. The history of humans is only a specific mode of this universal process and is to be understood only in unity with it." (pg. 55)
 - Chapter 5 - Finitude as Infinity. Infinity as Characteristic of Motility (pg. 57)
 - **"The finite being stands under the imperative of sending-itself-beyond-itself; it ought to become another, but thereby it will first become itself"** (pg. 57)
 - "The finite being exists qua being-beyond itself, qua the other of itself. The being of the finite is to pass away (perish)." (pg. 58)
 - ◆ **"...finite being does not disappear; it does not become nothing, rather through this passing away it comes back to itself!** This passing away is its own Being. Of course, the individual, fixed being, considered in isolation, perishes, but the individuality of the being here and now, determined to be such and such, is not finite being at all. The latter becomes what it is through the ontologically appropriate relation to its other, through the concrete emergence of being-for-another." (pg. 58)
 - **"What "passes away" is at the same time only an isolated and fixed condition,** removed from the context of the happening of beings. That specific "something" (the specific condition of an existing stone or plant) passes away, but not beings themselves. These are always more than what they are at any point: **that other into which being has gone over, into which it has passed away also belongs to this potency, to this "more."** Beings do not disappear; even when they are completely destroyed, this destruction is grounded in the potency or impotence of their being. Destruction is a positive occurrence: through it a possibility of being becomes actual; in it beings fulfill their "determination." (pg. 59)
 - **"The finite carries its own infinity in itself, as the infinity of its own happening"** (pg. 60)
 - **"Beings are finite; the Being of finite beings is motility. In this movement of perishing, each being returns back to itself and is fulfilled only through it.** Qua the Being of finite beings, motility therefore is always a return to self, a relation to self, and thus has the character of infinity." (pg. 60)
 - "The category of for-itselfness is perhaps the most comprehensive one in Hegelian ontology. It means both the most abstract, general, and the most concrete and actual mode of being" (pg. 61)
 - "From this general determination of for-itselfness it follows that **the unity of beings in the mode of for-itselfness is not a fixed one and at rest but one that is self-moved. It is "relation"** (Beziehung) (L, I, 14 7). Indeed, it is the built-in and self-canceling relation of being-other, and of the other to the self-changing being. Such a relation is only possible when the other is given to each being as an other, so that it can sublimate the other, "push it away," and can remove and "abstract" itself from its other (L, I, 148). The unity characteristic of for-itselfness is essentially one of "self-relating" (Sich-verhalten), and indeed a relating in the most striking sense of "being-reflected-to-self" (Insich-reflektiertseins) (L, I, 148). **Each being remains for-itself in this movement of becoming an other, in that it relates (verhiilt) itself to**

- others but remains self-same (ver-hiilt). It bends itself back in to itself out of the given multiplicity facing it, in such a way that it does not lose itself in this movement, does not go beyond itself but remains precisely by itself. This "relation to self" presented by for-itselfness must be understood in a such broad sense that it can be extended to all forms of reflected self-relation, from the most immediate one of the empty *atomon hen* to the most free movement of comprehension. The actual capacity of beings to be as subjects will develop itself through this relating, as already anticipated in the discussion of the unity constitutive of being qua something." (pg. 62)
- Chapter 6 - The Emergence of a New Dimension of Being and Motility: The "Recollection"* of Immediate Beings as "Essence" (pg. 65)
 - "Negativity and motility are the central determinations which the "Doctrine of Being" as immediacy has arrived at. Both constitute a structural unity: negativity is the ground of the motility of beings, and this negativity exists only as motility. The structural unity of being can now be grasped more concretely." (pg. 67)
 - "The Being of beings as simple thereness (Da-Sein) and as immediacy amounts exactly to this: **they nonetheless are through the fact that they negate every determinateness in which they find themselves; beings are irreconciled with themselves, they are self-repulsive; they move forward but throughout they remain themselves. Beings are nothing other than the presence, carrying out, and occurrence of this conflict**" (pg. 67)
 - "This "nothing," this negativity that being is, is itself never really at hand in the sphere of immediacy; it is not and can never be present, for this "nothing" is always the other of immediacy and presence. It is what being as present precisely never is, but this nothing nonetheless constitutes its being. At each moment, this "not-being," this negativity is what the immediately present being has already been." (pg. 68)
 - **this is very similar to Sartre's definition of 'for-itself'*
 - "The present (being) does not undo what has been; what has been remains in the present. But these - the present and the past - do not lie in the same dimension: "having been" constitutes its own dimension of being, and indeed when juxtaposed to the present, the actual dimension" (pg. 70)
 - Chapter 7 - The Motility of Essence in Its Two Dimensions. The "Ground" and the "Unity" of Beings (pg. 71)
 - "In the sphere of immediacy the ontological ground of all motility was the "absolute difference" of being, namely, the dualism of "in-itselfness" and "being-there," of in-itselfness and being-other. This difference now becomes more pronounced, and in the case of the motility of "essence" it is concretized as the difference and dualism between **two dimensions: having-been and presence, "essence" and being-there, "the world in-itself and the world as appearing."** Whereas the characterization of the immediate movement of "being" - being-for-another, change, perishing, passing into another- was confined to one dimension, to the immediately present being, already through the very terms which describe essential motility - reflection, seeming-in-itself (Scheinen-in-sich), appearance, and manifesting itself - its two dimensionality becomes visible. Through this two dimensionality this movement comes to constitute the essential ground and unity of beings." (pg. 71)
 - "Let us briefly summarize here the principal determinations of "ground" which Hegel deduces from this: the fundamental characteristic common to them all is that ground is immanent in beings themselves, when the latter exist no longer as immediate being-there, but rather as essentially self-moved and self-contained beings, as "the thing-itself." The second mutual characteristic is that the being of the ground forms the process through which the thing itself (die Sache selbst) unfolds. **Essence is the ground of beings: it is the permanent self-equating of reflection, the relation of these manifold determinations to an "essential being" (das Wesende) which remains constant through them. Essence is the allowing to happen (Geschehen-lassen) which proceeds from this "essential being" and the self-positing of that which is always posited.**" (pg. 78)
 - Chapter 8 - Being as Existence (pg. 80)
 - "Essence is a showing, revealing, and manifesting of itself" (pg. 81)
 - "The *Being* of these things that are is now fully determined as existence, while their mode is that of *appearance*" (pg. 81)
 - "In order to exist at all, that is, in order to be a being which is grounded and which is sustained throughout this grounded substantial unity, being must have already been: it must have an essence; at each moment the truth of its being lies behind it. It is always ahead of its own truth, it has always gone beyond it" (pg. 81)
 - "The ground of the thing, in turn, has gone into externality; it is itself an existent, a thing - this was the main result of the Doctrine of Essence. Each individual existing thing has the ground and basis of its existence in an other existing thing; not a single one of them is self-subsistent - precisely because all exist equally essentially, they exist equally unessentially." (pg. 83)
 - "That which exists is appearance, first because it is a self-showing, self-revealing, and self-manifesting only; second, because it never has its ground in itself, but as an existent has always already extricated itself from its ground. It has left it behind, in another. Qua this existent it is nothing then. This determination of existence as appearance can be understood only by taking the following into consideration: the fact that the ground has been does not mean that it has ceased to be, as if the existent which has extricated itself from the ground were an independent entity. Quite the contrary, the ground as having been is permanently present, it is "timeless" past, such that existence remains continuously determined by its having been and remains grounded. In both senses **appearance is a solely ontological character of existence**. Appearance does not signify an existent in relation to a knowing subject but the existent solely on its own basis and in its very Being..." (pg. 83-84)
 - "Here the one existent is dependent on the other not only for its immediate thereness, but in its positedness. **One existent posits another**. It does not support the other in its immediate subsistence qua this particular thereness, but in its existence proper to essence" (pg. 84)
 - "Being always occurs in a totality; it is an occurrence in a world, not, however, in the sense that being moves therein as in space, as if it had its "place" there. This totality holds and grounds being such that being can constitute its unity only in the being of the totality. **Within this totality, being is more precisely defined as a relating to (Verhalten zu) ... as relation (Verhiiltnis)**. The process of essence has already been defined as a relation taking place within each individual being. Now, as an ontological characteristic, relation leads beyond individual beings and is ascribed to the totality as a maintaining and grounding process, for totality is only a "relatedness-to-self."" (pg. 86)
 - "Essence, which appeared to have totally dissolved into the externality of the existing thing and into the nullity of appearance, **now shows itself once again in its true being as the occurrence of this relation. It is not within individual existent things, rather it occurs as the "essential relation" of things to one another**, as the Law which regulates these relations and which thereby first posits the existence of individual things. The duality of all being, determined here as the duality of essence and existence, now emerges as the duality between a "kingdom of laws" and a "world of appearance."" (pg. 86)
 - ◆ "The kingdom of laws is no other than the totality of "essential relations" within which existent things coexist together. Here as well, the duality of being signifies a concrete happening "within" the single totality. Existence occurs only in the essential relation of existents to one another" (pg. 86-87)
 - "Being as existence represents a process of essential relation in a double sense. First, it signifies the essential behavior of each individual existent throughout the factual determinacies of its thereness: how it absorbs each determinateness into the ground of its existence and how it immediately lets go of this ground. (Here only the immediate nature of this grounding process [Grundgeschehen] is decisive. On this account the entire mode of behaving [Sich-Verhalten] of the existent is immediate as well; it is only a process "in-itself," not "in-and-for-itself.") Second, this self-relating occurs only through the essential relation to other existents. Hegel defines the mode of this relation more closely as one of the whole and its parts; force and its expression; inner and outer. Each individual existent is at one and the same time itself and a part of a whole,

- the expression of force and this force itself, the outer of an inner. These relational modes are not haphazardly assembled but signify progressive stages of a formalization, of the identification of the members of the relation, which is then completed in the relation of inner and outer. "What is inner, is also at hand as outer and vice versa," "the inner and the outer are in and for themselves identical" (HE, 83 ff). The "unity of essence and existence," which completes itself in this progressive identification, is "actuality." (pg. 87-88)
- Chapter 9 - Actuality as the Fulfillment of Being (pg. 89)
 - **"Existence, as designating the Being of things which are (seienden Dinge), has proved to be a structure of relationality in a double sense:** first, as the behavior of individual existents toward every factual determinacy of their thereness (sichverhalten; self-related activity); second, as the ontologically appropriate universal interrelationship among individual existents, through which alone they are what they are. The essence of existents is contained within the process of development of this relationality. Because this process is an immediate one, existents have to be defined as "appearance," for what exists can only develop through this relation although it itself is not this relation. The process executes itself through it but is not for it. In order for appearance to become actuality, and for existents to become actual, this relation must be incorporated into their very existence. They must then let it develop out of their very own self: they must effectuate (wirken) the process. So long as this mode of being, on which all that is depends, is not arrived at, in the final analysis, being remains without essence. Its essence is intrinsic to it and is contained in it but it itself is not essential. Such being exists only as part of a whole, as the exteriority of an interior, as the expression of force, etc., and **in each case the essential being is precisely what as an existing being it immediately is not: the whole, force itself, or interiority.** There remains something that is not absorbed into and fully displayed by immediate existence, something that is merely inward, despite the fact that or precisely because of the fact that it is one that exteriorizes itself. So long as something is still exteriorized, there remains something else which has not yet exteriorized itself and which is only at the interior. And so long as something is merely at the interior, actual being has not been attained." (pg. 90-91)
 - "We meet here once more the deepest ground of Hegelian ontology on which **the entire Doctrine of Being is based. In its highest and most proper sense, being is actual being-there, being as manifest.** To be is to show, to manifest and to reveal oneself. All that is inner, that has not yet emerged and become external, is of an inferior value. All being that possesses an inner is not yet "absolute" being" (pg. 91)
 - ◆ **"Accordingly, all being is the process through which this movement between in-itselfness and being-there, essence and existence, inner and outer, possibility and actuality unfolds** (we discuss later the dualism between possibility/actuality as the central phenomenon in the sphere of actuality). For this reason alone does absolute externality, actual being-there, pure self-manifestation, display the highest mode of being, for being is never simply and immediately what it can and ought to be, but finds itself and moves itself within the difference of in-itselfness (potence) and existence. Only because being contains dynamis and energeia within itself, can it fulfill itself as pure energeia." (pg. 91-92)
 - **"When being posits its entire inwardness outside itself, it becomes actual. Force which achieves this process is a category of being itself."** (pg. 92)
 - "Actuality is simply being-there, being-at-hand, being-present; yet at the same time it is nothing simple. All that is actual is always something more, something other than what is exactly there, at hand and present. Actuality possesses nothing merely inward. All inwardness has become manifest and is outside. The merely interior is nothing actual. Still the actual never completely pours itself out into the external. **What makes the actual actual is that it has something "in-itself" (an sich), and is "in-itself."** This in-itself is neither simply dissolvable nor transferable to the given factual condition, to the present existence of the actual. The actual can transform itself and yet remain the same. It can be destroyed, but then it is the one destroyed, and this destruction also "belongs" to it in a sense. Even when it is completely dependent on it, the actual is in active control of its mode of being-there. It does not allow no matter what to happen to it, but resists certain kinds of occurrences, while offering itself to others. What actuality "intrinsically" (an sich) is, and what is still different from each individual circumstance of its existence as well as from the totality of these circumstances, has the most prominent feature of "possibility". Actuality controls a certain horizon (Umkreis) of possible determinations, and in every case its mode of being-there realizes a certain possibility within this horizon. Hegel analyzes this dual dimension of actuality and possibility as the fundamental feature of actual being. "What is actual is possible." This is the first premise of "actuality" (L, II, 171). Actuality "immediately contains in-itselfness (Ansichsein) or possibility." At any point in time, the actual individual always exists there as one among its many possible determinations. It always exists "in the form of one of its determinations, distinguishing itself thereby as existent from in-itselfness (Ansichsein) or possibility" (L, II, 176). But it does not evaporate into its immediate determinations; it still is more than these and has other possibilities through which it can become actual." (pg. 93)
 - Chapter 10 - A Summary Characterization of Actuality as Motility (pg. 103)
 - "The basic thrust of the preceding interpretation was to demonstrate that Hegel conceptualized the Being of actuality as motility; in fact, as the highest and most real form of motility. This should not imply that actuality always finds itself in movement as if it were first there and then set itself in motion. Rather, actuality constitutes itself through a distinctive mode of motility; actuality can be only as motility" (pg. 103)
 - According to the Doctrine of Essence, the Being of beings was defined as existence, and the latter's mode as appearance in a double sense: first as self-manifestation and, second, as the appearance of an other, of an inner, of an in-itselfness. Both meanings belong together: what merely appears is still not fully and properly there, manifest, outside itself. What appears, in that it appears, points to something that appears, and which is still in the grips (begriffen) of coming outside itself, and which is grasped (begriffen) as what is still not outside. Appearance therefore is not the highest mode of being. What is there is not pure and complete; it is always something which is not there. The rupture and dualism within all being has not been completely eliminated; beings have not fully come out into thereness, into actuality. The movement of the being-there does not carry itself; its "basis" lies in another. Thus in appearance neither the complete thereness of being nor the proper movement belonging to it has been arrived at." (pg. 104)
 - "Beings, however, are dependent on such completeness and authenticity (Eigentlichkeit). Precisely their inner dualism and rupture determines their being as an ought (which is not yet actualized- Tr.). This determination which we had first confronted in relation to the genesis of the something (see p. 58 above) is now concretized. Being not only ought to go beyond its given factual thereness, but it ought to "go beyond" in general, more accurately, going beyond the given factual determination in each instance is in the final analysis no other than an exteriorization of oneself, a self-expression, a self-manifestation. Precisely because "in-itself" (in sich) being is never already there, it must at every moment bring this in-itselfness into thereness, it must bring it about. This takes place when being is simply there in all its thereness, when in every factual determinateness, its thereness is not simply something assigned to it (an attribute), such that one could still distinguish its in-itselfness from this. This happens when in its being-there being is only there as itself, when all its attributes are nothing other than "ways and modes of being" (L, II, 162). This being-there can no longer be named appearance; it is a "shining forth," a "semblance" (Scheinen, phainestai)" (pg. 104-105)
 - "The fundamental factor holding together and giving unity to the dualism of actuality (expressed by Hegel as "on the one hand" and "on the other") is "reflection-into-self." Hegel has already introduced this in the course of explaining substantiality. Substance, as the "being in all beings," is actuality as "absolute reflectedness-into-self" (L, II, 185)" (pg. 106)
 - "Self-relation or reflectedness-into-self will be characterized rightfully as the fundamental category of the Being of the actual.

Furthermore, this category is the central determination underlying Hegel's entire Logic. The Doctrines of Being and Essence, as well as the Doctrine of the Concept, will be developed on the basis of the knowledge that Being is motility and that motility is a self-relation. **Hegel's entire ontology presents nothing more than the concrete unfolding of the fundamental mode of Being as self-relation throughout the various spheres of being.**" (pg. 106-107)

- Chapter 11 - The Comprehending Being (the Concept) as True Being. Substance as Subject (pg. 111)
 - "The conclusion to be drawn from the preceding interpretation of Being as self-relation, as reflectedness-into-self, is that conceptual activity (der Begreifen) is the most authentic being as well as the realization of actuality." (pg. 111)
 - **"Objectivity is what being is in-and-for-itself and not for another"** (pg. 113)
 - Chapter 12 - The Mode of Being of the Concept: The Individuation of Universality. Judgment and Conclusion (pg. 121)
 - "The universality of the concept is thus a relation of the concept to itself; indeed, this relation is one that negates and sublates the former negation of the concept (here this means its former singularity). **The universality of the concept attains equality-with-self through the sublating unification with negativity; it is essentially a negative unity.** This equality-with-self first is in that it "posits" itself; it takes place through that process of sublating negativity. Such a unity, however, is possible only as a specific form of self-relating, namely, as being in the mode of "for-itselfness" reflected-into-self. This "for-itselfness" is self-actualizing; it is being in the mode of subjectivity and of the I. Insofar as the concept was said to constitute the Being and evolution of beings themselves (see above p. 117) the self-actualizing for-itselfness of the concept must present an "objective" process of beings" (pg. 122)
 - **"Universality is a process which individuates (vereinzelt) itself; it is 'activity.' 'creative power.'"** (pg. 123)
 - ◆ "Universality is what it is only through absolute difference." (pg. 123)
 - "Hegel's theory concerns the original division of Being into the absolute difference of in-itselfness and being-there, 'concept,' and 'being.'" This fundamental phenomenon has been a leading theme of our interpretation from the very beginning; in considering the actual theory of judgment, we can therefore restrict ourselves to what is essential for our interests." (pg. 125)
 - "Every authentic judgment attempts to express the absolute difference of being; it considers the individual existent in the light of its Being and actuality in the light of its concept. It proceeds from that originary fact of the 'inappropriateness,' 'accidentality' of an individual being in relation to its 'intrinsic being' and to its 'universal nature.' Beings can be adequate or inadequate only because Being itself is essentially a 'potence' which presents and maintains itself in the negative as power. Every true judgment is a form of 'measuring': it measures the existent in relation to its intrinsic being; it judges the fact of 'correspondence or non-correspondence' (L, II, 307), or 'appropriateness or inappropriateness' (L, II, 303); it considers being as an 'ought' that provides the measuring yard in light of which to consider beings (L, II, 302)." (pg. 127-128)
 - "The fundamental fact that **every being only is through its manifold interdependence with other beings** has been demonstrated numerous times in the Logic (see pp. 52, 102, 105). Already in the sphere of the concept, the category of "universality" pointed toward such a universal interdependence. The universality of the concept signifies equality-with-self amid the multitude of individuations. As such, it is the concrete totality: it encompasses a multiplicity, indeed the wholeness of respective individuations. Through this, every actual being stands immediately in relation to other actual beings, and in such a way that this relation constitutes at the time its Being as well as its actuality. At first this takes place through the relation of the actual to others of the same species. In virtue of his/her special relationship to humanity (the species) for example, **the human individual stands in relation to all other humans.** More precisely, the nature of this relationship is such that humanity presents itself as an "ought," as a "determination" and "purpose" needing concrete fulfillment. Every individual being finds him/herself to be adequate or inadequate to this in a special way, toward which s/he permanently moves in his/her individual existence. **The species, as the "ought," is the "element" within which individuals move themselves and through which they relate to one another.**" (pg. 131-132)
 - Chapter 13 - The Unfree Reality of the Concept: Objectivity (pg. 135)
 - See text
- ***I did not finish this text as it was merely a regurgitation of Hegel and added nearly no value.***

d. Further Readings:

- Difference between Fichte's and Schelling's Systems of Philosophy, by G. Hegel <https://ia800306.us.archive.org/17/items/g-w-f-hegel-the-difference-between-fichtes-and-schellings-system-of-philosophy/g-w-f-hegel-the-difference-between-fichtes-and-schellings-system-of-philosophy.pdf>