

The Essential Loewald, by H. Loewald

a. Quotes:

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b. General Notes:

▪ Book 1 - Papers on Psychoanalysis

○ Introduction, by J. Lear (pg. ix)

- "All of his work can be seen as a thinking-through of one idea: namely, that **the human psyche is itself a psychological achievement. The infant does not enter the world a complete psychological entity; she emerges rather out of a less differentiated field, the infant-mother matrix.**" (pg. x)
- "The ability to relate to the world is also the ability to hold oneself at some distance from it. But then we need to re-think the central tasks of the ego. For the fundamental challenge is no longer to ward off a hostile and impinging reality, it is to stay flexibly balanced." (pg. xiii)
- "Loewald treats reality as the necessary correlate of the ego - that with which the ego is in relation - and this gives him freedom to characterize different sorts of relations to different sorts of reality." (pg. xiv)
- "...psychoanalysis teaches us that truth often needs to be uncovered: we get to it via a process of overcoming surface meanings. We always live amongst possibilities of misreading. The activity of exposing them is the way to truth." (pg. xiv)
 - "For Loewald, we cannot start with the concept of objectivity, it must emerge out of love. We have to begin with a certain kind of concern for our patients and for ourselves. We want to help our patients learn the truth about themselves (in ways that are helpful to them) and we want to be honest with ourselves in the process. But we cannot know ahead of time what this means. The only way to find out what truth is is to live out our commitment to it. If we care about getting to the truth about humans, there are three fundamental features of human beings that we have to take into account. First, humans are creatures with subjectivity: there is something that it is like for us to be. If we want to capture human reality, we have to capture the nature of human subjectivity. Any observing stance that does not reveal human subjectivity will not give us the truth about human beings. That is why psycho-analysis, insofar as it is committed to revealing that truth, must be a science of subjectivity. Second, human subjectivity is partially constituted by mental functioning that is both repressed and unconscious. This requires us to devise a method that will bring that unconscious to light. From a psychoanalytic point of view, there is no way we can ignore this and remain committed to finding out the truth about human existence. The claim that there is no "empirical evidence" for the unconscious only makes sense if one starts out with a prior and independent idea of "empirical evidence." From a psychoanalytic point of view, the place to start is with certain forms of human suffering: symptoms that don't make sense in their own terms, certain forms of human irrationality. If we allow the meaning of these symptoms to unfold, we will see that we have plenty of empirical evidence for the unconscious. The idea that there is none arises from a pre-emptive linguistic imperialism. From Loewald's point of view, we learn what empirical evidence is by learning what kinds of things to look for. Third, humans have a "second nature": that is, it is their nature to enter into a cultural and ethical world, to acquire a character through nurture and education. We cannot understand human existence unless we understand what it is for them to enter ethical and cultural life. It is out of our concern for getting to the truth about human beings that our concept of objectivity must itself develop." (pg. xix-xx)
- "To get to a more adequate conception of objectivity, Loewald abandons the 19th century model and moves to a different core idea: that is, that objectivity is trying to capture the reality of an object. An object is, by its very nature, a complex and somewhat durable structure. An object is not a passing impression or a fleeting feeling. Rather, an object is something we can approach from various perspectives; it is something that we do not understand unless we understand its various aspects. An objective stance - whatever that is precisely - must capture the objectivity of the object. That is, it must be sensitive to all the aspects and complexities that this kind of object presents. Ironically and delightfully, **the paradigm for Loewald of an objective stance toward humans is that of the loving mother toward her child.** A loving mother is attuned to the child's emerging complexity. Indeed, it is precisely out of love that the mother will recognize the child as distinct from her, as having all sorts of capacities for growth, creativity, and increasing independence. Far from being cold or devoid of emotion, the objective stance toward humans must be suffused with love. **For it is out of love that we recognize and respect what is distinctive and different about another human being.** On the 19th century scientific model, we are not supposed to intrude upon the nature of that we are observing. This ideal has prompted some scientists to stand behind one-way mirrors as they observed humans. By contrast, Loewald's approach is to reinterpret the ideal of non-intrusion. **To understand human reality in all its complexity, we must be able to interact with humans. So the ideal of non-intrusiveness is reinterpreted in terms of respect and responsiveness.** The model again is that of the loving mother toward her child. Instead of standing behind a mirror, the respectful and responsive mother becomes a mirror for the child. It is in her mirroring function—giving the child back to herself—that she takes on an objective stance. Here a comparison with Lacan may be of help. Lacan emphasized the importance of the "mirror stage," but for him this involves a child coming upon a shiny surface, of seeing himself reflected in a mirror. The child, in seeing his image, goes on to fantasize that he has more unity than in fact he does. The elementary ego is formed, according to Lacan, in a misrecognition. Note that for Lacan the paradigm mirror is an inanimate object and it is ultimately deployed in the service of falsehood. Lacan and Loewald are the two psychoanalysts influenced by Heidegger - and, in fact, their theories have a lot in common. This has gone unnoticed because what they value is utterly different. **Lacan valorizes disintegration—overcoming the false unity of the ego. Loewald, by contrast, values integration, and he believes true and creative integration is possible.** A mirror for him must thus be a living and loving mirror - one which facilitates integration. A child's present reality is constituted in part by her possibilities for the future. There is no adequate view of the child's present that does not include possible futures. A mother must somehow reflect those potential futures back to the child. But a loving mother will not reflect this or that future. It is a manifestation of love that the mother will not dictate a particular direction to the child. Rather, the loving mother will reflect the child's own capacity for growth. It is through this process, carried out over a long period at various levels of complexity, that the child will acquire the capacity to choose for herself amongst her possible futures. Of course, this is a rosy picture: we are talking about the loving mother and the well-endowed child. But it is not unrealistic: it is more like a best-case scenario. A well-endowed child has the capacity to develop the capacity for a certain kind of freedom. The loving mother will see that capacity and, in her love, be responsive to it. **It is precisely this loving-responsiveness that Loewald calls "mirroring."** And it is this mirroring which not only captures the truth about the child, but facilitates the growth of the capacity. Note that in this context we can say that the mother is "neutral," even "dispassionate" or "detached," in that she does not choose any particular future for the child. This does not mean she is a "cold" mother; precisely the opposite. It should now be clear that Loewald uses the mirroring relation of mother and infant as the prototype of the analytic relationship. Obviously there are significant differences between the mother-infant and the analyst-analysand relations. What matters is, first, that all the scientific concepts of psychoanalysis—neutrality, objectivity, truth—must be understood in terms of the model of maternal mirroring. Second, the analytic situation itself must be understood as the recreation of a developmental opportunity. There is something in the person's own capacity for growth that has gotten stuck—and, in the psychoanalytically significant situation, this is because of unconscious factors, of which the analysand has little understanding or

control. In the analytic situation, the patient will begin to enact old, even archaic, ways of relating to objects. This is the transference neurosis. It is in this context that "the analyst makes himself available for the development of a new object-relationship" (pg. xxi-xxiii)

- **"what is important for Loewald is not so much the new object-relationship itself, but the development of a new potentiality: the potentiality for relating to objects in new ways. It is the emergence of such capacities that lie at the heart of human growth and development."** (pg. xxiii)
 - ◆ **"Analysis is not supposed to come from the outside:** the analyst is not an expert who imparts a new set of facts to the analysand on how to live. Rather, **analysis is an opening-up (from the inside) of the capacity to live.** This is a recreation, at a different level of complexity, of the mother-infant field from which internal development and differentiation occur. The analysand will tend to impose old ways of relating to the fundamental figures from his past. The analytic process takes up these ways of relating with the aim of reviving a developmental process." (pg. xxiii-xxiv)
 - ◇ "What this process facilitates, Loewald emphasizes, is not the discovery of new objects, but rather the new discovery of objects. That is, what matters is not that the analyst is a new object for the analysand, but that the analytic process facilitates the growth of the capacity to relate to objects in new sorts of ways. The analysand has been living on a restricted diet of possibilities. There was a fixed set of ways of relating to people that the analysand implicitly assumed were all the ways there were. In that sense, her capacity for relating to people and situations has become stunted. A capacity is a kind of potentiality for relating to objects. In seeing that this capacity has gotten stuck, the analyst sees potentiality for a new potentiality. This is very much what the mother sees in her developing child." (pg. xxiv)
- "For Loewald, it should now be clear, there can be no understanding of psychoanalysis without a concept of objectivity that is integral to it. For without it we can have no idea of a transference distortion. The idea of objectivity gives sense to what the distortion is a distortion of. And without the concept of transference distortion, we simply have no idea what we are doing. We would have no way to distinguish between interpreting the transference and imposing a particular view of our own. Thus the concept of objectivity lies at the heart of psychoanalysis." (pg. xxv)
- "For Loewald, love is grounded in instinctual life" (pg. xxvi)
 - "On the psychological conceptualization, instincts are, by their very nature, in relation to objects. Instincts are located in the infant-mother field. There can be no question of how an independent mind reaches out to objects: **mind is by its very nature in relation to objects. Instincts are the elemental psychological forces of the mind that are always already in relation to objects.**" (pg. xxvi-xxvii)
 - "What is beautiful about Eros is that it allows us to capture something peculiar about human psychological growth: that **we tend to grow by differentiation and integration.** Ever the hedgehog, Loewald always brings psychoanalysis back to the infant-mother field. Love is the force that permeates and constitutes that field. By positing Eros as a fundamental force, we expect differentiation and integration to be the natural outcome." (pg. xxvii)
- "In the Loewaldian universe, by contrast, there is first a baby-and-mother cosmos that is relatively undifferentiated. And then through the workings of love within that cosmos, an infant and mother differentiate out and together constitute a more complex world in which two more differentiated entities stand in essential relations to one another. Here we see love working as an inner principle of growth and change. For Loewald, love makes itself manifest in the ways the world itself unfolds; it cannot be an addition to the world." (pg. xxvii-xxviii)
 - **"[I]ndividuation is a lifetime process of ups and downs, backs and forths—it is a way of life—and it is characteristically undertaken in various relations with others.** I shall return to the issue of the analyst's growth. For now, the important point is that individuation, for Loewald, is the developmental outcome of a loving engagement with the world." (pg. xxviii)
- "For Loewald, the point of making our unconscious wishes, fantasies, and emotions conscious is not simply that we can think about them and decide how to live with respect to them. It is also so we can play with them." (pg. xxxii)
- **"One of the central goals of psychoanalysis, for Loewald, is to achieve a certain creative flexibility in psychological life.** One's thoughts and feelings become infused with instinctual life in ways that facilitate a creative approach to life. One feels more alive. On the other hand, one's capacity for thinking about these feelings also increases, so there is correlatively more cognitive control over the forces of life." (pg. xxxii)
- "Unconscious repetitions - in addition to being unconscious - tend to be more automatic, more driven, more rigid than their conscious counterparts." (pg. xxxiv)
 - "The aim of analysis, for Loewald as for Freud, is to transform unconscious repetition into an active and conscious form of re-membering. Memory now gets to be recognized as such." (pg. xxxv)
 - ◆ **"This is a process of accepting responsibility for one's wishes and fantasies** - an activity that needs to be distinguished from holding oneself responsible. Holding oneself responsible is essentially a superego activity. In holding oneself responsible, one takes up a third-person stance with respect to oneself, and one judges oneself blameworthy or, less often, praiseworthy. Guilt is the paradigm of holding oneself responsible. Ironically, it is often the case that precisely because we hold ourselves responsible, in the sense of unconscious guilt, we cannot acknowledge responsibility for our wishes. For the unconscious guilt functions to keep the wishes repressed. One form of responsibility-taking is in place to avoid the other form. This is the way in which repression not only inhibits certain forbidden ideas from becoming conscious, but it inhibits ego-development itself. For Loewald, psychoanalysis reveals to us a new way in which we are thrown. Heidegger introduced the concept of being thrown to capture the idea that we are born into a culture, an historical epoch, a family over which we had no choice or control. Loewald's Freud adds a new dimension: we are thrown into a set of unconscious motivations that are not fully ours. Accepting responsibility is a way of taking over our thrownness and becoming active with respect to it. I do not think it an exaggeration to say that for Loewald this is a secular form of redemption. To be committed to the task of accepting responsibility for our past (unconscious) is to be committed to the idea that the past (unconscious) cannot simply dictate an inexorable present and future. There is always a question of how that past (unconscious) can be taken up and creatively transformed. The past (unconscious) is redeemed in this world, not the next, in the creative living with it in the present and towards-the-future. Loewald quotes Kierkegaard: "The dialectic of repetition is easy; for what is repeated has been, otherwise it could not be repeated, but precisely the fact that it has been gives to repetition the character of novelty." Surely, what is at stake here is the development of a capacity: a certain kind of capacity for creative living. Being able to take responsibility for one's unconscious motives is not an ability one is born with; it is something that, under favorable circumstances, may develop. To acquire this capacity is to open up possibilities for new possibilities. **One of the striking features of neurotic structures of fantasy is that they tend to present a confining set of possibilities as though they were all the possibilities there are.** The automatic nature of unconscious repetition pulls life toward the boring: for no matter what happens it is almost always experienced as more of the same. Loosening these bonds opens a person up to a much more flexible and thus nuanced sense of life's possibilities. The analysand emerges with new relations to life's possibilities, and that increases the capacity for joy—as well as for genuine sorrow. Loewald says that in the process of analysis there is a process of internalization—and we are at last in a position to understand what he means. The point is not that there is some unconscious fantasy of taking-in the analyst-if that is all that analysis were, analysis would only be one more form of unconscious suggestion." (pg. xxxvi-xxxvii)

- ◇ "[I]n the process of analysis one acquires the capacity to analyze for oneself. "We postulate thus internalization of an interaction process, not simply internalization of objects, as an essential element in ego development as well as in the resumption of it in analysis." Taking over the capacity to analyze for oneself is a crucial step in the process of taking responsibility for one's unconscious motivations. For this is the capacity to create a new form of repetition. This is what Loewald calls re-creation." (pg. xxxviii)
- ◇ "To acquire the capacity for analysis is to acquire the ability to interpret one's own unconscious drives. We have already seen that this requires that one take an objective stance - in the sense of mirroring - with respect to one's own unconscious motivations. And we have also already seen that this is an act of love. In this sense, accepting responsibility for one's unconscious motivations— and thus ego-formation itself - is an act of self-love. This is what Loewald (interpreting Freud) means when he says that Eros binds and integrates the individual human psyche." (pg. xxxviii)
- **"The task of accepting responsibility is a way of life.** In part this is because there is an ever present tendency for us to fall back into more archaic forms of experiencing the world; in part it is because unconscious stimulation is ever present; in part it is because life itself is an ever present occasion for creative repetition, or re-creation." (pg. xxxviii)
 - "We cannot be committed to truth without being committed to being truthful to ourselves. And being truthful to ourselves holds open the task and the opportunity of coming to the deepest understanding we can of who we are and what we are doing. For this reason, an understanding of psychoanalytic theory is as important a requirement in accepting responsibility for being an analyst as the capacity to analyze one's own unconscious motivations. The idea that psychoanalytic theory can be ignored, that it can be split off from one's clinical practice, is just that: a form of splitting. Psychoanalytic theory itself emerges out of a less differentiated field—a field that includes sufferers and those, like Freud, who were often stumbling about, trying to help. We cannot understand ourselves as psychoanalysts unless we continue that process of trying to understand what psychoanalysis is." (pg. xxxix)
- Part 1 - Concepts and Theory
 - Chapter 1 - Ego and Reality (pg. 3)
 - "In psychoanalytic theory we are accustomed to think of the relationship between ego and reality as one of adjustment or adaptation. The so-called mature ego has renounced the pleasure principle and has substituted for it the reality principle. It does not follow the direct path of instinctual gratification, without regard to consequences, to the demands of reality, does not indulge in hallucinatory wish fulfillment, but tests external reality and thinks and acts accordingly, adapting its thoughts and actions to the demands of reality. This conception of the relationship between ego and reality presupposes a fundamental antagonism that has to be bridged or overcome otherwise in order to make life in this reality possible." (pg. 3)
 - ◆ "We know that Freud's first conception of the ego was that it represents the repressive, defensive agency within the psychic apparatus. Only later did he stress the synthetic function of the ego." (pg. 3)
 - ◇ "In *The Ego and the Id* he describes vividly the unfortunate role of the ego, sandwiched between id and outer world (and superego), trying to compromise between and to satisfy these masters and to defend itself against their different demands. Freud's recognition of the defensive function of the ego has never ceased to play a predominant role in his conception of the ego, and has again and again overshadowed other aspects of the ego in psychoanalytic thinking." (pg. 3)
 - "We have then, so far, the following picture of the ego: it is a mediator between the outer and inner world (between external reality and id), an organizing agency, tending toward synthesis and unification (as against the id which is "scattered" and individualistic). Genetically speaking, it is differentiated from the id through the modifying influence of external reality; in biologicistic terms, it is the outer, cortical layer of the id and has as such become different from the inner stratum. The influence of external reality, which has brought forth the ego, is seen as essentially threatening and hostile. Correspondingly, the predominant function of the ego is a defensive one, not only against reality but also against the inner world of the id, which disregards reality. It is this threatened position of the ego, threatened from three sides (external reality, id, and superego), which makes it so susceptible to inner conflicts and disturbances." (pg. 4)
 - "The trend of thought in the theory of the development of the ego, so far, appears to be as follows: The ego is pictured as a cortical layer of the psychic apparatus. This layer comes into being through increasing tension between the psychic apparatus of the organism and what later is experienced as the external world. This is an image borrowed from biology, in analogy to a biochemical system consisting of two phases, separated by a membrane, which membrane is the structural expression, or crystallization, of the dynamic interrelationship between forces in the two media bordering on each other. In psychological terms, in successive stages, the growing infant and child moves away from primary narcissism in which there were as yet no boundaries separating him from an "outside world." The development of the relationship with the mother is representative of this growth process, even though this does not for long remain the only "outside" the child is related to. There is, biologically and psychologically, an increasing emancipation from the mother that leads to an ever-growing tension. The less mother and child are one, the more they become separate entities, the more will there be a dynamic interplay of forces between these two "systems." As the mother becomes outside, and hand in hand with this, the child an inside, there arises a tension system between the two. Expressed in different terms, libidinal forces arise between infant and mother. As infant (mouth) and mother (breast) are not identical, or better, not one whole, any longer, a libidinal flow between infant and mother originates, in an urge towards re-establishing the original unity. It is this process in which consists the beginning constitution of a libidinal object. The emancipation from the mother, which entails the tension system between child and mother and the constitution of libidinal forces directed towards her, as well as of libidinal forces on the part of the mother toward the child—this emancipation and tension culminate in the phallic phase of the psychosexual development, lead to the Oedipus situation, and to the emergence of the super-ego." (pg. 6)
 - "The significant point in this discussion is that reality is seen as an outside force, for Freud most typically and decisively represented by the paternal figure, which actively interferes with the development of the child in such a way that the ego essentially is on the defensive, and in fact becomes the defensive agency within the psychic apparatus. The interference is directed against the strivings for gratification of the libidinal urges toward the mother, and under the assault of reality (father) the psychic apparatus undergoes a series of modifications, repressions, deflections of its original tendencies, the structural representative of which is the ego. On the other hand, we know from considering the development of the ego as a development away from primary narcissism, that to start with, reality is not outside, but is contained in the pre-ego of primary narcissism, and becomes, as Freud says, detached from the ego. So that reality, understood genetically, is not primarily outside and hostile, alien to the ego, but intimately connected with and originally not even distinguished from it. I believe that in **Freud's thinking these two concepts of reality have never come to terms with each other,** and without doubt the former concept of reality as an essentially hostile (paternal) power, has remained the predominant one for him." (pg. 8)
 - ◆ "In the primary narcissistic stage, as we have seen, there is as yet no ego confronted with objects. It is the undifferentiated stage in which the infant and its world are still one, are only beginning to differentiate from one another, which means also that the differentiation of the psychic apparatus itself into its structural elements still is dormant." (pg. 10)
 - "The following formulation, at this point, seems justified: **The relationship of ego to reality is not primarily one of defense against an outer force thrust upon the ego, originally unrelated to it. The relatedness between ego and reality, or objects, does not develop from**

an originally unrelated coexistence of two separate entities that come into contact with each other, but on the contrary from a unitary whole that differentiates into distinct parts. Mother and baby do not get together and develop a relationship, but the baby is born, becomes detached from the mother, and thus a relatedness between two parts that originally were one becomes possible. This does not imply, of course, that the emergence of an ego and of reality is unassociated with pain and anxiety, and, as it were, unresisted; or that there is, for the observer, no world, no environment that sends stimuli to the organism. We are concerned here merely with the question how this world becomes psychologically constituted. And we want to stress the point that the **boundaries between ego and external reality develop out of an original state where, psychologically, there are no boundaries and therefore there is no distinction between the two. It is from here that the synthetic, integrative function of the ego can be understood. The ego mediates, unifies, integrates because it is of its essence to maintain, on more and more complex levels of differentiation and objectivation of reality, the original unity. To maintain or constantly re-establish this unity, in the face of a growing separation from what becomes the outside world for the growing human being, by integrating and synthesizing what seems to move further and further away from it and fall into more and more unconnected parts —this is part of the activity of the ego which constitutes it as an organization,** in the sense of an agency that organizes. The Oedipus conflict would be one very decisive step in this growing separation of the individual from its environment. The tension system between child and mother, seen from this angle, through the paternal castration threat, is forced on to, is transposed to a new level of integration. It would be justified to look at the defensive function of the ego, seen in the light of the above considerations, from an entirely different point of view. **What the ego defends itself, or the psychic apparatus, against is not reality but the loss of reality, that is, the loss of an integration with the world** such as it exists in the libidinal relationship with the mother, and with which the father seems to interfere in the Oedipus situation (castration threat)." (pg. 11-12)

- ◆ "We have seen that ego and reality evolve gradually in conjunction with each other; the psychic apparatus undergoes a series of modifications, repressions, deflections of its original tendencies towards re-establishment of the primary narcissistic unity or identity with the environment (mother), under the interfering influence of the (paternal) castration threat. The resultants of this development are the structures which we call ego and reality." (pg. 12)
- **"The ego, it is true, is forever in an embattled position where it has to defend itself against powerful forces.** But the danger is not all on the side of frustration of and threat to the primary narcissistic position and its genetic derivatives, the libidinal urges towards the mother. The danger is as much on the other side, on the side of the overpowering, annihilating mother. To express it in broader terms: **the original unity and identity, undifferentiated and unstructured, of psychic apparatus and environment is as much of a danger for the ego as the demand of the "paternal castration threat" to give it up altogether.** Against the threatening possibility of remaining in or sinking back into the structureless unity from which the ego emerged, stands the powerful paternal force. With this force an early identification is attempted, an identification that precedes and prepares the Oedipus complex." (pg. 14)
 - ◆ "We have said earlier that the ego mediates, unifies, integrates because it is of its essence to maintain, on more and more complex levels of differentiation and objectivation, the original unity stemming from the primary narcissistic position. Reality on the post-oedipal level, however, is constituted by just these characteristics, differentiation and objectivity, which the post-oedipal ego evolves in its integrative, organizing activity." (pg. 16)
 - ◆ "In this view, **the unstructured nothingness of identity of "ego" and "reality" represents a threat as deep and frightening as the paternal castration threat.** It is the threat of the all-engulfing womb. Dread of the womb and castration fear, both, may be powerful motives for defense, but not just defense against reality. They threaten loss of reality. Reality is lost if the ego is cut off from objects (castration threat); reality is lost as well if the boundaries of ego and reality are lost (the threat of the womb). Loss of reality always means also loss of ego. Loss of reality, in the sense here intended, does not mean that a "part" of reality gets lost (while another part is preserved). It means that the ego-reality integration sinks back, regresses to an earlier level of organization. What we observe in clinical or experimental states of regression is not that objects get lost, but that they become less objective, as it were. **Ego and reality, in a compulsion neurosis, regress to a magical level of integration, as they regress further in a schizophrenic reaction.** Upon a threat to the existing ego-reality integration, in the organizing activity of the ego they become reintegrated on a different level. Between the danger of a loss of object-relationships and the danger of a loss of ego-reality boundaries the ego pursues its course of integrating reality. While the primary narcissistic identity with the mother forever constitutes the deepest unconscious origin and structural layer of ego and reality, and the motive force for the ego's "remarkable striving toward unification, synthesis"—this primary identity is also the source of the deepest dread, which promotes, in identification with the father, the ego's progressive differentiation and structuralization of reality." (pg. 16-17)
- **"Ego and reality cannot be considered separately as they evolve together in successive stages of ego-reality integration."** (pg. 17-18)
- **"Introjection and projection are such early stages of ego activity. In the beginning phases, as in some psychotic disturbances, it is hardly possible to distinguish between introjection and projection, as the boundaries between "inside" and "outside" are still so rudimentary and fluid that the two terms signify different directions of the same process rather than two different processes."** (pg. 18)
 - ◆ "The schizophrenic does not primarily defend himself against reality by withdrawing from it, but reality regressively changes its character in such a way that the boundaries between ego and reality (and that means also the boundaries of ego and of reality) become fluid and to various degrees get lost. It is a regression to more primitive stages of ego-reality integration." (pg. 18)
- "It is impossible to grasp the full significance of such different ego-reality integration unless it is seen that the magical quality exists not only on the side of the ego, but also on the side of reality. Not only the ego, at such a stage, has magical powers or is a magical power, but also reality is a magical power. The empathic relationship between baby and mother is a mutual one; not only is the baby in empathic communication with the mother, but also the mother is in empathic communication with the baby. The magical quality of this relationship may be experienced by the child not only as magical identity or communication of a positive nature, but also as a threatening, overpowering force. Omnipotence is not something that the ego experiences as within itself only, but reality is also omnipotent (whether it be so for the "objective" observer or not), and against this the ego may experience itself as completely impotent. For a deeper understanding of the regressive phenomena in neurotic and psychotic disorders these considerations have to be taken into account." (pg. 19)
- **"In the formation of the ego, the libido does not turn to objects that, so to speak, lie ready for it, waiting to be turned to. In the developmental process, reality, at first without boundaries against an ego, later in magical communication with it, becomes objective at last. As the ego goes through its transformations from primitive beginnings, so libido and reality go through stages of transformation, until the ego, to the extent to which it is "fully developed," has an objective reality, detached from itself, before it, not in it, yet holding this reality to itself in the ego's synthetic activity. Then the ego's libido has become object relationship. Only then does the ego live in what we call an objective reality.** In earlier stages of ego formation the ego does not experience reality as objective, but lives in and experiences the various stages of narcissistic and magical reality. I mentioned earlier that Freud has raised the problem of psychological survival of earlier ego stages side by side with later stages of ego development, a problem that he says has as yet hardly been investigated. If we look closely at people we can see that it is not merely a question of survival of former stages of ego-reality integration, but that

people shift considerably, from day to day, at different periods in their lives, in different moods and situations, from one such level to other levels. In fact, it would seem that the more alive people are (though not necessarily more stable), the broader their range of ego-reality levels is. **Perhaps the so-called fully developed, mature ego is not one that has become fixated at the presumably highest or latest stage of development, having left the others behind it, but is an ego that integrates its reality in such a way that the earlier and deeper levels of ego-reality integration remain alive as dynamic sources of higher organization.**" (pg. 19-20)

- Chapter 2 - The Problem of Defense and the Neurotic Interpretation of Reality (pg. 21)
 - "The central importance of conflict, anxiety, and defense for any concrete understanding of normal and pathological psychological processes is based on very specific constellations in the growth period of human beings. **The infant and child, equipped at birth only with certain automatic mechanisms for maintaining himself in equilibrium with the environment, increasingly becomes confronted with external conditions of an extremely complex nature. These complex external conditions, external from the point of view of the observer, are not merely sets of "biological" events, but events of different orders of integration which we call psychological, cultural, social.** These events and processes are of a degree of integration and differentiation utterly incongruous with and superior to the level of integrative functioning of the infant and child. Thus, special efforts have to be made by the environment, and over a prolonged period of time, to create approximately appropriate psychological conditions for his development. The fact of human civilization, in its broadest sense, and its state of complexity renders a problem of how the human being can become an integral part of it, that is, integrated into its texture and participating in its further evolution. Neurotic and psychotic developments are the expression of a failure of the human being to achieve or maintain this integration on the level of integrative behavior that we call psychological. It is the discrepancy between the state of integration of "external reality" into which the infant is born and his integrative mechanisms and capacity at birth and for a long time to come that brings about multiple occasions for deviation, deficiency of organization, arrest of development, and pathogenic defenses. The environment in our culture is first represented by the parents, the family, who thus are in the position of having to create and maintain conditions for psychological survival and development." (pg. 21-22)
 - ◆ "The parental, and in the early stages especially the maternal, supply of satisfaction of needs and of support and channelling of maturation processes constitute a regressive movement on the part of the parents that minimizes the objective discrepancy and allows the infant to remain in integrative interaction with the environment. Active support and channelling consist of creating a regressive, primitively structured environment with which the child is able to integrate; this, ideally, should continue in a sliding balance between the maturing biopsychological structures, functions, and needs, and parental support. In actuality, however, the opportunities and conditions of practical necessity for an imbalance in this relationship, especially in our culture, are legion. Too little or too much, too early or too late support and channelling, and the varieties of conflict between the two parents in their capacity as supporting agents to the child represent a multitude of possibilities for such imbalance. With the increasing complexity of a culture other agents, in addition to parents, gain in importance, and the period of maturation lengthens." (pg. 22-23)
 - "**Discrepancy, then, between the individual's needs and the support of the environment, discrepancy between maturation level and environmental channelling of maturation processes, constitute basic threats.** To the extent to which the growing individual develops under the sway of such discrepancy, anxiety and the possibilities for conflict situations arise. I wish to emphasize that the discrepancies referred to cannot be assumed to be due to specifically hostile forces of the environment impinging on the individual. Such hostile forces may exist too. But **what is meant here is the difference between the integrative level of the individual and the integrative level of the environment.** To the extent to which this difference is being bridged by the regressive supportive channelling of the environment, development can proceed without this threat, as the progressive integration of reality on the part of the child is undisturbed by this factor. Defense, in the sense in which we speak of it when dealing with neurotic mechanisms, is based on the development of the ego as a specialized structure within the psychic apparatus, and, correspondingly, on the formation of and interaction with libidinal objects. A certain degree of ego structuralization and of object structuralization has to have occurred to make defense processes and operations possible. Ego structuralization and object formation occur to the extent to which synthetic-integrative processes can proceed relatively undisturbed by the above-formulated discrepancy. This, under ordinary circumstances, takes place to a degree sufficient for the gradual formation of an ego and of a reality of some cohesive organization. It is only on the basis of the work accomplished by early integrative processes, such as projection, introjection, and identification, through which an ego and objects come into being, that defense processes become possible, and that neurosis becomes possible. In psychosis, and to certain degrees in character disorders, defenses are not available or break down because of the weakness and deficiencies of the ego structure and the lack of reality organization." (pg. 23-24)
 - "**Defense is intimately related to regression. But regression is not one of the defense mechanisms. In the defense process, representing a failure in integration and an attempt at re-integration on a regressive level, the ego falls back on older methods, on more primitive processes of integration that serve as substitutes. They serve to establish and maintain a restricted level of "adjustment" to a piece or an aspect of reality that cannot be integrated adequately. Defense mechanisms, seen from this angle, are regressive attempts to come to terms with experiences that cannot be integrated on the level of development reached by the ego in other areas of its integration with reality.** They may, in certain instances, however, at the same time serve the function of furthering the progress of integration in other areas. The Oedipus complex, the "core of neurosis," is the prototype of a conflict that takes place, in one form or another, in every human being in our type of culture, a struggle that ends in a temporary defeat and, for a time, in the kind of restricted adjustment of which I spoke. The repression of the Oedipus complex is the outstanding example also of a defense process where the regression helps to further development in other areas." (pg. 24-25)
 - "To reformulate: **Defense**, in the sense in which we speak of it in neurosis, and therefore to a certain degree in normal development, **is based on that stage in the development of individual-environment configuration, of ego-reality integration, in which an organized ego and organized reality have been differentiated from each other.** What I mean here by organized reality may be indicated by saying that it implies (among other things) the establishment of distinct, libidinally invested (parental) figures mutually related to each other and the ego, such as they come into being in the development of the Oedipus situation. Only then is a stage in the constitution of ego and of reality reached in which a defense struggle between an ego and an "external" object world, and the resulting defense against id impulses can occur. Psychotic and related processes are located in pre-oedipal levels of development where the relatedness to the environment is of a more primitive cast than the relationship of an individual, structured into id, ego, and superego, with an external world. On pre-oedipal levels the integrative processes are still those introjective, projective, and identificatory interactions of a narcissistic and magical nature that lead to the above-mentioned definitive structures. In the analysis of psychotic states, and of many character disorders, it is these early, predefensive processes of integration, of relatedness to the environment, that represent the main subject and the main problem of our therapeutic endeavor. The regressive element in the defense process lies in the fact that pre-oedipal integrative mechanisms of a narcissistic-magical nature, in which no external reality in the full sense is yet constituted, are substituted for a more mature relationship to "objects" that fails to materialize to the extent to which a conflict cannot be mastered. This implies that in the defense process **reality regresses, that is, becomes less objective, just as the ego regresses.** In a neurotic symptom as well as in neurotic adjustment the organization of reality itself is affected." (pg. 25-26)

- "I have discussed the difference between integrative processes as such, and defense processes that are possible only on the basis of a certain level of integration on which an ego and an external reality have already been differentiated to a sufficient degree. And I wish to emphasize that interaction as such, between individual and environment, cannot be understood as defense. **Defense mechanisms, such as they occur in neurosis and normal adjustment, are specific and comparatively late processes, operations of faulty, regressive integration, in reaction to discrepancies between the integrative capacity of the individual and the level of integration of the external world, once the individual has reached the (oedipal) stage in which what it interacts with has become for him an external world.** The central importance of defense operations in human life is due to the fact that active support and channelling of maturation processes play such a predominant role still after the organization of an ego structure and the corresponding reality organization, and more so in our culture. This fact creates and constantly maintains occasions for discrepancy and accounts for the ubiquity of neurotic adjustment. Support and channelling have to have been reasonably adequate in early childhood to make it possible for the child to reach the Oedipus level, to develop defenses, which implies being able to fall back on earlier integrative mechanisms. If these early integrative processes are already decisively interfered with through lack of sufficient support and channelling, the result is ego deficiency and deformation, not defense." (pg. 26-27)
- "The high degree of differentiation and complexity of our civilization, which seems to have run away from its human sources and foundations and to have taken a course all its own, seldom mastered and understood, has led to the view that culture and reality as a whole is basically and by definition inimical to the individual. The estrangement of man from his culture (from moral and religious norms that nevertheless continue to determine his conduct and thus are experienced as hostile impositions) and the fear and suppression of controlled but nondefensive regression is the emotional and intellectual climate in which Freud conceived his ideas of the psychological structure of the individual and the individual's relationship to reality. It is also the climate in which neurosis grows— and here we hark back to our exposition of the neurotogenic conflict situation. The hostile, submissive-rebellious manipulation of the environment and the repressive-reactive manipulation of inner needs, so characteristic and necessary for man who cannot keep pace with the complexity of his culture and for a culture that loses contact with its human origins, is the domain of neurotic development. It is the above-described discrepancy situation, repeated and re-enacted on a different level." (pg. 29)
 - ◆ "This historical experience is perhaps the main reason for the overextension of the concept of defense in dynamic psychology - as well as for the rise of dynamic psychology itself. The discrepancy between the integrative capacity of the individual and the level on which the cultural environment and development has to be integrated by the individual in order still to be experienced as his own, and not as a hostile imposition, has constantly increased. But it is discrepancy, tension, and conflict that make us aware of dynamics, of the interplay of forces that otherwise remains hidden. And we may understand psychoanalysis and psychoanalytic treatment itself as an expression and utilization of the need to rediscover and reactivate the submerged communication channels leading from the origins of our lives to the solidified, alienated structures of behavior, automatic attitudes and responses, cultural institutions, conventions and beliefs, neurotic symptom formations, and defense systems and operations, which seem to have taken over and run their own inhuman course. On three levels, then, the biological, psychological and cultural, psychoanalysis has taken for granted the neurotically distorted experience of reality. It has taken for granted the concept of a reality as it is experienced in a predominantly defensive integration of it. Stimulus, external world, and culture, all three, on different levels of scientific approach, representative of what is called reality, have been understood unquestioningly as they are thought, felt, experienced within the framework of a hostile-defensive (that is regressive-reactive) ego-reality integration. It is a concept of reality as it is most typically encountered in the obsessive character neurosis, a neurosis so common in our culture that it has been called the normal neurosis." (pg. 29-30)
- "The conception of organism-environment, ego-reality, as an antagonistically related pair of opposites or isolated systems, lets the reality principle appear as a defensive-adaptive principle by virtue of which the pleasure principle becomes repressively modified, and fantasy becomes an isolated remnant of this earlier principle. In the process of reality testing and the establishment of the reality principle, fantasy is seen as split off. To the extent to which this happens as a defensive-reactive process, fantasy stays behind or has to be repressed in company with pregenital strivings. But this also indicates something about the fate of the ego and of reality. To the extent to which fantasy is split off, ego and reality in their mutual integration become restricted and impoverished, as can be seen in hysterical and obsessional symptom formation and in the corresponding character disorders. Projective-introjective processes, which are elements of the still rather obscure complex of integrative activities we call fantasy, continue in more highly differentiated forms to operate in the development and elaboration of reality during man's lifetime. Otherwise reality would be static (as indeed it has been conceived as being in psychoanalytic theory). It becomes static and hostile, visible in each individual patient, to the extent to which his life has become merely a defensive-reactive struggle. It is this neurotically impoverished reality, a form of reality that is exercising its great destructive power on all of us, in whose image the psychoanalytic concept of reality has been formed. The psychoanalytic investigation and understanding of ego development and ego structure, as it progresses, will also lay the foundations for an understanding of the dynamic nature of reality. **The clearer the distinction between integration as such and defensive types of integration becomes, the more apparent also will be the difference between the idea of an alien, hostile reality (a finished product imposed on the unsuspecting infant, from there on and forever after) and the integrated, dynamic reality (forever unfinished) on the elaboration and organization of which we spend our lives.**" (pg. 31-32)
- Chapter 3 - Hypnotic State, Repression, Abreaction, and Recollection (pg. 33)
 - "Repression, as a defense, is a regressive repetition of this nonarrival at consciousness. But while the original nonarrival at consciousness was due to the immature state of the ego, the later edition of such nonarrival is to be considered as an action of the more mature ego that can make defensive use of early, primitive mechanisms. The ego repeats, as a more integrated and differentiated unit of functioning, an early process. It is as though the early lack of associative absorption of an experience, the unmediated force of the unconscious memory trace, exercises a powerful influence on the more mature ego in the sense of tending to pull it back to its earlier state of immaturity, a temptation to which the ego partially succumbs: it represses the new experience because the new experience conjures up the infantile mechanism by way of the unconscious memory trace of the early experience." (pg. 37)
 - ◆ "...the phenomenon of repression cannot be fully understood without recognizing that it represents a more integrated version, on the part of the more mature ego, of a primitive mode of functioning of the psychophysical apparatus." (pg. 38)
 - "In each and every analysis we are confronted with two problems that are at the same time two fundamental problems of psychological dynamics: The ego resists "insight," it defends itself against admitting unconscious processes and "contents" into its presence that would imply their transformation into secondary processes (anticathexis in the Pcs); and it attempts in many circumstances to reject what had already been so transformed and to repress it into the unconscious. But on the other hand - and this is still less clearly recognized and understood —the unconscious resists this transformation into secondary processes and tends to draw back into its realm what had already been so transformed (Ucs cathexis). This is not defense but repetition compulsion. In terms of the analytic work this means that, inextricably interwoven with the analysis of defenses, is the task of working through." (pg. 38-39)

- ◆ "Working through is understood here as a process in which the resistance of the unconscious, the repetition compulsion, is being overcome. Working through is not primarily conceived of here as the undoing of repressions or other defenses, but is seen as the strenuous task of helping to lift unconscious processes onto a new level of integration, the level of secondary processes." (pg. 39)
 - ◇ "Recollection, as against reminiscence as used by Freud in this paper, is not a re-recording, but the creation of something new. While originating in something old, inscribed into the organism as an unconscious memory trace (body memory), it had not existed in this form before." (pg. 41)
- Chapter 4 - Ego and Time (pg. 43)
 - "The relations between ego and superego, for example, or the relations between various elements within the ego, are not spatial relations. Yet they must, insofar as we think in terms of structure and structural relations at all, conform to some principle of arrangement which allows us to conceive of them as structural relations. I suggest that this principle is time, that **psychic structures are temporal in nature. Psychic structures exist in time and develop in time.** But I do not speak of time here as a linear continuum of duration or of the sequence of events in physical time-space as observed in objective, external reality. The time concept involved here, psychic time, implies an active relation between the temporal modes past, present, and future." (pg. 43-44)
 - ◆ "From the point of view of objective time, what we call the psychic past, as in transference phenomena, is not "in the past" but in the present; it is active now, yet active as psychic past, it is the actuality of past experiences. The same is true for unconscious memory traces and their relationship to day residues. Both here and in clinical transference phenomena, the psychic past acts on and in the present, it acts on the psychic present and in the objective present. But the psychic present also has an impact on the psychic past; it activates the psychic past. Memory, as recollection for instance, manifests psychic time as activity; it makes the past present. Anticipation makes the future present. When we speak of object representation, object presentation, drive representation, a concept of time is implied in which "present" is understood as an active process - to present something. **To represent or present means to make or keep present, to present, maintain, or re-create presence.** Reminiscences, in the sense in which Freud speaks of them when he says that hysterics suffer from reminiscences, pull the psychic present back into some psychic past, although this takes place in the objective present." (pg. 44)
 - "When we call the ego an organization we do not only mean that **the ego is a structural unit whose elements are mutually interdependent and interdependent with the whole, not only that it is a system of interdependent functions, but we also have specifically in mind the integrative and differentiating functions of the ego. In other words, the ego is an agency which organizes.** It is useful to think of the ego's function of presentation and representation, of creating and recreating presence, as the temporal aspect of its synthetic or organizing function." (pg. 44)
 - "Insofar as **the superego is the agency of inner standards, demands, ideals, hopes, and concerns in regard to the ego,** the agency of inner rewards and punishments in respect to which the ego experiences contentment or guilt, **the superego functions from the viewpoint of a future ego, from the standpoint of the ego's future that is to be reached, is being reached, is being failed or abandoned by the ego.** Parental and other authorities, as internalized in the agency of the superego, are related to the child as representatives of a future and of demands, hopes, misgivings, or despair, which pertain to an envisaged future of the child. The superego watches, commands, threatens, punishes, forewarns, admonishes, and rewards the ego, it loves and hates the ego. All this we can do with ourselves only insofar as we are ahead of ourselves, looking back at ourselves from a point of reference that is provided by the potentialities we envisage for ourselves or of which we despair. Conscience speaks to us from the viewpoint of an inner future, whether it tells us what we should do or how we should behave in the future, or whether it judges past and present deeds, thoughts, and feelings. Past deeds and thoughts we condemn inasmuch as we have expected more from ourselves, or we approve of them inasmuch as we have lived up to our expectations. **Only insofar as we are in advance of ourselves** - conceive of ourselves as potentially more, stronger, better, or as less, weaker, worse than we are at present - **can we be said to have a superego.** That our expectations may be unrealistic, that we may mistake and misjudge our potentialities, is another matter. **Conscience, the mouthpiece of the superego, speaks to us, one might say, in the name of the inner future** that envisages us as capable or incapable, as willing or unwilling to move toward it and encompass it, just as parents envisaged us in our potentialities and readiness for growth and development. It is possible that the psychoanalytic concept of self as superordinate to the categories id, ego, and superego, when further developed and clarified, may help us to conceptualize these internal relations more precisely." (pg. 45-46)
 - "**Freud has used, more or less successively, at times inter-changeably, three different terms: ideal ego, ego-ideal, superego.** At the risk of doing violence to the fluidity of these terms as used by him, I am going to consider them insofar as they can serve as terms for successive stages in the development toward superego structure. Briefly, **the ideal ego represents a recapturing of the original primary-narcissistic, omnipotent perfection of the child by a primitive identification with the omnipotent parental figures. It is an identification representing the re-establishment of an original identity or unity with the environment and would seem to have connotations akin to hallucinatory wish fulfillment.** (Just as the early deprivations and disillusionments are undifferentiated antecedents of the later separations and relinquishments, so the early wish-hallucinations are antecedents of the later internalizations and so-called "restitutions of the object in the ego.") This ideal ego represents a return to an original state of perfection, not to be reached in the future but fantasied in the present. This state of perfection of the ego - perhaps the ideal undifferentiated phase where neither id nor ego nor environment are differentiated from one another - gradually becomes something to be wished and reached for: it becomes **an ego-ideal, an ideal for the ego, seen in a much more differentiated and elaborated form** than previously in parental figures. Perfection now is to be attained by participation in their perfection and omnipotence on the basis of an as yet incomplete distinction between inside and outside, between ego and parental object; it is magical participation. Here a future is envisaged for the ego, but not yet a future of the ego. The future state of the ego is to be attained by merging with the magical object. No stable internal structure representative of the ego's self-transcending exists as yet; the self-transcending is dependent on a magical communion with an ideal authority and model taking an intermediate position between external and internal. The ego's future needs to be still embodied externally in order to have any claim on the ego. We speak of **superego, of an inner future of, not merely for, the ego** once a share of the oedipal objects is relinquished, once the libidinal-aggression relationship with the oedipal figures (having gradually developed during the oedipal phase into a relationship with external objects) has been partially given up as an external relationship and has been set up in the ego as an internal relationship; then the ego envisages an inner future of itself, the superego being the representative of the ego's futurity. We know that many people never reach the stage of a reasonably stable superego structure, that the superego as a late structure is peculiarly prone to regressive tendencies in the direction of re-externalization, or on the other hand to a brittle rigidity that permits no further enrichment and growth. **For many of us our inner development depends to a large extent on those with whom we surround ourselves to support the weak superego, or we confine ourselves within narrow self-limitations without wider horizons;** it is then as though time stands still. The superego as a late structure in mental development shows great variations and fluctuations from individual to individual, as well as in any given individual during his life. As the latest differentiating grade in mental organization it is not only fragile, tending toward de-differentiation and regression, but also indicating, we may assume, the direction of future human evolution. Earlier I alluded to the assumption that the temporal mode of the

ego, understood as organizing agency, is the present - the present not as a state but as activity, the ego as presence-creating. Similarly, the temporal mode of the superego, the future, is not to be understood as a state but as activity. We cannot do justice, conceptually, to psychic structures unless we conceive of them as systems of action-patterns. The relationship between ego and superego, in terms of psychic time, would be a relation between psychic present and psychic future. I shall come back to these relations. Speaking genetically, the superego is not only a representative of external authorities and models with their demands and expectations, their prohibitions and allurements, but it is also a representative of the id. It is not possible for me to go into the complex connections that seem to exist between the two structural concepts, id and superego. I will emphasize only one aspect: the oedipal introjects, constituting the superego, do not represent strictly realistic external prototypes, but their character is co-determined by the quality and strength of the libidinal and aggressive drives of the Oedipus complex, so that the introjects represent the drives as much as the drive objects. Freud can say, therefore, that "the superego takes up a kind of intermediate position between the id and the external world" (S.E. 23:207). This implies the recognition that **the superego is a system, not of introjected "objects," but a system of introjections of interactions between id-ego and external world**, with the emphasis here on the id aspects of such interactions. In earlier interactions between psychic apparatus and external world objects and ego become differentiated one from the other; these earlier interactions are the introjections and projections contributing to the formation of the ego (seen from the vantage point of achieved superego formation, they can be recognized as being antecedents or prototypes of superego formation). They do not represent as yet interactions between id ego and objects but interactions between less differentiated, more fluid systems. The superego, considered as a psychic structure, is, as Freud had clearly seen, a further differentiation of the ego. This further differentiation is brought about by interactions between psychic apparatus and external world that are of a higher order than was possible prior to the relative completion of the organization of the ego and of objects. But it remains a system of internalizations of interactions and not of objects. The interactions that are internalized as superego elements take place between a psychic apparatus definitively differentiated into ego and id, and an external world definitively differentiated into distinct objects." (pg. 46-49)

- "The superego as a later structure, is more fluid, less stable than the ego, although its elements, the superego introjects (owing to the more structured relationship of ego and objects that is the material of these introjections) are more structured than the ego-introjects and therefore more easily visible. I suggest viewing the superego as an enduring structure-pattern of introjections whose elements may move in the direction of the ego or in the direction of external objects; they may thus lose their character as superego elements and either merge into the ego or regain a measure of object quality; new elements may become part of this structure-pattern. This conception implies the notion of degrees of internalization and externalization. Patients re-externalize aspects of their superego by projecting them on to the analyst and internalize aspects of the analyst's personality or, more precisely, of the analyst's relationship with the patient. We frequently hear patients describe the analyst's watchful "presence" in some vague form as the patient engages in given activities in his daily life, showing a certain degree of internalization that does not yet have the quality of being part of the patient's superego. It has more the quality of a fantasy object. In certain hallucinatory experiences of this kind, as most often described by borderline or psychotic patients, externalization has gone a step further, or, seen from the other direction, internalization has not gone as far. A complete relinquishment of the external object relationship has not taken place in these instances. While the superego as a structure-pattern is established through the resolution of the Oedipus complex and to the extent to which this resolution has occurred, new elements enter, are assimilated into this structure-pattern at various later stages in life, most clearly in adolescence. But they, too, become part of a structure-pattern that represents the ego's futurity, and they are selected insofar as they might fit, might be capable of assimilation into this pattern. Superego elements may be given up, expelled; persons in the external world representative of such abandoned elements may be repulsive to the superego, which shows that these elements have left residues in the superego. Superego elements may merge into the ego as certain goals set for the ego's development have been reached; but the ego, under conditions of stress and ego conflict, may lose hold of them so that they return into the superego structure. Lest the impression arise that I visualize something like peripatetic particles wandering back and forth between ego, superego, and external world, let me emphasize that internalization and externalization are not manipulations perpetrated on passive and static entities, nor movements performed by such entities. The process of internalization or introjection involves a change in the internal organization of the elements; this, while hard to conceptualize, is of the utmost importance. The more clearly the aspects of an object relationship, for instance between father and son, are internalized, become part of the son's inner world, the more they lose their object-relation character. Another way of attempting to formulate this is to say that internalization involves the process of neutralization. The relationship, being internalized, becomes (relatively) desexualized and de-aggressivized. The changing of superego elements into ego elements involves a further de-sexualization and de-aggressivation. The degree of modification and reorganization of material for introjection that is brought about by internalization varies with the degree of internalization. In insufficient or in pathological, distorted superego development the sexual-aggressive character of the internalized element is usually pronounced. Mourning, inasmuch as it involves the relinquishment and internalization of aspects of the lost object relationship, leads to an enrichment of the superego. Such internalization, if observed over long periods of time, may be progressive so that eventually this superego element merges into the ego, becomes an ego element, becomes realized as an ego trait rather than being an inner ideal or command. In terms of psychic time, the relation between ego and superego can be seen as a mutual relation between psychic present and psychic future. In the structure of the superego the ego confronts itself in the light of its own future. The establishment of the superego completes the constitution of an inner world whose dimensions may be said to be the temporal modes past, present, and future. They have to be conceived, like anything in the mental realm, as active modes, not as observed attributes. If we conceive of the superego as a psychic structure representing the ego's future from the standpoint of which the ego is judged, loved, and hated, the degrees of internalization, measured by the distance from the ego, would be steps in the movement from psychic future to psychic present, as organized in these two structures." (pg. 50-52)
- Chapter 5 - Book Review and Discussion (pg. 53)
 - "Whereas the topographic theory conceives of the mind as an apparatus or instrument, analogous to a reflex arc or to a microscope, the structural theory conceives of the mind as an organization, analogous to an organism." (pg. 57)
 - "Perhaps the most far-reaching change was brought about by Freud's increasing understanding of the role of identification in mental life, identification not as one of the defense mechanisms, but as a crucial factor in the formation of ego and superego." (pg. 57)
- Chapter 6 - On Internalization (pg. 69)
 - "It also is one of its characteristics that **psychoanalytic psychology does not view the psychic life of the individual in isolation, but in its manifold relations and intertwinings with other spheres and aspects of life**, such as social-cultural life and the somatic-biological sphere." (pg. 70)
 - "The concept of internalization allows us to approach the question of how psychic structure and psychic functioning in the individual come about and how they are maintained and developed. Our question here is not primarily what functions and purposes psychic structures serve; we are not asking about ego and superego functions, what ego and superego do once they are there. But we ask how they are formed, maintained, and develop, how they function, by virtue of what genetic and dynamic principles - granted that their functions and

- purposes may throw light on these matters. **Internalization, to anticipate, is conceived as the basic way of functioning of the psyche, not as one of its functions.**" (pg. 70-71)
- ◆ **"My own use of internalization refers to the processes involved in the creation of such an internal world and to its structural resultants,** and not to the construction of inner models, schemata, or maps, which are representations of the external world of objects and of their relations. The latter I will tentatively consider as mental functions made possible by the creation of that internal world." (pg. 73)
 - "Once we adopt the point of view of the ego, of psychic organization, we operate with a concept of defense where defense is understood as being in the interest of the ego and as being useful only insofar as it is in the interest of the ego. The ego defends itself against forces that would disrupt it, but in so doing it runs the risk of limiting its domain, while unsuccessful defense tends to be more disruptive. Internalization, in the sense of identification as used by Freud most explicitly in the third chapter of *The Ego and the Id*, is a process radically different from repression as a defense mechanism of the ego by which the ego protects its own current organization. In internalization, in contrast, the ego opens itself up, loosens its current organization to allow for its own further growth." (pg. 74-75)
 - ◆ "I wish to make it clear that, while superego formation is a particularly accessible instance of internalization, **internalization comprises much more than the formation of the superego; it is crucially involved in the formation of the ego itself.**" (pg. 75)
 - "I believe it is of the utmost importance, both theoretically and clinically, to distinguish much more sharply and consistently than Freud ever did between processes of repression and **processes of internalization.** The latter **are involved in creating and increasing coherent integration and organization of the psyche as a whole,** whereas repression works against such coherent psychic organization by maintaining a share of psychic processes in a less organized, more primitive state or returning them to such a state, the state of the id." (pg. 76)
 - ◆ **"Repression tends to keep object representations and object relations on an infantile level. Internalization, on the other hand, is a process by which, in the example of superego formation, oedipal object relations are renounced as such, destroyed, and the resulting elements enter into the formation of higher psychic structure, leading in turn to the development of object relations of a higher order of organization.**" (pg. 76)
 - ◇ "In repression the oedipal object cathezes, while detached from the parental persons, persist in unconscious fantasies of such object relations, whereas in genuine superego formation we are confronted not with unconscious fantasies—portrayals, as it were, of object relations - but with intrapsychic reconstructions, non-objective, if I may use this term here in a sense similar to what we mean when speaking of non-objective art. There, too, a destruction of the object and of the ordinary relations with the object takes place, and a reconstruction, following new principles of structuring. We may say that non-objective art, by communicating such novel structuralization, opens up new dimensions of reality organization. The same holds true for internalization insofar as object relations, based on higher or novel psychic structure achieved by the process of internalization, are thus raised to a new level; the objects with which these relations are entertained have thus gained a new degree and quality of integration. In our superego example, the relinquishment and internalization of oedipal object relations leads to object relations of a new, more mature cast. The primitive, archaic modes in which the child sees and relates to his parents give way to a more mature relationship to them as well as to non-incestuous objects. For the child the reality of parents and other objects changes as he matures, he does not simply relate in a different way to fixed, given objects." (pg. 77)
 - ◆ "I emphasize the destruction phase at this point in order to make it clear that the factor involved in superego formation is not repression; or, to be cautious, that **repression is not enough. Something that is repressed is not destroyed,** insofar as it stays repressed and is not crushed. **Its structure is preserved,** although its "location" is changed and its structure may be loosened or under strain. What is radically changed is the relation of the repressed to the coherent ego; the coherent ego has turned it away from itself, or has turned away from the repressed." (pg. 78)
 - ◇ "While what is internalized and what is repressed are both unconscious (in the dynamic sense), the former is a structural element of the coherent ego, the latter, the repressed, is not." (pg. 78)
 - ◆ **"But insofar and as long as repression is an active process, characterized by the ego's defensive activity of protecting its current organization against disruptive influences, repression is in opposition to internalization and prevents it,** as much as it prevents or inhibits adequate interaction with the external world." (pg. 78-79)
 - ◇ "Object ties in the form of identifications and introjections become constitutive elements in psychic structure formation, in the formation of ego and superego seen not as defense structures against instinctual and environmental stimuli, but as more developed and more structured organizations of instinctual-interactive forces." (pg. 80)
 - "Boundaries between subject and object, distinctions between them, on pre-oedipal levels are either nonexistent or only fleetingly present, fluid, blurred, so that at least no clear or constant distinction between self and object world, between inside and outside, is maintained. If this is so, speaking of internalization on such early levels of development means speaking of processes by which inner and outer are being differentiated by recurrent sortings and resortings. As I have formulated it in my paper "Internalization, Separation, Mourning, and the Superego" (1962), internality as well as externality is being established by such early, primary internalizations and externalizations. These are to be considered as the first steps in ego organization. Only on the basis of this relatively firmly established psychic structure do the later, secondary internalizations and externalizations take place, such as those leading to superego formation. I cannot in this paper discuss the assumption of primary ego autonomy (Hartmann), which is not in keeping with the ideas on ego formation advanced here." (pg. 81)
 - ◆ "But even where the subject-object distinction seems firmly established, where there seems to be no question of a weakening or loss of ego boundaries as we may observe it in exceptional or pathological states, the situation is less clear than we often assume. Any close, intimate object relationship has narcissistic features, identifications are involved. We become aware of this most acutely at a time of separation from such an object, or when we lose it. We may feel then that we have received a wound, as though a part of oneself has been torn off, a part that was strongly cathected with a kind of cathexis similar to the investment in our own body parts, of which we become aware when such a part is injured. What many people experience when their car is damaged is of a similar nature. The psychological phenomena mentioned suggest that object relations contain elements of libidinal-aggressive cathexes as well as identification elements in varying proportions, frequently one aspect more or less completely overshadowing or predominating over the other. **Internalization involves a giving up of both, the libidinal-aggressive as well as the identification elements in object relations.**" (pg. 82-83)
 - "Here I will be concerned with the difference between identification and internalization, considered as end states or resultants of mental processes. **Identification as such leads to an identity of subject and object or of parts or aspects of them.** Insofar as, in identification, they become identical, one and the same, there is a merging or confusion of subject and object. **Identification tends to erase a difference: subject becomes object and object becomes subject. Identification is a way-station to internalization, but in internalization, if carried to completion, a redifferentiation has taken place by which both subject and object have been reconstituted, each on a new level of**

organization. When we speak of the internalization of object relations, such as in the resolution of the Oedipus complex and in the work of mourning, **it is not**, if the processes are brought to completion, **a matter of maintaining identifications with the objects to be relinquished**; the latter is the case in melancholia where the object and the identifications with the object cannot be given up. **In internalization it is a matter of transforming these relations into an internal, intrapsychic, depersonified relationship, thus increasing and enriching psychic structure: the identity with the object is renounced. Internalization as a completed process implies an emancipation from the object.** To the extent— always limited in the vicissitudes of human life—to which internalization comes to completion, **the individual is enriched by the relationship he has had with the beloved object, not burdened by identification and fantasy relations with the object.** We are most familiar with the transformation I am trying to describe from the development of the child's love attachments to his parents into the adult's mature heterosexual love relationships, a development that includes oedipal object relinquishment and internalization, freeing the individual for non-incestuous object relations. **This freedom is not simply freedom from old object ties that have been cast off, but an inner freedom we call maturity, achieved by internalization of old ties. By internalization, then, the libidinal-aggressive relations between subject and object, as well as identity of subject and object, are given up, destroyed, and separate "identities" are formed or reconstituted. The identity of the individual as well as the identity of his objects becomes defined or redefined.** In this sense, identity does not mean identity between subject and object, but self-sameness, individuality. In this sense Erikson and others speak of ego identity, and correlative to this ego identity is the objective and clearly delimited identity of objects as objects. Mental life is so constituted that it oscillates between the two poles: internal identity, which makes object relations in the true sense possible, and identification that dissolves the differences between subject and object. I hardly need mention that I do not mean that object relations such as between children and parents come to an end by internalization. But through the successful preliminary resolution of the Oedipus complex, ushering in the latency period, the character of the relationship changes, becomes more objective, less colored by identifications and less passionate." (pg. 83-84)

- ◆ "There are degrees of internalization, as I have suggested in my previous paper on the subject, and identifications may be and often are way-stations on the road to internal, psychic structure. The ideal outcome of internalization is identity in the sense of self-sameness as an individual, and not identification and identity with objects. Identifications, though necessary as preliminary phases, to the extent to which the unending process of internalization succeeds, are dissolved, destroyed internally and something novel, psychic structure, comes into being." (pg. 84-85)
- Chapter 7 - Some Considerations on Repetition and Repetition Compulsion (pg. 87)
 - "Repetition on the psychological level cannot be defined simply in terms of reiteration or replica in a mechanical sense, although more or less stereotyped and automatic repetitions of prior experiences, prior behavior, thoughts, feelings and actions play an important role in normal and pathological processes. It is, in fact, one of the most important issues confronting us in a psychoanalytic consideration of repetition to make the distinction between such relatively passive or automatic repetitions and active repeating, and to study the conditions under which transitions from one to the other take place, although little will be said here about the latter point. **Any consideration of the relations between id, ego, and superego has to deal with the passivity-activity issue in terms of repetition, and so does any consideration of psychoanalysis as a therapeutic process.**" (pg. 87)
 - ◆ "If one adheres, as psychoanalysis does, to the concept of unconscious memory, repetition and recollection can be understood in terms of each other, depending on whether we focus on the present act, in which case we speak of repeating, or on the past prototype, in which case we see recollection. Indeed it can be claimed that to understand repetitions ("re-production as an action" - Freud) as a form of remembering, and to understand remembering as an act of repeating, as a "reproduction in the psychical field" (Freud), is one of the cornerstones of psychoanalytic psychology. It ties together past and present, the id and the ego, the biological and the psychological. Insofar as remembering is a form of repeating, we may distinguish two forms of repetition in human life, namely repeating by action, "acting out," and repeating in the psychical field." (pg. 88)
 - "The understanding of the difference between a healthy life development and one blocked or stunted by excessive repression and ego restriction may be furthered by applying the concepts of passive and active repetition. Psychoanalysis has always maintained that the life of the individual is determined by his infantile history, his early experiences and conflicts; but everything depends on how these early experiences are repeated in the course of life, to what extent they are repeated passively - suffered again even if "arranged" by the individual that undergoes them (Freud, 1920, p. 21) —and to what extent they can be taken over in the ego's organizing activity and made over into something new—a re-creation of something old as against a duplication of it. **In such re-creation the old is mastered, where mastery does not mean elimination of it but dissolution, and reconstruction out of the elements of destruction. We may thus distinguish between repetition as reproduction and repetition as re-creation, the passive and the active form.** This distinction is akin to, although not the same as, the one made by Bibring (1943) between the reproductive and restitutive aspects of repetition. Rapaport (1953) has stressed the crucial importance for psychoanalytic theory of the passivity-activity problem and discussed various aspects of it." (pg. 89-90)
 - ◆ "I have implied that the Oedipus complex-itself already a repetition of pre-oedipal experiences on a new organizational level-is repeated not just in puberty but throughout life, in varying mixtures and combinations of more or less passive reproductions ("neurotic" repetitions) and of active re-creations. This takes place in the guise of personal relationships in its various developments during life, and in the evolution of the inner world. The two go hand in hand, and we encounter repetition here again, in a different perspective. It is the repetition in the inner world of what has taken place in interaction with the outer world. The dissolution (not repression) of the oedipal conflict, the extent to which it succeeds in its aspects of mourning and internalization of abandoned object relations, with the erection of the superego as a new differentiation in the ego, is a prime example of re-creative repetition in the psychic field—in contrast to passive reproduction in the psychic field represented by the perpetuation of oedipal fantasies or pathological introjections. Internal re-creative repetitions of external involvement and its dissolution enable the individual to progress to repetitive mastery of the Oedipus complex in the external arena of personal ("heterosexual" and "homosexual") involvements in later life." (pg. 90)
 - "Reproduction and re-creation as defined here ("passive" and "active" repetition) are not merely in an oppositional relationship; they are also complementary. At this point it should be made explicit that **reproduction and re-creation as forms of repetition** both take place in the psychic field as well as in the field of external action. In both fields the passive reproduction of experiences does present the opportunity for arriving at re-creative repetition, depending on a variety of internal and external conditions that cannot be gone into here." (pg. 91)
 - "The compulsion to repeat unconscious conflicts, wishes, experiences passively is due primarily to their having remained under repression, that is, not exposed to the influence of the organizing activity of the ego, which would lead to what we have identified as re-creative repetition." (pg. 92)
 - ◆ "Reliving infantile experiences in the transference starts out as passive, reproductive repetition. Through the analyst's interpretations, revealing and articulating the infantile connections and thus evoking the sense of personal, nonautomatic activity

- both in the present and in the infantile past, transference repetitions may take on the character of re-creative repetition." (pg. 93)
- "Just as perception is an act of organizing, not simply registering data, so is consciousness. Consciousness of intrapsychic processes, then, is an activity that organizes, not merely registers, intrapsychic "data."" (pg. 95)
 - **"To acknowledge, recognize, understand one's unconscious as one's own means to move from a position of passivity in relation to it to a position where active care of it becomes possible,** where it becomes a task worthy of pursuit to make one's business and concern those needs and wishes, fantasies, conflicts and traumatic events and defenses that have been passively experienced and reproduced." (pg. 95-96)
 - Chapter 8 - On Motivation and Instinct Theory (pg. 102)
 - **"Psychoanalysis is interpretation.** Freud called his basic work *The Interpretation of Dreams*. The essential activity of the psychoanalyst is to interpret. The psychic life of the individual is interpreted in new ways whereby it assumes meanings and an inner coherence which heretofore were not apparent. Consequently, the meaning of what we call psychical or mental has changed. Man has gained a new power of understanding, and of thereby influencing, human life by the observation and discovery of phenomena and events hitherto unknown or unheeded, by interpreting them in a manner that so far had not been applied to psychic life, and by bringing known psychological observations and activities within the context of that new interpretation, i.e., by understanding them differently. Interpretation: we have no other way of applying our mind, whether in observation and understanding or in action. It is only in a context of meanings, when interpretations have become commonplace, that we speak of the material in question as "facts." Then we tend to deal with the material in the manner of our dealings with chairs and tables, forgetting or disregarding the mental activity of interpretation that is embodied in it but is now hidden. Even chairs and tables are such only within the context of our understanding use of them and are oddly shaped and assembled pieces of stuff outside this context. **Psychoanalysis is, however, a special case. Its essence is interpretation.** The psychoanalyst interprets dreams, slips of the tongue, symptoms, fantasies, thoughts, behavior, moods, emotions, memories, plans, actions, decisions, choices made or contemplated, physical illness, life circumstance—in principle anything and everything the patient lets be known or that can be deduced from what he reveals. The psychoanalyst's interpretations are based on and make use of a fundamental assumption: whatever transpires is personally motivated. This assumption is the all-embracing interpretation that constitutes the foundation for all individual interpretations. This founding interpretation has components that are condensed in the expression "personally motivated": (1) What the patient reveals is motivated within and not simply chance occurrence or merely determined by forces external to him. (2) The fact of his revealing it to the analyst and the time at which he does so are personally motivated; personal motivation is involved in the past and current events he reveals, as well as in his present activity of revealing them. (3) We must also hear something else that is evoked in the expression "personally motivated," namely that motivations, while residing in the person motivated, have something to do with relations with other persons who themselves are centers of motivation. These others involved in the motivational network are the important persons in the patient's past and current life, pre-eminently including his psychoanalyst." (pg. 102-103)
 - ◆ "I have implied that **the object of psychoanalysis is the individual human person.** Only in this entity do we encounter what psychoanalysis calls psychic life and psychic reality." (pg. 104)
 - ◇ "Psychoanalytic statements are not necessarily valid in respect to other units, such as for instance family or society, even though these are composed of individuals; nor are they necessarily valid or pertinent for psychological phenomena taken out of the context of the unit constituted by the individual, as is the case in experimental or general psychology." (pg. 104)
 - "Inborn apparatuses are nothing but a euphemism for neurophysiological and neuroanatomical substrates, they have no psychological status. Instinct (Trieb) does have psychological meaning and the term has its legitimate use in psychoanalysis only as a psychological concept, and not as a biological or ethological one. Nobody of course denies neurophysiological processes and neurological structures, or the maturation of such structures. But to speak of inborn ego apparatuses is speaking of a Hamlet who is not the Prince of Denmark. In psychoanalytic psychology the ego is a psychic structure that cannot be found anywhere in biology or neurology, just as an organism cannot be found anywhere in physics, or a superego in sociology. It makes sense to speak of the development of the id and the ego out of an undifferentiated phase, in which there is as yet no differentiation of id, ego, and environment, as long as the concept of the undifferentiated phase is not biologized and it is recognized that as psychoanalysts we cannot go back beyond that limit." (pg. 110)
 - ◆ **"...I consider instinct a psychoanalytic psychological concept, which should be kept free of biological and ethological connotations"** (pg. 115)
 - "Ego and id, conceived as psychic structures, come into being within the psychic unit the neonate is about to become by intricate interaction processes between conflicting, converging, and merging psychic energy currents surrounding and within the emerging psychic system; such interactions result in the organization of psychic structure. It cannot be stressed enough that such organization is most vitally codetermined by the fact of the far higher complexity and organization of psychic energy obtaining in the (for the observer) surrounding or environmental psychic systems. It is by the interaction with them that motivational forces of various orders of complexity and integration, and stable motivational structures of any kind, come into being within the newly emerging psychic unit, the child. On that basis, but never without maintaining further interaction with psychic forces of the environment, interactional processes within the new psychic system can be built into various forms of structured organization, whereby higher levels of motivation come about. Structures are understood as more or less systematic and stable organizations of psychic energy; they bring their higher potential to bear on mobile instinctual energy, thus transforming its currents into higher orders of motivational energy." (pg. 111-112)
 - **"One concern of Freud's, especially in the beginning, was to free psychology of its intellectualistic orientation, of its bias in favor of consciousness, and, from the point of view of then-current morality, of its preoccupation with the "higher," rational, and morally acceptable reaches of the mind. He was not alone in his interest in and emphasis on the irrational in life and human nature, the importance of primordial, archaic, infantile, and primitive forces in human life and the life of the mind, including those existing "in consequence of its connection with the body.""** (pg. 124)
 - ◆ "*Triebe were*, however, for Freud not just abstract constructs or concepts in a theory of motivation or personality, to be sorted out from other forces of motivation, to be classified and distinguished from affects, perceptual and cognitive processes, and somatic needs. Tribe, instincts, were—much more than scientists, doctors, ministers, judges ("the educated circles") wanted to admit or know - **what made the human world go around, what drove people to act and think and feel the way they do, in excess as well as in self-constriction, inhibition, and fear, in their daily lives in the family and with others, and in their civilized and professional occupations and preoccupations as well.** They dominated their love life and influenced their behavior with children and authorities. They made people sick and made them mad. They drove people to perversion and crimes, made them into hypocrites and liars as well as into fanatics for truth and other virtues, or into prissy, bigoted, prejudiced, or anxious creatures. Their sexual needs, preoccupations, and inhibitions turned out to be at the root of much of all this. **Rational, civilized, measured, "good" behavior, the noble and kind deeds and thoughts and feelings so highly valued were much of the time postures and gestures, self-denials, rationalizations, distortions, and hideouts—a thin surface mask covering and embellishing the true life and the real power of the instincts.** The life of the body, of bodily needs and habits and functions, kisses and excrements and intercourse, tastes and smells

and sights, body noises and sensations, caresses and punishments, tics and gait and movements, facial expression, the penis and the vagina and the tongue and arms and hands and feet and legs and hair, pain and pleasure, physical excitement and lassitude, violence and bliss - all this is the body in the context of human life. The body is not primarily the organism with its organs and physiological functions, anatomical structures, nerve pathways, and chemical processes." (pg. 125)

- ◆ "He created, partly in spite of his inclinations and not without grave misgivings, an entirely new method and standard of scientific investigation which went counter to scientific principles and methods derived from or devised for a different realm of reality-principles and methods that stultified an appropriate approach to and grasp of psychic life. He could do this because he was unwilling to accept the narrow limitations imposed on science by the science of his day, whose child he remained nevertheless. He broke out of those limits and widened the field of scientific action, while loath to accept the consequences of such a venture in all its implications. But had he not in such a way brought science and life as it is lived together again, psychoanalysis would never have had the impact on modern life and scientific thought that we see today. Instincts and the life of the body, seen in the perspective sketched above, are one and the same. They become separate only when we begin to distinguish between soma and psyche. But once this is done - and without this distinction there is neither physiology-anatomy nor psychology - instinct in psychoanalysis must be understood as a psychological concept. I believe it means reintroducing the psyche into biology and physics if one speaks of Eros and Thanatos as universal cosmic tendencies. Whether this is legitimate or not remains, in my opinion, an open question; this psyche, however, would in any event not be psyche or mind in terms of human psychology. Within the framework of psychoanalysis as a science of the human mind we must, if we accept the Eros-Thanatos conception (or its less "metaphysical" form, the duality of libido and aggression), speak of instincts as psychic representatives, and of life and death instincts as such representatives." (pg. 125-126)
- "The status of objects in psychoanalytic theory has undergone a gradual and profound change in the course of time. In broad outline, one may say that objects were first conceptualized predominantly as means for providing satisfaction of instinctual needs, i.e., as possible sources of "pleasure" and, by the same token, possible sources of unpleasure and frustration of such needs. Satisfaction, be it noted again, was understood as that process which, in conformity with the pleasure-unpleasure principle, leads to the elimination or reduction of excitation (stimulation), or is the result of such a process. Objects were taken as givens and no psychoanalytic questions were raised about them and their status in psychoanalytic theory. Such a psychoanalytically naive conception of objects, despite subsequent changes, still pervades much of psychoanalytic theory." (pg. 127)
 - ◆ "But gradually it became apparent that, at least in regard to early psychic stages - and these are of specific importance for instinct theory - objects are not givens. On the contrary, a highly complex course of psychic development is required for environmental and body-surface stimuli to become organized and experienced as external, in contrast to internal, and for such sources of stimulation, gratification, and frustration eventually to become objects, in any acceptable sense of that word, for a subject or self. Hand in hand with this came a growing recognition of the fact that, what from an external (i.e., non-psychoanalytic) observer's point of view are called objects, are indispensable and crucial factors in the organization of psychic functioning and psychic structure. In other words, **what is naively called objects plays an essential part in the constitution of the subject, including the organization of instincts as psychic phenomena and of the subject's developing "object relations"; and what is naively called subject plays an essential part in the organization of objects (not merely of object representations).** A detailed reconsideration of the concepts of object and object representation in psychoanalysis must be reserved for a later occasion. At that time the relation of instincts to objects will have to be re-examined." (pg. 127)
- Chapter 9 - The Experience of Time (pg. 138)
 - "[T]he experience of time, temporal phenomena, and the concept of time play an essential role in psycho-analysis, both as a method of treatment and research and as a body of theory. Here are some of the temporal phenomena and concepts that most obviously are of importance in psychoanalysis: memory, forgetting, regression, repetition, anticipation, presentation, and representation; the influence of the past on the present in thought, feeling, and behavior; delay of gratification and action; sleep-wakefulness and other rhythmicities in mental life; variations and abnormalities in the subjective sense of elapsed time; the so-called timelessness of the id; the role of imagination and fantasy in structuring the future; values, standards, ideals as future-oriented categories; concepts such as object constancy and self identity; not to mention the important factor of time in the psychoanalytic situation itself, in technical aspects, appointments, length of hour, etc." (pg. 138)
 - "While in the experience of eternity - which objectively may last only for a small fraction of time - temporal relations have vanished into a unity which abolishes time, in the experience of fragmentation time has been abolished in the annihilation of connectedness. To express this in a different way: in the experience of eternity, all meaning is condensed in the undifferentiated, global unity of the abiding instant, the nunc stans, and may flow out from there again to replenish the world of time with meaning; while in the experience of fragmentation, meaning, i.e., connectedness, has disappeared, each instant is only its empty self, a nothing." (pg. 142)
- Chapter 10 - Perspectives on Memory (pg. 148)
 - "Memory, for the psychoanalyst, is not just a faculty or function of the intellect by virtue of which the mind registers, retains, and may remember experiences, events, and objects. For him, memory also has something to do with separation, loss, mourning, and restitution, and often carries with it a sense of nostalgia, especially as we get older. The words commemoration and memorial remind us of such connotations." (pg. 148)
 - "Memory, however, does not simply enable us to hang on to the past in some way; it gives meaning to the present and helps to shape a future. Memory is connected with our whole experience of time. It is not merely a faculty of reviving or reproducing the past, nor is it simply the faculty of recording and retaining present but fleeting perceptions so that they may last in some other form. By virtue of memory, our experiences become connectible, are woven into a context, and extend into a past and a future. In an important sense, **memorial activity is linking activity.** A before, now, and after are created in this linking and become mutually influential; continuity of our life as individuals comes into being. By these memorial processes, what would otherwise be at best bits of impressions, only to perish immediately, are made to remain as inner state, image, or idea to be linked with fresh impressions and experiences. To move from one eventful moment to the next without having lost the first one—so as to be able to link and match one with the other—requires memorial activity. Without the mind's activity of holding and rebuilding its impressions and its own acts, affects, perceptions, ideas, images, and fantasies, an activity in which present reality is organized by matching and comparing with what has been and what, in anticipation, might be - without all this there would be for us neither past nor present nor future. These are the modes of time, the mutually dependent articulations of experience that arise through memorial activity. Without such inner reproductive holding, in which consists the linking together of before, now, and after, we would experience neither duration nor change. Memory, in this broadest sense, is the activity by which, above all, some sort of order and organization and some sense of permanence, as well as of movement and change, come into our world." (pg. 148-149)
 - ◆ "Such a broad conception of memory, in which the word refers to that central, all-pervasive activity of the mind by which our

- world and our life gain breadth and depth and continuity in flux, and change in continuity**, by which, in other words, our life and world acquire dimension and meaning, makes memory virtually synonymous with mind itself." (pg. 149)
- **"When I speak of instinctual forces and of instincts or instinctual drives, I define them as motivational, i.e., both motivated and motivating, and as being the most primitive psychic forces in the motivational, hierarchically organized network of psychic forces. As intrapsychic motivations, they arise within and develop from a psychic matrix or field constituted essentially by the mother-child unit. Instincts are here defined as what Freud has called psychic representatives, not as biological forces, and as forces that *ab initio* manifest themselves within and between what gradually differentiates into individual and environment (or ego and objects, or self and object world-allowing these terms for the moment to be equivalent). Instincts remain relational phenomena, rather than being considered energies within a closed system, to be "discharged" somewhere** (see Loewald, 1971). The differentiation, within the original matrix, of individual and environment involves the differentiation of narcissistic and object cathexis. Here, narcissistic cathexis means instinctual currents between elements within the emerging individual (or ego system); object cathexis means instinctual currents between individual and environment (or objects). Narcissistic and object cathexes, once portions of instinctual cathexis have thus been differentiated (other portions remain undifferentiated), interact with and influence each other; they do not simply each go their own way. It is the instinctual interactions within the ego system that deserve par excellence to be termed narcissistic, although the state prior to the differentiation of object cathexis and narcissistic cathexis is referred to as primary narcissism, a designation that is justified insofar as we consider that prior state in regard to the prospect of intrapsychic development. It is true that, once an ego system or internal world has developed, it may itself be cathected as a totality, and we speak of this process, too, as narcissistic. For our present purposes, let it be clear only that one has to distinguish, on the one hand, between cathectic processes within the system that give it its character as an organization, and, on the other, cathectic processes that are deployed upon the system by itself." (pg. 152-153)
 - ◆ **"If the ego is a unity that has to develop and not something "there" from the beginning of psychic development, this is also true for the object.** It is misleading to speak of objects when referring to stages in development where the differentiation of inside and outside, or ego and object, is at best in statu nascendi, where, in other words, there is as yet no subject as a psychic unity that may cathect or interact with something that is differentiated as an external unity." (pg. 154)
 - **"...perception is an active process and not a purely passive reception"** (pg. 157)
 - **"Memory is the child of both satisfaction and frustration"** (pg. 161)
 - ◆ "Memorial activity appears to be, if not initiated, at any rate promoted or activated by experiences of deprivation as well as by experiences of satisfaction." (pg. 162)
 - "I distinguish between the ego's structure as a self-organizing system of narcissistic interactions, and the ego's functions in relation to the world and to itself, which its structure makes possible." (pg. 166)
 - **"Through psychoanalysis man may become a truly historical being.** In contrast to the ahistorical life of primitive societies and primitive man, including the primitive man in ourselves, the higher forms of memorial activity make us create a history of ourselves as a race and as individuals, as well as a history of the world in which we live. Rudiments of this history-creating activity are present even in primitive mentality, but it comes into its own in the individual in those higher forms of reflective memory wherein we encounter ourselves in all our dimensions. **This is the thrust of psychoanalysis, of the endeavor to transform unconscious or automatic repetitions— memorial processes in which we do not encounter ourselves and others - into aware and re-creative action in which we know who we and others are, understand how we got to be that way, and envisage what we might do with ourselves as we are. In such memorial activity, which weaves past, present, and future into a context of heightened meaning, each of us is on the path to becoming a self.** For most of us, such self-aware organization and conduct of life with others and ourselves remains a potential rather than an actuality, except for brief moments or periods. Understanding this potentiality, however, can help us to strive toward a more human life." (pg. 171-172)
 - Chapter 11 - Ego-Organization and Defense (pg. 174)
 - See text
 - Chapter 12 - Primary Process, Secondary Process, and Language (pg. 178)
 - **"Repression, seen from this angle, amounts to a severing or loosening of the connections between thing-presentation and word-presentations.** Word-presentations may remain conscious but are no longer or only loosely linked with corresponding thing-presentations. As I had stated earlier, the hyper-cathecting link between them constitutes a psychical act of the nature of an internal perception. **This internal perception** (a "preconscious" mental act), **or rather its memorial presentation, in repression becomes disrupted.** Thus, **repression as an intrapsychic action can be understood as an unlinking.** The unconscious thing-presentation as a result of repression, however, is not simply a presentation of the "thing" minus the corresponding words. Rather, the words have been reabsorbed into that old memorial formation where thing and words are not yet distinguished as different but corresponding and thus linkable elements of experience. Therefore an interpretation of unconscious presentations, communicated in words by the analyst, is capable of re-establishing differentiation of the thing-presentation in such a way that renewed linking can be achieved." (pg. 188)
 - **"What psychoanalysis needs might not be a "new language" but a less inhibited, less pedantic and narrow understanding and interpretation of its current language, leading to elaborations and transformations of the meanings of concepts, theoretical formulations, or definitions that may or may not have been envisaged by Freud. Words, including concepts used in science, are living and enlivening entities in their authentic function.** In their interactions with "things" to which they refer, they are informed with increased or transformed meaning as these things become better known, even as words and concepts inform things with increased and transformed meaning." (pg. 193)
 - ◆ "Words have a potential for development and change of meaning while remaining the same words, just as things have that potential while remaining "the same". **Their potentials are realized to the extent to which they engage in live interplay with each other.** Concepts tend to become dead issues by narrow-minded exegesis." (pg. 194)
 - **"The primary process has been called primary because it is developmentally the first, the earliest form of mentation, and because it is seen as more primitive than secondary process. But the process is primary in a deeper sense insofar as it is unitary, non-differentiating, non-discriminating between various elements or components of a global event or experience. Thinking in terms of elements or components of an experience or act already bespeaks secondary process thinking. In primary process mentation oneness, as against duality or multiplicity, is dominant. In secondary-process mentation duality and multiplicity are dominant, i.e., differentiation, division, a splitting of what was unitary, global, unstructured oneness.** Earlier I spoke of the original uniform density conveyed in primary process, a density that may become reconstituted from secondary process differentiation by regressive condensation, as it occurs in repression. I also explained that **the secondary process consists not simply in splitting, dividing, discriminating—the word diacritic in Spitz's "diacritic perception" refers to the same phenomenon - but that in this same act the original wholeness is kept alive by an articulating integration that makes a textured totality out of a global one.** What was homogeneous becomes a manifold whose elements are linked together. A weakening of these links, of this connectedness, can occur that may culminate in a virtual rupture, a fragmentation of experience and thought." (pg. 196)

- ◆ "Developed language is a preeminent vehicle for articulating complex experiences or thought processes, for making explicit their elements and the mutual connections between these elements, for "scanning" experience and thought point by point, thus rendering present their immanent textured structure. Without language or some other sensory-motor means or vehicle for articulating mentation, conditions are ripe for primary process. But language itself arises out of the homogeneous "thing-presentation" or primary-process experience. Therefore words and sentences, while bringing to the fore the textured linkedness in experience and thought, themselves become linked to concrete experience in as much as secondary-process mentation differentiates vocables out of homogeneous experience as elements linked to it. I described how the mother's talking with the baby gives vocal accentuation to his experience that gradually becomes a separate but linked aspect of that experience. Although in a derivative form, based on far more articulate modes of mentation to begin with, something similar takes place every time we first learn a word for a thing. In such learning, much of the time, the word is not simply added to the thing, but the thing itself becomes first defined or delimited as an alive circumscribed entity (hypercathexis). The emotional relationship to the person from whom the word is learned plays a significant, in fact crucial, part in how alive the link between thing and word turns out to be. **Language, and any other mode of symbolization (visual representation, music, dance), in the course of its development may take on a life of its own, evolving its own laws** in accordance with its particular sensory-motor possibilities and the limits set by them. But this "life of its own" nevertheless remains imperceptibly tied to and fed by the global experiences from which it has segregated, while at the same time giving them newly disclosed meaning. **The primary form of mental acts is called unconscious, the secondary form preconscious.** I shall attempt to clarify the meaning of the word conscious, contained in these two basic terms of psychoanalytic theory, by going beyond the ordinary understanding of consciousness as conscious awareness." (pg. 196-197)
 - "The word conscious derives from the Latin *consci-us*, **con-scire, to know together**. In secondary-process mentation the differentiation of uniform experience involves a knowing-together (as belonging together) of the now differentiating elements of that experience. The hyper-cathecting linking of the elements, in our case of thing-presentation and corresponding word-presentations, is a perceptual act, an act of con-scire. The linking is a knowing-together, but a con-scire that is not necessarily itself known in and by the linking activity, it may happen unbeknownst to the ego or self that is engaged in this con-scire. Freud has called that kind of linking mentation pre-conscious." (pg. 198)
 - "We may say that language, being a vehicle for secondary process or conscient mentation, being a medium of hypercathexis that creates higher organization, in its most genuine and autonomous function is a binding power. It ties together human beings and self and object world, and it binds abstract thought with the bodily concreteness and power of life. **In the word primary and secondary process are reconciled.**" (pg. 204)
- Chapter 13 - Instinct Theory, Object Relations, and Psychic Structure Formation (pg. 207)
 - "I shall define, provisionally, individuation as that group of psychic processes or activities by which the separateness of subject and object as distinct psychic organizations becomes increasingly established." (pg. 207)
 - "In contradistinction to Freud's thought in "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes" (1915, pp. 121-22), however, I do not speak of biological stimuli impinging on a ready-made "psychic apparatus" in which their psychic representatives are thus created, but of interactional biological processes that find higher organization on levels which we have come to call psychic life. **Understood as psychic phenomena or representatives, instincts come into being in the early organizing mother-infant interactions. They form the most primitive level of human mentation and motivation. In their totality, and as mental life progresses toward more complex organization of different levels of mentation and interplay between them, instincts constitute the id as distinguishable from ego and superego.** Thus I conceive instincts (considered in the framework of psychoanalytic psychology), and the id as a psychic structure, **as originating in interactions of the infantile organism and its human environment (mother)**, that is, in what Mahler calls the dual unity of the infant-mother symbiosis. As for ego as a psychic substructure, and superego, they too, although on already more complexly organized levels of interaction, come into being as resultants of interactions of the individuating child and its human environment. Internalization of such interactions leads to their formation. Perhaps this was more readily acknowledged in respect to the superego, because Freud began his investigations into the process we now call internalization by studying the phenomena of identification as they came to light in the area of ideal formation and superego development. But it is equally true of the ego as a coherent organization that it is formed in those primary identifications taking place during pre-oedipal stages." (pg. 208-209)
 - ◆ "[T]he ego is not defined as a structure by having functions such as memory, perception, reality testing, etc., but by its being a coherent organization on a certain level of mental functioning. It is its mode of functioning, which is due to its particular differentiation and integration of mental activities and "percepts," that makes us speak of it as a psychic structure distinct from the other structures. In general, the character of being a structure is not determined by the fact that certain components are simply grouped together, whether these components are functions or material parts, but by the interrelations of the components as dominated by the organization of the whole, by the particular principles of arrangement and mutual relatedness of its component elements. We approach a psychoanalytic understanding of the structuredness or organization of a structure such as the ego or superego by understanding how it has come about, i.e., in terms of its genesis —granted that later factors may, and normally do, greatly modify and make more complex its organization and functioning. This is surely one of the reasons why we concern ourselves so much with early development. It is not only in order to understand children, but adults as well. I am not speaking in favor of reductionism. There is a vast difference between, on the one hand, deriving something from its origins and antecedents, thus reconstructing its structure and functioning, and, on the other hand, reducing some now extant structure to its original rudiments, as though no development had taken place. Without focusing on such reconstruction, we will never understand the unconscious organization and aspects of the human mind, or how where id was, ego may come into being." (pg. 210)
 - "The separateness of subject and object - I am not speaking of the objective separateness of two biological organisms - **becomes established by way of internalization and externalization processes in which both infant and mother participate**, and, later, the child and its broadening human environment. Disturbances of internalizing and externalizing processes, caused by deficiencies - for whatever reasons - in the vicissitudes of attunement between child and human environment, spell disturbance of individuation, of psychic-structure formation." (pg. 211-212)
 - "Individuation, the organization of instincts, of id, ego, and superego, I have said, is dependent on object relations. The term object relations is by tradition used in a loose and rather imprecise way in psychoanalysis. It comprises the relations between child and adult — and the human environment, regardless of the level of psychic development on which these relations occur." (pg. 212)
 - ◆ "Relationship, in contrast to sameness, identity, or "symbiotic fusion," **implies difference, presupposes differentiation**" (pg. 215)
 - ◆ "This relatedness is the psychic matrix out of which intrapsychic instincts and ego, and extrapsychic object, differentiate." (pg. 216)
- Part 2 - The Psychoanalytic Process (pg. 219)
 - Chapter 14 - On the Therapeutic Action of Psychoanalysis (pg. 221)
 - "In sculpturing, the figure to be created comes into being by taking away from the material; in painting, by adding something to the

- canvas. In analysis, we bring out the true form by taking away the neurotic distortions. However, as in sculpture, we must have, if only in rudiments, an image of that which needs to be brought into its own. The patient, by revealing himself to the analyst, provides rudiments of such an image through all the distortions - an image that the analyst has to focus in his mind, thus holding it in safe keeping for the patient to whom it is mainly lost. It is this tenuous reciprocal tie which represents the germ of a new object-relationship." (pg. 226)
- "Gradually, both recognition and satisfaction of the need come within the grasp of the growing infant itself. The processes by which this occurs are generally subsumed under the headings identification and introjection. Access to them has to be made available by the environment, here the mother, who performs this function in the acts of recognition and fulfillment of the need. These acts are not merely necessary for the physical survival of the infant but necessary at the same time for its psychological development insofar as they organize, in successive steps, the infant's relatively uncoordinated urges. The whole complex dynamic constellation is one of mutual responsiveness where nothing is introjected by the infant that is not brought to it by the mother, although brought by her often unconsciously. And a prerequisite for introjection and identification is the gathering mediation of structure and direction by the mother in her caring activities. As the mediating environment conveys structure and direction to the unfolding psychophysical entity, the environment begins to gain structure and direction in the experience of that entity; the environment begins to take shape in the experience of the infant. It is now that identification and introjection as well as projection emerge as more defined processes of organization of the psychic apparatus and of environment." (pg. 237-238)
 - "By an interpretation, both the unconscious experience and a higher organizational level of that experience are made available to the patient: unconscious and preconscious are joined together in the act of interpretation." (pg. 242)
 - ◆ "Language, in its most specific function in analysis, as interpretation, is thus a creative act similar to that in poetry, where language is found for phenomena, contexts, connections, experiences not previously known and speakable. New phenomena and new experience are made available as a result of reorganization of material according to hitherto unknown principles, contexts, and connections." (pg. 242)
 - "Ordinarily we operate with material organized on high levels of sublimation as "given reality." In an analysis the analyst has to retrace the organizational steps that have led to such a reality level, so that the organizing process becomes available to the patient. This is regression in the service of the ego, in the service of reorganization — a regression against which there is resistance in the analyst as well as in the patient." (pg. 242)
 - "We call analysis that kind of organizing, restructuring interaction between patient and therapist which is predominantly performed on the level of language communication." (pg. 243)
 - ◆ "The opening of barriers between unconscious and preconscious, as it occurs in any creative process, is then to be understood as an internalized integrative experience— and is in fact experienced as such." (pg. 251)
 - "I hope to have made the point in the present discussion that there is neither such a thing as reality nor a real relationship, without transference. Any "real relationship" involves transfer of unconscious images to present-day objects. In fact, present-day objects are objects, and thus real, in the full sense of the word (which comprises the unity of unconscious memory traces and preconscious idea only to the extent to which this transference, in the sense of transformational interplay between unconscious and preconscious, is realized." (pg. 254)
 - Chapter 15 - Internalization, Separation, Mourning, and the Superego (pg. 257)
 - "One of the differences between analysis and ordinary life is that experiences purposefully and often painfully made explicit in analysis usually remain implicit in ordinary life; they are lifted onto a level and quality of awareness that they do not usually possess in ordinary life. To gain such awareness, inner distance and perspective are needed, and to acquire them time is needed which is not often available or used in such ways in the urgency of immediate life experiences." (pg. 259)
 - "Analysis, understood as the working out of the transference neurosis, changes the inner relationships which had constituted the patient's character by promoting the partial externalization of these internal relationships, thus making them available for recognition, exploration, and reintegration. By partial externalization, psychic structures in their inner organization are projected onto a plane of reality where they become three-dimensional, as it were. However, the analyst, as was the case with the original parental figures, is only a temporary external object in important respects. The relationship with the analyst, like that with parental figures in earlier ego development, has to become partially internalized—a process which to varying degrees goes on during all but the initial stages of analysis, but which is to come to its fruition and more definitive realization during the terminal phase. The pressure of the impending separation helps to accelerate this renewed internalization, although the process of internalization will continue and come to relative completion only after termination of the analysis." (pg. 260)
 - "I use the term "internalization" here as a general term for certain processes of transformation by which relationships and interactions between the individual psychic apparatus and its environment are changed into inner relationships and interactions within the psychic apparatus. Thus an internal world is constituted and it in turn entertains relationships and interactions with the outer world. The term "internalization" therefore covers such "mechanisms" as incorporation, introjection, and identification, or those referred to by the terms "internal object" and "internalized object," as well as such "vicissitudes of instincts" as the "turning inward" of libidinal and aggressive drives. The word "incorporation" most often seems to emphasize zonal, particularly oral, aspects of internalization processes." (pg. 262)
 - "Internal and external relationships, of course, continue to supplement and influence each other in various ways during adult life; there are more or less continuous shifts and exchanges between internal and external relationships." (pg. 268)
 - "The superego, inasmuch as it is the internal representative of parental and cultural standards, expectations, fears, and hopes, is the intrapsychic representation of the future. Only insofar as we are ahead of ourselves, insofar as we recognize potentialities in ourselves, which represent more than we are at present and from which we look back at ourselves as we are at present, can we be said to have a conscience. The voice of conscience speaks to us as the mouthpiece of the superego, from the point of view of the inner future which we envision. One might say that in the voice of conscience the superego speaks to the ego as being capable or incapable of encompassing the superego as the inner future toward which to move." (pg. 273)
 - Chapter 16 - Psychoanalytic Theory and the Psychoanalytic Process (pg. 277)
 - "It is a commonplace fact that introspection and empathy are essential tools of psychoanalysis, and that we can analyze others only as far as we have been analyzed ourselves and understand ourselves. To this there is the corollary: we understand ourselves psychoanalytically by seeing ourselves as others (objectivating introspection), and our self-understanding is greatly enhanced by analyzing others, as every analyst knows." (pg. 280)
 - ◆ "By opening up the channels of intra-psychic and interpsychic communication our psychic life is altered..." (pg. 280)
 - "Psychoanalyzing someone means to intervene in his psychic life" (pg. 281)
 - ◆ "Psychoanalysis is an activity of the human mind which we as analysts exercise upon and in conjunction and cooperation with another person and his mental activity—whether we think in terms of "pure" psychoanalytic investigation or in terms of therapeutic analysis. The method we employ comprises prominently the use of verbal symbols as the means of communication, free association,

free-floating attention, self-reflection and introspection, confrontation, clarification, interpretation, etc. And psychoanalysis is the body of knowledge and theory resulting from this activity and method. When I say: "the method we employ," it means not only: we as analysts, but: we, analyst and analysand. If the analytic process "takes" at all, the method becomes common good, although with significant differences between analyst and analysand. There can be no analysis as a going process in which the analysand, after a period of time which we may call the time of induction, does not engage to a varying extent in the procedures listed above. In respect to some of them, such as free-floating attention, interpretation, self-reflection, this may happen only in identifying conjunction with the analyst, whereby an interpretation, for instance, is "accepted" by the analysand. Such acceptance, if genuine, involves the free reproduction of the interpretive act on the part of the analysand." (pg. 285)

- "The concept of internalization, as the essential process in intrapsychic structure formation or, to put it differently, in individuation, presupposes neither the subject-object split nor the assumption of a separate psychic apparatus or organization, however primitive, from the beginning; it posits an original psychic field or matrix, the mother-infant unit, within which individuation processes start. If one thinks in terms of an original undifferentiated phase of psychic life, this then would refer not only to id ego as intrapsychic potentials, but equally to the psychic undifferentiation of psyche-environment, of internal and external." (pg. 290)
 - **"Our object, being what it is, is the other in ourselves and ourself in the other. To discover truth about the patient is always discovering it with him and for him as well as for ourselves and about ourselves. And it is discovering truth between each other, as the truth of human beings is revealed in their interrelatedness."** (pg. 297-298)
- Chapter 17 - The Transference Neurosis (pg. 302)
 - See text
- Chapter 18 - Freud's Conception of the Negative Therapeutic Reaction (pg. 315)
 - See text
- Chapter 19 - Comments on Some Instinctual Manifestations of Superego Formation (pg. 326)
 - See text
- Chapter 20 - Book Review: Heinz Kohut (pg. 342)
 - See text
- Chapter 21 - Psychoanalysis as an Art and the Fantasy Character of the Psychoanalytic Situation (pg. 352)
 - **"The art of psychoanalysis, with regard to the analyst, consists essentially in the handling of the transference.** The fantasy character of the psychoanalytic situation is its character as play, in the double sense of children's and adults' playing and of drama as a play. Play and fantasy have their roots in life experience, draw their sustenance from it, and give life its meaning. The dramatic play is a re-enactment of life in fantasy, and this fantasy life enters actual life giving it renewed and enriching meaning. The playing of the child, and of the child in the adult, also has its roots in life experience and gives meaning to life experience. The relative freedom from constraints in play and fantasy life is not only a relief from the exigencies of life, it also allows one to see beyond those exigencies and not to be overwhelmed by their constraints in actual living. For the small child, fantasy, play, and actual life experience are still one and the same reality. It is only later that they become separated out as facets of a reality whose meaning is established in their interconnections. Thus the transference neurosis, on a regressive level of the patient's mental life, is experienced by him as though he does not distinguish between fantasy or memory and present actuality, whereas he is capable, when functioning on more advanced mental levels, of making this distinction and to profit from the revived connections between them. **The art of the psychoanalyst, then, consists in a threefold activity that is therapeutic:** (1) He promotes that regression which conjoins the patient's experiential past (memories and fantasies) with his experiential present - the actuality of the analytic situation—so that they tend to become one. (2) The analyst, by appropriately timed and appropriately responsive interpretations and other interventions that speak to the reflective levels and capacities of the patient, reminds him of the difference between past and present, between memory-fantasy and actuality. (3) In doing so, the analyst helps the patient to re-establish connections, links between these different facets of reality, links that give renewed meaning to memories and fantasy life and to the patient's actual life in the present. Insofar as the patient's experiences in the analytic situation become part of his mental life, they influence his future life. All depends on the transference neurosis being recognized as the play of fantasy—a trial action in the sense in which Freud spoke of thought as trial action— which shares in organizing reality, far from being unreal and therefore to be discarded. The resolution of the transference neurosis surely does not consist of renewed repression or any ultimate relinquishment of recovered memories and fantasies, but of employing them, revived and made available for development and change in the transference play, in actual living. The developmental tasks of late adolescence in many respects are similar to those in an analysis. The so-called idealism of youth often is supposed to be given up in favor of the so-called realism of the adult. This realism of the disillusioned adult, in many quarters seen as the healthy norm or at least as all that we can aim for, is the result of the disruption, of the lack of live communication between youthful dreams and fantasies and what we call actual, rational life. Reality testing is far more than an intellectual or cognitive function. It may be understood more comprehensively as the experiential testing of fantasy - its potential and suitability for actualization- and the testing of actuality - its potential for encompassing it in, and penetrating it with, one's fantasy life. We deal with the task of a reciprocal transposition." (pg. 366-368)
- Chapter 22 - Reflections on the Psychoanalytic Process (pg. 372)
 - **"[I]ndividuation and what we consider mature object relations, while originating and culminating in intimacy, involve and are dependent on separation, alienation, and renunciations along the way from infancy to adulthood.** Without these there cannot be effective internalization, that is, the building of a stable self that may maintain viable object relations. **The analytic relationship, then, comes into being as a sort of self-played dramatic play in and by which the history of the individual is re-experienced, restructured, acquires new meanings, and regains old meanings that were lost.** But this relationship is never allowed to materialize as an actual relationship. It has the substantiality and the evanescence of a play, as well as that quality of a child's play: it seems to exist for its own sake and at the same time to be a rehearsal for real life. The psychoanalytic method of treatment requires simultaneously unusual restraints and endurance of frustration together with an uncommon quality and degree of spontaneity and freedom - and all this, although in different ways, from both partners. Except in child analysis, both participants are adults, with the age difference often insignificant or nonexistent, yet the relationship is asymmetrical, much of the time experienced by the analysand as unjustly unequal. If the analysis progresses well, this asymmetry and sense of inequality gradually recede, not unlike what happens between parents and children as the children grow into adolescence and beyond, if things go well there. The relationship between analysand and analyst is comparable to adolescent and oedipal relationships and their derivatives, but also to the infant-mother "dual unit." Much of the analytic work centers around oedipal conflicts, but more and more, in many cases, also around developmental defects and distortions related to those early phases of the individuation process described by child analysts. In this connection, the self-object differentiation, until recently an essential condition of what we have believed to be scientific objectivity and analytic objectivity, can no longer be taken for granted as the single or basic mode of cognition and mental interactions. Is it the relevant mode and basis for all mental transactions between analysand and analyst, or is there a deep unconscious level on which this dichotomy is not valid? If so, for the sake of a more encompassing objectivity vis-à-vis the psychoanalytic

- process and its therapeutic potential this needs to be further elucidated. We are far from understanding much about it." (pg. 372-373)
- "Psychanalytic interpretations establish or make explicit bridges between two minds, and within the patient bridges between different areas and layers of the mind that lack or have lost connections with each other, that are not encompassed within an overall contextual organization of the personality. Interpretations establish or re-establish links between islands of unconscious mentation and between the unconscious and consciousness. They are translations that do not simply make the unconscious conscious or cause ego to be where it was; they link these different forms and contents of mental life, going back and forth between them. There are interpretations upward and interpretations downward. What is therapeutic, I believe, is the mutual linking itself by which each of the linked elements gains or regains meaning or becomes richer in meaning—meaning being our word for the resultant of that reciprocal activity. In the re-initiation and promotion of this process the interpretative activity of the analyst and the specific contents of interpretations are the enabling factors; he envisages and holds for the patient that context which makes linking possible." (pg. 382)
 - Chapter 23 - The Waning of the Oedipus Complex (pg. 384)
 - "In an important sense, by evolving our own autonomy, our own superego, and by engaging in non-incestuous object relations, we are killing our parents. We are usurping their power, their competence, their responsibility for us, and we are abnegating, rejecting them as libidinal objects. In short, we destroy them in regard to some of their qualities hitherto most vital to us. Parents resist as well as promote such destruction no less ambivalently than children carry it out. What will be left if things go well, is tenderness, mutual trust, and respect, the signs of equality. This depends, more than on anything else, on the predominant form of mastery of the Oedipus complex." (pg. 390)
 - "Responsibility to oneself, within the context of authoritative norms consciously and unconsciously accepted or assimilated from parental and societal sources, is the essence of superego as internal agency. I will stress here only certain relevant aspects of self-responsibility. It involves appropriating or owning up to one's needs and impulses as one's own, impulses and desires we appear to have been born with or that seem to have taken shape in interaction with parents during infancy. Such appropriation (notice that I use the same word as when I spoke of appropriating parental authority), in the course of which we begin to develop a sense of self-identity, means to experience ourselves as agents, notwithstanding the fact that we were born without our informed consent and did not pick our parents. To begin with we were more or less fortunate victims, and it may be claimed that in some sense this remains true as long as we live, victims of our instincts and of those of others, not to mention other forces of nature and social life." (pg. 392)
 - ◆ "When I speak of appropriating our desires and impulses, active forces themselves, I do not mean repressing or overpowering them. I mean allowing or granting them actively that existence that they have in any event, with or without our permission. Following the lead of the word responsibility, one may say that appropriation consists in being responsive to their urgings, acknowledging that they are ours. **A harsh, unyielding superego is unresponsive and in that sense irresponsible. Unless modified it leads to self-destruction or to its having to be bribed and corrupted.** Self-inflicted or "arranged" punishment is one form of such corruption; it merely assuages guilt for a while. **Responsibility to oneself, in the sense of being responsive** to one's urgings in the manner I described, **involves facing and bearing the guilt for those acts we consider as criminal.** Prototypical, in oedipal context, are parricide and incest. From the standpoint of psychic reality it matters little if these acts are, from the viewpoint of objective reality, merely fantasies or symbolic acts. (Parricide and incest, themselves strongly interwoven, stand for the basic aggressive and sexual instincts in their transgressive, "evil" aspects.) If parricide and incest are not carried out in factual reality, they nevertheless partake of psychic reality. I spoke earlier of the implications of internal, intra-psychic atonement. Atonement for these crimes — which I defined as reconciliation, being again at one—consists in a reconstitution of child-parent relations on the internal scene of action (internalization). As mentioned before, this transposition or transmutation, at once destruction and restitution, in metapsychological language is a transformation of object cathexis into narcissistic cathexis." (pg. 392-393)
 - "If without the guilty deed of parricide there is no individual self worthy of that name, no advanced internal organization of psychic life, then guilt and atonement are crucial motivational elements of the self. Guilt then is not a troublesome affect that we might hope to eliminate in some fashion, but one of the driving forces in the organization of the self. **The self, in its autonomy, is an atonement structure, a structure of reconciliation, and as such a supreme achievement.**" (pg. 394)
 - "In mature object relations, ideally the self engages in a return movement with objects that are differently organized and experienced by the self thanks to its own richer organization. It is this richer self-organization that can lead to novel ways of relating to objects while being enriched by their novelty. In some sense **that novel way of relating with objects** - most obvious in mature love relations - **creatively destroys and reconstitutes**, in a sea-change on the plane of object love, the old oedipal relations. It also constitutes an atonement." (pg. 394)
 - "Summarizing, I may list the various forms of the Oedipus complex's waning that I discussed: (1) repression; (2) "destruction" (transmutation) by internalization, involving parricide, guilt, and atonement. If I were to go deeper into these matters, issues such as mourning, remorse, repentance, would have to be considered. (3) "Destruction" on the plane of object love, by relinquishing incestuous ties and recreating the murdered and mourned oedipal ties through novel love relations. I am condensing here psychic events that repeat themselves on different levels of development throughout life. In that sense, there is no such thing as definitive destruction of the Oedipus complex." (pg. 394)
 - Chapter 24 - Book Review (pg. 405)
 - See text
 - Book 2 - Sublimation: Inquiries into Theoretical Psychoanalysis (pg. 435)
 - Introduction (pg. 441)
 - See text
 - Chapter 1 - Transformations of Passion and their Vicissitudes (pg. 449)
 - "Sublimation is passion transformed" (pg. 449)
 - Chapter 2 - Theoretical Advances (pg. 455)
 - "Sublimation is a kind of reconciliation of the subject-object dichotomy—an atonement for that polarization (the word atone derives from at one) and a narrowing of the gulf between object libido and narcissistic libido, between object world and self." (pg. 460)
 - Chapter 3 - The Traditional Theory of Sublimation and Defense (pg. 475)
 - See text
 - Chapter 4 - Symbolism (pg. 483)
 - See text
 - Chapter 5 - Illusion (pg. 503)
 - See text
 - Chapter 6 - Subjectivity (pg. 513)
 - See text
 - Book 3 - Psychoanalysis and the History of the Individual (pg. 529)

- Chapter 1 - Man as a Moral Agent (pg. 533)
 - "Psychoanalysis may be described as a method of psychological investigation and treatment of the person and of personality disorders, as a body of knowledge and theory of the mind of the individual and its development, and as a unique process of human interaction. Psychoanalysis is centrally concerned with "what it has been and is to be human" and with "the examination of human experience and its implications for the present and the future."" (pg. 534)
 - "It is the scope of psychoanalysis to consider human nature in the fullness of the individual's concrete existence and covering the full range of human potentialities, with special attention given—for a variety of reasons—to its historicity. The dimension of time plays an ever-increasing part in man's attempts to organize, master, and understand reality—be it the material reality of physics, chemistry, astronomy, and geology, or biological reality, or the reality of human history, its civilizations and societies, or of the individual person. This trend is connected with a deep modern interest in the nature of reality as process—in contrast to a substantive, static view—and with a pervasive tendency to understand what appears permanent and definitively structured in terms of the dynamics of becoming, that is, to reconstruct structures. Psychoanalysis deals with man within the full range of his human potential. As to the somatic events and levels of human functioning, traditionally considered the domain of biology and physiology, psychoanalysis attempts to deal with them from a different viewpoint or within a larger context or framework—as being integrants, constituents, of the psychological organization of human beings, and as such affected by that organization." (pg. 535)
 - "[T]he psychoanalytic process implies a conception of man's moral nature. **Promoting the individual's consciousness, fostering his ego development, means - whatever else is conveyed by the terms consciousness and ego - promoting his taking responsibility for himself.** The movement from unconscious to conscious experience, from the instinctual life of the id to the reflective, purposeful life of the ego, means taking responsibility for one's own history, the history that has been lived and the history in the making. In psychoanalysis, however, the emphasis is not only or primarily on the person's past history insofar as he consciously remembers it or can be told about by his elders. Psychoanalysis prominently is concerned with unconscious history. By this I mean not only the events of childhood and later life that have been forgotten. I mean that mass of past living and experiencing, which took place without self-awareness, and often—and this is more important—without the ego's mediation. The organizing activity of the ego is not necessarily in conscious awareness; in fact, it operates much of the time outside conscious awareness. It integrates raw experience, making it into a differentiated element of our psychic life, bringing it into a meaningful context. **The idea of responsibility, in its most basic sense, then refers to that inner responsiveness to raw experience which is the hallmark of the ego and transposes raw experience onto a different plane.** Repression is a throwback to that older plane of experiencing: undesirable or unacceptable memories, thoughts, fantasies, by being excluded from ego organization, sink back to that raw form of mentation which is conceptualized as the dynamic unconscious or id. Past history, then, is understood here not so much in the sense of past "objective" events or mental "contents," but more specifically in the sense of an earlier, archaic, form or level of mentation, an undifferentiated form of experiencing, that characterizes early developmental stages but is operative as well at chronologically later stages." (pg. 538-539)
 - **"Conscious" means being in a self-reflecting and self-reflecting state. Reflection is a con-scire, a knowing together.** It represents the internalization of an interplay originally occurring between the infant and his or her primary caretaker, mostly the mother, and then recurring in many other relationships. Psychoanalysts have spoken of the mother, in the primordial infant-mother psychic unit, as a living mirror in which the infant gradually begins to recognize, to know himself, by being recognized by the mother. This recognition has much more than so called cognitive connotations. It is mediated to the infant and growing child by a great variety of maternal activities and interactions with the child's bodily and instinctual life. Her knowing and understanding the child, as well as the imperfections and deficiencies of her understanding, are embedded in these interactions. This primal reflection and recognition brings about a conscire within the infant-mother psychic matrix and gradually becomes a crucial constituent, a potential of the individuating child's experiencing or mentation. Further complex developments, in continuous interaction with the caring persons, lead to that articulate and explicit conscire manifested in language and eventually to conscience. The phenomenon of conscience is a more fully developed and specialized resultant and function of what I call the morality of mental development. The con in conscire—the root verb for the words conscious and conscience - expresses the belonging-together of, and internal encounter between, "raw" experience and its reflecting recognition by the other in oneself. **The "other" in oneself appears in psychoanalytic theory in such terms as observing ego and superego.** But this internal other is only the end product of a complex differentiating - from another viewpoint, self-alienating—process that takes its start in the primary unity of the infant-mother psychic matrix. This development constitutes the individuation of the individual. One further element in this process has to be made explicit: the recognizing-caring activities of the primary caretakers crucially contribute to the development of the child's psychic life by the fact of their being ahead of his present stage of organization. Parental caring, knowing, understanding, embedded in their interactions with the child, take place in the context and perspective of the child's overall requirements and future course of development, as perceived and misperceived by the parents. Thus, parental recognizing care reflects more, as it were, to the child than what he presents; it mediates higher organization. This generation difference or gradient is essential. Similarly, the developing, internal conscire represents something other than an internal reflection of experience in the sense of mere "reduplication."" (pg. 539-540)
 - ◆ **"When I spoke of conscire, I had in mind, not conscious awareness, but the preconscious form of mentation. It is a conscire in its inner organization; but this form of mental process often is not in conscious awareness;** and it is not necessarily consciously perceived. Since the term, preconscious, stresses closeness or accessibility to conscious awareness, and since I believe that this is not the essential characteristic of the mental processes so designated, I prefer to speak of conscient processes. The term conscient intends to point out the structure of con-scire of this form of mental process. Conscient (preconscious) mentation loses the uniform single-mindedness of unconscious processes while gaining the new dimension of inner responsiveness involving a differentiation or dichotomy of a unitary mental activity. Such differentiation, which introduces duality and multiplicity into unity - and which may disrupt rather than articulate it—has its origin in, and is brought forth by, the caring environment's active mirroring. This mirroring, I said, reflects more than what the infant presents. It contains the mother's acts of organizing the infant's activities and experiences within an envisioned temporal-spatial totality of his being - the prototype of what is called his ego as a coherent organization. To the extent to which the infant's unitary (I am tempted to say, headlong) acts become integrated within such a totality, an internal mirroring comes into being. The totality or coherent organization is to begin with merely in the mother's foreseeing eye, as a kind of unperceived plan. And so the infant's uniform mental acts thus acquire differentiation. Unconscious mentation lacks this differentiation. The un- in "unconscious" points out this privation." (pg. 541-542)
 - **"Man is understood in psychoanalysis as tending toward higher organization, further development of his unconscious life forces. He tends to become a person. The development of a more conscious life involves a continuous appropriation of the unconscious levels of functioning, an owning up to them as potentially me, ego. This appropriation, this owning up, integrating the id into one's life context as an individual self, is then a developmental task or, in a different framework, an existential task.** I believe that Heidegger's concepts of Geworfenheit—man is thrown into the world, unplanned and unintended by himself - and Entwerfen - the taking over and actively developing the potentialities of this fact—have grown in the same soil. **To appropriate, to own up to, one's own history is the task of psychoanalysis as a therapeutic endeavor.** As such it constitutes resumption of psychic development, a resumption of developmental tasks. An important aspect of this process is

remembering the past. But much more is involved than recollection of past experiences and events, although such recollections usually form significant stepping stones toward this remembering." (pg. 543-544)

- "We note that **the analyst's interpretation is a form of active mirroring, reflecting back to the patient his behavior in a different light, in terms of higher, more comprehensive and more articulate mental organization**—analogous to the parental mirroring function in infancy and childhood." (pg. 544)
- **"To own up to our own history, to be responsible for our unconscious, in an important sense means, to bring unconscious forms of experiencing into the context and onto the level of the more mature, more lucid life of the adult mind.** Our drives, our basic needs, in such transformation, are not relinquished, nor are traumatic and distorting childhood experiences made conscious in order to be deplored and undone—even if that were possible. They are part of the stuff our lives are made of. What is possible is to engage in the task of actively reorganizing, reworking, creatively transforming those early experiences which, painful as many of them have been, first gave meaning to our lives. The more we know what it is that we are working with, the better we are able to weave our history which, when all is said and done, is recreating, in ever-changing modes and transformations, our childhood. To be an adult means that; it does not mean leaving the child in us behind. There is no one-way street from id to ego. Not only do irrational forces overtake us again and again; in trying to lose them we would be lost. The id, the unconscious modes and contents of human experience, should remain available. If they are in danger of being unavailable—no matter what state of perfection our "intellect" may have reached—or if there is danger of no longer responding to them, it is our task as historical beings to resume our history making by finding a way back to them so that they may be transformed, and away from a frozen ego. This, I think, is the original and enduring quest of psychoanalysis, and its importance in modern history." (pg. 545)
 - "Time, in human (not physical terms, is not an arrow, is not to be measured point by point. One might come closer to human time by saying that it consists in an interpenetration and reciprocal relatedness of past, present, and future. The history of the individual, not construed as the progression of external or intrapsychic events during his life, is constituted by this more-or-less actualized interpenetration and mutual determination of the three temporal modes, as it unfolds during the course of a life." (pg. 546)
- "If id and ego represent, respectively, psychic past and present, the superego might be seen as the representative of futurity. The superego is conceptualized as the inner agency of standards, demands, ideals, hopes, reproaches, and punishments. We become aware of it as the voice of conscience, and in relation to it we may experience guilt, shame, pride, or self-approval. It represents the care and concern we have for ourselves, in past and present, as continuing on into a future that is to be shaped. The superego has been characterized as a differentiating grade in the ego (eine Stufe im Ich). In terms of psychic time, this is the differentiation between inner present and inner future in the course of mental development. It is the growing recognition of a differential between who I am, what I do at present, and who I may or should be, what I may, should or should not do in the future—as hoped for, desired, demanded, by myself. The foundation for this differentiating grade is laid in those early times, when the mother, as a living mirror, reflected "more" to the child than he presented, when she, in her responsive activities, was cognizant of his potential for future growth and development and mediated it to the infant." (pg. 546)
- **"To the extent to which the individual remains entangled in his unappropriated id or disowns it, as in repression - and most of us do to a considerable extent - he is driven by unmastered unconscious forces within himself.** He is free to develop, to engender his future, to the extent to which he remains or becomes open to his id and can personalize, again and again and on various levels, his unconscious powers. For Freud these unconscious powers are the true psychic reality. This apersonal ground of our existence, he claims, we are called upon to make human, to make, each in his own way, into a person." (pg. 547)
 - "Freud's last instinct theory postulates Eros and Thanatos, the love or life instinct and the destructive or death instinct, as those apersonal - and that also means, amoral - forces. They become more or less personalized in the conduct of a human life. **Freud was not a religious man and certainly not a mystic. But one does not have to be a mystic to remain open to the mysteries of life and human individuality, to the enigmas that remain beyond all the elucidations of scientific explanation and interpretation. The life and death instinct theory was Freud's way of naming the creative destructive powers that shape, and are shaped by, becoming a person.**" (pg. 547)
- Chapter 2 - Transference and Love (pg. 549)
 - "Psychoanalysis has contributed to the understanding of man's love life, more specifically, of its genesis, development, and vicissitudes. What from a general point of view is genesis and development, becomes history in the unfolding of the individual. In the process of individuation the human being becomes historical. Historicity is understood here as that character of human experience which I called appropriation or owning up to one's past, to one's more or less unconscious motivational forces, to the "givens" of one's life. Taking over one's past, making it one's own, however, is not a return to the past in order to get lost in it. The past is important in view of and in relation to the present and future of one's life. Nostalgic reliving of youthful experiences, bitter reminiscing about past injuries and hurts, sad or angry complaints and accusations, or happy accounts of valued experiences and deeds - these and many other forms of evoking the past are ingredients, or steps, in the process of taking it over as one's own, in order to lead it into a future. The future, then, may have a chance to be my future, not the imitation of someone else's life, or merely the appendage of someone else, or a series of attempts to rebel or comply. By the past in human life I do not just mean the mass of so-called contents of the mind, memories, or mental representations, of past experiences and events that may or may not be available for recall. The aspect of the mind's past I wish to discuss, in relation to love and historicity, is related to the theme of the first lecture. I am thinking of the modes of organization of experience that differ from those called preconscious, or conscient, and conscious mentation. The dynamic unconscious or id is not properly to be conceived as a region or province of the mind where archaic - we might say, prehistoric - memory contents are preserved, and where repressed memories come to be lodged, as a region of "mental contents" that is more or less inaccessible to consciousness. In its fundamental meaning, unconscious is the name for a mode of experiencing or mentation that continually, throughout life, constitutes the active base and source of more differentiated and more complexly organized modes of mentation. What I call my unconscious memories and impulses are potentially mine to the extent to which they may be raised to a new level of mentation, may become integrated with the context of my conscient mode of experiencing. Such appropriation is seen as a developmental, evolutionary thrust or tendency of humans. It is not a process that at some point in individual development comes to an end, but an ongoing activity, or one that is resumed again and again. It would not do justice, however, to the complexity and richness of human life experience, if one only stressed the movement toward consciousness and overlooked or neglected the fact that we are dealing rather with a circularity or interplay between different levels of mentation. Formulated in terms of appropriation, it looks as if there is a need for conscient appropriation of unconscious experience as well as a need for reappropriating conscient modes (and the corresponding mental contents) into unconscious mental activity - and back again toward consciousness. What counts is this live communication, a mutual shaping, a reciprocal conforming, of levels of mentation. **The richer a person's mental life is, the more he experiences on several levels of mentation, the more translation occurs back and forth between unconscious and conscious experience.** To make the unconscious conscious, is onerous. **It is the transference between them that makes a human life, that makes life human.** The phenomenon, the concept of transference, is the key to the psychoanalytic approach to love. But I just spoke of transference between id and ego, between unconscious and conscient modes and levels within the psyche. Generally one thinks of transference as something going on between people, and especially, in the psychoanalytic situation, as transference from the patient to the analyst. Popularly this is often taken to mean that the patient "falls in love" with the analyst, a notion - however simpleminded or naive -

- that suggests the connection between transference and love." (pg. 549-550)
- "Self-love, often also called narcissism, must be distinguished from that identificatory love which, as I expressed it, brings one together into one individual self. In self-love, love of self, a stage is reached where one becomes an object to oneself, where one can respond to and care for oneself. This involves a split within the subject that is analogous to that other split, the ego-object distinction. In the development of object-love the object—needed, longed and cared for—is increasingly appreciated as an ego, a subject in its own right with its own needs and cares, similar to oneself. Equally, in the development of love of self, one's own ego, needful and caring, is more and more appreciated as an object to oneself, needed and to be cared for. Superego development is a related issue. Love of self may be described as a form of secondary narcissism. It is secondary insofar as it arises only on the basis of that primary, identificatory form of love which leads to the formation of an ego. It is secondary also insofar as that duality, that split within the subject, by which love of self comes into being, occurs." (pg. 556)
 - "Narcissism—to sum up—in my discussion does not refer primarily to love of self in contrast to love of others, but to that primordial love-mentation which does not structure or divide reality into the poles of inner and outer, subject and object, self and other, any more than the dynamic unconscious does. If left to its own devices, not tempered by secondary process and object-love, it leads to chaos and self-destruction. Object-love and love of self are forms of love that develop on the basis of narcissism." (pg. 557)
 - Chapter 3 - Comments on Religious Experience (pg. 565)
 - **"The psychic reality of the infant in early stages lacks the various distinctions and discriminations by which we come to organize our world and orient ourselves in it.** Indeed, it makes sense to say that the world, including ourselves, becomes a world of ours by the stepwise separations and differentiations from an unstructured uniformity which, to the extent of our knowledge, is first interfered with by the event of birth. As our psychic life develops, we appropriate, own up to this event and its far-reaching consequences." (pg. 565)
 - "[Freud] deliberately did not pursue his basic hunches, and under the weight of his authority religion in psychoanalysis has been largely considered as a sign of man's mental immaturity, of his need for finding rather transparent substitutes for his infantile dependency on parental protection against the threats and frustrations of life. The need for protection by an all-powerful father remained for Freud the basic fact that led to the creation of religion. He professed to be at a loss even to explain the existence of mother goddesses that presumably preceded the existence of father gods in archaic religions. Freud's well-known view on religion is that it is an illusion, comforting to the child in us, to the "common man," an illusion to be given up as we are able to overcome our childish needs for all-powerful parents. In essence, the ideas of "God" and of an eternal life are consolations or defenses—to help man cope with the exigencies, frustrations, and transitoriness of human life." (pg. 566)
 - **"Psychoanalysis is depth psychology.** Freud, despite his increasing emphasis on and preference for the rational ego, never repudiated that title for his psychology. As depth psychology, it has a twofold task: to make use of our conscious, differentiating, and objectifying mentation to understand more about that other, unconscious form of mentation from which our more complex mental processes derive (and which remains a living and vital resource and component of our mental life); and, in a countermovement, psychoanalysis aims to reconstruct, on the basis of its grasp of unconscious processes, the intricacies and vicissitudes of the organization of conscious life, that is, the ways in which unconscious libidinal forces, motivations, and aims engender or culminate in ego organization, making possible the conduct of responsible individual life." (pg. 576-577)

c. Further Readings:

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