

Psychoanalytic Explorations, by D. Winnicott

a. Quotes:

- "Most of my ideas are inspired by patients, to whom I acknowledge debt." - Author (pg. 93)

b. General Notes:

- Chapter 1 - Early Disillusion (pg. 21)
 - See text
- Chapter 2 - Knowing and Not Knowing (pg. 24)
 - See text
- Chapter 3 - A Point in Technique (pg. 26)
 - See text
- Chapter 4 - Play in the Analytic Situation (pg. 28)
 - See text
- Chapter 5 - Varieties of Clinical Obsession (pg. 30)
 - "An important feature of obsessional behaviour is the confusion that it implies. Why is it that in health a muddle can be tidied up, and in illness the tidying up that is compulsive is also futile? The Clue: In obsessional illness the confusion is an organised defence. A degree of confusion is unconsciously maintained in order to hide a very simple fact: triumph of bad over good, hate over love, aggression over capacity for preservation, etc. In this way, the tidying up can never succeed. But there may be found an almost conscious muddling up when tidying seems to succeed." (pg. 30)
- Chapter 6 - Excitement in the Aetiology of Coronary Thrombosis (pg. 34)
 - See text
- Chapter 7 - Hallucination and Dehallucination (pg. 39)
 - See text
- Chapter 8 - Ideas and Definitions (pg. 43)
 - "The false self. The true self"
 - These terms are used in description of a defensive organisation in which there is a premature taking over of the nursing functions of the mother, so that the infant or child adapts to the environment while at the same time protecting and hiding the true self, or the source of personal impulses. This is similar to the function of the Ego, in early Freud, turned towards the world, between the Id and external reality. In typical cases the imprisoned true self is unable to function, and by being protected its opportunity for living experience is limited. **Life is lived through the compliant false self**, and the result clinically is a sense of unreality. Other writers have used the following term to describe similar states: Observing Ego. **Spontaneity and real impulse can only come from the true self**, and for this to happen someone needs to take over the defensive functions of the false self.
 - Transitional object. Transitional phenomena
 - The term "transitional object" was intended to give significance to the first signs in the developing infant of an acceptance of a symbol. This precursor of a symbol is at one and the same time part of the infant and a part of the mother. Often this symbol precursor is in fact an object, and the infant's addiction to this actual object is recognised and allowed for by the parents. Often there is no materialisation, however, and then certain phenomena may be found later to have the same significance; for instance, watching, thinking, distinguishing between colours, exploitation of body movements and sensations, etc. etc. The mother herself may become a transitional object, sometimes the thumb. Degenerate forms are represented by rocking, head-banging, highly compulsive thumb-sucking, etc., and later pseudologia fantastica and stealing. In favourable conditions this object gradually gives place to an ever-widening range of objects, and to the whole cultural life.
 - Regression (to dependence)
 - The term "regression" is applied ordinarily in psycho-analytic writings to instinct positions. Regression is from genital to pregenital erotic experience or fantasy, or it is to fixation points belonging to the life of infancy in which pregenital fantasy is naturally dominant. Regression is also a convenient term for use in description of an adult's or a child's state in the transference (or in any other dependent relationship) when a forward position is given up and **an infantile dependence is re-established**. Typically, regression of this kind is from independence to dependence. In this use of the term the environment is indirectly brought in since dependence implies an environment that meets dependence. By contrast, in the other use of the term "regression" there is no implied reference to an environment. The term "regression" is also used to describe the process that can be observed in a treatment, a gradual shedding of the false or caretaker self, and the approach to a new relationship in which the caretaker self is handed over to the therapist.
 - Good-enough mother
 - This term is used in description of the dependence that belongs to earliest infancy. The implication is that mental health has to be founded in every case by the mother who, in health, has it in her to meet the minute-to-minute needs of her infant. What is needed and absolutely needed by the infant is not some kind of perfection of mothering, but a good enough adaptation, that which is part of a living partnership in which the mother temporarily identifies herself with her infant. To be able to identify herself with her infant to the necessary degree the mother needs to be protected from external reality so that she may enjoy a period of preoccupation, the baby being the object of her preoccupation. To be able to lose this high degree of identification at the rate of the infant's journey from dependence to independence the mother needs to be healthy in the sense of not being liable to morbid preoccupation." (pg. 43-44)
- Chapter 9 - Psychogenesis of a Beating Fantasy (pg. 45)
 - See text
- Chapter 10 - Nothing at the Centre (pg. 49)
 - See text
- Chapter 11 - The Fate of the Transitional Object (pg. 53)
 - "Another kind of transition has to do with the changeover from an object which is subjective for the infant to one which is objectively perceived or external. At first whatever object gains a relationship with the infant is created by the infant, or at least that is the theory of it to which I adhere. It is like an hallucination. Some cheating takes place and an object that is ready to hand overlaps with an hallucination. Obviously the way the mother or her substitute behaves is of paramount importance here. One mother is good and another bad at letting a real object be just where the infant is hallucinating an object so that in fact the infant gains the illusion that the world can be created and that what is created is the world. At this point you will think of Mme Sechehaye's term "symbolic realisation," the making real of the symbol, only from our point of view dealing with earliest infancy, we are thinking of the making real of the hallucination. This does in fact initiate the infant's capacity for using symbols, and where growth is straightforward the transitional object is the first symbol. **Here the symbol is at the same time both the hallucination and an objectively perceived**

- the defence organisation which the patient displays as an illness syndrome." (pg. 90)
- "It is a fact that is carried round hidden away in the unconscious." (pg. 90)
 - "In other words the patient must go on looking for the past detail which is not yet experienced. This search takes the form of a looking for this detail in the future." (pg. 91)
- "The purpose of this paper is to draw attention to the possibility that the breakdown has already happened, near the beginning of the individual's life. The patient needs to "remember" this but it is not possible to remember something that has not yet happened, and this thing of the past has not happened yet because the patient was not there for it to happen to. The only way to "remember" in this case is for the patient to experience this past thing for the first time in the present, that is to say, in the transference. This past and future thing then becomes a matter of the here and now, and becomes experienced by the patient for the first time. This is the equivalent of remembering, and this outcome is the equivalent of the lifting of repression that occurs in the analysis of the psycho-neurotic patient (classical Freudian analysis)." (pg. 92)
 - "emptiness is a prerequisite for eagerness to gather in. Primary emptiness simply means: before starting to fill up. A considerable maturity is needed for this state to be meaningful." (pg. 94)
 - "The basis of all learning (as well as of eating) is emptiness." (pg. 94)
 - "The search for personal non-existence can be examined in the same way. It will be found that non-existence here is part of a defence. Personal existence is represented by the projection elements, and the person is making an attempt to project everything that could be personal. This can be a relatively sophisticated defence, and the aim is to avoid responsibility (at the depressive position) or to avoid persecution (at what I would call the stage of self-assertion [i.e. the stage of I AM with the inherent implication I REPUDIATE EVERYTHING THAT IS NOT ME]. It is convenient here to use in illustration the childhood game of "I'm the king of the castle-you're the dirty rascal"). In the religions this idea can appear in the concept of one-ness with God or with the Universe. It is possible to see this defence being negated in existentialist writings and teachings, in which existing is made into a cult, in an attempt to counter the personal tendency towards a non-existence that is part of an organised defence. There can be a positive element in all this, that is, an element that is not a defence. It can be said that only out of non-existence can existence start. It is surprising how early (even before birth, certainly during the birth process) awareness or a premature ego can be mobilised. But the individual cannot develop from an ego root if this is divorced from psycho-somatic experience and from primary narcissism. It is just here that begins the intellectualisation of the ego-functions. It can be noted here that all this is a long distance in time prior to the establishment of anything that could usefully be called the self." (pg. 95)
- Chapter 19 - Meeting Regression in Psycho-Analysis (pg. 96)
 - See text
 - Chapter 20 - Psycho-Somatic Disorder (pg. 103)
 - See text
 - Chapter 21 - The Psychology of Madness (pg. 119)
 - See text
 - Chapter 22 - The Concept of Trauma (pg. 130)
 - "In terms of the earlier stages of the individual's integration and other maturational processes the mother (in particular) plays her role as the one who disillusion her infant; and the basis of her work in this respect is the initial stage in which (by specialised adaptation) she gives each infant the illusion of the experience of omnipotence. The success of the mother's and the family's disillusioning function is to be measured in terms of the child's capacity for ambivalence, but the basis for ambivalence is this experience of omnipotence relative to an object. The environmental reflection of ambivalence involves the idea of trauma. This leads on to a consideration of the nature of trauma." (pg. 145)
 - "The idea of trauma involves a consideration of external factors; in other words it belongs to dependence. **Trauma is a failure relative to dependence. Trauma is that which breaks up an idealisation of an object by the individual's hate,** reactive to that object's failure to perform its function. Trauma therefore varies in its meaning according to the stage of the emotional development of the child. Thus: (1) At the start trauma implies a breakdown in the area of reliability in the "average expectable environment," at the stage of near-absolute dependence. The result of such breakdown shows in failure or relative failure in the establishment of personality structure and ego organisation. (2) De-adaptation is the second part of the maternal function, the first being the giving of opportunity to the infant for an experience of omnipotence. Normally, the mother's adaptation leads on to graduated adaptive failure. This leads on to the family's function of gradually introducing the Reality Principle to the child." (pg. 145)
 - "Trauma in the more popular sense of the term implies a breaking of faith. The infant or child has built up a capacity to "believe in," and environmental provision first fits into this and then fails. In this way the environment persecutes by getting through the defences. The infant's or the child's reactive hate breaks up the idealised object, and this is liable to be experienced in terms of a delusion of persecution by good objects. Where the reaction is one of appropriate anger or hatred the term trauma is not apposite. In other words, where there is appropriate anger the environmental failure has not been beyond the individual's capacity to cope with his or her reaction. The more the child achieves integration the more severely the child can be hurt by being traumatised; hurt, or made to suffer, as opposed to being prevented from achieving integration. Eventually in the Oedipus complex, in inter-relationships as between three whole persons, the child needs to live through a period in which the personal reliability of the parents is experienced in order that the total equipment (projection and introjection mechanisms) may be used, and in which a personal or inner psychic reality may become established which makes fantasy an experience comparable to actual object-relating. A total presentation of this theme would need to include the concept of transitional phenomena. The result of such growth in the individual is a capacity for ambivalence. In the end, **trauma is the destruction of the purity of individual experience by a too sudden or unpredictable intrusion of actual fact, and by the generation of hate in the individual, hate of the good object, experienced not as hate but delusionally as being hated.**" (pg. 146-147)
 - Chapter 23 - Notes on Withdrawal and Regression (pg. 149)
 - "...it is extremely important that I understand the difference between regression and withdrawal. Clinically the two states are practically the same. It will be seen, however, that there is an extreme difference between the two. In regression there is dependence and in withdrawal there is pathological independence." (pg. 149)
 - Chapter 24 - New Light on Children's Thinking (pg. 153)
 - "...thinking comes into being as an aspect of the creative imagination. It serves the survival of the experience of omnipotence. It is an ingredient of integration." (pg. 155)
 - "Forward movement in the emotional development of an individual is away from an unorganised state towards integration, away from chaos towards understanding, away from ignorance towards knowledge and the power to predict, away from dependence towards independence. Thinking is one aspect of the integrative process, going ahead of full participation. To repeat my second idea; whereas thinking is an aspect of the individual's creative imagination, it can become exploited in the individual economy in defence against archaic anxiety and against chaos and against disintegrative tendencies or memories of disintegrative breakdown related to deprivation. In a positive way thinking is a part of the creative impulse, but there are alternatives to thinking and these alternatives have some advantages over thinking. For instance, **logical thinking takes a long time and may never get there, but the flash of intuition takes no time and it gets there immediately.** Science needs both of these ways of going along. Here we are reaching out for words, thinking, and trying to be logical, and including a study of the unconscious which affords a vast extension of the range of logic. But at the same time we need to be able to reach out for symbols and to create imaginatively and in preverbal language; we need to be able to think

- hallucinatorily." (pg. 157)
- Chapter 25 - Obsessional Neurosis and "Frankie" (pg. 158)
 - See text
 - Chapter 26 - Note on the Mother-Foetus Relationship (pg. 161)
 - See text
 - Chapter 27 - Absence and Presence of a Sense of Guilt (pg. 163)
 - See text
 - Chapter 28 - On the Split-Off Male and Female Elements (pg. 168)
 - See text
 - Chapter 29 - The Concept of Clinical Regression (pg. 193)
 - "Here we pay full tribute to the environmental provision, for instance, to the nature of the mother in her presentation of the world to her infant who knows nothing else. At the beginning the environmental factor may be allowed full value, second only to the inherited tendencies of the infant. As the child acquires autonomy and acquires an identity and feels real and perceives the environment objectively as a separate phenomenon, so the environment becomes (in health) increasingly relegated to second place, except that in illness - such as schizophrenia—it always has to be remembered that the environment may continue to be an adverse factor because of the individual's failure to obtain sufficient autonomy. It would not be possible to go further into the essential theory of personal development here and now, although nothing could be more relevant to the theme. For me, the clue to the conflict that underlies illness that we label psycho-neurosis lies within the individual. The analyst of the psycho-neurotic patient is involved, as is well known, in the analysis of the patient's repressed unconscious. By contrast, where schizophrenia lies, the analyst or whoever is treating the patient or managing the case is involved in elucidating a split in the patient's person, the extreme of a dissociation. The split takes the place of the repressed unconscious of the psycho-neurotic. I have tried to clarify my ideas on this theme particularly in "Psychoses and Child Care." Here I give a diagram of my idea of the basic split in psychotic illness, but clinically the split, being sub-total, may appear in various forms of dissociation, such as True Self and False Self and the intellectual life split off from psycho-somatic living. Obviously the nature of the dissociation that appears clinically may be influenced by the nature of expectations from the environment, so that a patient may be suffering from pathological expectations in the environment. The parents may have wanted a child of the other sex, for instance, or may have wanted a genius or a child that has no aggressive impulses. These pathological expectations can reinforce potential dissociations in the individual." (pg. 194-195)
 - "The split in the person happened and became organised because of an environmental failure. There was a failure of the "average expectable environment." In my terms a baby is usually cared for by a "good enough" mother. Well, either the good-enough mother had to fail (perhaps she got ill) or else she was not good enough." (pg. 195)
 - "For me, a good-enough mother and good-enough parents and a good-enough home do in fact give most babies and small children the experience of not having ever been significantly let down. In this way average children have the chance to build up a capacity to believe in themselves and the world—they build a structure on the accumulation of introjected reliability. They are blissfully unaware of their good fortune, and find it difficult to understand those of their companions who carry around with them for life experiences of unthinkable anxiety, and a deficit in the department of introjected reliability. It is among these latter persons that illness, when it occurs, tends to take a form that we label schizophrenic rather than psycho-neurotic or depressive." (pg. 196)
 - "...failures in environmental reliability at the early stages produce in the baby fractures of personal continuity, because of reactions to the unpredictable. These traumatic events carry with them unthinkable anxiety, or maximal pain. Here I come to the point where I have to confess that I did at one time think of schizophrenia and schizoid types of clinical disorder as regressions, so that I joined in the hunt for fixation points. This was a carry-over from the corresponding witch-hunt in the attempt to state the aetiology of psycho-neurosis in its various manifestations. My attitude changed when I saw that I must think of two kinds of regression—one is simply a falling back in a direction that is the opposite to the forward movement of development. One sees regressive features appearing, and one recognises that the growth mechanisms of the individual have become blocked. The other type of regression is quite different, although it may be similar clinically. In the second type the patient regresses because of a new environmental provision which allows of dependence." (pg. 196-197)
 - "From here (and I am ashamed to have condensed what I mean to the point almost of absurdity) **I began to see schizophrenia and especially the illness of the borderline case as a sophisticated defence organisation.**" (pg. 197)
 - ◆ "...what we see very clearly is an organisation towards invulnerability. Differences must be expected according to the stage of the emotional development of the adult or child or baby who becomes ill. What is common to all cases is this, that **the baby, child, adolescent or adult must never again experience the unthinkable anxiety that is at the root of schizoid illness. This unthinkable anxiety was experienced initially in a moment of failure of reliability on the part of the environmental provision when the immature personality was at the stage of absolute dependence.** The autistic child who has travelled almost all the way to mental defect is not suffering any longer; invulnerability has almost been reached. Suffering belongs to the parents. The organisation towards invulnerability has been successful, and it is this that shows clinically along with regressive features that are not in fact essential to the picture." (pg. 198)
 - "It will be appreciated that this theory includes the idea of trauma, by which I mean an experience against which the ego defences were inadequate at the stage of emotional development of the individual at the time, or in the state of the patient at the time. **Trauma is an impingement from the environment and from the individual's reaction to the impingement that occurs prior to the individual's development of the mechanisms that make the unpredictable predictable. Following traumatic experiences new defences are quickly organised, but in the split-second before this can take place the individual has had the continuous line of his or her existence** (as recorded in the personal computer) **broken, broken by automatic reaction to the environmental failure.**" (pg. 198)
 - **"Good-enough mothering is that which enables a baby not to have to meet the unpredictable until able to allow for environmental failures.** An important corollary is one that affects all who engage in the psychotherapy of schizophrenia in patients of whatever age. We give help by providing reliability which the patient can use in the sense that he or she can undo the defences that have been built up against unpredictability and the dire consequences in terms of the awfulness to be experienced. If we are successful we enable the patient to abandon invulnerability and to become a sufferer. If we succeed life becomes precarious to one who was beginning to know a kind of stability and a freedom from pain, even if this meant non-participation in life and perhaps mental defect." (pg. 199)
 - Chapter 30 - Addendum to 'The Location of Cultural Experience' (pg. 200)
 - See text
 - Chapter 31 - Playing and Culture (pg. 203)
 - "There is obviously a close association between playing and the idea of fantasy and dream. Playing also relates to the playing of games and such things as active imagination where a deliberate attempt is made to make use of surprising elements that the imagination brings about" (pg. 203)
 - **"Undoubtedly the concept of the transitional object and of transitional phenomena brought me to my wish to study this intermediate area which has to do with living experience and which is neither dream nor object-relating.** At the same time that it is neither the one nor the other of these two it is also both. This is the essential paradox, and in my paper on transitional phenomena the most important part (in my opinion) is my claim that we

- need to accept the paradox, not to resolve it. Transitional objects and phenomena are universal and protean. The study of transitional phenomena provides a valuable research ground for the student of human growth and development not only because it introduces the student to the infinity of variability in human beings but also because it has its own limits, and there are resemblances between elements, and these can be classified. In other words, it has some of the qualities of playing in that the child who is playing is using materials of external or shared reality for the expression of dream material. The personal dream is there, but two children may build similar houses because of the common denominator in the building materials and also because of archetypal elements in the dreaming. No two children can be alike, even identical twins, if the personal psychic reality be included beneath the surface markings of the personality. Nevertheless children can resemble each other and in any case they do resemble each other in that usually there are two eyes and a nose and a mouth, etc. I suggest that if we look at philosophy and for the moment ignore the immensely significant details of content, we can see operating a dynamic which I would call a non-acceptance of the inherent paradox. For me the paradox is inherent." (pg. 204)
- "...I have postulated a potential space between baby and mother figure which is the location of play. This potential space only comes to have significance as a result of a baby's living experience. It is not inherited - what is inherited may or may not result in the achievement of a place for play experience in the case of any one live baby. To my surprise I found that play and playing and the transitional phenomena form the basis for cultural experience in general, and that therefore what I was looking at concerned the greater part of our lives. Even here now we are in this potential space, and without good-enough mothering we should have found this discussion to be alien to us. In my statement of playing therefore I have made it my main point that: (1) Play is always exciting. (2) It is exciting not because of the background of instinct, but because of the precariousness that is inherent in it, since it always deals with the knife-edge between the subjective and that which is objectively perceived." (pg. 205-206)
 - Chapter 32 - Interpretation in Psycho-Analysis (pg. 207)
 - See text
 - Chapter 33 - Thinking and Symbol-Formation (pg. 213)
 - "see text
 - Chapter 34 - On 'The Use of the Object' (pg. 217)
 - "It is perhaps necessary to prevaricate a little longer to give my own view on the difference between object-relating and object-usage. In object-relating the subject allows certain alterations in the self to take place, of a kind that has caused us to invent the term "cathexis." The object has become meaningful. Projection mechanisms and identifications have been operating, and the subject is depleted to the extent that something of the subject is found in the object, though enriched by feeling. Accompanying these changes is some degree of physical involvement (however slight) towards excitement, in the direction of the functional climax of an orgasm. (In this context I deliberately omit reference to the aspect of relating that is an exercise in cross-identifications. This must be omitted here because it belongs to a phase of development that is subsequent to and not prior to the phase of development with which I am concerned in this paper, that is to say, the move away from self-containment and relating to subjective objects into the realm of object-usage.) Object-relating is an experience of the subject that can be described in terms of the subject as an isolate. When I speak of the use of an object, however, I take object-relating for granted, and add new features that involve the nature and the behaviour of the object. For instance, the object, if it is to be used, must necessarily be real in the sense of being part of shared reality, not a bundle of projections. It is this, I think, that makes for the world of difference that there is between relating and usage. If I am right in this, then it follows that discussion of the subject of relating is a much easier exercise for analysts than is the discussion of usage, since relating may be examined as a phenomenon of the subject, and psycho-analysis always likes to be able to eliminate all factors that are environmental, except in so far as the environment can be thought of in terms of projective mechanisms. But in examining usage there is no escape: the analyst must take into account the nature of the object, not as a projection, but as a thing in itself." (pg. 220-221)
 - "I should like to put in a reminder here that **the essential feature in the concept of transitional objects and phenomena** (according to my presentation of the subject) **is the paradox,** and the acceptance of the paradox: the baby creates the object, but the object was there waiting to be created and to become a cathected object." (pg. 221)
 - "To use an object the subject must have developed a capacity to use objects. This is part of the change to the reality principle. This capacity cannot be said to be inborn, nor can its development in an individual be taken for granted. The development of a capacity to use an object is another example of the maturational process as something that depends on a facilitating environment. In the sequence one can say that first there is object-relating, then in the end there is object-use; in between, however, is the most difficult thing, perhaps, in human development; or the most irksome of all the early failures that come for mending. This thing that there is in between relating and use is the subject's placing of the object outside the area of the subject's omnipotent control; that is, the subject's perception of the object as an external phenomenon, not as a projective entity, in fact recognition of it as an entity in its own right. This change (from relating to usage) means that the subject destroys the object. From here it could be argued by an armchair philosopher that there is therefore no such thing in practice as the use of an object: if the object is external, then the object is destroyed by the subject. Should the philosopher come out of his chair and sit on the floor with his patient, however, he will find that there is an intermediate position. In other words, he will find that after "subject relates to object" comes "subject destroys object" (as it becomes external); and then may come "object survives destruction by the subject." But there may or may not be survival. A new feature thus arrives in the theory of object-relating. The subject says to the object: "I destroyed you," and the object is there to receive the communication. From now on the subject says: "Hullo object!" "I destroyed you." "I love you." "You have value for me because of your survival of my destruction of you." "While I am loving you I am all the time destroying you in (unconscious) fantasy." Here fantasy begins for the individual. The subject can now use the object that has survived. It is important to note that it is not only that the subject destroys the object because the object is placed outside the area of omnipotent control. It is equally significant to state this the other way round and to say that it is the destruction of the object that places the object outside the area of the subject's omnipotent control. In these ways the object develops its own autonomy and life, and (if it survives) contributes in to the subject, according to its own properties. In other words, because of the survival of the object, the subject may now have started to live a life in the world of objects, and so the subject stands to gain immeasurably; but the price has to be paid in acceptance of the ongoing destruction in unconscious fantasy relative to object-relating. Let me repeat. This is a position that can be arrived at by the individual in early stages of emotional growth only through the actual survival of cathected objects that are at the time in process of becoming destroyed because real, becoming real because destroyed (being destructible and expendable). From now on, this stage having been reached, projective mechanisms assist in the act of noticing what is there, but they are not the reason why the object is there. In my opinion this is a departure from theory which tends to a conception of external reality only in terms of the individual's projective mechanisms. I have now nearly made my whole statement. Not quite, however, because it is not possible for me to take for granted an acceptance of the fact that the first impulse in the subject's relation to the object (objectively perceived, not subjective) is destructive. (Earlier I used the word " cavalier," in an attempt to give the reader a chance to imagine something at that point without too clearly pointing the way.) The central postulate in this thesis is that, whereas the subject does not destroy the subjective object (projection material), destruction turns up and becomes a central feature so far as the object is objectively perceived, has autonomy, and belongs to "shared" reality. This is the difficult part of my thesis, at least for me." (pg. 222-223)
 - "Object-relating can be described in terms of the experience of the subject. Description of object-usage involves consideration of the nature of the object. I am offering for discussion the reasons why, in my opinion, a capacity to use an object is more sophisticated than a capacity to relate to objects; and relating may be to a subjective object, but usage implies that the object is part of external reality. This sequence can be

observed: (1) Subject relates to object. (2) Object is in process of being found instead of placed by the subject in the world. (3) Subject destroys object. (4) Object survives destruction. (5) Subject can use object. The object is always being destroyed. This destruction becomes the unconscious backcloth for love of a real object: that is, an object outside the area of the subject's omnipotent control. Study of this problem involves a statement of the positive value of destructiveness. The destructiveness, plus the object's survival of the destruction, places the object outside the area of objects set up by the subject's projective mental mechanisms. In this way a world of shared reality is created which the subject can use and which can feed back other-than-me substance into the subject." (pg. 227)

- Chapter 35 - Development of the Theme of the Mother's Unconscious (pg. 247)
 - See text
- Chapter 36 - The Mother-Infant Experience of Mutuality (pg. 251)
 - "...the significance of the environment for the baby when there is near-absolute dependence is such that **we cannot describe the baby without describing the environment.**" (pg. 253)
 - "The "silent" communication is one of reliability which, in fact, protects the baby from automatic reactions to impingement from external reality, these reactions breaking the baby's line of life and constituting traumata. A trauma is that against which an individual has no organised defence so that a confusional state supervenes, followed perhaps by a reorganisation of defences, defences of a more primitive kind than those which were good enough before the occurrence of the trauma. Examination of the baby being held shows that communication is either silent (reliability taken for granted) or else traumatic (producing the experience of unthinkable or archaic anxiety). This divides the world of babies into two categories: (1) Babies who have not been significantly "let down" in infancy, and whose belief in reliability leads towards the acquisition of a personal reliability which is an important ingredient of the state which may be termed "towards independence." These babies have a line of life and retain a capacity to move forward and backward (develop-mentally) and become able to take all the risks because of being well insured. (2) Babies who have been significantly "let down" once or in a pattern of environmental failures (related to the psychopathologic state of the mother or mother-substitute). These babies carry with them the experience of unthinkable or archaic anxiety. They know what it is to be in a state of acute confusion or the agony of disintegration. They know what it is like to be dropped, to fall forever, or to become split into psycho-somatic disunion. In other words, they have experienced trauma, and their personalities have to be built round the reorganisation of defences following traumata, defences that must needs retain primitive features such as personality splitting." (pg. 259-260)
- Chapter 37 - On the Basis for Self in Body (pg. 261)
 - See text
- Chapter 38 - Individuation (pg. 284)
 - See text

c. Further Readings:

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