

The Kohut Seminars, by H. Kohut

a. Quotes:

b. General Notes:

▪ Chapter 1 - Value Judgements Surrounding Narcissism (pg. 3)

- "Any theory is hypothetical" (pg. 3)
- "Now **man in his object world** can be approached in an enormously sophisticated way. The mere use of the word object instead of people - the richness of such a term, in contrast to other-directedness, which relates narrowly to people - the richness, the capacity of broad application, needs hardly any defense. It includes awareness that it is completely compatible with the heights of health for a person to be lonesome. Lonesomeness and even aloofness are not in opposition to object love. As a matter of fact, as you know full well, people who shed objects indiscriminately, who can lose one seemingly beloved person and immediately turn toward another person and replace and substitute, lose one pet and buy another the next day, frequently reflect shallowness of object relationships. We know that people who have been traumatized early in life in their object relationships tend to be just this particular type. They quickly, like stray dogs, attach themselves to anybody who comes along, without discriminating between one or the other and without any real continuity. They cannot stand being alone, and not being able to stand being alone, cannot truly attach themselves to others. The loss of others, if one really attaches himself to these others, if one is really capable of such attachment, is accompanied by the one great sign or proof of object love: the capacity to suffer when an object is lost, the capacity to mourn or to long for an object when it is not present. The individual who quickly passes from attachment to attachment must indeed have an object present, but these are pseudo-objects. But I do not propose here to talk about object love - this is another developmental line. I simply want to caution you that **there must be great sophistication when we deal with the object world.**" (pg. 5)
- "There are indeed many forms of narcissism, as there are many forms of object love, that are maladaptive and, if you wish, sick. But even these concepts, sickness and health, are value judgments. There is no way in which one can define sickness. It defies definition; one returns to maladaptive. Again, the ideal state of full development and perfect functioning of some abstract organism or some abstract psyche depends only on the average expected environment, not on some other environment. We will be talking about the pathology of narcissism. We will in many ways show how **certain modes of narcissism are indeed a hindrance in adaptation, in well-being, in happiness, in relating to the world, in relating to one's work, in relating to all kinds of things that we justifiably consider to be valuable.** Exactly the same thing could be said for certain types of object fixations. I would think that while it is quite justifiable to find out the non-adaptive, non-valuable aspects of certain modes of narcissism, narcissism in and of itself in general cannot be said to be non-adaptive." (pg. 8-9)
- "The mere fact that there has been an ingrained idea that object love develops out of narcissism, that any return to narcissism is a valueless, or value-decreased regression, is one of the ways that has caused us to push narcissism aside, as something to be put out of the way, to be replaced by the capacity to relate to others. **Do not underestimate, however, the total cultural setting in which we are living. For nearly 2,000 years we have lived in a culture, particularly the Western culture, in which altruism is the height of all virtue. To love one's neighbor more than oneself, essentially not to be concerned with oneself, that is obviously a value of the highest degree.** It has tended to become the only basic value. And even though some people might not subscribe to organized religious beliefs, even though they might be professed atheists, it is much easier to be an atheist than to withdraw from such a broad cultural outlook as the one concerning the overriding value of altruism. There has been a cultural overvaluation or unique valuation of altruism. It has buttressed a particular type of prejudice, and, I believe, narrowed our vision concerning the evaluation of psychological phenomena in a very important aspect of the human mind. It may take the form of a true religious belief or a vague general feeling of the way people ought to live; it may become a sociopolitical translation of religious belief or socialism. Regardless of what form it takes, the marriage of this type of cultural ideal with the ideal of development and maturation has its own evaluated judgment. This is true particularly since Darwin: the higher form of development is considered better than the lower one. These two attitudes have combined to narrow our view on narcissism, and in particular on the one basic tenet that I would like to submit to you as I have done in the past. Namely, not only do primitive forms of object relatedness develop into higher forms of object relatedness, but narcissism in and of itself has its own developmental sequence, its own mode of development, its own series of developmental steps. Narcissism has its own epigenetic sequence, as does object love, but this has to be looked upon in a sophisticated fashion." (pg. 9)
- "Narcissism is by definition the investment of the self, the instinctual libidinal investment of the self. (I use psychoanalytic terminology because it happens to be the one I am familiar with.) In psychoanalytic language when we say instinctual investment of an object we use the word cathexis as another word to describe the phenomenon. The degree of attention, the degree of appetite, the degree of wanting to get to it, of having it, that is drive-connected and that is clustered around the image of an object - this we call the cathexis or investment of an object. The contrast to the investment of objects, or to use the broadest and easiest of terms, object love, is narcissism, that is, the love of the self, the investment of the self with all the things that one does to something that is being loved. One wants to maintain it; one wants to show it off; one wants to have it close. Narcissism was in love with himself. Of course, this is a gross symbolic representation of a much more subtle set of circumstances; so is mythology in general. But how about objects as narcissism? It is an old error that is extremely important to be clear about: narcissism does not exclude object relations. Object relations are not the same thing as object love. There are many relationships to other people that have nothing to do with loving other people but that are in the service of narcissistic aims. As a matter of fact, some of the most intense relationships to objects serve narcissistic purposes." (pg. 10)
 - "[P]rimary narcissism is not a clinical phenomenon, but a kind of directional force. The concept is perhaps most sensibly employed when we talk about such unknown factors as the innate propensity toward narcissistic fixations versus the capacity to develop narcissism into higher forms or to develop a rich and variegated object life. What we experience and what we can observe as narcissism is very much involved in a setting of object relations from the outset of life. The object, however, is first of all not loved under these circumstances, not cognitively recognized as something separate from the primitive self. It is either experienced as a part of the self or used for the maintenance of self-love, self-cathexis, self-investment—narcissism. In a simpler form, when an exhibitionist, sexual or nonsexual, shows his penis off in a park, or in a subway or a bus, to a woman with glasses, he does not love that person. He needs her tremendously, but there is no love involved. There is nothing that this person has that another person does not have. Perhaps the fact that glasses are necessary for this - I'm using a particular clinical example - defines at least some beginning rudimentary differentiation of a particular narcissistically invested object. This is not, however, a loved object, but an object that he uses for the reaffirmation of the powerful impression of his penis, of how frightening his penis can be, how much blushing and embarrassment it can produce in the person to whom he shows it. He needs this prop in the environment, but it is a narcissistic prop. It is a prop in the service of something that has reference only to a specific mode of heightening his self-esteem, in terms of the powerfulness of his penis. Regardless of whether there is a fixation of an old fantasy of power or an identification with a powerful penis he saw early in his life, exposing himself serves the purpose of self-aggrandizement. It has nothing to do with love of the person to whom the penis is shown." (pg. 11-12)
- "I stressed earlier that narcissism should not at any time become subtly nor covertly, let alone overtly, a value judgment. There is good narcissism, and there is not such good narcissism, depending on the task at hand. To be capable of adapting to the unexpected, as well as to the expected, may under

some circumstances separate the wheat from the chaff. A person with normal adaptive span might do well in a normal adaptive environment, but only people who under normal circumstances would seem to be pathological might survive the unusual." (pg. 14)

- **"There is an implicit value judgment in Freud's work that he made explicit, I believe, only once: Where id was there shall ego be (Freud, 1933, p. 80). Put in other ways, the highest degree of consciousness, the highest degree of awareness, the greatest expansion of the realm of the ego (they are not totally synonymous, but for our purposes at this moment let's assume they are), this is also the good, the desirable.** Freud (E. Jones, 1965, III, p. 144) did not tolerate any lack of veracity, whether this was in terms of denial or in terms of conscious lying. **All his life's work was devoted to the expansion of consciousness. What is not known should become known,** in the depth of the person and in the scientific attitude in the investigation of the environment, whether pleasant or unpleasant." (pg. 14-15)
- "First then, seen by itself, narcissism must not be confused as something that is evaluatively less good than object love. Secondly, narcissism is not the opposite of object relations; it is the opposite of object love; some of the most intense object relationships are in essence narcissistic ones. I will not go into details at this time. If you have any questions about this very general topic, put them aside, because we will come back to it. Thirdly, narcissism has to be evaluated in the same way developmentally and maturationally as parallel to object love. In other words, it has a developmental scale from early to late, from primitive to developed, from immature to mature. But I must again caution you that one must not confuse these with value judgments. Primitive narcissism may have its place, too. But first of all we have to say that narcissism in and of itself is not evaluatively bad, and then we must emphasize that there is a developmental line or a developmental scale of narcissism which one can see only when one has made the first step. So long as you consider narcissism as bad you do not think of a developmental scale. It must always be the primitive precursor of object love. But once you have made the step and said, "No, it is not a primitive precursor of object love, it has value of its own," then you can begin to see that narcissism too has a developmental line. There is a primitive kind of narcissism that relates to earlier situations of the small baby, and there are healthy forms of narcissism, developed forms of narcissism, mature forms of narcissism. In this sense neither health nor mature nor developed have value or evaluative meanings; the term health perhaps should be avoided altogether, but at any rate, forms of narcissism are adaptive in the mature sense of a developed person and have their own place (see Kohut, 1966). One can then see how these forms develop in the same way as one can see how object relations and object love develop." (pg. 16-17)
- Chapter 2 - The Separate Developmental Lines of Narcissism and Object Love (pg. 18)
 - **"In the early child, if he is normal and healthy, there is a normal developmental phase in which each individual moment, each cooing, each swallowing, each precursor of a thought process, each little recognition is there all by itself, intensely enjoyable, but not yet integrated into a total concept:** "This is only a part of me." But gradually, the influx of maturational pressures (repeated ontogenetically, phylogenetically, over millions of years) has contributed to the development of the race. This repeats itself today as a forward move toward the unification of single, as yet isolated, fragmentary separate experiences; they become subsumed under the experience of total self. It is this particular development, **this movement from isolated functions, from isolated body parts, toward a total cathexis of a total self, which is the phase of the development from autoerotism to narcissism.** I think this is somewhat restricted terminology simply on the basis of a libido theory, but quite appropriate to Freud's findings at the turn of the century when he formed this theory. As we would say now, this is a development from a phase of a fragmented self or of single experiences to a phase of a cohesive, non-fragmented, unitary self. When we speak about the unitary self, however, we do not mean that the unitary self precludes the experience of divisions of the self. As I said, pride in one's physique, pride even in one's capacity to love objects, and enjoyment of an intellectual task completed are not only compatible with a feeling of a cohesive self but support it. But the parts are always seen as areas of an undestroyed total self. It is extremely instructive, on the other hand, to observe people who in the course of prolonged treatment begin to reconstitute a sense of self and feel themselves whole and on the basis of that wholeness to engage in activities they formerly could not engage in." (pg. 25-26)
 - "Many object relationships are used for narcissistic purposes. There are objects in the child's surroundings, and in the surroundings of all of us, that are highly important to us, but that serve narcissistic purposes. When the child begins, for example, to get a sense of his own value, of his own cohesiveness, of being somebody, he needs other people to confirm this. This is an intense need. But these other people are not loved for their sake. They are not important as centers of their own volition or initiative or as independent human beings with their own goal-directedness. They are important only insofar as they serve the heightening or the maintenance of the self-esteem, let us say, of the baby or of us. It makes a great deal of sense to differentiate between object relations that serve narcissistic purposes and the love of an object when the other person is longed for, but is recognized and is imbued with interest, love, libido, or whatever you want to call it, as a human being with his or her own purposes, independent of oneself-independent of the heightening of one's self-esteem. Let me illustrate this point by the giving and the receiving of gifts: If you choose a gift primarily for the purpose of gaining the gratitude of the other person, you may say that the emphasis of this particular activity was a narcissistic one. If you give it, however, for the purpose of the enjoyment of the other person who is an independent person, then the emphasis is on object love in this particular transaction. It is true that there is always some degree of narcissistic enhancement in any kind of object love. But to ascribe a continuum between narcissism and object love is a logical fallacy. One can never do that. One can always prove that dark and light are the same because there are only degrees of grayness in between. So the fact remains that there are relationships to others in which the self is almost forgotten and the enjoyment that one gains is in the recognition of the other. There are other relationships, however, in which the point of gravity lies in the self. The extremes are the easiest ones to recognize. When one is in love one does not think of oneself. If we examine the imagery that goes on in an individual in love, it is totally about the other person - what she looks like, what she wishes, how she smiles. In other words, one is not particularly involved with oneself. This is true not only for human objects, but also for cherished tasks. We have talked about that before. I gave you the example of somebody so involved in a national goal or an idealistic goal that, in the process of aiming at it, he totally disregards himself, to the point that he does not feel injuries, which would obviously be the experience that would most call forth a narcissistic investment. On the other hand, when you are very much concerned with yourself, either with your own body or with your personality, whatever aspect of the self that is most invested, then very frequently you disregard others. I think **there is a difference between a mature being in love and the kind of primitive merger fantasies that are really an extension of the self or a merging into the self.** The fact is that in the condition of being in love very frequently all kinds of narcissistic fantasies are also activated simultaneously. When we talk about the separation of concepts on this explicit level, it is usually not helpful to look at the complexity of the actual empirical occurrence. I think that in a normal love relationship there are some narcissistic factors involved that are subordinated to the essential relationship to the other person. I think any kind of love relationship one encounters, particularly among younger people, has a good many narcissistic elements. Paradoxically, in the state of being in love, the overestimation of the object, if one examines it in detail, is not due to the heightened investment of object love or object libido. It is due, rather, to the narcissistic element in the love, in other words, to an old self-imagery that is projected onto the other individual. These are details that one can only analyze when one examines such relationships clinically or in detail. The major point that I would like to stress is that the mere presence or absence of object relationships does not tell you anything about the narcissistic state of the individual. People may, for example, be alone, but their aloneness does not mean any narcissistic regression, or any narcissistic retreat, or even, without value judgment, any narcissism. It may simply be a longing for somebody whom one loves very much. The person, for example, who is deprived of somebody whom he loves, or of a whole group of people whom he loves-the person who is displaced, for example, and loses his home, his family, everything that was of value to him - such a person may in new surroundings be alone for a long time. A second kind of person, however, placed in new surroundings will make the transition to the new set of objects with the greatest of ease. Put that way, chances are, sight unseen, that the second person's relationships are much shallower and much more narcissistic than those of the first person. The person who is incapable of attaching himself to a variety of totally new objects remains internally connected to the old ones. He is alone, but not narcissistic. The other one is

- surrounded with many people, but they mean nothing to him except in terms of his self, or as relief of loneliness, or as confirming his presence. The main point is that the mere presence or absence of relationships to other people does not tell you anything about the nature of the relationships." (pg. 27-29)
- **"Empathy has, at least historically, narcissistic roots. Empathy does develop originally out of a narcissistic relationship to another human being. The likeness of the mother-child relationship, their feeling the same thing at the same time - this is how empathy originates.** But the historical development - this is an old rule that one also must not forget - the fact that one can prove that something develops out of a common root does not mean that it is still the same that it was originally. We speak of a change of function (Hartmann, 1958), of the historical fallacy or the genetic fallacy. The fact remains that empathy subserves object love goals. On the whole one can differentiate, at least in terms of direction, objects who are recognized and permitted to be different, permitted to have their own wishes, their own interests. They are loved not only despite differences but because of differences complementing one's interest. In contrast, narcissistically invested objects are interesting to the person only insofar as they serve to maintain his own narcissistic goals. **There is, of course, no human relationship that does not contain features of both object love and narcissistic love.** On theoretical levels one should differentiate the two components. In clinical instances, either one or the other is crucial to the understanding of the personality. The capacity to help a love partner maintain his self-esteem by showing interest in him when he needs it, for example by listening to him when he needs to be listened to, is subordinated to the higher capacity for love and to the kind of mutuality that arises from knowledge that the partner will respond when you are in need of this kind of service. So a variety of detailed activities on both sides enters into any kind of complex human relationship. In other words, to give explanations to somebody who is suffering from a fragmented sense of self and from a shaky self-esteem—in terms of the disturbances in his object love is fallacious. It does not lead anywhere. He would not feel understood. As is so frequently the case with these complex topics, clinical material will make meaningful what we are discussing here theoretically, but one should know the theory in order to make the clinical material meaningful" (pg. 30)
 - Chapter 3 - Early Stages in the Formation of Self-Esteem (pg. 31)
 - "Although one learns to some extent to control and take hold of oneself by greater insights, narcissistic sensitivities of people enormously influence their actual behavior and thinking, even in seemingly very distant areas. Once one's eyes are opened one can hardly believe that one had overlooked the importance of these features among patients. The degree to which people suffer under the fluctuations of their self-esteem, the undue hurts to their self-esteem, is extreme; the intensity or the lengths to which people will go in order to balance a shaky self-esteem is enormous." (pg. 32)
 - "One more or less formed self-image has to give way and to be replaced by another. In other words, it is in late adolescence and early adulthood that problems of the cohesiveness of the self and fear of the breakdown of the self occur. Attempts are made in one form or another, either by submitting to the culture or by forming a counterculture to balance a shaky self-esteem. It is my conviction that a real understanding of this self-esteem problem can only be achieved if the genetic dimension, the history of the development of self-esteem and its early vicissitudes, as well as the weak spots in the personality, is taken into account. There are many people who, in going from adolescence into adulthood, make tremendous steps of adaptation. But they do not all break down; they do not all become depressed; they do not all turn to security measures like drugs, or touch therapy, or whatever may be involved in order to confirm the fact that they are alive, real, and worthwhile. There are many people who can suffer through the normal process and pain of making the change from one system of the self to another one." (pg. 32)
 - "When we speak of the fragmented self, there is a sound of pathology and I think rightfully so. From the clinical point of view, in the adult, indeed in general, **we can speak about fragmentation experiences in one's own personality; that is, feeling that one is not real, that one is not cohesive, that one has no continuity in time, that one is not a whole.** The social role, for instance, is a support in feeling whole. Knowing that one is a physician, knowing that one has some kind of specialty, allows people with very shaky self-esteem to find a niche, something special that only they themselves have; they use it not so much because it is so terribly interesting (certain hobbies, for instance, perform that function) but because it becomes a crutch to their self-esteem." (pg. 33)
 - **"The capacity of a child to feel that he is totally the hand at the moment that he grasps, that he is totally the mouth and the tongue sucking at a particular moment, is not pathology; this is health. It becomes pathology if later a cohesive self begins to disintegrate under the influence of trauma.** In the schizophrenic regression, when the healthy part of the person observes the disintegration as a fragmentation of the rest of his personality and tries by hook or crook to integrate what is going on by trying to describe it as a kind of disease, that still makes sense. When we have a physical disease, when a boil hurts before it bursts, we still have a sense of "I, even though our mind is concentrated around the boil. We still remain cohesive. The schizophrenic, in his regression to this fragmentation of the formerly cohesive self, attempts to interpret the already fragmented aspects of his experience as if there were a physical disease, as if there were something strange happening, and as if the self were still holding together. He can only try to bring a theoretical mantle around it, but he cannot truly feel anything. The forward movement of normal development is quite different. First of all, there is the stage of the baby experiencing separate processes in mental and physical body parts. **In this developmental phase it is enormously important for the maternal environment to respond according to the baby's needs. I do not mean necessarily the biological mother, but whoever the mothering adult may be. This may be a man, for maternal feelings are common to both.** The maternal environment responds to the individual body part without yet seeing the whole, but at each particular moment relating to the presenting part of the body, to the presenting new achievement, whether it is now lifting the head, the first moving over, the first cooing noise, or whatever it may be. Gradually, however, and in tune with the maturational pressures that bring the baby forward, the maternal environment becomes ready not only to enjoy each individual moment, and each individual rudimentary thought process or discovery of the world, which is not yet separated from the self, but also, having responded to each part in tune with the baby's needs, to respond now to the whole: calling the child's name - the higher cathexis of the response to the name. In other words, this is not only the hand of little Dickie, but this is Dickie's little hand. Not only is each individual body part then important and accepted by the environment, and confirmed as it is accepted, but it is also part and parcel of the total unity of self. These are the rudimentary aspects of the self experience. The environment can thus in many ways support, hinder, or distort this development of the self. The most basic of all the activities of the environment, and an enormously important one, is the capacity to respond to what I insist on calling the baby's exhibitionism. It is as if the wish of the baby could be verbalized, "Look, I am here. I am I." And the environment should then, usually visually, respond with the gleam in the mother's eye, the smile of the mother, the responsiveness of the mother's activity vis-à-vis the exhibitionism of the child. This is very different from, let us say, other needs of the child: for example, the response to the child's need to be fed. If you asked me at this point to distinguish where rudimentary object love begins and how it separates itself from rudimentary narcissism, I would be unable to make such distinction. It is sometimes very difficult to separate these, and in the earliest phases I would be very willing to say they form a unit and that we should not worry about separating them. But out of the mother's response, let us say to the hunger needs of the baby, there emerges an interplay of development which in the long run does lead to recognition of the independent needs of two independent individuals. The showing off of the child, the wish to produce pleasure in the mother, the lowering of self-esteem when there is no response - these certainly lead to **the confirming or the lack of confirming of the narcissistic needs of the child.** Confirmation of these needs is just as important for survival as satisfaction of the caloric or feeding needs of the child. It is the lack of responsiveness to the individual child, the deprivation of the child's narcissistic requirements, that leads to so many of these states that are described, for example, in the hospitalism babies seen by Spitz (1945, 1946) long ago. Severe narcissistic defects may occur as late as the beginning of latency, but what I am talking about now are the rudimentary beginnings of an early developmental phase. The height of the exhibitionistic responses for the baby would probably be within the first year of life. Later on, particularly after weaning, I would think it is the narcissism that is already involved in certain of his functions, his products, for example, around toilet training, and things of that particular type - the pride in the visible urination of the

- little boy - that may meet with a crucial lack of responsiveness. Certainly the narcissistic aspects in the oedipal phase are enormously important: the phallic narcissism of the little boy and the narcissism of the total body configuration of the coquettish little girl. All of these are now side by side with object passions. The enormous object passions of the oedipal complex are, of course, very well-known. At the same time, there are still very great narcissistic needs. So the blow that the oedipal defeat constitutes, and how it is suffered, is to be understood not only in terms of the disappointed object love, but also in the disappointment of fantasy of unfathomable greatness, of being a conqueror. How this is suffered, the degree, the fractionation - this is the riddle. No infantile narcissism can remain in anybody who grows up. But what happens to it? Later we will talk at great length about the transformations of this narcissism, the traumatic way in which it is defeated, thus making the difference between future vulnerability or future fitness. **One of the most important issues, then, is the response of the environment.** This is something in which you can, I believe, see most clearly the methodology by which one can extrapolate early developmental phases from adult pathology. Why are some people insatiable in their needs for acclaim while others are less so? There is, of course, pathology of a totally different nature in which people do not seem to have any need at all, but this is extreme illness of another kind. Take, as an example, the grandiosity of the messianic paranoid leader who seems to be totally without need for the confirmation of others. His belief is unshaken by the disbelief of the rest of the world. He can either be a crank, or he can finally, by dint of his enormous conviction, convince others to become his followers. In essence his narcissism seems to be well-balanced, but of course this is pathology. You may say pathology, under certain circumstances, becomes socially a highly important phenomenon. We talked about this in our first session, and how tricky all this is. When one speaks in terms of value judgment, one has to see the total environment in which a term is used. We know that a paranoid is ill by any kind of value scale that we subscribe to. We will not go into sophistry now, in which somebody may try to prove that such an individual is not ill and that everybody else is, although from his point of view, from his value scale, this is true. Under normal circumstances, we all need a steady stream of self-confirmation, and we have it. There are of course ups and downs. Have you ever thought about the narcissistic value of a bull session in which one takes other people apart? It is a contract between people who sit down together and talk about others who are not there, how lacking in intelligence and how fallacious they are. Cheeks glow, and everybody has a marvelous time. Why? Self-esteem is heightened by mutual confirmation of the lowness of others. Similarly, prejudice against an out-group always has the effect of heightening self-esteem. Is it good or is it bad? Is this health or is this disease? Obviously, knowing the socially disastrous effects of prejudice, the suffering that it produces, it is social pathology. And yet, as with my fellow with the Vonnegut hobby, there are some people who are held together only by dint of their prejudice. If they were to give this up, they would fall apart. It is almost impossible to convince somebody that his prejudice is just what it is. It is always imbricated, as is true for any delusion with some realistic factors. No delusion is generally made out of whole cloth; there is always something to it. But what is the purpose that it serves? I am emphasizing all this because all that we see in our observations of adults - from the normal to the abnormal, from our patients to ourselves - is indirectly caused in early development. **We need a steady influx of the confirmation of ourselves.** Nobody exists, again with the exception of some paranoid-like messianic characters, who does not suffer when he is totally unknown in some place. Many a person has made a comparatively reasonable adjustment in a small town or village where everybody knows that he is the son of the English teacher or the grocer, for example. Suddenly, at a big university where nobody knows him, the question "Who am I?" looms large. Previously his self-concept was kept in balance by steady confirmation from morning till night of the surrounding small village or town, where everyone knows who he is, where he hears each day, "Hi, Dick," or "Tom," or whatever his name may be. Suddenly, here he is in an anonymous environment. He goes to class where the teacher does not know him, to classes where there are so many students that he will never be known. Then there comes the yearning, and finally a tremendous attachment to somebody who gives him a personalized response. Now there are other people who come from small towns who may suffer a bit, but do not need to make these tremendous attachments. In the anonymous environment of a huge university, they do not become deeply depressed, reaching for drugs, suddenly feeling that their whole existence is unreal in a schizoid-like phenomenology or symptomatology. Why does this occur to some and not others? There again, life is not so simple. One has to examine what weak spots in the individual environment converged upon the particular precipitating factor, and these have to be weighed. It is obvious that one usually begins by showing the person understanding for the present task that has precipitated his sense of unreality...The mere fact that one shows him that this is the way he feels now makes him somebody, because there is someone else in this world who has been capable of reaching out enough for him to know what is going on. So very frequently, the mere understanding is a step toward feeling better. I go through developmental precursors of the problems we are discussing here, and veer back and forth between glimpses of child and adult, not only to prove to you that it is important to investigate these early experiences because they have significance in terms of what we find in our everyday life and in our functions as healers, but also to give you an idea of the many nuances of the disturbances in the self experience, of disturbances in self-esteem, and the various interactions both in terms of maintenance and breakdown of self-esteem. For example, the mirroring of the mother is gross behavior that one can certainly see. Perhaps one can be led to recognize it more sharply when one has lived with patients and has seen their eternal wish, "Please tell me that what I say is right. Say it again. Say it was good. Say it was fine. Say it was the finest thing you ever heard. Say this was progress. Don't just sit there!" And so when there is a patient in whom the need to have a response fills hour after hour, you can gradually recognize there must be some kind of lack early in life which makes him still cling to and want such reassurance when he should have had his fill. The sophisticated child observer, recognizing this need, may see things he would perhaps otherwise not have paid much attention to, or he can see some things now in their fullest significance. You can see what this kind of behavior and interaction in childhood will finally lead to in terms of either satisfaction and balance or still persisting needs and imbalance. It may make you aware of something that I was very proud to have seen: that it is the gleam in the mother's eye that the child misses." (pg. 34-38)
- "When a small child is deprived of his parents, he is deprived not only of their response in terms of self-confirmation, but also of part of the self in a way for which it is terribly difficult to find adult words." (pg. 40)
 - **"The child must normally have the conviction that the surroundings which are part of him are unshakable, providing pleasure, bliss, satisfaction, preventing or out-balancing anxiety.** When we watch mother and child in their interaction, and the mother empathically responds to the child's needs, we know that we are watching two people, a baby, an independent unit, and a mother, an independent unit; but this tells us nothing about how the child experiences the relationship. **To the child the mother is himself.** He only knows that when the mother is not here he is much less than he was before. In very much the same way, when somebody who has made the relationship to such a highly overestimated object (by our realistic standards) loses that object, he does not yearn for that somebody but for a part of himself he has lost. His self-esteem is lowered. Again, this is different from the kind of expansion of the self in which one feels great but needs somebody else to be part and parcel and servant to this greatness. Then one does not look up to somebody who is very great and fantastically powerful. One assumes one's self is all powerful and fantastically big, except somebody else is needed to maintain this image of self. The baby, having this kind of conviction, could not maintain it very long unless adults were playing their role and helping him to maintain this. The child does not know that others are doing something out of their good will and out of their maternal and paternal instincts. It is done because he is he, and he wants it, and this is part of his greatness. So there is a subject-bound narcissism that needs other people to maintain itself, and there is an object-bound narcissism that needs the presence of this other overestimated object to whom one can attach oneself. These developmental lines not only go side by side with the development of object love, but also go side by side with each other; in other words, both of these developments are present at the same time. People who have suffered losses of objects during phases of development in which the object is still experienced as part of the self suffer later on - not from being deprived of somebody they love, but rather, from missing part of their own psychological equipment. They chase all their lives after objects, trying to fill an inner void. There are people who have lost an idealized parent before the formation of their own idealized superego - in other words, before they have set up a system of their own goals and values that is so highly idealized in all of us. The content of our values may change, but the normal person always idealizes. Ideals

- always play a special role in the mental setup. They may be different this year than they were ten years ago, but if we are fairly healthy in this particular way, we feel pleased with ourselves when we live up to our ideals. Our self-esteem is high when we live up to our values and goals. There are, however, people who have lost an idealized parent so suddenly that they were unable to transform this external figure into a set of idealized values. These are people who over and over again attach themselves to one idealized figure after another. They seem to be hungry for objects. But they are not hungry for objects; they are filling the void of something that they themselves do not have. They must look up to somebody. And only when this other somebody then says, "Yes, you are good. Yes, you have lived up to my values," will they have this sense of balanced self-esteem that is prized so highly by everybody. In principle this occurs before superego formation. However, I have extended it in a practical way to the period including the very beginning of latency, because the newly formed superego is still fragile at that time, and although it has been achieved, it apparently can still be undone. But that does not alter the principle. **There is an inner void, a missing function, the lack of an inner capacity to feed one's self-esteem by living up to one's own values, which depends on the idealization of the superego, which is achieved by the gradual detachment from the idealized other.** There is one area in my own observation in which I feel a little bit insecure yet. I have no question that the nuclear content of the superego is basically laid down and firmly crystalized at the end of the oedipal period. I believe that the idealization of the superego, more than laying down of content, has another very important firming to go through in puberty. So the detachment from the idealized figures of puberty has a genetic kind of meaning that the repetition of the Oedipus complex at puberty no longer has. I am still in doubt about that. Anybody can imagine how it feels to feel good about oneself - you have done some active work and you feel all warmed up physically, or you have done some good thinking and you feel satisfied with yourself. You feel as a cohesive whole, as it were. This is in contrast to the kind of disheveled experience about oneself that one sometimes gets, a feeling of not hanging together well. I know I am talking about this now in very nonpathological analogies, but you can see it in much grosser forms in the type of patient that I am particularly interested in, the patient with the narcissistic personality disturbance. Such patients are not psychotic people. They are not borderline people. They are not necessarily very sick or very ill people. They are people who lend themselves very well to insight therapy. But there are very specific disturbances in their self-esteem. Their problems are not primarily rejected impulses and conflicts about them. Their problems are primarily in the realm of self-esteem, of self-feeling, of hanging together, of feeling real about themselves. This all seems to have an ominous sound, but it does not deserve such an ominous sound. We will discuss the reason later when I try to differentiate these disorders from the psychoses or from those larval or hidden psychoses that are now frequently called borderline cases." (pg. 40-42)
- "[W]e assume that a child has experiences early in life in which each individual sensory impression, each individual movement, each individual feeling, is at the moment all of it, and that includes certain things that the observer knows to be external. For example, when the baby sucks, the complex of oral cavity and nipple is one single experience. This complex of oral cavity and nipple is recoverable - can be extrapolated - from schizophrenic experience. The phenomenon can be seen, then, almost in pure culture: a regression takes place to this particular phase - and beyond, as a matter of fact. We will talk about this when we examine the essential differences between the psychotic state, the borderline cases which are larval or hidden psychotic states, and the more labile states. The point is that, developmentally speaking, the child has experiences which are repeated in cases of narcissistic character disorders - brief oscillations which touch on this childhood base but are quickly overcome. This base is more stably cathected and more permanently reached in the psychoses. They give us marvelous access to the reconstruction of this developmental phase as a positive experience. In other words, when the small child feeds he has not even a rudimentary concept of "All of me also feeds." All there is at the moment is the feeding. It is this particular part of the oral cavity plus the nipple that is experienced; everything else is not there. And later, with another feeding experience, this is something else again; it does not yet hang together bound by memory. The infant does not have the capacity to think, "Formerly I was enjoying myself ecstatically on the nipple. Now I'm gladly falling back to sleep again." In the initial stages of a schizophrenic regression, when it is still emerging, when it is still new, before it is covered over by secondary maneuvers which really fixate the regressive state, you can observe what happens. In these initial stages of the schizophrenic regression, the healthy part of the patient's personality watches helplessly as a regression takes place. This occurs generally after a hurt to the self-esteem. This regression, however, does not settle down in primitive phases of an archaic cohesive narcissism. In other words, there is not a quick swing back and forth from one position to another, but a massive regression to this particular stage, which then goes on in other directions which we will perhaps discuss in another context. We do not need to go into that now. What happens under such circumstances is that the patient then revives as a pathological state what formerly was a normal developmental state. This is one of the crucial issues to be understood if one wants to grasp the nature of sophisticated developmental psychology. What once was a healthy, appropriate developmental state becomes something, or may become something, highly pathological. So the schizophrenic, in the initial stages of the schizophrenic regression, watches with dismay and fright the uncontrollable regression to an archaic mode of experience, in which individual body parts are cathected in an isolated, fragmented way and no longer belong to the total self." (pg. 44-45)
 - Chapter 4 - Empathetic Environment and the Grandiose Self (pg. 47)
 - "The gradual development of single detached experiences may be viewed as precursors of the self. There follows, then, a gradually increasing awareness of the experience of individual functions, body parts, and mental activities. **With the integration and awareness of these experiences the total self emerges and takes form. It is not that the total self replaces former experiences. It is that in addition it integrates all former experiences.**" (pg. 47)
 - "The capacity to form such fantasies is a great sign of potential health" (pg. 48)
 - "Perhaps this is a good time to elaborate some vicissitudes of the growth process of self-esteem. The psychic economy of the speed with which the developmental phases are stepped, like the steps of a ladder from one to another, is of the utmost importance. **Trauma occurs when the child is held back at a developmental or maturational phase although he is ready to move forward. This occurs if the mother insists on experiencing the child as part of her own body-self at a time when the child wants to exert his own initiative.** The child at this point wants to see the mother to some extent as somebody with her own initiative who is not immediately affected by his moods. In other words, an echo must now last longer and must not be as immediate. The mother has to change with the child. Psychic economy plays a role in the growth process. **If a maturational step is imposed on a child too quickly and too suddenly, this is trauma.** If the mother demands of the child that he suddenly give her up after having been totally involved with her, then it is traumatic. It is also traumatic if she keeps him too long under her wings. In other words, what is healthy in one developmental phase is traumatic in another." (pg. 49)
 - "The caretaking adult, with a radar of empathy for the child, is continuously in tune with his need to be narcissistically put into equilibrium. **It is the failures of this equilibrium, if they are appropriately frustrating - in tune with the child's maturation and progress in taking over - which enable the child to grow. It is the traumatic failure in equilibrium and empathy which sets up severe trauma.**" (pg. 52)
 - "[T]ransitional objects, like this particular spool, or the blankets that children carry about, are way-stations in the development from rudimentary or immature to mature object love. I am quite convinced that it deals with rudimentary object love. **It deals with an object that has initiative, an object that has activities of its own. This mother made herself independent. And what this child is struggling with is to allow this mother independence only insofar as he has something to say about it too. He deals with the suddenness of the disappearance of the mother.**" (pg. 58)
 - Chapter 5 - Building Psychic Structure that Regulates Self-Esteem (pg. 61)
 - **"A beginning of otherness, a rudimentary suspicion of otherness, must somehow arise in the baby. Yet this otherness is only of interest to the baby in terms of regulating what it experiences in this primitive way as well-being, which is indistinguishable from what we call self-esteem.** There is no question that it later becomes ramified and branches out into perfection of all kinds-physical, mental, moral, esthetic, and all the different forms perfection may take. Originally, it is all one big package that we may call well-being. This is the narcissistic equilibrium. In its perfect form, the

- narcissistic equilibrium of the baby includes all these needs that are being physically cared for-and more. The baby has drives. It not only has drives around sequences of hunger satiation, but also has drives of a kind that, approximating the closest adult experience, for want of a better word, Freud (1905a, 1915a) called sexual drive. From the best known of a series of rather similar experiences, he called all libidinal experiences sexual, not only because they appear in perversions, where they are clearly sexual, but also because even when they are not sexual they have an urgency or pleasure-seeking familiar to every-one. They are alike in intensity. So, in a similar kind of correlation, I suggest that we talk about the exhibitionistic drive and the need of the adult to spin out great fantasies about himself, and that we correlate these with rudimentary beginnings." (pg. 62)
- "[W]hat I call the mirror transference in its various phases of development is an expression of the fact that others are experienced and needed in the sense of being agents for self-confirmation, for self-approval." (pg. 64)
 - "I want to emphasize the importance of the capacity to experience this mirroring from the environment and to be confirmed by an acceptance of what the adult observer knows to be another human being. **One needs to experience oneself as having an effect, of receiving a response, of being important**" (pg. 65)
 - "[A] mirror is cold; it is only a mirror visually. **The mother is not just such a mirror. She is a responding mirror**, which is a very different kind of mirror" (pg. 65)
 - "In the merger with another person that other is experienced as an extension of the self. In the alter ego or twinship experience the other is experienced as just like oneself. Finally, we have the most differentiated other in the true mirror transference. In the narrower sense, the other person is important only insofar as he confirms in enthusiasm and applause. All these stages have one thing in common. **The self-experience is enhanced and confirmed by the response to the exhibitionistic needs of the child and to the grandiosity of the adult so that he feels powerful, perfect, all-knowing. It is the support that the external environment**, as we know it to exist, **gives to the child in maintaining these delusions**, as we may wish to call them. Psychologically speaking they are the deepest truths about the small child, although objectively speaking they are erroneous. He must have this state of mind before he can give it up." (pg. 66)
 - "[T]here is a basic degree of self-confidence, of pride in oneself, of self-cohesiveness, a basic degree of ideas of greatness about oneself, of self-acceptance, a basic minimum or optimum of showing off, of exhibiting oneself, which belongs to mental health. From childhood to adulthood, the character of this changes. But even in adults, there is a nuance of the old baby worship that is still left even in our comparatively subdued demands for attention and approval. These demands are not grandiose, as they are in the child who recognizes nothing apart from himself. We still maintain certain illusions about ourselves, which are indeed not illusional but rather, in a sense, our right, the right for survival, the right for success. They are infringed on by other people's rights. One has to learn gradually how one can make demands for attention for oneself and yet realize that these demands must be limited. This need for a merger, a mirror image, an alter ego or twin-like creature is asking that other people, even though different, concentrate on oneself and give one attention, echoing and approval. What all these demands have in common is that they arise within the same structure; they arise inside the subject. It is this structure that I call the grandiose self on the basis of its development and its origin." (pg. 71-72)
 - "Understanding increases a person's mastery over his reactions. It gives him greater control. He can swing forward again into an equilibrium of greater narcissistic self-acceptance as he is accepted and understood by another human being. This is an expansion of his own capacities. The important thing is not so much the theoretical explanation but the human explanation in a human context; this allows the person to expand his own self-understanding." (pg. 74)
 - Chapter 6 - The Admiring Selfobject and the Idealized Selfobject (pg. 77)
 - "The omni series - omniscience, omnipotence - all this is still one little whole, because cognitively it is not yet elaborated. It is simply a kind of undisturbed narcissistic well-being. **Anything that frustrates the physical and mental well-being of the child - any noise, any coldness, any wetness, any hunger, any delay—all this is a narcissistic disturbance.** And then the child, recognizing that there are shortcomings in this narcissistic paradise, that it is not limitless, attempts to save it in some way. The child saves it in ways that are difficult to grasp by any direct empathy, but there are replicas in adult experience that at least bring us closer to understanding it. The child saves it in two antithetical ways. Put simply in a verbal formula which is very far from the experience, the child tucks away the feeling, "I am all good, but everything else is bad. I am all great, but there is some badness outside that doesn't belong"" (pg. 78)
 - "One finds it in national prejudice, national pride, when the nation becomes, as it were, the heir of the old grandiose self. The nation is an expansion of the self. It depends on how one experiences it, of course. Some people may experience the nation as an idealized object, but most of the time not so. The supernations, like the fascist states, were not essentially experienced as ideals with which one united, although ideals were of course formed also. They were essentially experienced as all-powerful expansions of the self. In the same way, the tank, for the tank driver, becomes his power, rather than his merging into an ideal carrier that he admires. **For the religious person, the adult replica for the idealized object is the absolute God**, particularly the God of the mystics. The great mystic writers of the Middle Ages, for example, described over and over again this experience of merging into something great, into something perfect, the God life, and feeling themselves to be absolutely nothing. The individual death becomes quite meaningless, because it becomes a reuniting with this super power." (pg. 79)
 - "[I]n the developmental sequence - the increasing selectivity of the parental responses, the increasing frustration, the increasing loss of the approving object, not by death and sudden disappearance, but by the gradual withholding of approval, which is always part of an object that is lost, if you take the term object in the sophisticated sense - all this leads to the gradual taking over by the psyche of functions that were formerly performed by others. In the case of the idealized object there is also a loss. There is recognition that the ideal is not ideal. But it must be recognized not prematurely and not massively; otherwise it becomes traumatic and indigestible. It becomes useful for the psyche when it occurs at the right moment and at the right speed. Then it leads to the setting up internally of the formerly external ideal, with all the ensuing advantages of having an internal ideal object, namely, one's values, goals and ideals. They then feed one's narcissistic approval if one approaches these goals. One is therefore less in need of an external idealized object. The strongest and most mature people have strong ideals which are more important to them than external approval. Nobody is limitless in that respect; everyone is capable of being swung around by the threatened loss of ideals or by the approval or disapproval of external leaders. But an individual usually can maintain himself without being affected by external leaders. However, under the influence of an enormous mass movement, almost anybody will fall victim to strong external pressures, regardless of how firm his internal ideals have been. As in the fascist states earlier in our century, as you know, even comparatively healthy people were not capable of maintaining themselves, but were swept up for long periods in the grandiosity of the surrounding environment and in the need to merge with the all-powerful state. This reduced the individual to infancy in many ways, by regimentation, by total thought control, by a variety of infantilizing devices. We strictly avoid this in psychotherapy, because then irreversible regressions would follow. Even though some degree of therapeutic success occurs, it lasts only as long as the irreversible regression is maintained. To return to our example of the fascist state, people immediately see the light as soon as the state loses its power. Then all the masses again see the world realistically. A workable definition of mental health may be the capacity to choose from a number of psychic mechanisms according to need. There is an important rule to remember: When higher forms of adaptation fail, then the grandiose self emerges. And when in the treatment you recognize that this is happening, it is helpful to the patient to point out when you think it happened and what brought it on. If you help the patient to recognize that his loss of self esteem, angry sullen behavior, hypochondriacal symptoms, or excessive shame, for example, arose because of separation from the therapist or from an unempathic response, you help him to deal with the blow. You may help him to understand that under states of severe loss of self-esteem his feeling is akin to, "Everything on the inside is bad; everything on the outside is good." A combination of shifts in the narcissistic object from the grandiose self to the idealized parental imago, according to the vicissitudes of the

- self-esteem system, would be ideal. However, most people do not operate that way. The most common problem encountered is a lack of internalization; that is, the grown person is constantly seeking applause and approval from the outside. And when you recognize that, it is important to differentiate whether he seeks approval because he wants reaffirmation of his own grandiosity or because he wants approval from the idealized value system. Another more subtle form of the grandiose self fantasy is the skilled person who is always belittling what he has accomplished, saying, "I have accomplished nothing; everything good has been done by somebody somewhere else, or something on the outside!" Competent people, such as analysts, often have this attitude toward Freud, that nothing new has been done since his discoveries. Sometimes this is referred to as success guilt, but it may also represent an illusion that somebody else, all-powerful and God-like, has done everything. In this way he gains strength from merging with his image of the strong other." (pg. 81-82)
- "[M]ental health cannot be defined by one form of mechanism or another, but, if anything, by **the capacity to turn to the full instrumentation of possibilities**, depending on one's momentary needs or particular psychological task. Health is thus determined by the variety of possibilities that a person has at his disposal rather than a rigid narrow way of dealing with the world and with inner and outer problems. The capacity to turn toward another under stress and to ask for this other person's protection, to some kind of replica of the merger, also belongs to the armamentarium of mental health and is very compatible with mental health." (pg. 84)
 - Chapter 7 - The Acquisition of Internalized Values, Ideals, and Goals (pg. 95)
 - **"Structure means nothing more than having a formerly external function permanently in your possession. An external function now becomes an integral function"** (pg. 95)
 - **"Gross identification is simply an emergency use of another person, discarded again as soon as the nearness to the other person is gone."** (pg. 95)
 - **"[T]he gross internalization best studied and best known is what we call the superego. The superego under normal circumstances is, in essence, the endopsychic replica, predominantly of the parent of the same sex. The superego incorporates the prohibitions that emanate from that particular parent, as well as the approval, the positive values and goals set up by that particular parent.** What I stress in addition is the particular aura of prestige, perfection, and importance that this particular parent had for the child. It is the idealized image of the self originally. In its very origins, when the child was very small, this important parent or parental figure was, if you speak very loosely, a projection of the child's own narcissism. I will come back to explain why this term projection is erroneous, but for the time being this process has certain similarities to projection. The original term would be primary projection, which is something different from projection as usually understood, for the term, in the meaning I attribute to it here, describes a period when there is still no clear separation between inside and outside. One can hardly talk about projection for that reason. The adult observer knows there is an object outside, but it is perceived by the child still as part of himself. It is to this part of himself that the high degree of prestige, power and perfection is given over. It cannot be maintained in other parts of the self, namely, what the observer knows to be the child himself. This is a complex point: something that later becomes an archaic object starts out as a somewhat differentiated part of the self, and is then taken back into the self under the impact of a disappointment in this particular individual." (pg. 99)
 - **"Structure building, then, is best understood when one observes the gross internalized structure, namely, the superego."** (pg. 100)
 - **"[T]his parental figure is set up as an internal structure, and this internal structure we call the superego.** It is important to emphasize that this internal replica of the father is not the father or his representation. Assume that this process is interrupted when, for instance, the father disappears, dies, leaves for the armed services, becomes mentally or physically ill, distant and unreachable. There is an internal representation of the father present in such instances. **We call it an imago or a representation. It is a complex of memories which are highly cathected, highly desired.** To elaborate the concept of an imago: if any one of us, as an adult, has to be absent from somebody he cherishes, needs or wants, or to whom we are very close, the memory image of this person remains in us. It becomes an object of longing, and we will think about this person. In the mourning process, by the way, this is also true. The memory process is there also. As a matter of fact, thinking about the dead individual and gradually withdrawing from the representation of that individual is one of the counterforces against identification. **The individual becomes an internal object of affection, a memory from which one gradually withdraws.** Therefore, one does not have to set the individual up in oneself as a part of oneself. In other words, mourning and identification are two separate ends of the scale, but not quite. I will refine this later. What I am seeking to clarify at this moment is this: a child who does not have the opportunity to separate himself from the oedipal father at the correct time in life - when he is ready for this separation and when internal separation is still within his span of capabilities - will forever, in the course of his life, search for such a father. In other words, the father image will remain an archaic object which has not been internalized." (pg. 101)
 - **"The superego is not a mirror image of the father but it is a selective, chosen aspect that becomes integrated.** Yet the superego, so far as I can judge, has never, in any individual I have ever encountered, achieved the total integration that ego functions achieve. It will always be a little bit like something from the outside that happens to be on the inside. One relates to one's own values and prohibitions a little as if they were still coming from the outside." (pg. 102)
 - **"In these guidelines concerning the formation of the superego, one must also remember that it is not only the prohibitive functions, but also the approving functions, the positive goals incorporated in the parent, that serve as the forerunner of the superego.** Keep in mind that the values incorporated in our superegos have this special kind of meaning that we defend to the utmost. In terms of our own lives, the capacity to imbue our central values within the superego with such high prestige is an enormous safeguard to mental health, but the content of the values may change. It changes gradually, but it changes. It matures in most people, and particularly in thoughtful people. They are capable of changing the content of their values. They cannot do without values. Something will always be their value; even the relativity of values may finally become a cherished value, as it does in some very sophisticated people. It then becomes part and parcel of an attitude of tolerance toward other values and other people's value systems." (pg. 103)
 - "[F]rom innumerable moments of experience, every day, with every denial from the parents, with every delay, which is a kind of denial, something is set up internally. The ego performs internally something that formerly was performed externally by the mother or father. Here again, as later on, if the loss is traumatic, beyond what the psyche at a specific developmental moment can actually perform, or if it is done in too great a measure, then there will be a gross identification with the lost parent or withdrawal from the past; thus there will be lack of structure." (pg. 103)
 - Chapter 8 - Addictive Need for an Admiring Other in Regulation of Self-Esteem (pg. 113)
 - "The nature of her love or of her desire is less differentiated than one generally expects from a mature 22-year-old: fondness and love or passion for another person. It has a nondescript urgency to it that is more encountered in the addictions, whether addiction to a drug, to people, to food, to alcohol, to masturbation, or to perverse pursuits. One finds a variety of features, but **there is an unnameable quality that an addiction has, a quality of urgency, a no-delay-tolerating quality, wiping out all differentiations.** For example, for an alcoholic alcohol is the important thing. It does not matter whether it is good or bad bourbon, good or bad wine; it is what is behind it." (pg. 118)
 - **"An addictive person needs the object of his addiction with an absolute intensity** which is not the same as the comparative relativity even of passionate love. It does not have anything to do with the total maturity of the surrounding personality. It is not to be denied that in general the infantile features are present, particularly in long-term addictions, and that a certain maturity is needed for the capacity to love. These are secondary features. In the addictive personality I think there is something intrinsically different. The way in which I formulated it once is that addiction tends to relate, so far as I can judge, to just this type of setup that I have talked about so much here - namely, that functions which the reasonably mature individual can perform for himself cannot be performed for themselves by some people. There is some missing aspect of their own psychological

structure for which external supplies are needed, while other people do not need that external supply. The example that is the easiest to understand is the self-soothing capacity. The capacity to calm oneself is not something that grows by itself. It is, like any other internal structuralization, based on the fact that originally there was an external environment present that did that for one." (pg. 124)

- "It is very difficult to be the object of an addiction, because in order to be such an object one is depersonalized. One is not oneself. All that counts is what one is used for." (pg. 127)
- "A person needs the object of his addiction in a way that is essentially different from the way he needs an object of his love. The difference is that **the object of an addiction is needed to perform an important psychological function ordinarily performed by oneself**; as in this case, a self-soothing, self-esteem maintaining function that ordinarily in the course of development is internalized as part of one's own psychic structure. In contrast, a love object can be viewed as a person in his own right, with his own needs, as an independent center of initiative who is loved as the uniquely different individual that he is. Unlike the addictive relationship, such a love relationship is not dependent for its very existence on the love object meeting the other's narcissistic needs. While a love object may at times be used to help maintain one's self-esteem, the need is only temporary, and greatly less in frequency, duration and intensity, than is the case with the need of the object in addiction. Viewed in this light, the addictive quality of the patient's object relationships goes hand-in-hand with self-esteem being easily crushed each time one of her boyfriends breaks away. This patient's need for an admiring other to help maintain self-esteem reflects her failure in having adequately internalized this function. From the perspective of development, a function which was ordinarily performed for a child when he was incapable of doing so for himself is internalized and taken over by the child because the caregiving adult phases out her performance in a gradual way at the appropriate time. It is through this process of phase-adequate, nontraumatic, gradual loss of an outside supply that one comes to take over performing a function for oneself. However, when internalization does not occur, an individual may then heavily rely on other people or chemicals to carry out this function." (pg. 131-132)
- Chapter 9 - Physical Symptoms as a Reverberation of Self-Esteem Needs (pg.133)
 - See text
- Chapter 10 - Time of Transition (pg. 153)
 - "[T]he success of analysis is not to create people who cannot have strong feelings, who cannot be passionate, who cannot fly off in a rage or be violent, but to enable them to choose when, where and how to express their strong feelings." (pg. 165)
 - "Neutralization, however, is only part and parcel of this broader mechanism of sublimation. Neutralization alone is not sublimation. A scientific investigator in his libidinal history might have infantile sexual curiosity as the zero point of this developmental line. But neutralization alone does not lead from the excitement about the primal scene in the next room to the lesser excitement of being fascinated with a new idea, a new chapter in psychology or a new chapter of biology, chemistry, or whatever idea the investigator has. Neutralization is only one aspect of it. There are other things that are needed. There must be a shift away from the content. In other words, there is also displacement. Secondly, there is aim inhibition, which is also not neutralization. The aim is no longer what it once was in the infantile curiosity of wanting to see and to participate in the sexually stimulating goings-on, to identify with both partners when one watches the excitement of intercourse or hears something in the next room. It is not only that in the original situation there was unneutralized libidinal excitement, but also that there is a shift now from the sexual scene to something totally different. This can be the wish to investigate a new country, a new art form, a new chapter of chemistry or psychology. It is a deflection - it is a shifting away. **So it is (a) neutralization, (b) a shift away in content, (c) aim-inhibited**. One does not now behave with the immediacy of wanting to be involved. One can wait, one can do all kinds of in-between preparatory work. **All these three together make for sublimation**." (pg. 165-166)
- Chapter 11 - Separation from Family (pg. 171)
 - See text
- Chapter 12 - Extending Empathic Understanding (pg. 188)
 - See text
- Chapter 13 - Function of Empathy in Building Esteem (pg. 203)
 - See text
- Chapter 14 - Emotionally Experienced Understanding (pg. 222)
 - See text
- Chapter 15 - Idealizing Transference (pg. 244)
 - See text
- Chapter 16 - Acting Out (pg. 260)
 - "The important thing in the classical definition of acting-out is that the motivation for what is done is strictly separated in the psyche." (pg. 260)
 - "Classical acting-out, then, relates to an unconscious constellation, a repetition or an expression of something early in childhood that is now dramatized in the course of the present" (pg. 262-263)
 - "[T]he central structural and dynamic relationships that underlie acting-out may be seen as a psychic split in depth - a horizontal split so that the top layer of the psyche behaves like a puppet moved by the bottom layer, without knowing why, but more or less rationalizing the behavior." (pg. 263)
- Chapter 17 - Plagiarism as Acting-Out (pg. 279)
 - See text
- Chapter 18 - Self-Esteem and Ideals (pg. 297)
 - See text

c. Further Readings:

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