

# Heideggerian Marxism, by H. Marcuse

a. People / Organizations: [https://monoskop.org/images/9/95/MARCUSE\\_Herbert\\_-\\_Heideggerian\\_marxism.pdf](https://monoskop.org/images/9/95/MARCUSE_Herbert_-_Heideggerian_marxism.pdf)

b. Quotes:

- "To be sure, philosophy must take hold of the "interiority" of the individual existence, and it must struggle to establish itself in this arena..." - Author (pg. 50)
  - "If philosophy is truly concerned with existence, then it must take this existence upon itself and, existing together with it in a state of contemporaneity, fight for truth. The philosopher must know that he has not only the right, but also the duty, to intervene in the entirely concrete difficulties of existence, because the existential meaning of truth can only be realized in this manner. Thus, at the endpoint of every genuine concrete philosophy, one finds the public act: the accusation and defense of Socrates and his death in prison; Plato's political interventions in Syracuse; and Kierkegaard's struggle with the state church" - Author (pg. 51-52)
- "Life in its "simple relation to itself" is true equality-with-self-in-otherness. It maintains and comports itself as selfness and oneness in the various states of its living." - Author (pg. 79)

c. General Notes:

- Introduction: What is Heideggerian Marxism? (pg. xi)
  - **"Two of the central categories of *Being and Time*'s "existential analytic" were "temporality" and "historicity." Both notions addressed the way that we situate ourselves in time and history.** In Heidegger's view, one of the hallmarks of "authentic" being-in-the-world was a capacity to actualize the past in light of essential future possibilities. Conversely, inauthentic Dasein (das Man) displayed a conformist willingness to adapt passively to circumstances—an existential lassitude that bore marked resemblances to the inert being of "things." Heidegger's ability to fuse the discourse of "everydayness" with the demands of "rigorous science" he had imbibed during his youthful apprenticeship with the founder of the phenomenological movement, Edmund Husserl, distinguished his thinking from the *Lebensphilosophie* or "philosophy of life" that flourished among popular writers (e.g., Oswald Spengler and Ludwig Klages) at the time" (pg. xiii)
  - **"Marcuse's early essays make it unmistakably clear that capitalism—imperialism, finance capital, monopolies, cartels, and so forth—was the social formation that determined the nature of contemporary politics and society.** In his view, in order to become "concrete," philosophy at some point would need to address these problems and themes" (pg. xx)
- Chapter 1 - Contributions to a Phenomenology of Historical Materialism (pg. 1)
  - "Marxism, in whose epistemological context historical materialism enters into history, does not appear in the form of a scientific theory—as a system of truths whose meaning rests wholly in its accuracy as knowledge [Erkenntnisse]—but rather in the form of a theory of social action, of the historical act [Tat]. Marxism is both the theory of the proletarian revolution and a revolutionary critique of bourgeois society; it is a science insofar as the revolutionary action that it wishes to set free and to stabilize requires insight into its own historical necessity—into the truth of its being. It lives in the inseparable unity of theory and praxis, of science and action; and every Marxian investigation must maintain this unity as its central and dominant component" (pg. 1)
    - **"The truths of Marxism are not truths of knowing [Erkennens], but rather truths of happening [Geschehen]." (pg. 1)**
      - "Within Marxism, historical materialism refers to the entire domain of knowledge related to historicity—to the being, the structure, and the motility of happening." (pg. 1)
  - "Let us now sketch out a brief outline of the Marxist fundamental situation: its central concern is with the historical possibility of the radical act—of an act that should clear the way for a new and necessary reality as it brings about the actualization of the whole person. Its standard-bearer is the self-consciously historical human being; its sole field of action is history, revealed as the fundamental category of human Dasein. Thereby, the radical act proves itself to be the revolutionary and historical action of "class" as the historical unit" (pg. 3-4)
    - **"Radical action is, according to its essence, necessary, both for the actor and for the environment in which it is performed.** Through its historical occurrence it transforms necessity—transforms something that had become utterly unbearable—and posits in its place precisely the necessity that alone can sublate the unbearable. Any act that does not have this specific character of necessity is not radical and also might just as easily not take place, or might just as easily be performed by someone else. This leads to the last, decisive meaning of necessity: necessity is immanent to the radical act. That it must occur right now, that it must be done precisely here and precisely by this person, means that it cannot, under any circumstances, be forced on the doer [Täter] from outside; that the doer must—in the sense of an immanent must—commit it now because the deed [Tat] is given along with the doer's very existence. Only under these circumstances does the act become truly necessary, in that its happening does not allow itself to be prescribed from outside, but rather brings itself forth out of itself" (pg. 5)
      - *\*otherwise, an inner impellent of the subject being impelled - which, to me, speaks of unfreedom, as freedom founds a condition of division (which houses in-itself 'potential')*
  - "We have already seen: the act is intended existentially in that it emerges from human Dasein as essential conduct and in that it is directed toward human Dasein. **The radical act must (in relation to the doer) happen as a concrete necessity of concrete human Dasein and it must (in relation to the environment) be necessary for concrete human Dasein. The sphere of this concrete necessity is history. All determinations of the radical act unite in their foundational determination as historicity.**" (pg. 5)
    - "The radical act only possesses immanent necessity if it is historical—if its necessity is historical—precisely because human Dasein essentially fulfills itself in history and is determined through history. This means that the doer of a radical deed must have historical existence and that the field of action must be history: both the direction and goal of the radical deed must themselves come out of history and must affect historical existence. In order for the concrete possibility of the radical act to be determined, the historical situation within which it should be done must be recognized [erkannt]. For this to be possible, it is necessary to clarify both the structure of historicity in general and the fundamental conditions of historical existence." (pg. 6)
  - **"From the very outset, historical humanity does not appear as an isolated individual, but as a human being among other human beings in an environment, as "dependent," "as belonging to a larger whole."** In whatever the historical time or space the [phenomenological] gaze is cast, it always discovers society as that which is historically concrete, as the historical "unity" (pg. 6)
    - "Society's limit appears within natural space; its reach extends across a determinate spatial environment (village-city-country). The force and direction of society's effective power is constituted through its reproduction, through the constant renewal and constant repetition of its existence." (pg. 7)
  - Human Dasein, as something that is historical in its being, needs neither other-worldly impetus to set it in motion nor a preset goal toward which to move, because it can be only as happening" (pg. 7)
    - **"All historical development rests in the immanence of history itself; it is the unfolding of societies as the concrete historical unities propelled by their reproduction and conditioned by the natural environment.** At this point we shall forgo a further presentation of the theory of historical development based on Marx's texts, since it is familiar to the readers; only those aspects of this theory necessary for clarifying the fundamental

- phenomenon of historicity will be mentioned here" (pg. 7)
- "The new generation can only become the subject of history if it recognizes and grasps itself as the object of history, if it acts from the knowledge of its singular historical situation." (pg. 8)
  - "Since there is no uniform reproduction, but rather various forms of it, the totality of concrete historical society disintegrates once more into other unities. Even if a particular society's mode of production should prove relatively uniform, the division of labor nonetheless guarantees that the relative position of an individual vis-à-vis society depends upon his or her place within the process of production, and **it is these different positions that constitute class as the decisive unity**. Through the development of the forces of production, the national division of labor becomes an international one; the universal character of class becomes visible beyond all national and spatial particularities. This development has reached its zenith in the creation of the modern world market. The "comprehensive dependency" of the individual in its reproduction transforms the individual's historical existence into a world-historical one: the "transformation of history into world history" is complete" (pg. 8)
  - "Marx's analysis of historical humanity demonstrated that humanity's consciousness and achievements are parts of the historical-social totality and that they are founded on concrete historical being. Knowledge is also not an act that leads human Dasein out of the immanence of historicity. Even if one may speak of the object of knowledge as being "above" or "beyond" history, the knowing act [erkennende Akt] is itself not something that descends from nowhere into concrete being; rather, it is always the product of concrete human beings and the historical situation is the condition of possibility of all knowledge. All true knowledge discloses real objects and states of affairs. As realities, they are valid only if a knowing human Dasein can direct itself toward them in order to make itself "true," to make itself correspond to its historical situation. All genuine knowledge is, in the most profound sense, "practical" knowledge, in that it brings a human Dasein "into the truth." That is the meaning of science—and science's sole task is to fulfill this meaning. Historical existence first becomes complete in the scientific knowledge [Wissen] of this existence, in the knowledge of its historical situation, its possibilities, and its task. Only then is it "immediately bound up with history"; only then can it do that which it must do—and do it radically. Only that which must be done can be done radically and it is only through knowledge that human existence can become certain of this necessity. In the historical situation that we have been addressing, class is the decisive historical unity and the knowledge of the unique, historical-social necessity is the achievement of "class consciousness." In class consciousness, the chosen class arises to become the bearer of the historical act. Should the revolutionary situation be at hand, it can only be seized by that class that is conscious of its historical situation." (pg. 9)
  - "We have attempted to show how, in the fundamental Marxian situation, the radical act is set free in its historical necessity. Under the [phenomenological] gaze, historicity reveals itself to be the primary determinacy [Bestimmtheit] of human existence; and the concrete ground of historicity is the touchstone to which all intellectual and material objects that have become abstract must return. Human freedom is fulfilled in grasping its own necessity, in the will to that immediate historical existence that realizes itself as the radical act in the revolutionary historical situation" (pg. 10)
    - "An *immanent* analysis provides the only meaningful approach to a theory that defines human existence as primarily historical and that uses theory only as a way of securing and unleashing the historical act. Such an analysis takes the basic intention of this theory itself as its basis and asks: can human Dasein in general be thought of as primarily historical? If so, has the theory in question brought historicity fully into view?" (pg. 10)
  - "If, in turning toward Heidegger's *Being and Time*, we linger somewhat longer than might be necessary in this context, it is because this book seems to represent a **turning point in the history of philosophy**: the point at which bourgeois philosophy unmakes itself from the inside and clears the way for a new and "concrete" science." (pg. 10-11)
    - "Numerous objections may certainly be made concerning Heidegger's analyses and his methodological foundations can be rejected outright. Yet every critique of this sort misses the meaning of this work, which remains "true" even if it commits significant errors. Decisive, here, is the new philosophical impetus that these interpretations have brought about. Conscious of its acute necessity, the basic question of all living philosophies is posed: what is authentic existence and how is it possible at all?" (pg. 14)
  - "It is not Dasein in general that is drawn, as thrown being-in-the-world, into its world in every case, and it is not worldhood in general that is related, as meaningfulness, in every case to a particular Dasein; rather, **there is always a concrete Dasein in a concrete world, and a concrete world is related to a concrete Dasein**. This last abstraction makes it impossible to advance to the material content of historicity. According to its very essence, Dasein is always concrete Dasein in a particular historical situation (spatial-temporal situation) and, as such, it is, according to its very essence, determined by concretely demonstrable material givens. The phenomenological analysis must not come to a standstill once it has discovered Dasein to be the phenomenally ultimate form of thrownness. **There is no unitary world of significance that is bound to a unitary Dasein**. The bond that exists between Dasein and world is in accordance with being and is not a free-floating abstractum; rather, it constitutes itself in concretely historical processes. To be sure, Dasein is thrown being-in-the-world, but as such it is always determined by its world, and not simply in the mode of fallenness in relationship to some "they"—even if this "they" is in accordance with Dasein's being—but rather through the concrete-historical with-world and environment into which it was born. It is this that we call the material content of historicity; it is not only the factual, but also the structurally final determination of Dasein. Dasein's being-in-the-world means thrownness in a concrete-historical with-world and environment, such that Dasein determines and develops itself in each case out of this world. Let us recall the phenomenological interpretation's exhibition of Dasein's primary mode of conduct as that of a practical, provision-making being: being as setting itself up in its world, directing itself toward its world, utilizing the objects to be found in its world as they prove useful for its provision. This means that concrete-historical Dasein should be understood primarily in terms of how it has provided for itself in its world and according to its world. Dasein's primary care is for itself, for its production and reproduction." (pg. 24-25)
    - "The individual person is not the historical unit of Dasein. It cannot be stressed often enough that these formulations are oriented toward the unit and unity that offers itself in an examination of concrete historicity—that is, of a "society."" (pg. 26)
  - "The course of the analysis of historicity has made clear that Dasein is always concrete-historical Dasein and that it specifically takes the form of the determinate society (determinate in some form or another, determinate according to Dasein itself) into which the concrete-historical Dasein in its making-provision has been thrown. Dasein's original mode of conduct is practical-active, as production and reproduction, on which the domains of cultural, spiritual, and intellectual objects are founded." (pg. 27)
    - "To every concrete-historical Dasein there belongs a concrete-historical "lifespace." The thrownness of Dasein is also thrownness into a particular part of the natural world. Out of this part of its natural environment, Dasein first creates the possibilities of its existence as possibilities of production and reproduction. **The circle out of which Dasein creates these possibilities is what we call "life-space."** This circle is no inviolable barrier: it can be blasted open, expanded, or contracted—but these explosions, expansions, and contractions are, in each case, modifications of this particular life-space and, as such, are determined by the life-space, such that **the life-space enters into the historical movement as an inescapable inheritance**. It is neither a "form of intuition" nor an empty spatiality of nature but rather is full of the "ready-to-handness" of the Dasein that is concerned with, appropriates, and provisions it. Life-space is filled with everything that Dasein needs and to which it lays claim for its use. Out of this life-space come the objects of Dasein's fears, hopes, and beliefs and from it Dasein receives the impetus for everything Dasein does. From life-space as well come the impulses to movement—to every movement that seizes the whole existence of the society for which Dasein makes provision. This may be the case when the life-space proves no longer sufficiently fertile to bear the production and reproduction of the society concerned with it and is therefore expanded or improved, or when it must be protected from the assault of another society and thereby is circumscribed or destroyed, or when new spaces with new societies appear in its train, which are then drawn into

the circle of its provisioning. Life-space appears, in the first instance, as the frontier of concrete-historical Dasein, the historical unity as determinative of society; this becomes most easily and graphically evident in the historical forms of the horde, the tribe, the village community, and the antique city-state. (The question of how much family and clan contributed to the creation of the historic unities will not be explored here. Though their importance cannot be denied, they are not—in a phenomenological sense—primary historical unities, and factually they could not have been such unless they possessed, in the sense of complete autarky, their own life-space.) We will later see whether this determination is sufficient for the interpretation of a fully historical Dasein. Let us now consider how historical society makes provision for itself in its life-space. **Heidegger's analysis of Dasein once again exposed the truth that man's substance is his existence. That means that the human being can only fulfill its essence if it fully grasps and shapes its existence.** The human being's first concern is for its own existence (and not, moreover, for its existence in the vegetative sense—which would merely be the "instinct of self-preservation"—but rather for the maintenance, formation, and furtherance of being as thrown being-in-the-world, which is to say, with the inclusion of the material and ideal concretions that belong to it existentially). **We may designate as "existential needs" the circle of objects comprehended within Dasein's primary concern and we may designate as "economy" the provisioning aimed at fulfilling these needs.** The existential needs of society are rooted in the objects whose provision is necessary for the maintenance, formation, expansion, or furtherance of its being. The meaning of "social production and reproduction" is determined by the totality of existential needs and the modes of provisioning arising from them. Social production and reproduction are truly the most originary and the ultimate constituent of every historical unity because they, without exception, affect its pure existence, and the essential distinction and characterization of human Dasein can only be derived from an existential difference. And one cannot deduce anything more about this totality nor does it allow itself to be further reduced, for it is immediately rooted in the thrownness of Dasein itself in the sense that it is, on the one hand, determined by the natural environment (soil conditions, climate, situation, etc.) into which Dasein is thrown and, on the other hand, determined by the historical inheritance of past generations, to which it is (positively or negatively) committed. As the expression of the existential needs of a society, the society's mode of production is both the constitutive historical foundation on which it rests and the ground on which the historical movement takes place. Yet it must be remarked ever again that the ideological dimensions of a society are produced ahead of and alongside the economic dimensions—and that is precisely because the former have their foundations in the latter. The old question of what has objective priority, of "which came first"—mind or matter, consciousness or being—not only cannot be answered by a dialectical phenomenology but also becomes meaningless within this framework. **What is given is simply always Dasein as historical being-in-the-world, which already includes, at one and the same time, spirit and matter, consciousness and being;** and it is only on the basis of this evident circumstance that assessments can be made of the foundational relationship that prevails in Dasein. Every attempt to reshape givenness so that it favors the absolutization of one of its parts is dogmatism—a dogmatism that dialectical thought can only hold in contempt, for it constitutes an attempt to begin a dialectical examination with a rigid abstraction, with a primum absolutum. Let us summarize once again. Historical society constitutes itself in the modes of production corresponding to its thrownness, in the modes in which it provisions its life-space in accordance with its existential needs. Only then, when a society truly provisions its life-space in a unified way as a society, is it a historical unity, the bearer of historical movement. In the moment when this unity is torn asunder, when the whole society no longer exists in making-provision for its existential needs, and where a division of labor is sufficiently advanced that the provision for life-space is no longer regulated through the voluntary act of the whole society, but is rather distributed by means of various coercive measures (such that now the hardest work appears as the activity of the subordinate and the inferior)—in this moment the existential needs, too, grow out of and differentiate themselves from this division of labor within a society that was once unified. As soon as the mode of production of a society is so arranged that it constitutes different strata within the same life-space—strata that exist only in and through their position within the productive process—then these strata become the authentic bearers of historical movement. With the emergence of "classes," new historical unities also arise, which are more originary, more authentically historic than the (seemingly) inclusive communities of the city, the country, the nation, since class exists solely in and through the primary mode of historical Dasein—through the mode of production—and only class is determined through it." (pg. 27-30)

- "Factically, however, the possibility of authentic historical existence—of insight into fate and the ability to grasp existence through the act—is only given in specific historical situations. **The everyday provisioning of life-space necessarily thrusts Dasein into the provisioned environment and helps render the environment independent, transforming it into a rigid world of mere things, a world that holds Dasein captive within it with the inescapability of a law of nature and dictates Dasein's relation to it. This process of "reification," "depersonalization," "alienation" discovered by Marx, finds its most extreme expression in capitalist society, but is certainly already in force everywhere that the making-provision of the life-space,** rather than being unitarily regulated according to the existential needs of the society, is divided within itself and thus robbed of the mastery it once held over its own existence. Once this has come to be the case, then the mode of production of such a society necessarily comes into contradiction with its forms of existence, and the authentically productive class must, on the strength of its sheer existence, break through the reification and sublimate the contradiction. Knowledge of one's own historicity and conscious historical existence becomes possible at the moment when existence itself breaks through reification. If, for a particular Dasein, the world is no longer given except as a life-space that must be provisioned; if it no longer exists in anything but this provisioning; if, through its existence, it creates the conditions through which the world is first possible at all as life-space—then it can know that the world is, in accordance with being, related to a provisioning Dasein and that all of the reified objectivities are things that have historically come to be in that they have been objects of provisioning by a Dasein living among them. With the knowledge of the historicity of the world there comes to Dasein as well the knowledge of its own historicity, which, precisely through its thrownness, can create a new world by means of the transforming act. We now understand why it is that bourgeois philosophy must, according to its rootedness in being in bourgeois society, insist on the Dasein-independent objectivity of the environment—or alternatively, in those cases where it did maintain that the world is constituted in Dasein, it needed to contain this constitution within the immanence of consciousness. It is in the moment when revolutionary praxis is known [erkannt] as authentic historical existence and when concrete change is recognized as the real movement of the world that bourgeois society can finally be seen in its historical becoming and necessary fallenness. There is a Dasein whose thrownness consists precisely in the overcoming of its thrownness. The historical act is only possible today as the act of the proletariat, because it is the only Dasein within whose existence the act is necessarily given" (pg. 31-32)
- **"The motility of history is the happening of human existence.** Every new historical reality demands a new human existence. Human existence can never become real through a mere change of the present reality, because in that case it would never move beyond the present existence. Indeed, **by accepting the present existence as a given, Dasein must necessarily fall into its world of meaning, into its "ideology" (every reform, every revision of the status quo, presupposes acknowledgement of the status quo). "New" existence is only possible as "disavowal."** There is so little contradiction between organic, historical development and revolution that revolution appears, rather, as the necessary form of historical motility; **for it is revolution alone that can change the existence of historical Dasein"** (pg. 33)
  - "The historicity of the world and its dialectical motility already permeate, as living truth, the externally rigid architectonics of Hegel's teachings as well. But idealism cheated human praxis out of its meaning and cheated the act of its decision insofar as it enclosed human knowledge in the world of appearances constituted a priori in consciousness, thereby elevating this a priori constitution above concrete experience. Historical materialism turned this relationship around; not, however, in order to pose the philosophical problem in a new way, but rather because it was forced, out of the necessity of an existence that had become unbearable, to comprehend anew that which happens." (pg. 33)

▪ Chapter 2 - On Concrete Philosophy (pg. 34)

- **"Philosophizing, if one takes the meaning of this word seriously, is a mode of human existence. Human existence is in all its modes subject to the question of its meaning [Sinn].** It is the distinguishing characteristic of human existence that it is not realized through its mere being, that it "confronts" its possibilities in a very specific way, that it must first seize these possibilities and, in this seizing, live in the shadow of the question concerning its "to what end" [Wozu]. (All conceptions of this "to what end" as the sphere of the purpose that transcends human existence, for the sake of which it would exist, will be avoided here and elsewhere. Even when bracketing any thought of purpose, one can still speak of a "to what end," namely when the "to what end" of existence is grounded in its own being.) **This "to what end" in its relationship to human existence is what we mean here by meaning.**" (pg. 34)
  - **"All genuine philosophizing has found its meaning in itself and grasped it through itself. Authentic philosophical effort aims at knowledge as the becoming visible of truth. The meaning of philosophizing can be designated provisionally as the making visible of truth"** (pg. 34)
- "If truth is thus related to human existence through validity, this relation receives its existential significance through a phenomenon that is often overlooked: appropriation [die Aneignung]. **Truth demands by its very nature—** however independent from all human existence the being of its conditions may be—**an appropriation through human existence. Truths are not sought out and secured, not grasped through the labor of knowing then to be tucked away somewhere and preserved in abstracto; rather, in the knowledge of truth lies the demand for its appropriation. Knowledge is an appropriation only for the one who knows primordially, for the one who discovers and achieves mastery over what is known for and in his person, "as if it were the first time."** For every individual who fails to repeat this process of original discovery with his entire person, knowledge becomes mere familiarity, truth becomes accepting-as-true. Every genuine truth must be known [gewußt] and possessed, and knowing [Wissen] and possessing are not temporary acts of human consciousness that appear and then disappear again; rather, they belong to the existing of human Dasein itself, they are a function of existence. Appropriation in no way constitutes the being of truth (the true conditions), but it does constitute the purpose [Sinn] of truth. **The "to what end" of truth is realized only in appropriation.** If its appropriation through human Dasein necessarily belongs to the meaning of truth, and if this appropriation is realized as knowing and possessing in the existing of Dasein itself, then truth must also have an impact in this existing. **The existing of human Dasein is, however, at every instant a form of relating to the world: action and reaction. Truth must thus intervene in this actual sphere of existing: Dasein must, in its form of relating, be able to orient itself toward the truth.**" (pg. 35)
  - "If the meaning of philosophizing is the making visible of truth, and if this truth has a fundamentally existential character, then not only is philosophizing a mode of human existing, but philosophy itself is, according to its very meaning, existential. One can delineate the domain of philosophy however one likes, but in its search for truth, philosophy is always concerned with human existence. Authentic philosophizing refuses to remain at the stage of knowledge; rather, in driving this knowledge on to truth it strives for the concrete appropriation of that truth through human Dasein. Care [Sorge] for human existence and its truth makes philosophy a "practical science" in the deepest sense, and it also leads philosophy—and this is the crucial point—into the concrete distress [Bedrängnis] of human existence." (pg. 36)
- "Human existence, the subject of philosophy, always stands in a particular historical situation. The subjects and objects addressed by philosophy are not abstract, "interchangeable" ones; each individual exists in a particular framework of activity (in which he maintains and shapes his existence), in a particular social situation (through which his everyday environment is defined), in a particular state of the community of the people, which has in its turn evolved on the basis of particular natural and historical conditions. From birth onward each individual is delivered up to his historical situation: the possibilities of his existence are prescribed through it. And the objects that "stand over against" Dasein, the things with which it is occupied and with which it fills a life-space, the natural world in which it lives, the structures and forms in which it runs its course—these are not fixed, "unequivocal," independent quantities that manifest themselves in the same way in any given historical situation. Whenever and wherever they appear, they have already been grasped and changed by a concrete existence, have likewise become "history," handed down from one generation to another, shaped according to the necessities of the respective existence. If one intends to be serious about the philosophical concern for Dasein, then philosophy must not view this conditioning of Dasein through the historical situation as mere facticity, as historical "perspective," as temporal coincidence, or as the realization of an "essential content" [Wesensgehalt] (that is itself extraor supratemporal), but rather as the authentic fate of Dasein, as the concrete fullness of existence itself. **Dasein does not "make" history as its product, it does not live in history as if history were its more or less coincidental space or element; rather, the concrete existing of Dasein "is" happening [Geschehen] that is understood as "history" [Geschichte].**" (pg. 37-38)
  - "Social arrangements, economic orders, and political formations together constitute the happening of Dasein and must be viewed from the perspective of this existence [Existenz]. If they are investigated from the outset as "things," with an eye toward their structure, their relationships, and the laws of their development, the observations (most likely undertaken with the model of the natural sciences as their mistaken ideal) that result will be such that the meaning of these constructs cannot even appear. For in and with these constructs a particular Dasein exists in such a way that the very possibility of its "reification" is only given at a specific historical stage of the "fragmentation" of Dasein. It is similarly unacceptable to divide historical reality into a collection of discrete layers or spheres, such that, for example, economic and political and social and artistic and scientific activity are dealt with as self-sufficient, independent "modes of existing." Such a separation may be necessary for the modern scientific establishment, and it may also be objectively necessary for individual empirical investigations—but every investigation that aims at the essence of such constructs must be borne, even at the level of method, by an awareness of the indissoluble unity of historical existence. There are no "economic subjects," "legal subjects," etc., but only individuals or communities, which, as historical unities existing in their respective situations, engage in economic activity, administer and receive justice, pursue the arts and sciences, and so forth." (pg. 39-40)
    - "In capitalist society, a particular mode of human existing, one that belongs only to that society, has become reality. The economic system has drawn all areas of life into the process of reification, which has detached forms of life and unities of meaning [Sinneseinheiten], previously bound up with the concrete individual, from any form of individual personality, and has created a force [Gewalt] that operates between and above individuals. Having been established, this force now subsumes all forms and values of the individual and the community under itself. The modes of being-with-one-another [Miteinandersein] are emptied of any essential content and are regulated from without according to "foreign" laws: fellow humans are primarily economic subjects and/or objects, professional colleagues, citizens, members of the same "society"; the essential relationships of friendship and love, any authentic form of human community is restricted to the small sphere of life that remains separate from general occupation [Geschäftigkeit]. At the same time as **this situation drives individualism to the fore** (which in no way contradicts a pronounced collectivism of the economy!), the individual is also separated from his "activity," which is "assigned" to him and is carried out without any possibility that it could actually lead to personal fulfillment. The world in which this Dasein lives is also evolving to an ever greater degree into a "business" [Betrieb]. The things encountered in it are viewed from the outset as "goods," as things that one must use, but not in the sense of using them to meet the needs of Dasein. Instead, they are used to occupy or to fill an otherwise aimless existence, until they actually do become "necessities." In this way more and more existences are consumed simply in order to keep the "business" operational. The form of existence of all classes has hollowed itself out in such a way that it becomes necessary to place existence itself on a new foundation. These remarks were not intended to depict the worldview and the "position" of capitalist society at the stage of high capitalism. **The aim was merely to indicate that the crisis of capitalism is a crisis of existence, which has truly been shaken to its foundation"** (pg. 42)

- "Precisely this, however, is the goal: that philosophical investigation once again directs its attention toward the possibilities of appropriation of truth that are available to a given Dasein. If this Dasein is in a situation whose historical structure (the concrete way in which Dasein maintains and shapes itself socially) makes the appropriation of such truths impossible, then **it is the task of philosophy to seek out Dasein and to attempt take it out of this situation and "bring it into truth."**" (pg. 43)
  - **"...in capitalist society all personal values have been lost or have been put into the service of technological and rational "objectivity."** If philosophizing is to have any possibility of being existentially necessary for such a Dasein, it must attempt to bring this Dasein into a situation in which it can grasp and maintain the truths of its essential laws. Knowledge of the historical possibilities of contemporary Dasein must be achieved: this must include both a comprehension of its origins and a demarcation of the range of its transformations. After supplying a precise analysis of present existence, philosophy has the task of investigating which of these possibilities ensures a "true mode of existence." It must carefully observe every movement of existence: it must drive forward those that represent a movement toward truth and hinder those that lead to fallen modes of existence" (pg. 44)
- "We will now attempt to characterize the direction and the task of such philosophizing. It is the process of philosophy becoming concrete..." (pg. 44)
  - "This philosophizing is directed toward the specific Dasein contemporaneous with it. Its task is to bring this Dasein into the truth of existing. Now in order to even be able to approach Dasein, in order to be able to take hold of it in its existence, concrete philosophy must become historical, it must insert itself into the concrete historical situation. The becoming historical of philosophy means, firstly, that concrete philosophy has to investigate contemporaneous Dasein in its historical situation, with an eye toward which possibilities for the appropriation of truths are available to this Dasein, which truths it can realize, and which are necessary to it." (pg. 44)
  - "Concrete philosophy knows that truths can never be taken in abstract form and arbitrarily grafted on to any Dasein; rather, they must be grasped out of the midst of the existing Dasein and maintained in existence. For this reason, concrete philosophy incorporates into its "teaching" the entire concrete situation of contemporaneous Dasein in the complete determinateness of the social structure. Only when it knows how Dasein thus determined suffers and acts, what its real difficulties are, which modes of existing and which paths for change are prescribed to it by the situation, only then can it bring Dasein into truth, become for it an existential necessity." (pg. 45)
    - **"If concrete philosophy truly wants to bring Dasein into truth, then it must take hold of it in the only sphere in which existential decisions can occur: in the sphere of action. The existing of Dasein in its concrete form as "happening" is always a changing, a transforming of conditions, an affecting, in other words, an acting"** (pg. 46)
  - "Concrete philosophy can thus only approach existence if it seeks out Dasein in the sphere in which its existence is based: as it acts in its world in accordance with its historical situation" (pg. 47)
- **"Concrete philosophy is concerned with the truth of contemporaneous human existence.** The bringing-into-truth of Dasein means, concretely, a "real" change in existence: not just a (peripheral) change of its contingent forms and formations (forms of life and culture in the sense of the customary terminology), but rather a change in the mode of existing itself, which constitutes the foundation of all these forms in the first place. The concrete mode of existing is the true sphere of happening: "history." It is the mode in which a given Dasein grasps and lives its fate in its world, a fate, moreover, that unfolds in a particular historical situation, one that can be identified and distinguished through its particular economic and social structure" (pg. 49)
- **"Society is neither a determinately existing [daseinendes] subject alongside the individual nor the sum of individuals; rather, society is in a very concrete sense each and every individual, it is the concrete-historical mode of individual Dasein.** Thus it is precisely when philosophy intends to become serious about its concern for the individual that it must not lose sight of the world in which the individual's Dasein realizes itself. The individual exists as an individual only in a particular situation of the surrounding and shared world, in a particular situation of social being. This situation is never merely coincidental, such that it could or must first be "stripped away" in order to gain access to the "authentic" existence of the individual. It is the reality of his existence itself and only through it can the individual truly be addressed, be affected." (pg. 50-51)
- Chapter 3 - On the Problem of the Dialectic (pg. 53)
  - **"The word "dialectic" and the concept of it have been so abused in recent philosophy and in Marxist theory and praxis that it has become necessary to reconsider its origins.** Philosophy appears to view the dialectic as a panacea that will allow it to escape from the helpless confusion and lifelessness that it has brought on itself. **Philosophy grasps the dialectic in a confused manner as the necessity of contradiction, tension, and movement partly in knowing, partly between knowing and reality, ego and world, ego and validity, partly within reality itself.** It appears that unequivocal decisions can thereby be avoided; everything can be incorporated into such a "dialectical system," and everything remains in an unresolved state. Dialectics is used within Marxism in a similar manner. To some, this development is "only a historical contingency," a moribund residue of Hegelianism in Marx and, for that reason, something that can without detriment, indeed with profit, be removed from Marxist theory and practice. To others, it is an essential part of Marxism, but—and this point is decisive—what for Marx was the meaning and essence of historical movement has become a fetter in the present. Through a faulty dialectic each mistake, each step backward, can be justified and can be claimed as a necessary link in the dialectical movement, so that in the end the same thing results as with bourgeois philosophy—decisions are avoided. In view of this, one should either abandon all talk about the dialectic or make an effort to reappropriate its originary meaning. This exercise tries to make a small contribution in this direction." (pg. 55)
  - "In this way the meaning and purpose of the dialectic acquires a deeper justification. The purpose of the dialectic no longer consists merely in discovering true be-ing by removing it from the obscurity and dispersal of the inauthentic be-ing of sensual reality and revealing its unity, determinacy, and permanence. Rather the being of this be-ing has itself become problematic and with it its relation to sensual reality, to which it is no longer opposed as unified and permanent be-ing to a diverse and flowing (inauthentic) nonbe-ing. Be-ing has divided mysteriously into types, which reunite or separate according to their respective natures, and in this motility, through this process, form new unities of be-ing. This be-ing is neither motility nor permanence, and yet it is only in motility and permanence (Sophist 250c). **The major objective of the dialectic, as described in the Sophist (253), is capturing this be-ing in its multiplicity, which is recognized as its type of being.** This is accomplished through a very complex procedure of "classification" in terms of the "types" of be-ing. In due course, through increasingly narrow classificatory divisions, the desired unities of being become visible together with the nonbe-ing (differences) that "belongs" to them" (pg. 57)
    - **"For Plato, the dialectic is a capacity (cognition [Erkennen], knowledge [Wissen]) of human reason to comprehend be-ing as it is, in its true being.** It is not based on human reason or on the relation of reason as knowledge to the "world," but rather in the being of be-ing itself. **Every be-ing is in a state of diversity, indeterminacy, and motility only when it is ontologically related to other be-ings, or when it separates itself from be-ing in order to build a new unity of being with some other be-ing. It is simultaneously with its other, with nonbe-ing, with difference only through limitation and determination.** Be-ing is only in this motility, change, and multiplicity and is only in them as unity, permanence, and sameness. Be-ing is inherently dialectical and for that reason can only be comprehended dialectically" (pg. 58)
      - **"The task of the dialectic is to identify the unities of be-ing as determinacies,** first by perceiving in each be-ing the one comprehensive Idea. But it does not stop there; it continues to investigate how many new determinacies as unities this primordial Idea has divided itself into, a process that is relatively infinite because every be-ing contains unlimitedness in its being (Philebus 15–16)" (pg. 58-59)
  - "...for Hegel—as already for Plato—the dialectic is a capacity of knowledge and a method of knowledge only because and insofar as be-ing itself, the true reality, is inherently dialectical" (pg. 59)
    - **"The dialectical method as a philosophical method is nothing other than the expression and representation of this necessary motility, the**

**necessary becoming of reality itself. Its highest principle is “surrender to the life of the object.”** The dialectical method should free all being from its apparent ossification and isolation and comprehend it as a necessary moment in its totality, as a result of becoming and in this way comprehend being in its genuine essence" (pg. 59-60)

- "Thus for Hegel the origin and basis of the dialectic lies in being itself. It is— as Hegel continually stresses—not a method, which is applied to being by the ego, the knowing subject, not simply an instrument of knowledge, but is 'nothing different from its object and content; for it is the content in itself, the dialectic that the content has in itself, that moves it forward. . . . It is the motion of thing itself'" (pg. 60)
  - ◆ **"...as the origin of the dialectic lies in being, in reality itself, the foundation of the dialectic lies in the ontological historicity of being, of reality.** Only because and insofar as the real is historical is it dialectical, and it can and must be comprehended through the dialectical method." (pg. 61)
- "Our results so far are summarized in the following theses. The theses are by no means proved in the text above, but are rather only meant as a guide for further discussion of the problem. (1.) The dialectic is not a method or form of knowledge based on some philosophical or sociological theory nor is it a means of knowledge, but rather the designation for a mode of being of being itself. Only because and insofar as a mode of being of being is dialectical can research on this mode of being be dialectical. Only such research can be understood as dialectical. (2.) Not all be-ings are dialectical in their mode of being; rather only those whose being is historicity are. (3.) Only authentic historical being is in the true sense dialectical: human existence in its reality, in its happening, and in the world it takes hold of and shapes. (4.) The idea of a tension or opposition between the human ego, on the one side, and a "posited" world of being, "superbeing" [Überseins] (God . . . ), or validity, on the other, is never dialectical because such an interpretation abandons the fundamental basis of the dialectic at the very outset in its approach. It counterposes concrete (historical) human existence, which is viewed from the beginning as an isolated entity, to an ontologically ahistorical world (and in this way the wholeness of the world is torn to pieces, so that it can be bound together again afterward in unity or tension)." (pg. 64-65)
- "It is true that Hegel's philosophy was fed by religious sources that remained strong through his final systematic investigations, but they flow into a purely philosophical foundation, are treated on this philosophical basis, and do not eliminate the necessity of purely philosophical arguments. Many of Hegel's later philosophical concepts are already present in his early theological writings" (pg. 69)
- **"The Hegelian dialectic is rooted in Hegel's own system in such a way that it cannot transcend that system. It has no basis outside of his self-enclosed philosophical system. The Marxian dialectic cannot be applied to the situation in which Marx rooted it as long as this situation itself is not sublated and a new dialectical movement established in a new situation.** Only on the basis of the realized proletarian revolution could the question regarding the possibility of a new dialectic of happening be raised. These suggestions are meant to show that Marx really raises the genuine problems of the dialectic and uncovers the precise preconditions necessary for raising the question of the Marxian dialectic." (pg. 85)
- Chapter 4 - New Sources on the Foundation of Historical Materialism (pg. 86)
  - See text
- Chapter 5 - On the Philosophical Foundations of the Concept of Labor in Economics (pg. 122)
  - **"[P]lay negates as far as possible this "objective" content and lawfulness of the object and puts in its place another lawfulness, created by man himself, to which the player adheres of his own free will: the "rules of the game" (in the broadest sense; those who play alone also follow rules; game rules need not be explicit and can be used ad hoc for single cases). In play it is as if the "objectivity" of objects and their effects and the reality of the objective world, which one is normally forced constantly to recognize and interact with, had been temporarily suspended.** For once, one does entirely as one pleases with objects; one places oneself above them and becomes "free" from them. This is what is decisive: in placing oneself above the objective world one comes precisely to oneself, into the dimension of one's freedom that one is denied in labor. In a single toss of a ball, the player achieves an infinitely greater triumph of human freedom over the objective world than in the most massive accomplishment of technical labor. **In regard to the meaning and goal of play, a person is, in playing, with oneself and not with objects (which are other than himself): one expresses one's freedom by acting on the objects, going along with or playing around with them.** If we want to express in everyday language the function of play in human life, we refer to specific modes of the happening of the self and not to objects: we speak of distracting oneself, relaxing oneself, forgetting oneself, and recuperating oneself. With this we already have a further characteristic of play that points directly to labor as its counter-phenomenon. **Within the totality of human Dasein, play has no duration or permanence.** It happens essentially in "intervals," "between" the times of other doings [Tuns] that continually dominate human Dasein. But the way that life happens in play is not a happening that is completed in and through itself: it is essentially dependent and points inherently to another doing. **Play is self-distraction, self-relaxation, self-recuperation from regimentation, tension, toil, intense self-awareness, etc.** It is self-distraction, self-relaxation, self-recuperation for the purpose of a new concentration, tension, etc. Thus play is in its totality necessarily related to an other from which it comes and at which it is aimed, and this other is already preconceived as labor through the characteristics of regimentation, tension, toil, etc." (pg. 128)
    - "Play, on the other hand, is essentially particular, without duration. It happens only temporarily, from time to time. Regarding the happening of human life, one can speak of "life as labor" but not "life as play."" (pg. 129)
  - **"Human life happens as praxis in the eminent sense that man must make [Tun] his Dasein himself, in such a way that he has to seize it and fulfill it as a task. Man's happening is a continual making-happen** (while the happening of animal Dasein is a mere letting-happen: the animal lets its Dasein happen immediately, even when it "does" something; for example, when it builds a nest, protects itself from attack, seeks nourishment. For animals, all this doing is, in Wexberg's apt expression, "biologically sanctioned." The animal does not "have" its Dasein as a given task that it has to fulfill through its modes of being). **Man constantly finds himself and his world in a situation that is not immediately his own, so that he cannot simply let his Dasein happen in this immediacy. Instead, he must first make every situation his own, by "mediating" it with himself. This process of mediation is designated by the concepts of "production and reproduction"** (after Marx, these concepts were deprived of their original essential meaning and relegated to the economic dimension). Production and reproduction by no means refer simply to the happening of "material Dasein" in economic doing, but rather to the mode of making-happen of human Dasein as a whole: appropriation, sublation, transformation, and development of human Dasein in all spheres of life. This applies to both the immediate situation of the "world" and to Dasein within it. This process is a bringing-before-onself and, as having-brought-beforeoneself ("represented"), a creation and development of Dasein and its world in all regions (including "material," "vital" as well as "intellectual" [geistig] being). For humans, this doing is essentially a knowing [wissendes] doing, which keeps its goal (producing and developing Dasein and its world in an ever more appropriate and suitable way) in sight and that uses this "purpose" as a guide—purposeful doing. **Labor is grounded in this mediating-knowing doing [vermittelnd-wissenden Tun] and in the continual production and reproduction of human Dasein.**" (pg. 131)
  - **"In the context of our investigation, being-an-object is the counter-concept to being-a-self. The objective world means, first and foremost, only what is other than the self. For the self all be-ing outside of it is part of the objective world—this includes even other men and one's own body.** Although in different ways, works of art, science, etc., belong to the objective world, as do works of technology, nature, objects of use, etc. The self is only in the context of its "world"—in and with the objective world. But in regard to the happening of the self, this particular world as a whole and everything in it happen in a way "other" than the self; they have their own "history" that never coincides with the history of the self. **When the self begins to make its Dasein happen, it finds itself confronted with a world that is the world of another Dasein: a world filled and formed by a human animating power that is not its own, that is always already past and is yet present and real. This is a world of public institutions, organizations of a political, social, and economic nature, means of production and objects of consumption, things of use, works of art, etc.** It is also a world of the universal division

and organization of space and time that, as a whole, remains the work of past Dasein, even in every new creation. Which Dasein it was that gave a particular world its time and which was responsible for the shaping and filling of a particular life-space can only be determined on the basis of the respective historical situation. Depending on the stage of historical development reached, the “subject” of “world-formation” appears as the family, the tribe, the estate, the class, etc. But regardless of how the world has been formed, it is always encountered as the reality of a past Dasein, as a past that is still present. And just as the objective world is the reality of Dasein already past, so it also carries the future of this past life in it: it is the actuality of its provisions and plans, its discoveries and mistakes, its alliances and enemies. Thus, it is not a closed “state” [Zustand], nor is it a static preexisting multiplicity of disposable beings, but is rather through and through unfinished and open—through and through movement, happening. **The happening of the objective world with which Dasein is always already confronted, and which extends from the past into the present and anticipates the future, is a happening with its own temporal and spatial dimensions that proceeds alongside the happening of Dasein; it has its own immanent dynamic and its own immanent laws, which even enable it to “take on a life of its own” and to elude the control of Dasein. Dasein, in order to happen at all, must first let this objective world happen; it must preserve it, take care of it, develop it, and work on it.** This is the first decisive experience that laboring doing has. Now we can already say that the process of “mediation,” of production and reproduction, begins with the sublation of the past currently present. In order for Dasein to generate its own situation, to appropriate and shape its own world, it must interact with this happening past, which presents itself as an objective process making certain demands on Dasein’s happening. The countryside, once it is opened to commerce; the field, once it is cultivated; the mine, once it is dug; the factory, once it begins operations; the law, once it is promulgated; the constitution, once it is implemented; the work of art or science, once it is offered to the public—they all have their own “history” that never coincides with the history of any particular Dasein and that can never be deduced from any such history. They all have their own laws of happening. For Dasein to keep happening at all, all of these elements of the objective world must, each in their own way, be cared for, maintained, secured, expanded, and preserved. This labor is by no means determined solely by the needs of contemporary Dasein; it must take into consideration what is lacking in these various elements of the objective world; it must address the necessities that the immediate Dasein of the preformed and prefilled “world” brings with it. To these demands posed by the objective world, human doing responds by consciously adapting itself to its object and by binding itself to its immanent laws—both of these responses are expressed in every single act of labor and both together are what give the “mediation” between man and the objective world the character of a relation among things and what makes the object into a thing (to be treated as such). **Whether explicitly or not, willingly or not, labor is always concerned with the thing itself** [die Sache selbst]. In laboring, the laborer is always “with the thing”: whether one stands by a machine, draws technical plans, is concerned with organizational measures, researches scientific problems, instructs people, etc. In this doing he allows himself to be directed by the thing, subjects and binds himself to its laws, even when he masters his object, handles it, guides it, and lets it go. **In each case he is not “with himself,” does not let his own Dasein happen. On the contrary, he places himself in the service of something “other than himself,” and he is with something “other than himself”**—even when this doing fulfills his own freely assumed life. This alienation and estrangement of Dasein, this taking-on-oneself the law of the thing rather than letting one’s own Dasein happen is fundamentally inevitable (although it can disappear to the point of being completely forgotten during and after labor). This phenomenon is by no means identical with the resistance of the “material” [Stoff] and it does not stop with the termination of a particular process of labor. Dasein is in and of itself subject to this objectivity [Sachlichkeit]...The process of human being in the world is “self-actualization” [Selbsttäterschaft] from beginning to end, making one’s own Dasein happen, being-oneself in every Dasein, but this being-oneself is possible by letting the objective world happen, by being with and for an other. This is why laboring on the objective world is essentially burdensome, independent of any burden implicit in any particular process of labor. In the end, the burdensome character of labor expresses nothing other than the negativity rooted in the essence of human Dasein. **Man can come to his own being only by passing through his other and through “alienation” and “estrangement.”**” (pg. 136-139)

- **“Labor is in its very essence and meaning related to the happening of Dasein in its totality, that is, to praxis in both dimensions (necessity and freedom).”** (pg. 149)
- Chapter 6 - German Philosophy, 1871-1933 (pg. 151)
  - “...the foundations of transcendental idealism reestablished by neo-Kantianism, and also by Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology—which we will consider in a moment—were undermined by the antirationalist currents of vitalist philosophy, existentialism, historicism, and intuitionist metaphysics.” (pg. 151)
  - **“Everything we understand today by the term “phenomenology” is nothing but a mixture of disparate philosophical tendencies that no longer have anything in common with the philosophy of Husserl, the founder of the phenomenological school.** Since the year 1900, phenomenology has undergone a considerable transformation. Because divergent tendencies have dominated within the school, phenomenology’s influence in the domain of ideology has by no means been uniform” (pg. 157)
    - “The decisive innovation of Husserl’s Logical Investigations lies in its theory of intuition. Up to this point philosophy only recognized sensory intuition (pure, empirical sensation); Husserl enlarged the domain of intuition by recognizing “nonsensory” intuition as well, the intuition of ideal significations and their relationships. **Through “nonsensory” or “eidetic intuition,” one perceives clearly the categories and the categorical laws of being in itself, independent of empirical determination; in other words, the universal ideas of concrete facts. This theory, known as the “intuition of essences,” would later become one of the most discussed aspects of phenomenology.** In its original intention, it bore no relationship either with a mystical theory of knowledge or with the speculation of a metaphysical domain of ideas” (pg. 157)
  - “To the world of facts, Husserl systematically added a world of essences, the study of which constituted the foundation of pure phenomenology considered as the fundamental a priori science of all other sciences. Simultaneously, this science of essences found its direction and its transcendental justification through the **“phenomenological reduction.” This reduction, which recalls the Cartesian method of the Meditations, is the suspension of the everyday habits involved in the perception and comprehension of the world, the suspension of faith in the existence of reality.** The bracketing of reality opens the path toward the only absolutely certain foundation of philosophy: the transcendental subjectivity of “pure ego” in which the world constitutes itself as it is. The two principal trajectories, briefly stated, in which phenomenology developed are: the transcendental strain and the objective-metaphysical strain” (pg. 158)
  - “For Heidegger, metaphysics, in its ancient form of ontology, that is to say, as a theory of being in itself and in its entirety, is the first and ultimate task of philosophy. However (and here Heidegger follows in the direction first delineated by Husserl), being exists only in the understanding of man. Thus, before performing ontology, it is first necessary to analyze human being. Grasping human being, for Heidegger, is not a matter of pure consciousness of the transcendental “ego” as in Husserl, but one of concrete man in his facticity. Therefore, it is not the “ego cogito”—the pure abstraction that dominated philosophy from Descartes until Hegel—that serves as the foundation for philosophy, but real human existence such as it is found in its real history. Here Heidegger distinguishes himself from Husserl; phenomenology becomes a “hermeneutic” of human existence known as “existential analytics.” What Heidegger proposed as a concrete analysis of human existence and its modes of being constitutes one of the most fertile avenues of the new philosophy” (pg. 160)
    - “Dilthey’s philosophy represents the highest point that bourgeois thought was able to reach in terms of the nature and structures of history. Dilthey employed his insightful analyses of man and the historical world to combat positivistic and dogmatic metaphysics. He recognized clearly the dangers inherent in transcendental philosophy: its propensity for turning the philosophy of concrete man away from man’s real affairs and concerns. If, in his later works, he undertook a reconstruction of philosophy based on the foundations of concrete life, this reinterpretation of philosophy should in no way be identified with irrationalist misconceptions. Dilthey’s conception of life is precisely the critical weapon he uses

against absolute and eternal categories. He undermines these categories and ossified systems by revealing their true functions in history. Heidegger sought to develop Dilthey's project" (pg. 160)

- **"The real temporality of human being is its historicity. Heidegger understands man as essentially historical;** he considers the actual possibilities of the human being and the conditions of his realization as determined by history. However, opposed to this tendency toward historicity in his philosophy there is also a transcendental trajectory necessitated by the very idea of phenomenology and ontology. Heidegger's "existential" analytic distorts concrete man and orients itself toward human existence in general, in the neutrality of its ontological essence. **Heidegger's philosophy is wedded to the idea of an authentic existence that is realized through a firm willingness to die for one's own possibilities. It is here that Heidegger's existential analytic is transformed into a politics of heroic, racist realism.** Pure consciousness as a residue of the destruction of the world in Husserl becomes, with Heidegger, pure human existence, human existence in its transcendental purity. The original inclination toward historicity is paralyzed; history is transported into human existence, it even becomes identical with real existence. In the end, man has no other choice but to accept and appropriate the historical situation in which he finds himself. Since the material sphere remains entirely outside of this philosophy and can in no case serve as a criteria for real existence, man, isolated within himself, becomes easy prey for any real power, that, by referring to the actual situation as the true historical situation, demands of man total submission to its domination. **The characteristics of authentic existence—the resoluteness toward death, the decision, the risking of life, and the acceptance of destiny—are severed from all relations to the real misery and the real happiness of mankind and from all relations to the reasonable ends of humanity. In this abstract form, these characteristics become the fundamental categories of the racist worldview.**" (pg. 161)
- Chapter 7 - Heidegger's Politics (pg. 165)
  - "We saw in Heidegger what we had first seen in Husserl, a new beginning, the first radical attempt to put philosophy on really concrete foundations—philosophy concerned with human existence, the human condition, and not with merely abstract ideas and principles. That certainly I shared with a relatively large number of my generation, and needless to say, the disappointment with this philosophy eventually came—I think it began in the early thirties. But we re-examined Heidegger thoroughly only after his association with Nazism had become known" - Marcuse (in interview with Olafson) (pg. 165-166)
  - "...I first, like all the others, believed there could be some combination between existentialism and Marxism, precisely because of their insistence on concrete analysis of actual human existence, human beings, and their world. But I soon realized that Heidegger's concreteness was to a great extent a phony, a false concreteness, and that in fact his philosophy was just as abstract and just as removed from reality, even avoiding reality, as the philosophies which at that time had dominated German universities, namely a rather dry brand of neo-Kantianism, neo-Hegelianism, neo-Idealism, but also positivism." - Marcuse (in interview with Olafson) (pg. 166)
  - "In my first article ("Contribution[s] to a Phenomenology of Historical Materialism," 1928), I myself tried to combine existentialism and Marxism. Sartre's Being and Nothingness is such an attempt on a much larger scale. But to the degree to which Sartre turned to Marxism, he surpassed his existentialist writings and finally dissociated himself from them. Even he did not succeed in reconciling Marx and Heidegger." - Marcuse (in interview with Olafson) (pg. 167)
  - "Now, from personal experience I can tell you that neither in his lectures, nor in his seminars, nor personally, was there any hint of his sympathies for Nazism. In fact, politics were never discussed—and to the very end he spoke very highly of the two Jews to whom he dedicated his books, Edmund Husserl and Max Scheler. So his openly declared Nazism came as a complete surprise to us. From that point on, of course, we asked ourselves the question; did we overlook indications and anticipations in *Being and Time* and the related writings? And we made one interesting observation, ex-post (I want to stress that, ex-post, it is easy to make this observation): **If you look at his view of human existence, of being-in-the-world, you will find a highly repressive, highly oppressive interpretation.** I have just today gone again through the table of contents of *Being and Time*, and had a look at the main categories in which he sees the essential characteristics of existence or Dasein. I can just read them to you and you will see what I mean: "idle talk, curiosity, ambiguity, falling and being-thrown into, concern, being-toward-death, anxiety, dread, boredom" and so on. Now this gives a picture which plays well on the fears and frustrations of men and women in a repressive society—a joyless existence: overshadowed by death and anxiety; human material for the authoritarian personality. **It is for example highly characteristic that love is absent from *Being and Time*—the only place where it appears is in a footnote in a theological context together with faith, sin, and remorse. I see now in this philosophy, ex-post, a very powerful devaluation of life, a derogation of joy, of sensuousness, fulfillment.** And we may have had the feeling of it at that time, but it became clear only after Heidegger's association to Nazism became known" - Marcuse (in interview with Olafson) (pg. 169-170)
    - **"I quote literally: "Let not principles and ideas rule your being. Today, and in the future, only the Führer himself is German reality and its law." These were Heidegger's own words in November 1933.** This is a man who professed that he was the heir of the great tradition of Western philosophy of Kant, Hegel, and so on—all this is now discarded, norms, principles, ideas are obsolete when the Führer lays down the law and defines reality—the German reality. I talked with him about that several times and he admitted it was an "error"; he misjudged Hitler and Nazism—to which I want to add two things, first, that is one of the errors a philosopher is not allowed to commit. He certainly can and does commit many, many mistakes but this is not an error and this is not a mistake, this is actually the betrayal of philosophy as such, and of everything philosophy stands for. Secondly, he admitted, as I said, it was a mistake—but there he left the matter. He refused (and I think that somehow I find this rather sympathetic), he refused any attempt to deny it or to declare it an aberration, or I don't know what, because he did not want to be in the same category, as he said, with all those of his colleagues who suddenly didn't remember any more that they taught under the Nazis, that they ever supported the Nazis, and declared that actually they had always been non-Nazi. Now, in the case of Heidegger, as far as I know, he gave up any open identification with Nazism I think in 1935 or 1936. He was not Rector of the University any more. In other words, from that time on he withdrew, but to me this in no way simply cancels the statement he made. **In my view, it is irrelevant when and why he withdrew his enthusiastic support of the Nazi regime—decisive and relevant is the brute fact that he made the statement just quoted, that he idolized Hitler,** and that he exhorted his students to do the same. If, "today and in the future," only the Führer himself is "German reality and its law," then the only philosophy that remains is the philosophy of abdication, surrender" - Marcuse (in interview with Olafson) (pg. 170-171)
- Chapter 8 - My Disillusionment with Heidegger (pg. 176)
  - "Only gradually did we begin to observe that the concreteness of Heidegger's philosophy was to a large extent deceptive—that we were once again confronted with a variant of transcendental philosophy (on a higher plane), in which existential categories had lost their sharpness, been neutralized, and in the end were dissipated amid greater abstractions. That remained the case later on when the "question of Being" was replaced by the "question of technology": merely another instance in which apparent concreteness was subsumed by abstraction—bad abstraction, in which the concrete was not genuinely superseded but instead merely squandered. I left Freiburg in January 1933. Prior to 1933 neither I nor my friends had observed or known anything about Heidegger's connection to Nazism. Only later did we attempt to reconstruct the affinity between his philosophy and his politics. **Today it seems inexcusable to me to dismiss Heidegger's support of the Hitler regime as a (brief) mistake or error. I believe that a philosopher cannot make such a "mistake" without thereby disavowing his own, authentic philosophy**" (pg. 176)

d. Further Readings:

- Studies on the Development of the Platonic Dialectic, by J. Stenzel
- Plato's Method of Dialectic ed. by D. J. Allan
- The Dialectic in Contemporary Philosophy, by S. Marck



- Dialectic, by M. Adler [https://ia801503.us.archive.org/20/items/in.ernet.dli.2015.46365/2015.46365.Dialectic\\_text.pdf](https://ia801503.us.archive.org/20/items/in.ernet.dli.2015.46365/2015.46365.Dialectic_text.pdf)
- Possibility, by S. Buchanan <https://ia801306.us.archive.org/29/items/possibility032307mbp/possibility032307mbp.pdf>
- The Labour Theory of Value, by P. Dooley <http://digamo.free.fr/dooley5.pdf>
- (Article) What is Labor, by K. Elster