

From Safety to Superego, by J. Sandler

a. Quotes:

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b. General Notes:

▪ Preface (pg. xv)

- "Essential to the ideas expressed here is the view that psychoanalytic theory has no clear boundaries and that it merges at times into many different aspects of general psychology and the biological sciences. Emphasis is placed on the fact that we relate to the world (including our own selves) by way of mental representations, and that we may modify and distort such representations for purposes of our own. Such purposes are adaptive in the sense that we respond not only to pressures arising from outside ourselves, but also to demands from internal sources. These demands arise not only from the instinctual drives but also from anxiety and pain in its many forms; and in this pain we must include that which arises from wounds to our self-esteem." (pg. xv)
- "Examples of concepts that have had to be reconsidered are the pleasure-principle, the superego and ego ideal, identification, introjection, incorporation, internalization, the ego and the self, mental representation, adaptation, narcissism, fixation and regression, fantasy, mental energy, sublimation, psychological structure, trauma, transference, object relationships, depression, and the general theory of affects." (pg. xviii)

▪ Chapter 1 - The Background of Safety (pg. 1)

- "Freud distinguished, in *Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety* (1926), between the experience of trauma and that of danger. In the traumatic situation, the ego is helplessly exposed to quantities of excitation that cannot be discharged or in any way controlled. Situations of danger, on the other hand, are those in which the ego anticipates a situation that it cannot master, one that is potentially traumatic. The experience of trauma, that is of helplessness, is the same no matter what the source of the uncontrollable excitation may be, and in the course of development, highly specialized methods are evolved whereby traumatic excitation, the threat of trauma implicit in the danger situation, and the correlated affect of anxiety may be avoided. The source of potentially traumatic excitation may be the id or stimulation of the sense organs. In the earliest undifferentiated phase of development, however, no distinction is made by the infant between excitations arising from different sources. Some of the techniques that the ego develops for dealing with potentially traumatic excitation have been studied in detail, in particular the mechanisms of defence. Yet all the functions of the ego that subserve adaptation, including those of the conflict-free sphere (Hartmann, 1939), can be considered as being directed toward the mastery of excitation. I want to single out for discussion one, from some points of view the most important, of the ego's functions through which it controls and contains excitation that might otherwise be traumatic. I refer to the process of perception in which unorganized sensations arising from the various sense organs are transformed into organized and structured perceptions. The development of a primitive capacity for perception must clearly precede the differentiation of situations of danger from the experience of trauma. I should like at this point to summarize my thesis very briefly by saying that the act of perception is a very positive one, and not at all the passive reflection in the ego of stimulation arising from the sense organs; that the act of perception is an act of ego mastery through which the ego copes with the excitation, that is, with unorganized sense data, and is thus protected from being traumatically overwhelmed; that the successful act of perception is an act of integration that is accompanied by a definite feeling of safety— feeling so much a part of us that we take it for granted as a background to our everyday experience; that this feeling of safety is more than a simple absence of discomfort or anxiety, but a very definite feeling quality within the ego; that we can further regard much of ordinary everyday behavior as being a means of maintaining a minimum level of safety feeling; and that much normal behavior as well as many clinical phenomena (such as certain types of psychotic behavior and the addictions) can be more fully understood in terms of the ego's attempts to preserve this level of safety. Following from this I want to put forward, without considering it in detail, the notion of a "safety principle" that mediates the development of the reality principle from the pleasure principle." (pg. 1-2)
- "Evidence collected over the past 20 or 30 years, particularly from the work of experimental psychologists, fully substantiates the idea that **perception is a very active ego process, a part of the ego's essentially integrative activity.** It seems clear that there is a very real qualitative difference between incoming sensory stimulation that has passed the external protective barrier, and the percept that we actively construct to modify and confine the sensory excitation. Perception need not, moreover, be tied to states of consciousness, and we can speak of preconscious as well as of unconscious perception. **We know that the act of perceiving constitutes an attempt to add "meaning" to incoming excitation: meaning, that is, in terms of past experience and future activity.** We know, too, that instinctual drives and the ideas attached to them (so-called unconscious phantasy) can substantially modify the form and content of our perceptions; that unpleasant and threatening cues can be suppressed and incongruities overlooked in the act of perception. We can conclude, therefore, that it is not only variation in the quantity of cathexis that modifies the incoming excitation (as described by Freud in his paper "Negation"), but that there is also a qualitative organizing component, related to instinctual wishes and to past memories and to the whole body of organized concepts and schemata built up within the ego, that constitutes an internal frame of reference by which the outside world is assessed. This frame of reference is essential to all perception, and its formation is a necessary basis, for example, for successful distinction between "self" and "not-self." It seems that the central feature of the perceptual process is that it attempts to organize and structure the incoming data from the sense organs. In this the ego deals with incoming stimulation in exactly the same way as it modifies latent dream thoughts and transforms them into manifest content. There is a "perception work" corresponding to the "dream work." Indeed, this need not surprise us if we consider that the distinction between the various sources of excitation, between drive excitation and excitation from the real world, is only painstakingly built up in the infant over months and years. That our adult perceptions refer so strikingly to the outside world (I include here the body as part of the outside world), while the demands of the id are not so clearly differentiated, is a result of the necessity during development to abandon the pleasure principle in favor of the reality principle, and the consequent need for reality testing. When we speak of the cathexis of the external world, or of objects in that world, we mean the cathexis of representations within the ego, representations that have been built up by successive experiences of the real world; experiences, however, that represent reality as distorted by the child's intellectual limitations, by his memories, wishes, and defense mechanisms. **As the child matures and achieves successful reality testing, perceptions can be assumed to provide a more and more accurate rendering of real events.** We know, particularly from the work of Piaget, that the young child's perception of his body and of the external world is distorted not only by his needs and fantasies but also by his inadequately developed frame of reference, a frame of reference through whose use sensations are modified into perceptions. The development of the capacity for more refined and valid perceptions goes hand in hand with the development of more accurate reality testing. We can speak of a successful act of sensory integration as one in which excitation (I speak now of stimulation from any source, from the id or the outer world) is smoothly and effectively dealt with by the ego. I want to suggest that such **successful sensory integration is not only accompanied by anxiety reduction, but also contributes to a background feeling within the ego, a feeling that can be referred to as one of safety or perhaps of security. I want to stress the positive character of this feeling (which need not, of course, be conscious).** It is a feeling that bears the same relation to anxiety as the positive body state of satiation and contentment bears to instinctual tension. Genetically, this feeling must be a derivative of the earliest experiences of tension and satisfaction. **It is a feeling of well-being, a sort of ego tone. It is more than the mere absence of anxiety, and reflects, I believe, some fundamental quality of living matter that distinguishes it from the inanimate. It is a quality of feeling that we can oppose to the affect of anxiety, representing in a sense its polar opposite.** This concept of safety feeling is not, I believe, identical

- with Federn's concept of ego feeling, thought it may be related to it. The feeling of safety is not connected a priori with ego boundaries or with the consciousness of self, but develops from an integral part of primary narcissistic experience, and must exist in rudimentary form from the time of the earliest experiences of need satisfaction. Later, of course, it becomes attached to different ego activities and structures, and to mental content, and we can postulate safety signals in the same way as we do signals of anxiety. These safety signals are related to such things as the awareness of being protected; for example, by the reassuring presence of the mother. I refer only to a simple background feeling that can be compared to a level of tonus in a resting muscle, and that is as different from atonic feelings of death and emptiness as a healthy muscle is from a denervated one. I have stressed the positive aspect of this feeling, and its existence as a sort of constant affective background to all our experience. It is normally maintained through regular and effective handling of quantities of incoming excitation by the ego, a process that becomes increasingly automatic as time goes on, but that retains its active character throughout. In sleep, disturbing stimuli from any source may be dealt with by the dream work, and in this sense we can regard the dream not only as the guardian of sleep but also as a perceptual mechanism that maintains the level of safety feeling within the ego. At any given moment, we are all dealing, in a smooth and integrative way, with the results of stimuli impinging on us from all sides, for example, those arising from the proprioceptors that give us unconscious, or preconscious, information about our posture. This incoming excitation is all organized and dealt with, and we tend only to become aware of it when the sense data do not correspond to our experience and expectation, as when we step into a hole in the dark. We then experience a momentary trauma and a reduction in the level of safety feeling. Normally, however, the experience of our senses is in harmony with what we expect on the basis of our mental model of the external world, with our psychic schemata or frames of reference, and our experience coincides with our expectations. Now trauma, danger, and anxiety deriving from any source can reduce the safety level. It would seem that in taking appropriate action resulting in reduction of anxiety, the ego also heightens the level of safety feeling. This leads us to an important theoretical step that is, I believe, thoroughly substantiated by experience. **In addition to directly defensive activity aimed at the reduction of anxiety, the ego will attempt to counterbalance the anxiety, so to speak, by heightening the safety level by whatever techniques it has at its disposal.** Perhaps the most convenient way of heightening safety feeling is through the modification and control of perception, and I should like to describe a few of the ways in which this can take place. The classification of these techniques of controlling perception is fascinating topic in itself, but I will only mention here that these methods of perceptual modification seem to fall into two major classes, though, of course, we can classify them in many different ways: those methods that involve modification of the perceptual processes within the ego (that is modification of the excitation that has passed the external protective barrier); and those that involve deliberate and purposive behavioral manipulation of the external world so that the sense organs are subjected to altered and different stimulation." (pg. 3-6)
- "I refer to the bizarre posturings and stereotyped movements found in certain forms of schizophrenia, and we may perhaps include such phenomena as echolalia and echopraxia. These can, in part at any rate, be understood as attempts to raise the safety feeling level by gaining a secure source of stable perceptions that correspond to intact object, thing, or movement representations within the fragmented psychotic ego. These perceptions result in an increase in the level of safety feeling, through a hypercathexis of the residual but secure perception. There is recent evidence that the schizophrenic defect involves gross direct perceptual disturbance, and I would suggest that much of the most bizarre and regressed schizophrenic behavior is meaningful if we take the point of view that it represents a desperate attempt to find an 'island' of perceptual security. Those who are familiar with the way in which psychotic children clutch their possessions, hide in corners or under blankets, or perform stereotyped movements, will have been, I am sure, impressed by the panic that these children show when their source of secure perceptions is tampered with (for example, through forcibly restraining a child from carrying out a repetitive movement)." (pg. 7)
 - "[T]he ego makes every effort to maintain a minimum level of safety feeling, of what I have called ego tone, through the development and control of integrative processes within the ego, foremost among these being perception. In this sense, perception can be said to be in the service of the safety principle. Familiar and constant things in the child's environment may therefore carry a special affective value for the child in that they are more easily perceived —colloquially we say that they are known, recognizable, or familiar to the child. The constant presence of familiar things makes it easier for the child to maintain its minimum level of safety feeling. And this is a process that is not necessarily identical with the libidinal cathexis of objects as sources of instinctual gratification, though it may often be difficult in practice to discriminate the one from the other. Instinctual drives will always remain the prime motivators of behavior, and although I have, to use Freud's analogy, described a little part of the rider, this does not mean that the horse does not exist." (pg. 7-8)
 - Chapter 2 - On the Repetition of Early Childhood Relationships (pg. 9)
 - See text
 - Chapter 3 - The Concept of Superego (pg. 17)
 - "Freud in his paper "On Narcissism" (1914)...put forward the idea of an institution in the mind that watches the ego and that compares it with an ideal standard - an ideal that is derived from standards of behavior set by the parents. Starting from the observation that libidinal impulses are repressed if they are in conflict with the subject's ethical ideas, he suggested that the formation of this ideal, against which the subject assesses himself, would be a necessary precondition for such repression. He speaks in this context of the self-respect of the ego. In the ideal image, the child embodies all the feelings of perfection that he felt himself to possess in his early childhood. If he can conform to it, he regains his early state of narcissistic perfection. The conscience is formed as an institution in the mind that sees to it that the ego gains narcissistic gratification from the ego ideal, and that watches the real ego and constantly compares it with the ideal standard" (pg. 19)
 - "He emphasized again the positive rewarding aspect of the relationship between the ego and its ideal. When some thought or activity in the ego coincides with the standards of the ideal, there results a feeling of triumph and release—a return to the state of primary narcissistic union with the parents. In joining a group, the subject may give up his ego ideal and substitute for it the group ideal as embodied in the leader. The leader becomes invested with all the individual's idealized qualities, and the fact that other members of the group are doing the same thing leads to a reinforcement of this process by an identification of the group members with one another. The ego in turn is experienced as an object to the ego ideal. In the condition of mania, we find the extreme and pathological instance of the feeling of narcissistic union with the parents, in which ego and ego ideal are completely at one, and the subject can blithely disregard feelings of social responsibility. Conversely, the sense of guilt and feelings of inferiority represent an expression of tension between the ego and the ideal, finding its extreme expression in the abject misery of the melancholic. Freud makes an explicit distinction between identification of the ego with an object (which results, for example, in the pleasure of being one of a group in such organizations as the army), and the embodiment of the ego ideal in an external person, in external authority (as in the Church)." (pg. 20)
 - "Two years later, Freud presented the structural point of view in *The Ego and the Id* (1923a). The term "ego ideal" is replaced by "superego," but Freud did not imply by this change of term that he was dealing with two separate organizations. He saw the superego, as he had seen the ego ideal before, as constituting a modification of the ego. The superego - a structural precipitate within it - comes into existence at the time of the resolution of the Oedipus complex and, through its formation, becomes the main agent in bringing about a solution to the oedipal conflicts that occur so intensely during the phallic phase of instinctual development. He saw it as the vehicle of morality, reflecting the "higher nature" of man, and, as such, being a representative of the child's relation to his parents and to society. It exercises the function of self-judgment, and preserves throughout life the capacity to stand apart from the ego and to rule it. In the same way as the child had no choice but to obey his parents, so the ego later submits to the imperative demands of the superego. It exercises the "censorship of morals," and tension between ego and superego is manifest as a sense of guilt and worthlessness. The superego is for the most part unconscious, and in analysis its critical functions can produce certain special forms of resistance. It can be hypermoral and even tyrannical toward the ego; but it is capable of modification to the extent that the standards and moral injunctions of

- other external authorities (such as teachers) may be absorbed into it. Freud regarded the superego as being formed on the basis of identifications with the parents, such replacement of object cathexes by identification being an important part of character development, though superego identifications can be distinguished from those that enrich the ego. The decisive superego identifications take place as a consequence of the necessity to deal with both positive and negative Oedipus complexes. The parents are introjected after the fashion described in "Mourning and Melancholia" (1917a), and the child erects, in the superego, the same barrier to instinctual expression as existed outside in the shape of the parents. **The superego represents, however, a definite structure within the ego, and it is more than the simple sum of the parental identifications—it is a consistent organization that stands apart from the other constituents of the ego.** The more intense the Oedipus complex and the more rapidly it is repressed under the influence of external measures, the stricter becomes the superego. Freud repeatedly stressed the fact that the superego is not only a product of parental identifications, but it functions also as a mode of expression of the most powerful id drives. By constructing the superego, the ego places itself in subjection to the id. Indeed, Freud says "the ego forms its superego out of the id," and it is the unhindered traffic between the id and the superego that accounts for its largely unconscious nature. Thus, the more a child controls his aggressive impulses toward another, the more tyrannical does his subsequent superego become. The dread of the superego persists from the earlier fear of castration, a fear that is reinforced, as we know, by the child's own aggressive impulses. Thus the id finds a path through the ego in two ways: directly, to the extent to which its impulses are ego-syntonic; and indirectly, through the superego. With every identification, Freud points out, there is a desexualization and at the same time an instinctual defusion. The libidinal cathexis no longer binds the destructive tendencies that now find expression in the severity and punitiveness of the superego. This defusion is particularly evident in melancholia. The superego has also elements in it that represent reactions against the id. Thus it not only contains the precept "be like your father," but it also contains prohibitions—certain things are father's prerogatives." (pg. 20-21)
- "In the *New Introductory Lectures*, Freud refers, as he had done earlier, to the superego as a "function" in the ego, but adds that it is to a certain extent independent, pursuing its own ends. He reiterates the superego's role as a replacement of parental authority, as an inner agent that now dominates the ego by granting proofs of affection and by threats of punishment that in turn mean loss of love. He contrasts the harshness of the superego in many people with the kindness and gentleness of their real parents, and attributes this disproportion to the "transmutation of instincts" that occurs at the time of the resolution of the Oedipus complex. In *The Future of an Illusion* (1927), Freud draws attention to the role of the superego in the perpetuation of culture, and much of what he has to say about the transmission of culture (in particular, the cultural illusions of religion) is pertinent to our understanding of the superego, which is, after all, the most effective agent of cultural transmission. He says, "Every individual is virtually an enemy of culture," and culture must protect man against his own hostile impulses. He goes on to say that the satisfaction provided by the attainment of a cultural ideal is essentially a narcissistic one. In *Civilization and Its Discontents* (1930), Freud amplified the connection between the superego and the aggressive instinct. The child's dread of the parents, which had manifested itself as social anxiety, is, as he had previously described, felt as guilt once the parents have been replaced by conscience. But over and above this, the aggressiveness of the superego is reinforced every time the child renounces its own aggressive wishes on account of the demands of society. Indeed, frustration heightens the aggressiveness inherent in the child's ambivalence, and it is deflected into the superego, its strength now being seen to be a measure of the child's own hostility toward the prohibiting and restraining parent. Masochistic behavior can then be seen to be a function of the ego's erotic attachment to a sadistic superego. In his first presentation of the concept of ego ideal (1914), Freud had stressed the importance of the libidinal, erotic aspects of the tie to the parents, especially the mother, in the formation of the ego ideal. Later, and most explicitly, in *Civilization and Its Discontents*, he emphasized the aggressive, sadistic side. Yet he did not fail to point out that the setting up of high ideals and standards is a function of the superego, as is also the punishment meted out to the ego by the conscience for failure to fulfill these ideals." (pg. 22-23)
 - **"The development of the ego, from the earliest weeks of life onward, is marked by the construction, within the mind of the child, of organized frames of reference or schemata that subserve adaptation.** These schemata or mental models revolve at first around experiences of need satisfaction, and no distinction is made by the child between sensations that arise from inside its own body and those that occur as a result of the activities of the mother. With development, these schemata gradually extend to include aspects of the external world other than those intimately associated with immediate need satisfaction. Essentially they enable the child to assess the properties of the outer world with increasing efficiency, and to predict the pleasurable or unpleasurable consequences of his behavior. The term "internalization" has been used in regard to these processes, but as its current usage is such as to include processes of introjection and identification as well, it seems preferable to think in terms of an organizing activity to describe the construction of these inner models. The concept of an organizing activity seems a particularly appropriate one as the schemata of the child embrace not only data gained through sensory impressions arising from the outer world, but sense data (including affect data) arising from instinctual tensions as well. In addition, it will be necessary, as I hope to show later, to contrast organizing activities with those of introjection and identification, and to dissociate them from processes of "taking in" traditionally associated with oral instinctual aims. Indeed, **organizing is primary to and must precede introjection and identification**, in the sense in which these latter two processes will be used in this presentation. **One can neither identify with nor introject aspects of another person unless one's ego has previously constructed some sort of mental model of that person.** Organizing activity embraces those activities grouped by Piaget (1936, 1937) under the headings of "assimilation" and "accommodation," by Hartmann (1939) as "fitting together," the construction of "perceptual" and "effector" worlds (Üexküll's notion of Umwelt [1926] is relevant here), "differentiation" and "integration" (Werner, 1940), and is a reflection of the synthetic function of the ego. Organizing activity begins to occur extremely early in life, from the moment when the child's experience of the present can be said to be modified by what has been experienced in the past; from the moment sensations begin to be transformed into percepts, however primitive these percepts may be; from the moment that differential cathexis of aspects of the child's world can be said to occur. Clearly, it is those experiences that are directly concerned with need satisfaction that are first registered and organized by the child, under the dominance of the pleasure principle, and the child's first models of the world (and the term "world" includes, of course, the child's own body) are extremely scanty, primitive, and self-centered. The child's inner world, Hartmann (1939) points out, arises as "a central regulating factor ... interpolated between the receptors and the effectors." **Organizing activity is much more than the mere taking in of impressions from the outside, but is intimately connected with the development of all organized ego functions and secondary processes. It includes the construction of frames of reference, schemata, and all the techniques by which the child controls his perceptions (arising from the id or the outside world) and activities. It includes also the development of ego functions such as memory, thinking, imagination, and the capacity for purposive action, functions that in turn foster further organizing activity. Part of the child's inner world consists of models of his objects (or aspects of his objects) and of the self, models that are composites and abstractions created by the child out of its multiple experiences.** The self-schema can also be classed as a type of object schema, cathected by instinctual energy as are the other object models of the child. In the normal child, object relationships develop out of the child's first experiences of satisfaction and dissatisfaction, and their development is associated, in the inner world of the child, with the construction of a libidinally cathected mother schema or imago, although this is limited at first to qualities of experience associated by the child with need satisfaction. Initially these need-satisfying experiences are not differentiated from the self, but as time goes on, a distinct mother schema is organized. It consists, in essence, of a set of expectations relating to the mother's appearance and activities, and when the mother conforms to these expectations (which vary according to the state of instinctual tension within the child), the child experiences satisfaction. When the mother's behavior does not in fact correspond to the cathected internal mother imago, the child experiences frustration, unpleasure, and anger. Later the response of the child becomes more and more removed from the original gratifying situations, so that the presence of the mother, or even the knowledge of the mother's readiness to attend to the child, becomes a source of satisfaction in itself. The internal imago of the mother is thus not a substitute for an object relationship, but is itself an indispensable part of the relationship. Without it no object

relationship (in the psychological sense) exists. It is not in itself a source of real gratification to the child, although it may temporarily achieve a diminution of an instinctual tension through hallucination. The real source of gratification is the mother or any other object who can conform to the child's mother schema. The child's inner world enables him to distinguish, localize, and interpret his sensory impressions; but it also functions to provide him with warning or guiding signals that regulate his behavior. Thus his developing body schema gives him a means of identifying sensations and experiences in his own body, and also assists him to coordinate his bodily activities, as, for example, in learning to walk. Similarly his mother and father schemata gradually enable him to recognize and interpret the activities of his parents, and at the same time allow him to predict what behavior will evoke their love and approval, and what their disapproval, and to control his behavior accordingly. I want to draw particular attention to these two functions of the child's inner world, the function of representing and the function of guiding, for they will ultimately be reflected in that specialized part of the inner world that later becomes the superego. The growth of the inner world goes hand in hand with the partial abandonment of the pleasure principle in favor of the reality principle. The notion of "reality" in this context includes the reactions of the parents in the child's behavior, and no essential distinction can be made till relatively late in development between the "real world" as adults know it and the culturally determined or idiosyncratic commands, wishes, and precepts of the parents. There is as yet no distinction in kind between frustrations imposed by the parents and those that are a consequence of the resistance of other aspects of the "real world" to the demands of the child. Indeed, the child gains much of its knowledge of the properties of the real world, with consequent benefit to ego development, through parental interpretations of reality. It is largely through the agency of the parents that the reality principle replaces the pleasure principle. Now we know that the needs of the child progress from the need for bodily satisfaction and comfort to a need to feel loved in a variety of other ways as well. With increasing discrimination between the self and other schemata, the child comes to realize that his early pleasurable, narcissistic state of union with the mother is threatened. He suffers a lowering of the level of libidinal cathexis of the self, with consequent narcissistic depletion, and, as Freud puts it (1914), he needs to restore the state of "a real happy love [which] corresponds to the primal condition in which object-libido and ego-libido we would now say self-cathexis] cannot be "distinguished." The child's many attempts to restore this original narcissistic state provide an enormous impetus to ego development. Freud (1914) says: "The development of the ego consists in a departure from primary narcissism and gives rise to a vigorous attempt to recover that state." The child has a number of techniques at its disposal for the restoration of this original state of well-being, and of these I want to consider only two that are relevant here: (1) Obedience to and compliance with the demands of the parents. (2) Identification with and imitation of the parents. The term "identification," which refers both to a process and to the end product of that process, has been used by psychoanalysts in a variety of ways, and attempts to differentiate ego identifications from superego identifications have led to much confusion. In the present formulation, the term will be used only for identifications that modify the ego; so-called superego identifications will be seen as a combination of introjection on the one hand, and a corresponding "ego" identification on the other. The observation of very young children has taught us that identifications with parents and others are an aspect of normal development, and that identification is by no means always a substitute for an object relationship, nor is it always used defensively. Transient identifications may later become a permanent feature of the child's personality, but the capacity to make temporary identifications remains after childhood, and is a particular feature of adolescence. We can define "identification" by saying that it represents a process of modifying the self-schema on the basis of a present or past perception of an object, and that such modification may be temporary or permanent, whole or partial, ego enriching or ego restrictive, depending on what is identified with and whether the need for such an identification is of short or long duration. Whereas in primary identification the child fuses or confuses the rudimentary schema of the self with that of another person, so that the distinction between self and not-self does not exist, in secondary identification the self-schema is modified so that it becomes like that of the object, and some of the libidinal cathexis of the object is transferred to the self. Secondary identification is a later acquisition of the child, and grows out of the more primitive mechanism, which remains, in a controlled way, within the ego as a constituent of the capacity for empathy. Primary identification also reappears as a feature of ego functioning in deteriorated schizophrenics, when the capacity for distinguishing between self and not-self has broken down. We might say that secondary identification represents an attempt to create the illusion of primary identification. Secondary identification is not very different from imitation in the small child, though conscious intent is more prominent in the latter. For present purposes we need not make a fundamental distinction between the two. **Identification is a means of feeling the same as the admired and idealized object, and therefore at one with it;** and, as Freud has pointed out, it can exist side by side with object relationships. If we recall the joy with which the very young child imitates, consciously or unconsciously, a parent or an older sibling, we can see that identification represents an important technique whereby the child feels loved and obtains an inner state of well-being. We might say that the esteem in which the omnipotent and admired object is held is duplicated in the self and gives rise to self-esteem. The child feels at one with the object and close to it, and temporarily regains the feeling of happiness that he experienced during the earliest days of life. Identificatory behavior is further reinforced by the love, approval, and praise of the real object, and it is quite striking to observe the extent to which the education of the child progresses through the reward, not only of feeling omnipotent like the idealized parent, but also through the very positive signs of love and approval granted by parents and educators to the child. The sources of "feeling loved," and of self-esteem, are the real figures in the child's environment; and in these first years, identificatory behavior is directed by the child toward enhancing, via these real figures, his feeling of inner well-being. Identification may also be used for the purposes of defense, particularly where the child is faced with a problem of resolving a conflict between its need for an object's love and its hostility to that object. In the familiar "identification with the aggressor" the child deals with his fear of a threatening person by identifying with his omnipotent, powerful, and terrifying qualities. It may also be called into play in an attempt to deal with a loss or a withdrawal from a loving object. In this latter case it is usually accompanied by an introjection of the object, a process that I shall discuss presently; but **identification is not the same as introjection** as it will be defined here, and the distinction between the two is, as we shall see, of supreme importance in understanding the formation of the superego. **The two techniques of restoring a feeling of being loved (of increasing the level of libidinal cathexis of the self) that I have mentioned, identification and obedience, make use of the two functions of the child's parental schemata that I have described earlier, the function of representing and the function of guiding respectively.** But the mechanisms of identification and obedience by no means operate in isolation from each other. In many activities, the child obtains what amounts to a double gain through behaving in such a way as to identify with the parents and at the same time obey their wishes. Thus the toddler who seriously washes his hands after playing with dirt gains both from "doing what mother wants" and from "being like mother." What develops in the ego of the child in the preoedipal years is an organization that reflects the idealized and desirable qualities of the parents on the one hand and that prompts the child to suitable object-related behavior on the other (behavior, that is, that will gain for the child a feeling of being loved). It contains approving and permissive as well as prohibiting and restraining features. It is not yet a structure (in the sense in which Freud used the term in *The Ego and the Id*), for the introjection of parental authority that will elevate it to autonomous superego status has not yet taken place. **It is a preautonomous superego schema, a "plan" for the later superego. It is a sort of undergraduate superego that only works under the supervision of the parents,** and is a differentiated part of the child's own "reality," influenced as is all the child's inner world by instinctual drives and fantasies. It has not yet gained a license for independent practice, so to speak, and it will only do so with the decisive introjections that go with the resolution of oedipal conflict. What might appear to be conflict between ego and "superego" in the preoedipal stages is based on the child's predictions, often distorted, of parental reaction. We know that **the child's view of his parents is objective only to a limited degree. His parental schemata will be colored by his fantasies, and in particular by the projection of unwanted qualities of his own onto them.** The child may not be able to tolerate the aggressive and sadistic parts of his self, and transfers these features from one part of his inner world to another - from his model of his self to his model of his parents. In this sense, projection is the opposite of identification." (pg. 31-37)

- "I do not need to describe here the ways in which the child's conflict between his instinctual urges and his need to preserve his narcissism are

intensified when the child enters the phallic stage. His positive and negative Oedipus complexes, the ambivalence inherent in them, the impossibility of really fulfilling his instinctual wishes, the fear of punishment and castration (which is correlated with a father image distorted by the projection of the child's own aggression) —all of these combine to create a situation of unbearable tension in the child. During the phallic phase, the superego schema is much elaborated and modified, although it will always bear the stamp of his pregenital relationships to his parents. This schema, not yet the superego, has the function of representing (albeit in a distorted way) the admired and feared qualities of the parents. But it also functions to indicate to the ego which piece of behavior will evoke the love and admiration of the parents, and which will cause their displeasure, with consequent lowering of the narcissistic level in the self. We link the development of the superego proper with the resolution of the Oedipus complex. Freud regarded this development not only as the outcome of oedipal conflict, but also as the very means whereby the child effects a resolution of this conflict. The superego is formed, as Freud puts it, as a precipitate within the ego, and its formation is correlated with a partial and relative reduction of interest in and dependence on the real parents. The major source of self-esteem is no longer the real parents, but the superego. Introjection of the parents has taken place, and a structure has been formed that did not exist in this form before. At this point it is necessary to indicate the meaning given to the term "introjection" in this context; for, after all, have not the functions that we call "superego" previously existed in the mind of the child in the shape of the parental schemata? **What distinguishes the introject from the internal schema is precisely the capacity of the introject to substitute, in whole or in part, for the real object as a source of narcissistic gratification. This implies that the introject must somehow be developed out of the schema, crystallized and structuralized within the ego, so that it can be given the power to satisfy, and be felt by the ego to be a sufficient substitute for the objects.** The construction of an introject is thus the sequel of a complete or partial dissolution of the relationship to the real object. Through introjection, the relationship to the object is maintained and perpetuated, but the real object is no longer so vital to the relationship. It follows that what is introjected is neither the personality nor the behavior of the parents, but their authority. (This view of introjection is therefore different from that of Ferenczi—who introduced the term—and that of Melanie Klein.) With this elevation of the superego schema to autonomous status—with its structuralization, in the sense described by Freud in *The Ego and the Id* (1923a)—what was previously experienced as the threat of parental disapproval becomes guilt, though the affective experience is probably the same in both; and an essential component of this affective state is the drop in self-esteem. This differentiates guilt from anxiety, and links it with feelings of inferiority and inadequacy as well as with the affect that is experienced in pathological states of depression. An opposite and equally important affective state is also experienced by the ego, a state that occurs when the ego and superego are functioning together in a smooth and harmonious fashion; that is, when the feeling of being loved is restored by the approval of the superego. Perhaps this is best described as a state of mental comfort and well-being, of "eupathy." It is the counterpart of the affect experienced by the child when his parents show signs of approval and pleasure at his performance, when the earliest state of being at one with his mother is temporarily regained. It is related to the affective background of self-confidence and self-assurance, as well as to the pathological state of mania. Freud has described the way in which both superego formation and identification are associated with a de-sexualization of the child's libidinal aims, and with an instinctual defusion. This defusion enables the child to retain his tender feelings toward his parents, and to divert his destructive urges into his now structuralized schema of parental attributes and behavior—that is, into his superego. The degree to which his hostile wishes cannot find expression through his ego will determine the degree of severity or even savagery of his superego. This may occur to such a degree that the superego may be a much-distorted representative of the real parents of childhood. In this way, as Freud has frequently pointed out, the superego is also a representative of the id, in close and constant touch with it. There has been a strong tendency in psychoanalytic writings to overlook the very positive side of the child's relationship to his superego; a relation based on the fact that it can also be a splendid source of love and well-being. It functions to approve as well as to disapprove; and the relative understressing by psychoanalysts of the former may be due to the fact that they are primarily concerned as therapists, rather than as educators, with situations of conflict and inner disharmony. It will be noticed that superego formation has been linked throughout with introjection, and has been separated conceptually from processes of identification. That the reinforcement of identifications with the parents is something that occurs concurrently with superego formation and progression into latency, is something that cannot be questioned. Freud himself did not always distinguish identification with the parents, particularly with the father, from their introjection and the consequent setting up of an internal authority that can act in opposition to the ego; but in view of recent developments, particularly the increasing theoretical importance of the concept of "self," such a distinction appears to be essential. **Identification is a technique whereby the self is modified so that it corresponds, to a greater or lesser extent, to an object as perceived by the ego.** The model for the ego may be a real person, or an introject. Thus we have a state of affairs in which the ego can use its capacity for identification to obtain a libidinal gain through being at one either with another person who is idealized or feared (or both), or through feeling at one with the introject that contains a representation of the behavior, appearance, and attitudes of the parents. Thus we can replace the notion of superego identification with that of identification with the introject. It changes and modifies the content of the self, but does not result in the formation of psychic structure. Where ego and superego work together harmoniously, the harmony may be achieved by such an identification on the part of the ego, and also by direct obedience to or compliance with superego precepts and demands. This harmonious working together does not represent a merging of the superego into the self (which we see in manic states and which is associated with primary identification), but a modification of the self on the basis of a model of the idealized qualities of the parents, or their demands and prohibitions, as embodied in the superego. Furthermore, if the child can both identify with and obey the introjected parents at one and the same time (as in the example I gave earlier of the child washing his hands "to be like mother" and "to please mother"), a double gain is effected. We can also see, particularly in the course of an analysis, how guilt feelings may be dealt with by identification with the introject, and identification that shows itself through the adoption of a strict and moralizing attitude to another." (pg. 37-40)

- "[T]he superego is only supported by the ego as long as it functions, in its turn, to support the ego; and situations do exist in which the ego can and will totally disregard the standards and precepts of the superego, if it can gain a sufficient quantity of narcissistic support elsewhere. We see this impressive phenomenon in the striking changes in ideals, character, and morality that may result from the donning of a uniform and the feeling of identity with a group. If narcissistic support is available in sufficient quantity from an identification with the ideals of a group, or with the ideals of a leader, then the superego may be completely disregarded, and its functions taken over by the group ideals, precepts, and behavior. If these group ideals permit a direct gratification of instinctual wishes, then a complete character transformation may occur; and the extent to which the superego can be abandoned in this way is evident in the appalling atrocities committed by the Nazis before and during the last war. Changes in morality can sometimes be seen when a person becomes much loved by another; the superego is then not as necessary as before as a provider of love and as a source of well-being." (pg. 41)
- Chapter 4 - Psychology and Psychoanalysis (pg. 45)
 - "It is one of the ego's functions to create the representational world, but there are many silent functions in the ego processes that are never sensed by the individual, and that correspond to all the silent physiological processes that go on in our bodies and do not attract our attention unless they become involved in pathology. We then become aware of them through their repercussions, that is, through our perceptions, through their influence on the representational world. So far I have spoken of the representational world in rather static terms. However, it is far from being static. It changes from moment to moment under the influence of stimuli arising from the body, in particular from our instinctual drives, and also as a result of the impact of the external environment and as a consequence of our activities, thoughts, and fantasies. The change in our perceptions, from one instant to another, reflects changes in the representational world." (pg. 53)
 - "[W]e can define "internalization," which is usually used to include identification, introjection, and incorporation, on the basis of the perceptual processes involved in the construction of the representational world. Quite simply, we can call internalization the process of representation

formation. "Identification" falls into place as the modification of one's self-representation on the basis of a model of another person. The little boy who copies his father's behavior and mannerisms, either temporarily or permanently, is changing his self-representation so that it duplicates aspects of his father representation. This permits him to transfer to himself some of the feelings of admiration and love that he has for his father. It may also serve other functions. If he changes his self-representation so that it copies his father, he has then less need to preserve his father and may dispose of him, or deal with his loss, more effectively. The use of the concept of the representational world enables us to think rather more clearly about the ideas of the transfer of libidinal and aggressive cathexis, and such tricky problems as those of object love, and of primary and secondary narcissism. Freud has pointed out, and this is something that is very apparent clinically, that if a child loves, without being loved in return, he suffers a narcissistic depletion. If, on the other hand, he is loved, his feeling of well-being rises. If we did not make use of such concepts as self and object representation, we would have to speak of the restoration of the child's libidinal level through a flow of libido from the mother to the child, a sort of ethereal communication. I, for one, am loath to accept such a formulation. Of course, on a descriptive level, which is the level on which Freud was speaking at the time, it is correct to say that if the mother loves the child, invests the child with libido, the child feels better; but it must be the child's own libido that is restored to his self-representation, not the mother's. From a psychological point of view, it makes a great deal of sense to speak of the child's feeling of well-being as located in his self-representation when a particular representational relationship exists between the self and mother representations in his representational world. We can then link the state of the child's libido with the particular relationship of the two images at the time—those of himself and of the loving parent. Turning now to the important concept of "introjection," the use of the present model allows us to clear up some of the confusion that exists around it. The introjection of early childhood (Foulkes, 1937) can be defined in terms of the primitive development of such functions as the recording of memory traces, of attention, memory, and perception. It would then be synonymous with the earliest stages of internalization. The introjections that are characteristic of the resolution of the Oedipus complex, on the other hand, and that are related to the formation of the superego proper, can be formulated very differently. These latter introjections can be defined as occurring when the child acts in the absence of a parent figure as if the parent were really present. Rather than speak of the "taking in" of the parents, we would have to consider the changes that occur in the representational world that give the parent representations a status that they did not previously possess. Introjection does not necessarily involve a change in the self-representation and can be sharply distinguished from identification, which does involve such change. "Incorporation," as the psychological counterpart of eating, would then be a change in the shape of the self-representation so that the taking in of an object, or part of an object, is represented. The incorporated father's penis, for example, would be the self-representation containing a penis representation inside it. The process of "superego" formation, if considered in terms of the representational world, loses much of its psychological mystery. Similarly, the "ego ideal" can be seen in terms of an ideal self-representation or set of representations that the child constructs in his representational world, largely under the influence of his parents and educators. The self ideal would be the schema that the child creates, consciously or unconsciously, of the self-he-would-like-to-be, or the self-he-feels-he-ought-to-be. What about mental conflict and the concept of defense? How does the notion of the representational world fit in? A wish is conceptualized in psychoanalysis as having two components. The first is the instinctual drive or need, and the second, the ideational content with which it has become associated. For example, a wish to exhibit oneself in the nude contains as its instinctual component the exhibitionistic part-instinct, and as its ideational part the image of oneself exhibiting to others. In the present context, the instinctual drive, which belongs to the id, will have its associated content within the representational world. Thus a wish, let us say, to smear with faeces would be sensed by the child as a temporary change in the constellation of his representational world, his self-representation assuming the shape of the child himself smearing. The object of the wish would appear in the representational world as an image of the object that the child wishes to smear. If this content is acceptable to the ego, as it often is in small children, it will find its way to consciousness as a conscious fantasy, and may find discharge in activity. If, on the other hand, it arouses conflict and anxiety, it will remain in the unconscious part of the representational world, kept from consciousness or motility by the defensive activities of the ego. The pressure of the instinctual drives behind it will necessitate constant activity on the part of the ego to deal with it, but the significant point is that the unwanted wish must somehow be unconsciously or pre-consciously sensed on the stage of the representational world for defensive activity to be initiated. If the unwanted images are simply blotted out (and, of course, such a blotting out involves the expenditure of energy) we have the process of "repression." Alternatively, the ego may act in such a way as to rearrange the contents of the representational world in such a way that a compromise is reached; or any one of a large number of other defensive steps may be taken. For example, a portion of the forbidden self-representation may be transferred to an object representation—a process that we know as "projection" or "externalization." The child will then not allow himself to smear nor even know that he wants to smear, but may react in a horrified way to similar activities undertaken by others. He may develop a "reaction formation" to his smearing wishes, in which case the conscious and unconscious parts of his representational world may be extremely different. He might build up a self-representation that is directly opposed to his unconscious self-image, and that is characterized by excessive cleanliness and obsessional character traits. I have a patient in analysis whose self-representation is a highly denigrated one, arousing his disgust and shame. What he would unconsciously like to be does not fit at all with the image he has created as his ideal self. This patient habitually begins his analytic sessions by accusing his colleagues or myself of highly undesirable and loathsome activities, at the same time extolling his own virtues and achievements. His undesirable self representation is constantly forcing itself towards consciousness, and he defends against the arousal of disgust with himself by transferring parts of this unwanted self-image to the representations of others. At the same time, he defensively changes the shape of his self-image by changing the unwanted aspects of it into highly idealized characteristics, and provides himself with a feeling of well-being that he would not otherwise have. It is perhaps in the understanding of the ego's regulation of well-being and of self-esteem that the model that I have outlined here has had its most useful application. This is a topic that has been relatively neglected in psychoanalysis. The unconscious parts of the self-representation can, of course, break through in slips or in dreams, and the mechanisms whereby the unconscious aspects of the representational world are transformed into acceptable manifest content are familiar to you all through Freud's *Interpretation of Dreams* (1900). The notion of the representational world is, I believe, perfectly at one with the classical aspects of Freudian metapsychology and is by no means intended to replace any parts of it. It is an auxiliary way of looking at things, of pulling parts of the psychoanalytical model together. It is a point of view from which to examine data, in the same way as the structural and topographical theories of psychoanalysis are points of view from which observations can be examined and explained. It does, however, provide, I believe, a bridge between the structural and pre-structural theories of Freud, for it seems possible that the tripartite division into conscious, pre-conscious, and unconscious systems can be integrated to a greater degree with the structural division of the mental apparatus into id, ego and super-ego, via the concept of the representational world. **The construction of this world can be understood as a function of the developing ego.** In so far as it is an organization, it is part of the ego, although it is constantly being influenced by the instinctual drives and by that specialized part of the ego that we call the superego. But at the same time, it can be well comprehended in topographical-dynamic formulations. Indeed, one of the most significant parts of it is the account it takes of the discrepancy that exists in both normal and disturbed persons between those parts of the representational world that enter into and are dealt with by the conscious, preconscious and unconscious systems. The ego on the other hand prevents unwanted unconscious representations from finding expression in consciousness and motility. We know that one of the things that has in the past distinguished psychoanalytic thinking from nonanalytic psychologies has been its insistence on the importance of an unconscious mental life. In this mental life, the representational world is all-important, and we can look forward eagerly to further psychological studies of the role of perception that occurs without awareness in preconscious and unconscious fantasy." (pg. 53-57)

- Chapter 5 - The Representational World (pg. 58)

- "In all our considerations, we have made use of a notion that seems to us to be a central one in psychoanalysis, that of the child's subjective world, a

- world that is only gradually differentiated in the course of development as a consequence of processes of biological and psychological adaptation." (pg. 60)
- "[I]f we take into account our knowledge that perception of objects in the external world cannot take place without the development, within the ego of the child, of an increasingly organized and complex set of representations of external reality, then we have to go further than a purely descriptive differentiation between "internal" and "external," and for our present theoretical purpose, we will have to approach the metapsychological problem of the child's "world" from a rather different point of view. The representations that the child constructs enable him to perceive sensations arising from various sources, to organize, and structure them in a meaningful way. We know that **perception is an active process** (Chapter 1) **by means of which the ego transforms raw sensory data into meaningful percepts.** From this it follows that **the child creates, within its perceptual or representational world, images and organizations of his internal as well as external environment.** It is well known that the infant constantly confuses aspects of what we as observers would describe as "internal" and "external" reality within its representational world. All this means that in order to know what is "outside," the child has to create a representation of that "outside" as part of his representational world, and this process is quite distinct from the internalization of aspects of the parents that accompanies the resolution of the Oedipus complex. We know that in the course of development, the child creates stable images of objects existing in the external world. These images are located within the representational world of the child, but refer to what the child learns to experience as the "external" world. The process of superego formation, of transferring the authority and status of the love objects to the "inner" world, can only take place after the child has learned to perceive his objects, that is, after he has created stable object presentations in his representational world. It is evident that if we take such a view, it is extremely difficult to talk of introjection or identification as simply "taking in" the parents. The parents must first be perceived in order later to be introjected and in order to be perceived, they must have been built up within the representational world as object representations of one sort or another. In order to avoid confusion, it is necessary to relate the terms used here to those employed in Chapter 3. From this it seemed to us that the notions of introjection and identification can be conceptualized in terms of changes of cathexis within the representational world. In order to do this, we have found it necessary to distinguish between the ego as a structure or organized set of functions on the one hand, and the representational world on the other. **The construction of a representational world is one of the functions of the ego,** which has, however, many additional functions - never sensed and thus never perceived consciously or unconsciously. **A specialized part of the representational world consists of symbols for things, activities, and relationships, and provides the furniture for the ego function of thinking. The representational world contains more than object or thing representations.** Sensations arising from the child's own body in its interaction with its environment result in the formation of a body representation (body schema), and the psychic representations of instinctual drives find form as need and affect representations. At this point it is useful to introduce a distinction between representations and images. A "representation" can be considered to have a more or less enduring existence as an organization or schema that is constructed out of a multitude of impressions. A child experiences many "images" of his mother-mother feeding, mother talking, mother sitting down, mother standing up, mother preparing food, and so on and on the basis of these, gradually creates a mother representation that encompasses a whole range of mother images, all of which bear the label "mother." (pg. 60-62)
 - "The **self-representation** is, however, much more than a body representation. It **includes all those aspects of the child's experience and activities that he later feels (consciously or unconsciously) to be his own.** It has a status that parallels that of object representations, except that **it refers to the child himself.** By the "self-representation" we mean that organization that represents the person as he has consciously and unconsciously perceived himself, and that forms an integral part of the representational world. This self-organization is a perceptual and conceptual organization within the representational world. **The construction of the representational world is a product of ego functions, and the self- and object representations are part of the representational world.** The representational world might be compared to a stage set within a theater. The characters on the stage represent the child's various objects, as well as the child himself. Needless to say, the child is usually the hero of the piece. The theater, which contains the stage, would correspond to aspects of the ego, and the various functions such as scene shifting, raising or lowering the curtain, and all the machinery auxiliary to the actual stage production would correspond to those ego functions of which we are not normally aware. Whereas the characters on this stage correspond, in this model, to self- and object representations, their particular form and expression at any one point in the play correspond to self-and object images. (Although this distinction has not been fully maintained for the purposes of this paper, it is an important one.) Clearly the delineation of discrete self-and object representations in the representational world can only come about gradually, with maturation and experience. We assume that initially the child's representational world contains only the crudest representations of pleasure and unpleasure, of need-satisfying experiences and activities, and it is only gradually that the infant learns to distinguish self from not-self, and self from object in his representational world. The gradual establishment of self-boundaries (at first body boundaries) is a part of normal development, and their absence at a time when we would expect them to have been established, or their disappearance once they have been established, would lead us to suspect a pathological affection of one or more important ego functions. It is convenient at this juncture to introduce the idea of the "shape" of a self- or object representation or image to denote the particular form and character assumed by that representation or image in the representational world at any one moment. The notion of "shape" is particularly useful as a sort of shorthand, and we have made extensive use of it in simple diagrams in our discussions of the various changes that take place during the course of development and under the influence of various defensive activities of the ego in the child's representational world. The child who feels angry at one moment and the subject of attack at another shows a change in the shape of his self-representation—or, alternatively, his self-image (be it conscious or unconscious has changed. Moreover, the shape of an unconscious self-representation may be different from that shape that is permitted access to consciousness or motility. Thus we could speak of a child who has an unconscious aggressive wish to attack on object as having a particular shape of his self-representation—the unconscious image of himself attacking the object—that is not ego-syntonic and that is only permitted to proceed to consciousness or motility once its shape has been changed by means of defensive activity on the part of the ego. The self-representation can assume a wide variety of shapes and forms, depending on the pressures of the id, the requirements of the external world, and the demands and standards of the introjects. Some shapes of the self-representation would, as has been said, evoke conflicts within the ego if they were allowed discharge to motility or consciousness, and the defense mechanisms are directed against their emergence. This refers, of course, to the expression of id impulses. It is perfectly consistent with psychoanalytic metapsychology to link the expression of an instinctual need with a shape of the self-representation, or for that matter, with the shape of an object representation. Needs soon become transformed into wishes of one sort or another in the course of development, and these wishes involve self- and object representations. Thus an unconscious wish, let us say, to exhibit one's body to another, involves the unconscious perception by the ego of an image of the object reacting in some way. These self- and object images must, it seems to us, be unconsciously appreciated by the ego and be dealt with in some way by it, for example, by repression (or some other form of defense) or by permitting an acceptable derivative to gain access to consciousness or motility. The distortion of the unconscious wish involves changes in the shape of the self-and object representations. Other shapes of the self-representation are versions that would provide the child with the greatest narcissistic gain, and represent ideal selves for the child (as in the "superman" daydreams of latency. Clearly such ideal selves begin to be formed in pregenital times, and their exploration has thrown some light on a number of aspects of what has been broadly conceptualized as the ego ideal. More will be said of these ideal selves later." (pg. 60-64)
 - "It is important to delineate the relation between the representational world and the ego. It is a function of the ego to construct a representational world from the original undifferentiated sensorium of the infant. This goes hand in hand with ego development, for the building up of representations is a *sine qua non* for ego development, and is itself a prerequisite for progressive adaptation. In this the ego is and remains the active agency. The representational world is never an active agent—it is rather a set of indications that guides the ego to appropriate adaptive or

defensive activity. It may be compared to a radar or television screen providing meaningful information upon which action can be based. **The ego makes use of self-, object, or affect representations, and of the symbols derived from them, in its effort to maintain equilibrium.** It can permit them in an undistorted way, or modify them according to its needs. **The representational world provides the material for the ego's perceptual structuring of sensory impulses, for imagination and fantasy, for direct and modified action, for language, symbols, and for trial action in thought.** Using the concept of the representational world, it has been possible to avoid certain theoretical difficulties that have been met with in the course of our work, and to define such mechanisms as identification and introjection in a relatively simple way. These definitions have been tested out in the course of indexing psychoanalytic case material, and have so far proved serviceable. **"Identification" becomes for us a modification of the self-representation on the basis of another (usually an object) representation as a model.** Temporary identification and imitation would be a change in the shape of the self-image that would not show itself as an enduring change in the self-representation. More enduring identifications would be manifested as organized changes in the self-representation. The representation used as a model in identification may, of course, be largely based on fantasy. While it is perfectly correct to say that **identification is a modification of the ego,** it would appear to be more specific and helpful to define it as a modification of the self-representation, a modification that can, nevertheless, result in far-reaching changes in the ego, for the representational world is intimately involved in the child's psychological experience and behavior. **Within the representational world of the child, identification with an object would be the coalescence or fusion of a self-representation and an object representation, or a change in the self-representation, so that the object representation is duplicated.** A child may also identify with an ideal self. In this case we would speak of "identification with the ideal." This is particularly important in superego formation. Thus, for example, a child may construct an "ideal self" based on parental example or precept before it is capable of changing the shape of the self to conform with the ideal. Then, perhaps at a much later date, circumstances (such as physical and psychological maturation) make it possible for the child to identify with the ideal (as in a child's later identification with the professional activities of a lost parent). Identification that is the result of momentary fusion of self- and object representations is, under certain circumstances, a normal process, and the basis for such phenomena as empathy. Where such fusion is of longer duration, and self-boundaries are not intact, a psychotic process may be present. Identification that is the outcome of duplicating the object representation is normally seen as part of the process of loosening the object tie; the object is then no longer as important as before, but still exists as an object representation apart from the self-representation. The boundaries of the self remain intact. **"Introjection,"** as we have defined it (we refer here to the introjections that normally accompany the resolution of the Oedipus complex, and that result in the formation of a structured superego), would be a completely different process. **It can be regarded as the vesting of certain object representations with a special status, so that these are felt to have all the authority and power of the real parents.** As Freud (1940) puts it: "This new mental agency continues to carry on the functions which have hitherto been performed by the corresponding people in the external world." We know, however, that distortions in the object representation accompany the process of introjection. In particular, the child may transfer much of his own aggression to the parental representations, so that they can appear to him to be far more severe and punitive than his parents ever were in reality. Introjection in this sense means that the child reacts, in the absence of the parents, as if they were present. It does not mean that the child copies the parents - this would be identification. It is as if the child says to himself, "I shall be what my parents wanted me to be, as if they were now here," rather than "I shall be like my parents." An example would be the child who obeys a parental injunction (in the absence of the parents) not to stay up late, even though the parents habitually do so themselves. If he identified with the parents, he would stay up late. One could say, loosely, that the child identifies with the parents' demands. Probably, in introjection, there is always an accompanying identification with an ideal self-representation communicated to the child by the parents, or based on the child's distortions of the parents' wishes or reactions. Identification can be observed to occur long before the onset of the oedipal phase, and continues, in one form or another, throughout life. Those identifications that have a special relation to the resolution of the Oedipus complex can be considered to differ from somewhat earlier identifications in their content rather than in their mechanism. The child who identifies with the moral attitudes and behavior of his parents may do so either as an identification with parental representations at the same time as introjection takes place, or may do so following introjection of his parental object representations (or aspects of these). In the latter case we may have the phenomenon of identification with the introject. This is an extremely common occurrence, seen particularly when the child has, in his turn, become a parent, and for the first time identifies with his (introjected) parental attitudes in his attitudes to his own children. Such identification with an introject probably plays an important part in a girl's normal transformation into a mother. Identification with the introject can be seen in children's play. For example, it can be detected in the child who, feeling guilty (anticipating the disapproval of his superego), turns on another child and criticizes him in exactly the same way as he feels criticized (or feels about to be criticized) by an introject. We all know those patients who bring their guilt feelings to an analytic session in the shape of self-righteous criticism of others. On the basis of the theory of superego functioning that we constructed, it was possible in our Index work to attempt a classification of clinical observations that would resolve some of the difficulties we had previously met in indexing superego material. We did not now call upon therapists to distinguish between "ego" and "superego" identifications, for in practice it is not possible to make any such distinction; nor did we ask them to decide in every case whether the superego conflict they saw was conflict with inner or outer authority, for the distinction between the two often fades when a patient externalizes an introject, re-creating an inner conflict in the transference. What we did do was to devise a multiple approach under a number of different headings (Sandler et al., 1962). One of these Index headings refers to statements that the therapist can make on the basis of his clinical material about the extent of organization and structuralization of the superego, a second heading to its characteristics. This is followed by a section referring to its object and instinctual sources, and a section concerned with contents activating the superego system. It would not be appropriate to go into these here, but two further sections are perhaps of special interest. The first of these we have called the "Ego Response." The ego has to deal with tension arising within itself in its desire to satisfy the instincts, to cope with reality, and to serve authority. It will use essentially the same techniques for dealing with inner authority as it has developed for coping with the real parents, and the way in which the ego attempts to resolve tension with inner or outer authority we have called the "ego response." Examination of our indexed material has shown us that there is an almost unlimited range of ego responses for coping with such tension with authority. These range from compliance and defiance to self-punishment of various sorts, to demands for approval and reassurance, to rationalization and concealment, and so on. **Identification is one of the most important of the ego responses - the ego deals with tension with inner or outer authority by altering its self-representation to duplicate the object, and the child's feelings and behavior change accordingly.**" (pg. 64-68)

- **"The self-ideal is an ideal shape of the self-image** that is capable of (conscious or unconscious) visualization by the child. It is a desired shape of the self—the "self-I-would-like-to-be," and when the child becomes capable of actually changing the shape of his self-representation to conform with one of the "ideal" shapes, we can speak of "identification with the ideal" having taken place. In the course of looking at the various methods that children use to restore narcissistic cathexis, we have been struck by the enormous extent to which recourse is had to what we have called "compensation in fantasy." If we regard **fantasy as the purposive manipulation in imagination of the representational world,** it is easy to see how the narcissistic cathexis of the self-representation (the hero in such fantasies) is restored through the assumption in fantasy of one of the ideal shapes—that is, a self-image that will yield the greatest degree of narcissistic gratification and well-being." (pg. 71)
- Chapter 6 - Ego Ideal and Ideal Self (pg. 73)
 - "In our work with the analytic material of child patients in the Hampstead Index, we have found it convenient to view the superego in terms of what has been called the "representational world" of the child (See Hartmann, 1950; Jacobson, 1953a, 1954c). A fuller account of the concept of the representational world will be found in Chapters 4 and 5. Briefly, **it is the universe of representations, of ideational and affective content, that the developing child constructs, on the basis of the sensory experiences arising from the drives and from the interaction between his own body and the**

outside world. At first it is extremely rudimentary, and the representations that are constructed by the developing ego are linked with experiences of need satisfaction, but later the child creates representations of many other things, activities, feelings, and relationships. He differentiates a self-representation from object representations, and learns to distinguish between "inner" and "outer" experiences. As time goes on, certain representations (linked with unwanted instinctual wishes) are repressed, and remain unconscious, while other aspects are permitted access to consciousness and motility. A specialized part of the representational world consists of words and symbols and provides the furniture for the ego activity of thinking. The representational world is not at all synonymous with the ego, although it is one of the functions of the ego to create and organize the representational world. Relevant to the present discussion is the idea of the shape of a representation of self or object—the particular form or character assumed by that representation at any given moment, determined by the pressures of the id, the requirements of the external world, and the standards and demands of the introjects. "Introjection" in this context is the elevation of the parental representations (or aspects of these) to special status. It occurs when the child acts in the absence of a parental authority figure as if the parent were actually present. It is the investment of object representations with an authority or status that they did not previously possess. The relationship of this type of introjection, associated with the resolution of the Oedipus complex, to superego formation has been discussed in detail elsewhere (Chapter 3). Introjection can take place without resulting in identification. "Identification," as distinct from introjection, can be defined as the changing of the shape of one's self-representation on the basis of another representation as a model. Identification is not bound to introjection, and in its most primitive form represents fusion, in whole or in part, of self- and object representations. Later, it can take place as a conscious or unconscious copying of aspects of the "shape" of an object representation, and duplicating it in the self-representation, with the distinction between self- and object representations being maintained. Identifications of one sort or another take place early in life, but the analysis of pregenital identifications forms an important part of analytic work with both children and adults. After the formation of the superego through the introjection of parental authority, there can occur identification with features of the introjects as well as with aspects of non-introjected objects. The capacity to identify with objects (via object representations) continues through life, irrespective of whether these objects are persons in the subject's environment or introjects. The self-representation is built up on the basis of the child's experiences of his own body through its interaction with the external world, and through identifications with his objects. (The object representation includes all the distortions through projection that the child has made during the course of his development.) One of the shapes that the self-representation can assume is one that we can call the "ideal self," that is, one which, at any moment, is a desired shape of the self—the "self-I-want-to-be." This is that shape of the self that, at that time, in those circumstances, and under the influence of the particular instinctual impulse of the moment, is the shape that would yield the greatest degree of well-being for the child. It is the shape that would provide the highest degree of narcissistic gratification and would minimize the quantity of aggressive discharge on the self. The ideal self at any moment is not necessarily simply that shape of the self that represents instinctual impulses as being fulfilled but will be determined as well by the child's need to gain the love and approval of his parents or introjects, or to avoid their disapproval. In this sense **the ideal self is at any moment a compromise formation, a compromise between the desired state of instinctual gratification and the need to win the love of, or to avoid punishment from, authority figures, internal or external.** The ultimate criterion at any given time is an economic one. If the threat of punishment or of loss of love is greater than the libidinal or aggressive gains obtained through direct wish fulfillment, then the child will abandon his wish-fulfilling ideal in favor of one that is more acceptable to his objects, internal or external. It is clear, however, that in any given situation, there might be a conflict of choice between various shapes of the ideal self. The special economic gain obtained through constructing the ideal self on the basis of identification deserves mention. If the parental injunction is "behave as I do," then the formation of an ideal self that is modeled on the object provides a double gain. In the first place, it represents compliance with the wishes of authority, and the child gains a feeling of being loved; in the second place, the child feels identified with his admired object and can love and admire himself as he does the object." (pg. 83-85)

- "The first we can refer to as the "ideal object," in which the child possesses an admired, idealized, and omnipotent object. The second represents those ideals that are held up to the child by his parents or introjects in the form of the ideal ("good," "well-behaved") child. This ideal, conveyed to the child by his parents, need not be identical with the ideals or behavior of the parents themselves. It represents the parents' ideal of a desirable and loved child, as perceived by the child. The child may be aware of these parental ideals, yet they need not have been integrated into the content of the child's self or ideal self. Whether they are or not depends on the child's ego development and on the economic loss or gain involved. Both these types of ideal appear to be included in the sense in which Freud spoke of the superego as the vehicle (Träger) of the ego ideal (1933). Finally, we have the set of ideals that constitutes the content of the ideal self, and this is the sense in which Freud spoke of the ego ideal in his first formulation, in the paper "On Narcissism" (1914), and even in Group Psychology (1921a), although in the latter paper he had, in contrast to his 1914 formulation, included the "conscience" in the ego ideal. Clearly the content of the ideal self on the one hand, and that of the ideal object or ideal child (as transmitted by the object) on the other, need not necessarily be the same, though they are often closely related. The child has a strong motive for identifying in his ideal self with the idealized features of his authority figure, whether real person or introject, for by identification, he can transfer some of the libidinal cathexis attached to the object to the ideal self. Object love is transformed into secondary narcissism, with resulting potential increase in well-being and self-esteem. By identifying in his ideal self with the "good" child image of his parents or introjects, he can feel loved and admired by them. The ideal self is far more fluid and flexible than the ideals held up to the child by his introjects, although it will contain a solid core of identifications with the admired parents of his earliest years. In the well-adapted individual, the content of the ideal self will undergo continuous modification in the light of the person's experiences of reality. In states of regression, the content of the ideal self will approximate more closely to aspects of the idealized pregenital objects. In normal development, parental ideals that have previously been taken over will be modified and displaced in a reality-syntonic fashion and will be integrated with the ideals taken over from other figures throughout life—such figures as friends, teachers, and colleagues; indeed, from any admired object. Ideals may also be derived from feared objects through a mechanism similar to "identification with the aggressor." The sources of the content of the ideal self can be categorized as follows: (1) Identification with aspects of loved, admired, or feared objects. These objects may be introjects (after the formation of the superego proper), or may be at any time persons in the individual's environment. (2) Identification with the image of the "good" or "desirable" child as conveyed by the objects. (3) Identification with previous shapes of the individual's own self. By this is meant the construction of ideals based upon the wish to attain "ideal" states previously experienced in reality or in fantasy. To these sources we should perhaps add the influence of the individual's reality knowledge. **The capacity to take reality into account in the construction of the ideal self of the moment is a most important one from the point of view of development and adaptation. Reality knowledge here includes knowledge of one's own potentialities and limitations as well as knowledge of the environment.** At any one moment and in any situation, the ideal self will be a resultant of the operation of all the factors mentioned. It will contain temporary and ad hoc elements to varying degree, but will also contain a more stable core, for the most part unconscious, based upon the ideals created in childhood. In particular, the ideals based on and maintained by the relationship to the introjects will play an important part in normal and pathological mental life. Conflict of choice between various shapes of the ideal self, especially between those derived at various stages of development, will also play a significant role in determining pathology." (pg. 86-87)

- "The establishment of an ideal self within the representational world of the child provides him with a potential source of well-being. Some of the libido attached to the objects can now be transferred to the ideal and the child can become more independent of the love, praise, and encouragement of his objects, attempting to avoid disappointment and frustration by living up to his ideal self ("identification with the ideal self")." (pg. 88)

▪ Chapter 7 - The Metapsychology of Fantasy (pg. 90)

- "Fantasies are, for Freud, fulfillments of secret and repressed wishes and protect the ego from anxiety arising from undischarged instinctual tension.

- They may be compared to a dream in waking life, and the term "daydream" is thus appropriate. Because reality is on the whole unsatisfying, we develop a life of fantasy in which we make up for the insufficiencies of reality by the production of wish fulfillments." (pg. 96)
- "Fantasies may be a substitute for play. When play has to become secret it may be carried on in fantasy. The fantasy allows the repressed memories to become conscious in distorted form. In fantasies that accompany satisfaction, the sexual object is raised to a degree of perfection not readily found again in reality. **The function of fantasy, says Freud as late as 1930, is to help make oneself independent of the external world by seeking satisfaction in internal psychic processes.** It gives the ego time to modify external circumstances in order to attain instinctual discharge. Thus the function of fantasy is to create a wish-fulfilling situation that allows a certain amount of instinctual discharge—a discharge that would not be permitted in the existing circumstances of external reality—and that also corrects and modifies that reality in the imagination." (pg. 96)
 - "Summary of Freud's Writings on Fantasy: (1) Conscious fantasy, or daydreaming, is a reaction to frustrating external reality. It implies the creation of a wish-fulfilling situation in the imagination, and thereby brings about a temporary lessening of instinctual tension. Reality testing is discarded; the ego nevertheless remains aware that the imaginative construction is not reality, without this knowledge interfering with the gratification thus achieved. Conscious fantasy differs from hallucinatory wish fulfillment in that the daydream is not normally confused with reality, whereas the hallucinatory gratification cannot be distinguished from reality. (2) Fantasies that are descriptively unconscious can be divided into two main classes: (i) those that are formed in the system Pcs., and that parallel the formation of conscious daydreams, except that they do not possess the quality of consciousness; and (ii) those that are relegated by repression to the system Ucs. To the repressed daydreams in the system Ucs. we must add the proliferated derivatives of fantasies and memories that have been formed according to the laws of the primary process, as well as derivatives that have reached the systems Pcs. and Cs., subjected to secondary-process elaboration, and then repressed. For the sake of completeness, we can add the hypothetical primal or inherited fantasies. (3) Once a conscious or preconscious fantasy has been repressed into the system Ucs., it functions exactly like a memory of instinctual satisfaction and can provide the ideational content of the instinctual drives. Fantasies in the system Ucs. —perhaps we can say, unconscious fantasies proper—are not wish fulfillments, but are now the ideational content of instinctual wishes. They deserve the name of fantasy only inasmuch as they are derived from the content of conscious or preconscious fantasies. Fantasies belonging to the system Ucs. and those in the systems Pcs. and Cs. may be similar in their ideational content. They can be contrasted in the descriptive, dynamic, and topographical senses. (4) Unconscious fantasies can find expression in new conscious and preconscious daydreams; but they can also find expression and gratification in any one of a large number of other forms, none of which necessarily qualifies for the designation "fantasy." (pg. 108)
 - "Freud saw this mental process as the effort to attain the fulfillment of an unsatisfied wish through the creation of an imagined wish-fulfilling situation, in which the wish was represented as being fulfilled (usually in a disguised form). Frustrating reality is known, but is temporarily put aside. This process, involving a knowledge of what is "real" and what is "unreal," can without difficulty be considered, from the structural point of view, as a function of the ego. It represents a technique whereby the ego temporarily avoids displeasure or disappointment by holding reality in abeyance. Fantasizing may represent the formation of a compromise between instinctual wishes and the demands of the superego, and, in general, lends itself well to defensive use. As fantasizing in this sense can be considered an ego function, it makes use of secondary (as well as primary) processes, and as an activity can reach a high degree of organization. It is a form of thinking that may be differentiated from reality-oriented thinking in that it involves a turning away from frustrating reality, although it may itself subserve adaptation (as in the creation of tentative fantasy solutions to problems, fantasies that may later be fulfilled by the manipulation of reality). Fantasizing involves a fantasy work that closely parallels the dream work, although the influence of secondary-process functioning is more evident in the former. The fantasy work of the ego will include much of what in dreaming constitutes secondary elaboration or revision. As in the process of dreaming, the fantasy work makes use of both repressed and non-repressed mental contents (recent memories, percepts, the content of past fantasies and other derivatives, etc.), and will often make use of elements of reality knowledge in the elaboration of the fantasy. (This might be thought of as corresponding to the use of the day's residues in dream formation.) The product of this process—the fantasy content—may be (descriptively) either conscious or unconscious." (pg. 111-112)
 - "It seems necessary, therefore, to distinguish between the capacity of the ego to organize mental content (as it does in perception, organized memory, reality-oriented thinking, as well as in fantasy), and the organized form imposed on the mental content, an outcome of the ego's work. Once formed by the ego, fantasy content that becomes id-cathected content (wish content) may retain all or part of the organized qualities that have been imposed on it. This is obviously also true for repressed memories, for a memory derives from (conscious or unconscious perception, an ego function that produces, in the percept, highly organized mental content. (We speak here of the state of affairs that exists after the ego has reached a fair degree of development, because unorganized impressions that are registered before the beginnings of an ego, in the so-called undifferentiated state, must be excepted, the organizing of mental content being by definition one of the functions that we call "ego.")" (pg. 114)
 - "Fantasizing, then, can be regarded as an ego function, producing organized, wish-fulfilling, imaginative content, that may or may not become conscious. It involves a temporary laying aside of reality, although elements of reality can be utilized in the creation of the fantasy. Once formed by the ego, the fantasy content, which may show a high degree of organization and symbolization, can be repressed and subjected to primary-process functioning alone. Fantasy thinking differs from reality-oriented thinking precisely in the fact that the demands of reality are partially or wholly ignored. It does not aim at changing reality in order to obtain satisfaction; rather it involves the creation of an imagined alternative and satisfying state. It arises as a consequence of the frustrations inevitably imposed by reality, and although the ego remains aware that the imaginative construction is not reality, partial and immediate gratification is achieved. There are, of course, many thoughts that occupy an intermediate position between fantasy and reality-oriented thoughts, and the two cases represent the extreme ends of a continuum. Moreover, fantasizing, although it involves a turning away from immediate frustrating reality, can be utilized as an important aspect of scientific and artistic creativity. It should be added that these remarks on fantasizing do not preclude the possibility that, in certain circumstances, reality can subsequently be changed so as to bring about a realization of the fantasy." (pg. 117)
- Chapter 8 - Sexual Fantasies and Sexual Theories (pg. 121)
 - See text
 - Chapter 9 - Trauma, Strain, and Development (pg. 127)
 - See text
 - Chapter 10 - Obsessional Manifestations in Children (pg. 142)
 - "The obsessional neurosis is characterized by a drive regression to the anal-sadistic level, with heightened ambivalence. The drive impulses show the characteristic changes attributed to "drive defusion." On the side of the ego, we find an increase in magical thinking, with a heightened sexual and aggressive cathexis of thought. There is a prominent use of the defense mechanisms of displacement, reaction formation, isolation, and undoing, together with the excessive use of intellectualization and rationalization. Object relationships show regressive alterations, although residua of phallic-oedipal types of relationship may be discerned. Indeed, we hardly ever see a complete and simple regression to the anal phase but rather see a regressive analization of oedipal relationships and conflicts, so that masturbation conflicts, for example, may be a dominant feature of the clinical picture. The obsessional disturbance is marked by a tendency of the conflict to spread, with no stable compromise solution appearing as we see it in the classic hysterical symptom. There is a high degree of superego conflict, and the superego introjects show primitive features, with a reinforcement of their aggressive qualities. The form taken by the symptoms bears an intimate relationship to anal drive characteristics." (pg. 143-144)
 - Chapter 11 - Pain, Depression, and Individuation (pg. 154)
 - "The ideal state of well-being is closely linked with feelings of safety and security. It is the polar opposite of feelings of pain, anxiety, or discomfort, and

- bears the same relation to these as the state of physical satiation and contentment in a small infant bears to the unpleasure of instinctual tension. The attainment of this state may follow or accompany successful drive discharge, but there are circumstances in which drive satisfaction does not lead to the development of well-being, but rather to the experiencing of its opposite, as in states of mental conflict." (pg. 157)
- "In this there is a qualitative difference between the systems id and ego. The drives are characterized by states of tension and demands for discharge (and the body pleasures associated with such discharge) that change in the course of development. The dynamics of ego functioning appear to be much more related to the maintenance of affective states of well-being that do not change as grossly in the course of development (although the ideational content associated with the ideal state may change markedly). In what follows **we shall use the term "ideal state" to refer to the affective state of well-being, and the term "ideal self" to denote the particular shape of the self-representation at any moment in the individual's life that is believed (consciously or unconsciously) to embody the ideal state.** As the representational world of the child becomes increasingly structured, his system of self-representations includes images that reflect affective states of well-being. The "ideal self" derives its content not only from affect representations, but also contains ideational components that may originate from various sources. These sources include memories of actual states of well-being previously experienced, or of fantastic and symbolic elaborations of such states. The elaborations in fantasy may subserve defensive functions, in which case we may get magical and omnipotent components in the ideal self. The specialized form of ideal that ensues when the child needs to aggrandize himself for the purpose of defense can be referred to as the "idealized self," but it should be borne in mind that idealization is only one possible source of the content of the ideal self. Similarly, where the ideal self is based on identification with an admired object, we can distinguish between qualities that the child attributes to the object because of its infantile perception of the object at the time, and those that are attributed to the object representation in fantasy (usually resulting from ambivalence conflicts)." (pg. 157)
 - "We saw the role of the object as being that of a vehicle for the attainment of the ideal state of well-being. While this is perhaps obvious when object relationships are of the anaclitic, need-fulfilling (part-object) type, it is not so obvious when the state of object constancy has been reached. It could be argued that love for the object can be truly altruistic, that the object can be loved for and in itself. Yet we believe that this is never entirely true, and that the value that any object has is directly connected with its genetic and functional relation to the self. This would appear to be so even after the attainment of object constancy, when the object has developed "uniqueness" and has become an indispensable key to states of well-being. The subject was explored by Freud in his paper "On Narcissism" (1914), in which he traced the development of object love from primary narcissism. **Object love, like the whole development of the ego, can be seen as a roundabout way of attempting to restore the ideal primary narcissistic state.** The perception of the presence of the love object when its presence is expected is, moreover, a source of feelings of well-being and safety (Chapter 1). And this is true even when the object is fulfilling no drive-reducing role. It is clear that if the presence of the object is a condition for a state of well-being in the self, then loss of the object signifies the loss of an aspect of the self, of a state of the self. One might say that for the representation of every love object there is a part of the self-representation that is complementary to it, that is, the part that reflects the relation to the object, and that constitutes the link between self and object. We can refer to this as the object-complementary aspect of the self-representation. We have suggested that even if the highest level of object love has been reached, **the object is ultimately the means whereby a desired state of the self may be attained, in fact or in fantasy.** This does not imply any degree of undervaluation of the role of object relationships in development and in mental life in general; the object is, after a certain point in development has been passed, unique and essential for the maintenance of well-being in the self. When a love object is lost, we not only have the loss of the object in its own right, but also the loss of the object-complementary aspect of the self and the affective state of well-being that is intimately bound up with it. In such a state of object loss, the affective value cathexis of the object is greatly increased, and attention is focused almost exclusively on the object because it is the key to the reattainment of the lost state of the self. This displacement is biologically conditioned because of the long period of dependence of the human infant on its biological object. In the case of the toddler, the mere presence of the mother in the nursery may be sufficient for him to play happily, all but ignoring her presence. His state of well-being may be quite obvious from his contented play. If she leaves the room without his noticing her departure, he will go on playing happily until he notices her absence. His perception of this may precipitate a disruption of his well-being and a state of distress. All his attention and activity will be directed toward restoring her presence. What he feels is lost is the mother; what is actually lost is not only the mother but also the well-being implicit in the relationship." (pg. 158-159)
 - "[J]ust as the child's love for the object has its counterpart in feelings of well-being in the self derived from the object relationship, so is there a state of the self that mirrors a hostile relationship to the object. If the object were only hated, loss of the object would tend to restore well-being, and the loss would be accompanied by relief because of the lessening of unpleasure in the self and the resulting approximation of the self to an ideal state. Here again, the feelings of unpleasure may be related by the child to the object representation that is felt to be the source of the existence of the undesired, painful state of the self. If the object were only loved, regaining of the lost object would equally restore a sense of well-being. However, once the child has achieved a degree of object constancy, once so-called whole-object relationships have been established, no object is only hated or only loved. In simple ambivalence there is, on the one hand, the wish to maintain well-being in the self by ensuring the object's presence; on the other, there is a wish for it to disappear because it arouses feelings of unpleasure or pain in the self. This creates a state of conflict, and there are a variety of ways in which attempts may be made to deal with this conflict. There can be, for instance, the splitting of ambivalence, so that either the loved or hated aspect of the object is displaced onto another person who is treated accordingly; or one facet of the ambivalence may simply be denied or repressed. There can be identification with some attribute of the object. There are the various forms of externalization of an aspect of the self-representation (more commonly the aggressive aspect) as in projection ('I do not hate him, he hates me"); and, indeed, all the defense mechanisms can be called into play to deal with the conflict situation. The child may also attempt to control his environment by clinging or other methods of manipulating the object, but if his ambivalence is intense, no state of his environment will be felt to be satisfactory to him, that is, will be capable of producing feelings of well-being in the self. It is self-evident that the situation of ambivalence that we have described is a painful one. The child cannot in reality approximate the actual state of his self to that of an ideal state, because the ideal object (which would only be loved and only love in return) and that would create a state of perfect contentment in the self does not exist in reality. It is here that the child so often turns to idealization and compensation in fantasy. It seems obvious that pain is in itself not the depressive reaction. If the internal or external situation can be successfully defended against, the pain will lessen or disappear. If the child reacts to the experience of pain by an increase in his discontent, and, in particular, if he regresses to an oral demanding attitude, he becomes the typically unhappy and complaining child with whom we are all familiar. In such cases, one often sees an inner source of discontent, one that may have a long history in the development of the child, displaced onto the external environment, so that nothing really satisfies, nothing pleases. Children defend against the recognition of an inner source of pain, and find it more comfortable to blame an object for it. This brings us to a further important point. If a state of pain is experienced in the self, then the actual self may become an object of the child's anger or even hate. It is an unsatisfactory self, and will be invested with aggressive cathexis. The child may experience a state of ambivalence toward his own self. This is quite distinct from the phenomenon of aggression directed toward the self on the basis of identification with an ambivalently loved object. Unless this is successfully dealt with by some externalizing mechanism, the child may become the victim of a circular process, in which ambivalence toward the self increases the degree of pain and discontent. Important sources of pain are external authority figures (or the superego, once it has been established). Anger felt toward the object world (and the introjects) may be inhibited because of the fear of retaliation. Fear of punishment and guilt are themselves sources of pain; but, in addition, if the ego deals with these feelings by directing aggression against the self, then this too will result in pain. Aggression may be turned toward the self by a process of displacement from the object or via identification with the hated object." (pg. 169-171)

- "[W]e consider individuation to be a line of development that continues through life" (pg. 175)
- Chapter 12 - On Disorders of Narcissism (pg. 180)
 - See text
- Chapter 13 - On Sublimation (pg. 191)
 - See text
- Chapter 14 - The Tendency to Persistence (pg. 208)
 - "[W]e can conceive, for example, of repression as an ongoing dynamic process, one that is not really sufficiently described in terms of the withdrawal of attention cathexis and the application of anti-cathexis. We can regard the repressed instinctual drive impulse as taking the form of a sensorimotor representation that is repeatedly impelled toward full discharge under the pressure of the drive. The process of repression includes then a rapid unconscious recognition by the ego of the emergent representation, a recognition that is then followed by the application of a counterforce that restricts the representation from proceeding further. It is as if the ego can, quite outside consciousness, scan the field of emergent id-propelled representations and, perhaps on the basis of warning signals of anxiety, direct an inhibitory counterforce against them, so that the instinctual drive is either prevented from obtaining discharge or has to find discharge via sensorimotor representations that are more acceptable. The ego is continually performing acts of judgment, influenced not only by the content of the drive representation, but by all the information, past and present, available to it. We can assume that the ego scans and organizes the data presented to its internally oriented sense organ in much the same way as it scans, selects, and organizes the information arising from other senses. The ego is repeatedly being faced with what are essentially problem-solving tasks in which the problem to be solved is that of effecting a resolution from moment to moment of the frequently conflicting demands of reality and of the various psychic institutions. If existing organizations are adequate to cope with the immediate adaptation task, then the processes of trial action and inhibition proceed rapidly and smoothly, so much so that we can speak in this connection of what Hartmann has called "automatization." When the existing organization is not able to cope efficiently and adequately with the problem at hand, there will be a tendency to test, in internal trial form, solutions that have previously been effective and to integrate them into a new organization that is appropriate to the task. Even if this reorganization takes only a brief moment of time, a form of temporary regression in the service of the ego (to use Kris's term) will have occurred. It is tempting to expand this notion in the content of the many contributions that have been made on the subject of creativity, but we will confine ourselves here to calling attention to the existence of individual differences in the capacity for such temporary creative regression (cf. the work of George Klein and others), and to remarking that, in the creative moment, regression and progression go hand in hand. If, for some reason, higher level and progressively adaptive organizations cannot be created, we may see the emergence of a solution that is dominated by a genetically older structure (i.e., organization); and in this case we can speak of regression proper, in the sense with which we are clinically so familiar. If this regression affects mainly the controlling, delaying, and inhibiting aspects of discharge, we have functional ego regression; if it affects the pathways of drive discharge we can speak of drive regression. The particular fixation points that determine the nature and extent of the particular functional regression can be regarded, in the sense of the views discussed here, as being inherent in the style of the organism's functioning. We use "style" in this context to relate to both overt and inhibited modes of functioning. This is a topic that needs fuller elaboration of the sort that is impossible to present here. All of this can be conceptualized in terms of a tendency to persistence. The essential point is that in every psychological "event" or in every attempt at problem solving (we include in this the finding, at any moment, of an appropriate form of drive discharge, the appropriate negotiation of environmental tasks, as well as the functions of cognition, perception, etc.), the attained resolution is preceded by a rapid recapitulatory exploration of previous solutions established in the course of the individual's ontogenetic development. The concept of persistence also implies that the organization of previous situations that we have conceptualized as "structures" persists even though new structures of increasing complexity are continually being formed. We should like to conclude with a consideration of one or two implications and applications of the notion of persistence. We are all familiar with the processes that we refer to as "identification" and "projection." Identification (we refer here to secondary identification), as a number of authors now see it, involves a change in the self-representation on the model of an object representation; and projection the attribution to an object representation of some aspect of the self-representation. These processes can occur after the boundaries between self and object representations have been created; before that, we have the state referred to by Freud as "primary identification," "adualism" by Piaget, and "primary identity" by others. A better term to designate this early state might be "primary confusion" (Sandler, 1960b). If we apply the idea of persistence to processes of identification and projection in the older child or adult, we can postulate that there will always be a momentary persistence of the primary state of confusion, however fleeting, whenever an object is perceived or its representation recalled. What happens then is that the boundaries between self and object become imposed by a definite act of inhibiting and of boundary setting. It is as if the ego says "This is I and that is he." This is a very different idea from that of a static ego boundary or self-boundary that remains once it has been created. What develops is the inhibition of the state of primary confusion and the ego function of disidentifying, a mental act of distinguishing between self and object that has to be repeated over and over again; and the function of disidentifying makes use of structures that we can call boundaries. The persistence of this genetically earlier primary confusion in normal experience is evident when we think of the way in which we move and tense our bodies when we watch ice skaters, or see a Western. We must all surely have had the experience of righting ourselves when we see someone slip or stumble. In these everyday experiences, there is a persistence of the primary confusion between self and object; and this may more readily occur in states of relaxation or of intense concentration in which the bringing into play of boundary setting may temporarily be suspended or delayed. Herbert Spencer referred to something like this when he spoke of "primitive passive sympathy." McDougall, in commenting on the phenomenon, pointed out that "the fundamental and primitive form of sympathy is exactly what the word implies, a suffering with the experiencing of any form of emotion when and because we observe in other persons or creatures the expression of that feeling or emotion." The persistence of this genetically early state in the microgenesis of perception and thought must surely provide the basis for feelings of empathy, for aesthetic appreciation, for forms of transference and counter-transference in analysis (here we can see one aspect of the value of the reclining position of the patient and the free-floating attention of the analyst). And in connection with what we call secondary identification and projection, we would suggest that the bridge to these processes is the persisting momentary state of primary confusion or primary identification that occurs before the process of "sorting out" or "disidentifying" occurs. One result of this "sorting out" may be that aspects of the object representation are incorporated into the self-representation and vice versa. What we have called "persistence" is an essential part of normal mental functioning, and it has direct relevance to the changes that occur as a consequence of successful psychoanalytic treatment. These can be related to changes in function and to processes of reorganization. Even with the resolution of a neurotic conflict, the undoing of regression, the disappearance of symptoms, and the emergence of new and progressively adaptive modes of behavior, the previous solutions inherent in neurotic organization persist, but their functioning is restricted to "trials" or "samples" of the type we have described. The maintenance of the newer modes of functioning must therefore depend on the capacity to continually inhibit and to restrict the neurotic solution to a "trial" form. This raises many interesting questions in regard to the therapeutic process in general, to problems of establishing criteria for the termination of analysis, to the differences between child and adult analysis, and to a whole host of allied problems." (pg. 217-220)
- Chapter 15 - Adaptation, Affect, and the Representational World (pg. 221)
 - "[A] high degree of autonomy from the drives, the superego, and from the environment indicates a relatively greater range of choices in adaptive responses in problem solving and in decision making, and in the development of the means of obtaining pleasure, gratification, and well-being. It should be clear by now that our concept of adaptation is more than that of adaptation to the external world, but includes adaptation to inner forces and inner states, as well as to the demands or promptings of external reality. It is perhaps unfortunate that the way in which the term "adaptation"

is generally employed is to denote reality relationships this has certainly influenced a number of psychoanalytic writers on the topic, and even Hartmann, in his classical work on adaptation (1939), placed emphasis on adaptation in relation to the tasks of reality mastery, although he took the ego's role as a mediator between drives and reality fully into account. Our own emphasis is different from this, and it will become apparent in what follows that we regard adaptation to reality as a (biologically pre-disposed) consequence of a more general principle of regulation and control." (pg. 225)

- **"The aim of all ego functioning is to reduce conscious or unconscious representational discrepancy and through this to attain or maintain a basic feeling state of well-being."** (pg. 229)
- "In the course of the child's everyday life he develops and creates various shapes of the ideal self that are appropriate to his home, to his school, to his groups of friends, and so forth. These ideal shapes of the self may vary quite considerably from one set of circumstances to another, and tendencies, wishes, or impulses that may be permitted in one situation may create a painful internal state in another. The content of the "ideal" states may be derived from present reality, or from past experience - we include here the set of ideals that are related to the parental introjects once the superego has been established, and that we know can often be a source of intense pain when the child feels that he does not conform (or wish to conform) to his superego ideals. While internal conflict is a major source of painful states, reality factors also play a part. **Every child is constantly being faced with situations that create discrepancies between actual and ideal states of the self**, but some children experience these discrepancies to a far greater degree than others when they are exposed to special external circumstances. It is clear that the progressive movement towards adequate appreciation of, and adaptation to, reality must involve the relinquishing of ideals that are no longer appropriate to present reality — reality-dystonic ideal shapes of the self, so to speak. We have made use of the term "individuation" to describe the gradual development of increasingly reality-adapted ideals in the growing child, together with the giving up of infantile ideals and dependence on external objects for supplies of well-being. This does not mean that we regard individuation as synonymous with development, but rather as an important adaptational aspect of it. However, previous ideal shapes of the self are not always readily abandoned, and will often show their influence in the content of new ideals. **If the child is not able to make the necessary progressive modifications in the shape of his ideal self, he may well turn towards ideal states that have been satisfactory in the past, and that he can attain in reality or in fantasy. This is an important aspect of the regressive processes that we can observe in the course of normal and pathological development**, and that subserve purposes of adaptation. **Individuation is essentially an outcome of processes in the ego, and successful individuation is a fundamental component in the child's development towards psychological maturity.** It is in part determined by drive progression, and the correlated establishment in the representational world of what can be called "phase-adequate ideal states" appropriate to the new development level. A further factor influencing individuation is the well-being that results from social recognition and approval - a factor that continues to operate when superego introjection has taken place and the child is able to obtain so-called "narcissistic supplies" from internal as well as external sources (Chapter 3). A third, and extremely important factor in individuation, is the effect on the child of the maturation, development, and consolidation of autonomous (primary and secondary) ego functions. The attractions offered by the child's new potentialities and experiences enable him to relinquish his attachment to previous ideal states, and to strive towards attaining the well-being offered by new ideals created by processes of maturation and by the move forward into a fresh developmental phase. "Pleasure in function" and "mastery pleasure" play an important part here, as well as the pleasure from direct drive discharge and the affective gains that can ensue from the capacity to identify with admired objects (especially parents and older siblings). The child attaches a "feeling cathexis of value" to his newly acquired achievements, and the alteration in his ideal self enables him to achieve a unity of actual and ideal self through independent activities. **We consider individuation to be a line of development that continues throughout life**, and while failures in early development may make later individuation difficult (and similarly, early failures in individuation may later affect various lines of development), the growing individual is constantly confronted with situations (particularly crisis situations and developmental transitions) which require further processes of individuation. These situations give rise to mental pain, and individuation appears to be the most adaptive response to such pain. The capacity for progressive individuation varies in different individuals; the capacity for "distancing" (Chapter 11) and the capacity to dis-invest object representations and to invest feelings in activities and interests appear to be important factors. While, from the point of view of the ego, individuation is the most adaptive response to pain, from the side of the drives, the normal response to pain is aggression directed at whatever is considered to be the source of the pain. However, if the child does not go on to individuate, he may remain as a miserable, unhappy, unsettled, and discontented child who shows a chronic feeling of resentment towards himself or towards those whom he feels are responsible for his lack of satisfaction. In these formulations, there is a qualitative difference between the systems id and ego. The demands of the drives (which can be regarded as stimuli arising from an internal source) give rise to feeling states within the ego, states that include a particular feeling quality of pain or unpleasure. Reduction in drive tension (so-called drive discharge) is accompanied by pleasurable feeling states and is normally followed by a positive feeling state of well-being. The control that the ego can exert on the instinctual drives is instigated and regulated by the ego's awareness of changes in its representational world. Ideational content is always linked, however tenuous this may on occasion be, with feelings of one sort or another, and ultimately it is always the feeling state, existing in the present or anticipated, that is the criterion upon which the ego bases its adaptive maneuvers. In speaking of the adaptive and progressive process of individuation, we have referred to the "giving up" of earlier ideals and ideal self-object relationships, and although we qualified this by saying that earlier ideals are not always readily abandoned and show their influence in later ideals, a further qualification or modification of this statement is necessary. In a paper on the concept of persistence (Chapter 14), we put forward the view that structures (and this includes the structures of the representational world) are not lost in the course of development. This would imply that the content of earlier shapes of the self or of self-object relationships can be seen as adaptive solutions that are never lost. It is possible to regard the mental apparatus as having developed as a superordinate control system responsible for the very characteristics of behavior that such writers as Hartmann and Rapaport, as well as Holt (1965) have described as ego autonomy. The regulatory basis of the psychological control system, as distinct from the anatomical-physiological one, in our view, based on the maintenance of a dynamic feeling homeostasis. Feelings within the ego, including variations in the basic feeling of well-being, are not determined solely by stimuli arising from the instinctual drives nor by stimuli from the external world, although it is true that an imbalance of one or another source will affect feeling states. Changes in feeling states are, as we see it, the impetus to the development of psychological structure. Earlier in this paper, we spoke of the distinction between the criteria for development and adaptation on the one hand and the structures and functions involved. Changes in the feeling state and in the representations associated with these changes provide the impetus for the development of psychological structures and represents the ultimate basis for the ego's regulatory activities. We mentioned ego autonomy earlier as being closely related to adaptation, and this can be seen to have a close relation to internal conscious or unconscious feeling states. **Ego autonomy can be regarded as the individual's freedom to explore and to find new solutions without suffering intolerable disruption of the internal feeling state of well-being or safety.** In a sense, the degree of autonomy is a reflection of the range of ways and means that the person has been able to find during the course of his development to maintain his basic feelings of well-being and safety in the face of superimposed disruption of his feeling state arising from any source, from the drives, from the superego, or from the external world. Of particular relevance is the degree to which the individual can explore different solutions in the trial actions that constitute thought, while still maintaining a minimum level of well-being and then to base appropriate action on the basis of this exploration in thought and in imagination. Moreover, a high degree of ego autonomy would imply a capacity to divorce the maintenance of the basic feeling tone from stereotyped and automatic responses to either drive or reality demands. There are many directions in which this conception can be explored and expanded. One of these relates to the question of autonomy from the standards and ideals of the superego introject. Another relates to the degree of freedom that the individual can attain from infantile ideals. Changes in the ego's basic feeling state may be gross or may be restricted to signals (as in the anxiety signal,

or other painful signals, or signals of well-being, or of sensual or other pleasures). Implicit in this is the notion that even the most refined and abstract intellectual representations have feeling signals attached to them. We would reiterate that the apparatuses that the ego constructs during the course of its maturation and development are prompted in their development ultimately by the need to control feelings and that their principle role is to widen the tolerable range of conscious or unconscious experiences without unduly disrupting the basic feeling tone of safety, well-being, or security. In conclusion we would note that the model, presented here is an intrapsychic one. As such, it provides a basis for uniting a general theory of adaptation with a fully psychoanalytic point of view. Indeed, its essence is that psychoanalytic psychology is a psychology of adaptation to changes in feeling states, and that any particular aspect of the theory of adaptation (e.g., adaptation to the demands of the drives, or to the external environment) can be encompassed within the framework of the wider model." (pg. 230-234)

▪ Chapter 16 - Towards a Basic Psychoanalytic Model (pg. 235)

- "The realm of subjective experience refers to the experience of the phenomenal content of wishes, impulses, memories, fantasies, sensations, percepts, feelings, and the like. All we "know," we know only through such subjective phenomenal representations, which may vary widely in content, quality, and intensity. Having said this, we would add immediately that experiential content of any sort, including feelings, can be either conscious or un-conscious. Implicit in this is the view that the individual may know "his own experiential content outside consciousness, that ideas can be experienced and feelings felt outside conscious awareness; and that he does not know that he unconsciously "knows." All this makes necessary the conceptualization of the existence of what we can call a representational "field" or "screen" upon which content can appear and be assessed. And, we would stress again, this content may or may not possess the quality of consciousness. In sharp contrast is the "nonexperiential realm." This is the realm of forces and energies; of mechanisms and apparatuses; of organized structures, both biological and psychological; of sense organs and means of discharge. The nonexperiential realm is intrinsically unknowable, except insofar as it can become known through the creation or occurrence of a phenomenal event in the realm of subjective experience. From this point of view the whole of the mental apparatus is in the nonexperiential realm, capable of becoming known to us (only to a limited extent) via subjective experiences of one sort or another. It follows that the dimension or antithesis of consciousness-unconsciousness should only be applied to the realm of experience and not to the nonexperiential realm." (pg. 241)
- "The view of adaptation taken here implies that the experiences are constantly being aroused that disrupt the person's basic feeling state, and that the aim, function, or purpose of adaptation is to maintain a basic stability of the central feeling state." (pg. 246)
- "All external stimuli act by arousing, in one way or another, internal signals that are the internal representations of the external world. It an external situation is to acquire meaning and significance, its internal conscious or unconscious perceptual representation must acquire that meaning. Changes in the external world and the instinctual drives arouse associated sensorimotor representations that are see left-hand side of Fig. 16.2) fragmentary and chaotic, being linked by primary process functioning. Their experiential aspects are scanned, processed, modified, checked, organized, and "censored" before they are allowed to reach consciousness or motor discharge." (pg. 249)
- "The id can be conceived of as lying in both experiential and nonexperiential realms. The instinctual forces and stimuli belong to the latter, as do the structures that they activate and that would, if their activity were permitted to proceed unhindered, reduce feelings of tension and yield primitive instinctual pleasures. In the experiential realm, the subjective ideational and feeling experiences associated with the process of direct drive discharge are aroused towards the left of Fig. 16.2), and represent the "seething cauldron" of feelings and wishes. These experiential representations give rise to warning signals, and inhibiting structures are called into play, in turn modifying the content of experience. Thus the id represents, as Rapaport has put it, "peremptory aspects of behavior". In contrast, the ego refers to aspects related to delay (Rapaport, 1959, p. 5). Thus id and ego are aspects of the total apparatus. The "superego" is a concept relating to a special aspect of the functioning of the apparatus. It consists of those structures that have evolved during the course of progressive adaptations that present guiding standards to the individual and are made use of to the degree to which they provide positive feelings of gratification, well-being, and safety by creating an unconscious illusion of the presence and love of authority figures. In return for this, the individual accepts all sorts of restrictions on his wishes and behavior. If he disregards them, he experiences special forms of anxiety (eg, guilt, see Chapter 3). Thus the "superego introjects" are organizations within the non-experiential realm. They give rise to special subjective representations (ideals, "self-I-ought-to-be," etc.), that act as guides or goals in the realm of conscious or unconscious experience. In essence, the superego is a system that provides warning, threatening, but also in some way reassuring feeling signals of a particular sort and has an ongoing function in the "here-and-now." We believe that the adaptational point of view of superego development and functioning allows us further insight into those situations in which superego changes are said to occur (e.g., in psychoanalytic therapy, group situations, etc.), and into the relation between the concepts of superego and ego ideal (Chapter 6)." (pg. 251)

▪ Chapter 17 - Psychoanalytic Psychology and Learning Theory (pg. 255)

- "...the concept of the representational world...can be regarded as the whole complex of mental representations of inner wishes, feelings, memories, percepts, and symbols. One specialized part of the representational world is that which contains the representations of what is external to the individual; another refers to the representation of the person himself (his self-representation); and other areas relate to images with various symbolic meanings. The representations of words and mathematical symbols are prime examples of this last, and form a substantial part of the representational content of normal thinking. Further, the representation of what is outside is never an exact reflection of what we assume to be actually outside the person concerned. His perceptions are structured and colored by what has gone before and by his own (conscious or unconscious) wishes and desires. Essential to the representational world are the many organized schemata that the individual constructs during the course of his development and that form the background frame of reference to all current processes of perception, imagining, remembering, feeling, and thinking. The representational world in all the different aspects of its organization is constantly influenced by stimuli arising both from within and without the individual, and new schemata are constantly being created as new perceptual and conceptual solutions are being found. These schemata form the basis for future attempts at adaptation (in the sense in which we have used the term) and problem solving, although they may in turn be modified by experience." (pg. 258)
- "Structures are essentially unknowable and exist outside consciousness. They can only become known to us indirectly through the formation of an ideational representation - in which case what we know is not the structure itself but its mental representation. In general, a structure can be defined as a relatively permanent organization or an organization with a relatively slow rate of change." (pg. 259)
- "(1) Learning can be defined as progressive structural modification. If we take the view that no structure is ever lost, then unlearning, or extinction, would imply a process of inhibition. This allows us to explain both the reappearance of extinguished responses in experimental learning situations and the clinical phenomenon of regression. (2) The elements that become linked in processes of learning are not stimulus and response but rather one ideomotor representation and another. Such learning can occur outside consciousness, but learning only takes place through (conscious or unconscious) changes in the experiential content of the individual's representational world. (3) The reinforcing agents in the linking of one ideomotor representation with another are changes in feeling states. Gaining pleasure leads to reinforcement, as does the avoidance of pain or un-pleasure, but dominant over this is the process of increasing or maintaining the safety feeling. (4) There is a process of scanning of the unconscious area of the representational world; in other words, of evaluating the ideomotor representations in terms of the feeling states or feeling signals as sociated with them. This occurs extremely rapidly, and a representation is normally only permitted discharge if the feeling state that accompanies it is not too disruptive of safety and well-being. (5) Some structures may evolve in order to solve ongoing inner conflict. But they may persist and be utilized in order to maintain safety feeling even though the original impulses that entered into their formation are no longer operative in the same way. It is likely that the latter structures are those that are most amenable to change through behavior therapy. Thus a neurotic symptom (and the structures that

subserve it) may be directed towards solving, for example, an ongoing conflict between an instinctual wish and the internal (superego) standards of the individual. But it may equally function at a later date as a method of producing safety feeling, and if other methods of providing safety feeling are available, then a different and more comfortable solution may be created and utilized, and the employment of the older symptom structure inhibited. (6) Although the processes of adaptation described above have an immediate "here-and-now" quality, the capacity to manipulate trial actions in thought (as is evident in man) within or outside consciousness and to assess the feeling signals associated with these trial ideomotor representations leads to the function of anticipation and prediction through thought. This, in turn, provides a further dimension to the learning process." (pg. 262-263)

- Chapter 18 - Theoretical and Clinical Aspects of Transference (pg. 264)
 - See text
- Chapter 19 - The Role of Affects in Psychoanalytic Theory (pg. 285)
 - See text
- Chapter 20 - Varieties of "Aggression Turned Against the Self" (pg. 298)
 - See text
- Chapter 21 - The Psychoanalytic Concept of Orality (pg. 301)
 - See text

c. Further Readings:

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