Object Relations Theory and Clinical Psychoanalysis, by O. Kernberg

a. Quotes:
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b. General Notes:
   - Chapter 1 - Structural Derivatives of Object Relations (pg. 19)
     - "What follows is a tentative model linking the mechanisms of internalization of object relations, on the one hand, with the vicissitudes of instinctual drive derivatives and of ego formation, on the other. In summary, I formulate the following main propositions: (1) **Introjections, identifications, and ego identity are three levels of the process of internalization of object relations in the psychic apparatus**; all three will be referred to comprehensively as identification systems. All these processes of internalization bring about psychic precipitates or structures for which we will use exactly the same term as for the respective mechanism. Introjection, for example, will be considered to be both a process of the psychic apparatus and, as a result of that process, a structure. (2) All these processes of internalization consist of three basic components: (a) **object-images or object-representations, (b) self-images or self-representations, and (c) drive derivatives or dispositions to specific affective states**. (3) Organization of identification systems takes place first at a basic level of ego functioning in which splitting is the crucial mechanism for the defensive organization of the ego. Later a second, advanced level of defensive organization of the ego is reached at which repression replaces splitting as the central mechanism. (4) The degree of ego, as well as superego, integration and development depends on the degree to which repression and its allied mechanisms have replaced splitting and its allied mechanisms " (pg. 25-26)
     - "**Introjection is the earliest, most primitive, and basic level in the organization of internalization processes. It is the reproduction and fixation of an interaction with the environment by means of an organized cluster of memory traces** implying at least three components: (i) the image of an object, (i) the image of the self in interaction with that object, and (iii) the affective coloring of both the object-image and the self-image under the influence of the drive representative present at the time of the interaction. This process is a mechanism of growth of the psychic apparatus, and it is also used for defensive purposes by the ego. **Introjection, then, depends on perception and memory** (that is, on apparatuses of primary autonomy), but it transcends these not only by a complex and specific organization of perceptions and memory traces but also by linking "external" perception with the perception of primitive affect states representing drive derivatives. In the earliest introjections, object and self-image are not yet differentiated from each other (Jacobson, 1964), and the definition of introjection suggested really corresponds to a somewhat later stage in which successive differentiations, refusions, and redifferentiations of the self- and object-images have finally crystallized into clearly delimited components. The "reciprocal smiling response" at around three months of age that Spitz (1965) has described and considered an indicator of the first organizer of the psyche, probably corresponds to this crystallization. The affective coloring of the introjection is an essential aspect of it and represents the active valence of the introjection, which determines the fusion and organization of introjections of similar valences. Thus, introjections taking place under the positive valence of libidinal instinctual gratification, as in loving mother-child contact, tend to fuse and become organized in what has been called somewhat loosely but suggestively "the good internal object." Introjections taking place under the negative valence of aggressive drive derivatives tend to fuse with similar negative valence introjections and become organized in the "bad internal objects." In the process of the fusion of introjections of the same valence, homologous components of introjection tend to fuse, self-image with other self-images and object-image with other object-images. Since by this fusion more elaborate self-images and object-images are being "mapped out," this process contributes to the differentiation of self and object and to the delimitation of ego boundaries. This, in turn, further organizes and integrates the apparatuses of perception and memory; thus, later introjections contain an ever growing complexity of information about both the object and the self in any particular interaction. **Identification is a higher-level form of introjection** which can only take place when the perceptive and cognitive abilities of the child have increased to the point that it can recognize the role aspects of interpersonal interaction. Role implies the presence of a socially recognized function that is being carried out by the objector by both participants in the interaction. For example, when mother does something with the child (such as helping it to get dressed), she is not only interacting with it but also actualizing in a certain way the socially accepted role of mother (giving clothes, protecting, teaching). Also, the affective component of identification is of a more elaborate and modified character than that characteristic of introjection because of the moderating effects of various developing ego apparatuses and the decrease in splitting mechanisms, to which we will return. The psychic derivatives of drives, as they enter into object relations, are integrated into identifications as well as into introjections, and, in more general terms, it is suggested that the original penetration of the psychic apparatus with drive derivatives is achieved through these internalization processes. The cluster of memory traces implicit in identification comprises then: (i) the image of an object adopting a role in an interaction with the self, (ii) the image of the self more clearly differentiated from the object than in the case of introjection (and possibly playing a complementary role), and (iii) an affective coloring of the interaction of a more differentiated, less intense quality than in the case of introjection. Identification is also considered to be a mechanism of growth of the psychic apparatus which may be used for defensive purposes, and identifications fuse in a way similar to introjections. Actually, introjections form the core of similar, related identifications. Since identifications imply the internalization of roles as defined above, behavioral manifestations of the individual, which express one or both of the reciprocal roles of the respective interaction, become a predominant result of identification; the behavioral manifestations of introjections are less apparent in interpersonal interactions. The child learns his own, at first more passively experienced roles as part of his self-image component of the identification. He also learns mother's roles (as part of mother's object-image) and may at some time re-enact those roles. Long-term storage and organization are typical of role actualization in ego identity. Identifications ordinarily first appear during the last few months of the first year but become fully developed only during the second year of life. Behavior manifestations of the child which are imitative of mother's behavior are indicators of the matrix of identifications. Ego identity represents the highest level in the organization of internalization processes, and Erikson's (1956) conceptualization is followed here closely. **Ego identity refers to the overall organization of identifications and introjections under the guiding principle of the synthetic function of the ego**. This organization implies: (1) a consolidation of ego structures connected with a sense of continuity of the self (the self being the organization of the self-image components of introjections and identifications) to which the child's perception of its functioning in all areas of its life and its progressive sense of mastering the basic adaptational tasks contribute significantly (Murphy, 1964); (2) a consistent, overall conception of the "world of objects" derived from the organization of the object-image components of introjections and identifications and a sense of consistency in one's own interpersonal interactions, the behavioral aspects-that is, general consistency in the behavior patterns-being even more important aspects of ego identity than those of identifications; and (3) a recognition of this consistency in interactions as characteristic of the individual by his interpersonal environment and, in turn, the perception by the individual of this recognition by the environment ("confirmation"). There is one important difference between ego identity and the subordinate processes of introjection and identification. Introjections and identifications are structures of the psychic apparatus in general, and I shall mention direct introjection into the superego later on, and also refer to introjection when talking about the organization of the id. Ego identity, by contrast, is a structure characteristic of the ego, a fundamental outcome of the synthetic function of the ego. Ego identity also represents that specialized part of the ego which has awareness of and control over those drive derivatives which determine by their organization the modified matrix of affect dispositions available to the ego (I shall refer later on to one aspect of how affect modification is achieved)." (pg. 29-32)

- "Nevertheless, by far the greater part of internalized object-images is normally integrated into higher level structures, and those which remain as object-representations experience important modifications over the years under the influence of ego growth and later object relations. The normal outcome of identity formations is that primitive identifications are gradually replaced by selective, partial, sublimatory identifications in which only those aspects of object relations are internalized which are in harmony with the individual identity formation. Actually, the enrichment of one's personal life by the internal presence of such selective, partial identifications representing people who are loved and admired in a realistic way without indiscriminate internalization constitutes a major source of emotional depth and well-being. The normal process of individualization is marked by the shift from identifications to partial, sublimated identifications under the influence of a well-integrated ego identity. One might say that depersonification of internalized object relations, reshaping of part of them so that they come to resemble more the real objects, and individualization are closely related processes (Ticho, 1965). The world of object representations, then, gradually changes and comes closer to the "external" perceptions of the reality of significant objects throughout childhood and later life without ever becoming an actual copy of the environmental world. **Intrapsychic "confirmation" is the ongoing process of reshaping the world of object representations under the influence of the reality principle, of ego maturation and development, and through cycles of projection and introjection.** The persistence of "nonmetabolized" early introjections is the outcome of a pathological fixation of severely disturbed, early object relations, a fixation which is intimately related to the pathological development of splitting. Splitting, in turn, interferes with the integration of self- and object-images and the depersonification of internalized object relations in general. Under these pathological circumstances, early nonintegrated object-images come to the surface; but even then, as is being stressed throughout this chapter, we never do have "free-floating" internal objects but always confront specific ego structures into which they have crystallized." (pg. 33-34)

- "Intense "negative" affect states related to aggressive drive derivatives create perceptual constellations entirely different from those generated by intense "positive" affect states under the influence of libidinal strivings in external circumstances that are not too different. This overwhelming nature of early affective states is the cause of the valence of the introjection and of the kind of fusion and organization which will take place involving it. Introjections with positive valence and those with negative valence are thus kept completely apart. They are kept apart at first simply because they happen separately and because of the ego's incapacity to integrate introjections not activated by similar valences, but then gradually, in response to anxiety, because of the ego's active use of this separation for defensive purposes. This is actually the origin of splitting as a mechanism of defense. Introjections, the earliest form of identification systems, may be considered as precipitants around which ego nuclei consolidate." (pg. 35)
- "At what point does the ego come into existence? Certain ego structures, and functions connected with them, exist from the beginning of life: perception, the capacity to establish memory traces, and the other functions just mentioned. These are essentially functions of the primary autonomous apparatuses (Hartmann, 1939). On the other hand, the capacity to establish introjections represents a higher level of inborn capacity, intimately linked with the "perceptualization" of drive derivatives. It is suggested that the ego as a differentiated psychic structure, in the sense of Freud's (1923) description, comes about at the point when introjections are used for defensive purposes, specifically in an early defensive organization against overwhelming anxiety." (pg. 35)
    - "The first ego state is probably one in which the "good internal objects" (the early positive introjections with mostly undifferentiated and fused self- and object-images) and the "good external objects" (such reality aspects of external objects which are really "part-objects') constitute the earliest defensive organization of the ego (the "purified pleasure ego"), while all negative introjections are "ejected" (Jacobson, 1964) and considered "not me." One might also say that by the act of this ejection "me" is established (Sandler, personal communication). Later, under the influence of maturing perception, motor control, and memory organization, when external objects come to be differentiated more from the internal psychic world, a typical tripartite situation exists: (i) the ego is organized around the positive introjections ("good internal object"); (ii) a positive, libido-invested aspect of reality is acknowledged as "external reality" in intimate relation with the ego, and self-and object-images are being differentiated in this interaction; (ili) an entity of "bad external objects," representing both realistically frustrating or threatening external objects and the projected, negative, early introjections completes the picture. This active separation by the ego of positive and negative introjections, which implies a complete division of the ego and, as a consequence, of external reality as well, is, in essence, the defensive mechanism of splitting. In the earliest stage of the ego when active splitting operations start, the ego only presents fused positive introjections, within which object-and self-images are also fused, and early "positive part-objects." There is as yet no ego boundary between the positive external part-objects and their mental representations. Negative introjections (within which self- and object-images, internal and external objects are also fused) are ejected, and active splitting keeps the purified pleasure ego dissociated from the "not me." At the later stage which we have mentioned, reality is more acknowledged by the ego, both in the awareness of the difference between good external "part-objects" and good object representations, and in the growing separation within the ego of object- and self-images. This stage also implies the beginning delimitations of ego boundaries in the area of positive object relations, the beginning of reality testing. Splitting is now maximally present and permits the complete projection of negative introjections ("bad internal objects") onto the outside. Introjection is now also used as a defensive mechanism in that an intensification of positive interactions, the development of dependent strivings, takes place not only in relation to libidinal drive derivatives but also as a protection against anxiety and helplessness, especially when these are increased by the fear of projected, bad external objects. Spitz's (1965) description of the "eighth-month anxiety" that appears when the child is approached by a stranger explains this reaction as a consequence of the infant's now being able to differentiate his mother from other people and the infant's interpreting the situation as an indication that mother has left him. It may well be that this specific anxiety is also related to the mechanism of splitting, to the defensive use of mother's "good" image as a protection against fear of (projected) bad external objects, the "stranger." **Splitting as an active defensive process can come into existence only after introjections have fully developed.** Splitting processes probably begin around the third and fourth month of life, reach a maximum between the sixth and twelfth months, and gradually disappear in the second and early part of the third year. In summary, the maturation and development of primary ego apparatuses give rise, at one point, to **introjections**, which in turn **become an essential organizer of what is going to be the ego as an integrated structure**. After some development of introjections as psychic structures, a point is reached when introjections are actively kept apart or split for defensive purpose. Now **the ego as a centralizing, synthetic function** (in the sense of overall organizational purpose) **and as a definite organizational structure comes into existence**. Thus, **introjections, the earliest point of convergence of object relations and instinctual drive representatives, may be visualized as an essential "switch" bringing the ego into operational readiness.** Later development of all ego structures and functions then contributes to the development of the specific ego structures which we have called identification systems. These ultimately determine ego identity, the highest level of the ego's synthetic functions. The mechanism of splitting may be considered an outgrowth of what was primarily a "physiological" lack of integrative capacity in the psychic apparatus. It becomes an essential defensive operation of the early ego, and splitting in this regard is splitting of the global, poorly differentiated ego. Later on, however, splitting becomes a mechanism especially involved in the organization and in the pathology of identification systems, the object relations-determined structures of the ego (that is, the self, the representational world, and ego identity in general). In these later stages of development, the integrity of the ego is less interfered with by splitting mechanisms; secondary autonomy is partially maintained even with severe regression and with splitting of the self and the representational world. By contrast, excessive, pathological early splitting threatens the integrity of the ego at that point and also the future developmental capacity of the ego as a whole. It has to be stressed that in the active keeping apart of introjections of opposite valence, what is split is not only affect states of the ego but also object-images and self-images. Excessive, pathological splitting, therefore, interferes not only with the integration of affects but also with integration of the self and with the

development of the representational world. Because of the fundamental importance of early introjections in the organization and integration of the ego as a whole, pathological splitting carries over into splitting of the ego as an organization." (pg. 36-38)

- "The fusion of positive and negative introjections implies a fusion and concomitant modification of their affect components. The irradiating effect of purely positive and purely negative affective states diminishes, and the mutual compenetration of libidinal and aggressive drive derivatives fosters a broader spectrum of affect dispositions of the ego. This development, essential for normal psychic growth, also triggers off an additional development of the intra-psychic life: the image of an ideal self representing the striving for reparation of guilt and for the reestablishment of an ideal, positive relationship between self and object. The image of an ideal object which represents the unharmed, all-loving, all-forgiving object completes the picture Jacobson, 1964; Sandler et al., 1963). Anxiety constitutes a basic motive for defensive operations of the ego at all levels of development. Guilt feelings, an ego state arising under the influence of the fusion of identification systems of opposite valences and the real self/ideal self tensions which originate in this process, later become the typical motive of defense prompted by superego demands. In other words, the superego uses the capacity of the ego for experiencing guilt for its own purposes." (pg. 40)
- "From here on, synthetic processes show an accelerated development. Integrative processes combining all kinds of introjections and identifications into the ego identity take place, and this expands and solidifies all structures of the ego. Ego boundaries are further delimited, and the ego extends its centralized control over perception and motility. "Pockets" of intolerable, severely negative introjections are dissociated from the ego core and lose their previous free access to perception and motility: from now on, negative introjections may be directly repressed. It is suggested that this consolidation of the ego establishes repression as the central defensive operation, in contrast to the splitting of the earlier ego. In fact, this developmental step brings about a fundamental difference between early and later ego development, and I will come back to a discussion of splitting and repression as two basic mechanisms of ego defense at different levels of development and the energic conditions related to this change. The continuing processes of introjection and projection now also permit the internalization of previously feared, dangerous, frustrating objects (especially prohibitive parental images), and fusion takes place between these introjected prohibitive parental images and the guilt-determined ideal objects which were mentioned above. The product of this fusion is partly integrated into the ego and partly repressed, and these nuclei of fused ideal object/prohibitive parental images constitute forerunners of the superego. **Fusions between the ideal self and the ideal objects come to constitute the ego ideal** (jacobson, 1964), again part of which is integrated into the ego and part of which is repressed and synthesized like other forerunners of the superego and later contributes with them to the definite formation of the superego. At this point, a change occurs in the patterns of growth of the ego through the development and integration of identification systems. Henceforth, drive derivatives entering the psychic apparatus are partially repressed before they penetrate the ego core, and become directly part of the rejected identification systems which constitute the dynamic unconscious in its definite form. On the other hand,. intense guilt feelings, derived from the tensions between self and ideal self and from the "prohibitive parent/ideal object" pressures on the ego, may be projected onto the outside and reintrojected directly into the superego. Guilt is projected in the form of accusations or threats attributed to parental figures, and this projection determines the reinforcement of introjection of prohibitive parental images into the superego." (pg. 41-42)
- "**Splitting, it has been suggested here, is a mechanism characteristic of the first stages of development of the ego. It grows out of the naturally occurring lack of integration of the first introjections and is used as a defensive mechanism to protect positive introjections, thereby indirectly fostering ego growth. Splitting consists in dissociating or actively maintaining apart identification systems with opposite valences (conflicting identification systems) without regard to access to consciousness or to perceptual or motor control.** The drive derivative attains full emotional, ideational, and motor consciousness but is completely separated from other segments of the conscious psychic experience. In other terms, in the process of splitting, the ego protects itself against anxiety connected with early intrapsychic conflicts (represented by conflicts between introjections of opposite valences) by a regressive nucleation. As stated before, splitting is typically a mechanism of the early ego in which identification systems have not crystallized into higher organizations such as the self or the representational world, but it can persist pathologically at higher levels of ego organization." (pg. 44)
- "**Repression, by contrast, is a central defensive mechanism of the ego at a later stage and consists in the rejection of an impulse or its ideational representation**, or both, from the conscious ego. Just as splitting, at a more primitive level of development, is reinforced by projection, denial, and other typical primitive defenses, repression, on its higher level of ego development, is reinforced by mechanisms such as isolation, displacement, and other typical neurotic or normal defensive operations. **Repression consolidates and protects the core of the ego and contributes crucially to the delimitation of ego boundaries.** At the time when splitting properly prevailed, and, under pathological conditions, when it continues to do so over the years, the ego protects itself against anxiety by a defensive nucleation, which necessarily exacts a high price in regard to the ego's synthetic functions and reality testing. After repression has become predominant and in the less severe forms of psychopathology (mainly the neuroses and moderate character disorders), the ego protects itself against the anxiety connected with intolerable conflicts by eliminating these conflicts from consciousness. Repression is thus a much more effective defensive operation, but it requires strong counter-cathexes because, unlike splitting, it is characterized by the blocking of discharge (Sandler, personal communication)." (pg. 45)
- "**Splitting, then, is a fundamental cause of ego weakness.** Since splitting also requires less counter-cathexis than repression, a weak ego falls back easily on splitting, and a vicious circle is created by which ego weakness and splitting reinforce each other." (pg. 46)

- Chapter 2 - Normal and Pathological Development (pg. 55)
  - "In Chapter 1, I suggested **two general levels of ego organization (centering, respectively, on the mechanisms of splitting and repression) and proposed that primitive units of affect state, object-representation, and self-representation constitute the basis of later structuring of internalized object relations.** I reexamined the concepts of introjection, identification, and ego identity from this viewpoint and, using these formulations, outlined a tentative developmental model." (pg. 55)
  - "In broadest terms, **psychoanalytic object-relations theory represents the psychoanalytic study of the nature and origin of interpersonal relations, and of the nature and origin of intrapsychic structures deriving from, fixating, modifying, and reactivating past internalized relations with others in the context of present interpersonal relations. Psychoanalytic object-relations theory focuses upon the internalization of interpersonal relations, their contribution to normal and pathological ego and superego developments, and the mutual influences of intrapsychic and interpersonal object relations**. This broad definition may be narrowed down in three, progressively more restricted ways. (1) Object-relations theory may refer to the general theory of the structures in the mind which preserve interpersonal experiences and the mutual influences between these intrapsychic structures and the overall vicissitudes of expression of instinctual needs in the psychosocial environment. In this broad definition, psychoanalytic object-relations theory would include all the vicissitudes of the relationship between the intrapsychic and the interpersonal fields. One might even say that psychoanalysis as a general theory constitutes an object-relations theory. This would make a distinct theory of object-relations within psychoanalysis unnecessary, except, perhaps, as a general focus or approach occupying an intermediate ground between psychoanalytic metapsychology proper (Rapaport and Gill, 1959) and clinical analyses of normal and pathological functioning. Psychoanalytic object-relations theory, thus defined, has been referred to as a "middle language" between the metapsychological and the clinical ones (Mayman, personal communication, 1963). Two recent significant overviews of psychoanalytic object-relations theory have used this broad conceptualization, integrating it with contemporary ego psychology. I am referring to *Aspects of Internalization* by Schafer (1968) and *Object Love and Reality* by Modell (1968). Schafer's book presents probably the most comprehensive analysis to date of identification processes from an ego psychological viewpoint, and Modell stresses the importance of the vicissitudes of internalized object relations in the examination of borderline and psychotic conditions. (2) Object-relations

theory can also refer to a more restricted approach within psychoanalytic metapsychology stressing the buildup of dyadic or bipolar intrapsychic representations (self- and object-images) as reflections of the original infant-mother relationship and its later development into dyadic, triangular, and multiple internal and external interpersonal relationships. This second, more restricted definition of object-relations theory stresses the simultaneous buildup of the "self" (a composite structure derived from the integration of multiple self-images) and of object-representations (or "internal objects" derived from the integration of multiple object-images into more comprehensive representations of others). The terminology for these "self" and object" components varies from author to author, but what is important is the essentially dyadic or bipolar nature of the internalization within which each unit of self-and object-image is established in a particular affective context. In this conceptualization, **the self-object-affect "units" are primary determinants of the overall structures of the mind (id, ego and superego)**. Authors who adopt this approach deal with the questions this structural model raises regarding the interrelationships of instincts, affects, and object relations in various ways. This second definition of psychoanalytic object-relations theory implies, in contrast to the first one, a more circumscribed approach to psychoanalytic metapsychology, but includes authors with very different viewpoints regarding instinct theory, structural models of the mind, and treatment approaches. It encompasses the ego psychological approaches of Erikson (1956), Jacobson (1964), and Mahler (1968); the British schools of Fairbairn 1952), Winnicott (1955, 1960, 1963), Bowlby (1969), and Melanie Klein (1934, 1940, 1946); to some extent, Harry Stack Sullivan (1953); and the exploration of psychoanalytic theories by Talcott Parsons (1964a, 1964b). (3) A still more restricted definition of psychoanalytic object-relations theory limits the term to the specific approach of the so-called "British psychoanalytic school" of Melanie Klein and Fairbairn and approaches related to Fairbairn's, such as those of Winnicott (1955, 1963], Wisdom (1963, 1971], Guntrip (1961, 1971), and Sutherland [1963]). This has been the ordinary understanding of object-relations theory, and it has traditionally been counterposed to contemporary ego psychology. For theoretical and clinical reasons, I prefer the second definition. It limits itself to what is specific to object-relations theory within psychoanalytic theory at large and includes a common type of "unit of internalization" which permits relating the works of authors of different schools to one other. It also allows one to bring together findings and conceptualizations which at times have been artificially separated because of the difficulties of communication between various psychoanalytic groups. As I see it, object-relations theory, already implied in Freud's writings, transcends any particular psychoanalytic school or group and represents a general psychoanalytic development to which authors of very different orientations have contributed significantly. The term "object" in object-relations theory should more properly be "human object" since it reflects the traditional use of this term in psychoanalytic metapsychology for relations with others. To counter the occasional misunderstandings in psychoanalytic literature which consider object-relations as examining only interpersonal relations, it needs to be stressed that psychoanalytic object-relations theory is particularly concerned with the intrapsychic field, the intrapsychic structures representing the primary dyadic relationship which later expands in many directions. Psychoanalytic object-relations theory, as circumscribed in the second definition, represents, in my opinion, a major integrative framework which can link the psychosocial approach to and the subjective, experiential nature of human life, on the one hand, with the intrapsychic structures comprehended in general metapsychology, on the other. Having offered a definition and circumscribed the field of object-relations theory, I would now like to discuss the usefulness of this psychoanalytic approach. Object-relations theory has contributed significantly to: (a) our understanding of severe types of psycho-pathology, such as borderline conditions, psychoses, regressive types of character pathology with problems of identity, and chronic types of marital conflicts; (b) a better knowledge of ego and superego formations and their mutual relationships; (c) the clarification of various processes of internalization; (d) the psychoanalytic examination of small group processes; (e) and the discovery of a link between individual psychopathology and pathological group behavior. Object-relations theory has also raised new questions in the complex field of psychoanalytic instinct theory; and, as I suggested in an earlier paper (Kernberg, 1972), internalized object relations may be considered a crossroad where instinct and the social system meet and contribute crucially to the development of the personality of the individual. Finally, this approach focuses upon such special criteria for mental health and normality as: (1) the depth and stability of internal relations with others; (2) the tolerance of ambivalence toward loved objects; (3) the capacity for tolerating guilt and separation and for the working through of depressive crises; (4) the extent to which the self-concept is integrated; and (5) the extent to which behavior patterns correspond to the self-concept." (pg. 56-59)

- "In what follows I will outline a general theory of (1) the origin of the basic "units" (self-image, object-image, affect disposition) of internalized object relations, (2) the development of four basic stages in their differentiation and integration, (3) the relationship between failure in these developments and the crystallization of various types of psychopathology, and (4) the implications of this sequence of phases for general structural developments of the psychic apparatus. In order to present an integrated overview, I will repeat findings from earlier work. However, my main stress here will be on providing an integrative framework which will relate my work to that of various other authors. In the process I will illustrate the usefulness of psychoanalytic object-relations theory for a general developmental analysis and a structural theory of psychopathology. **Stage 1: Normal "Autism" or Primary Undifferentiated Stage.** This earliest stage of development precedes the consolidation of the "good" undifferentiated self-object constellation built up under the influence of pleasurable, gratifying experiences of the infant in interactions with his mother. This phase covers the first month of life, and a pathological arrest, failure or fixation of development at this stage would be reflected in the lack of development of the undifferentiated self-object image and the consequent incapacity to establish a normal "symbiotic" relationship with the mother—a condition characteristic of autistic psychosis (Mahler, 1968). Throughout this stage there is a gradual buildup of the normal, primary, undifferentiated self-object representation. **Stage 2: Normal "Symbiosis" or Stage of the Primary, Undifferentiated Self-Object Representations.** The consolidation of the pleasurable or rewarding or "good" self-object image signals the beginning of this stage, which extends from the second month of life to somewhere between the sixth and eighth months of age. This is the basic "good" self-object constellation, which will become the nucleus of the self system of the ego and the basic organizer of integrative functions of the early ego. I am including in this phase the symbiotic phase of development in the strict sense described by Mahler and the differentiation sub-phase of the separation-individuation process described by her (1971, 1972). The reasons for including the differentiation sub-phase in stage 2 of the development of internalized object relations are the relative incompleteness of the differentiation of self and object representations from each other and, more importantly, the persisting tendency for defensive regressive refusion of "good" self and object images when severe trauma or frustration determine pathological development of this stage. This is in contrast to later defensive organizations in which splitting mechanisms operate while boundaries between self- and object-images remain stable (borderline personality organization). Pathological fixation of or regression to stage 2 of development of internalized object relations is clinically characterized by the failure in—or loss of —the differentiation of ego boundaries, which is characteristic of symbiotic psychosis of childhood (Mahler, 1968), most types of adult schizophrenia (Jacobson, 1954), and depressive psychoses (Jacobson, 1966). Jacobson (1971) has proposed basic structural differences between depressive and schizophrenic psychoses. In the case of depressive psychosis, ego-superego boundaries are preserved in spite of the refusion of self- and object-images within the ego and the superego; in the case of schizophrenia, a more generalized refusion of self- and object-images takes place, with the disintegration of the overall psychic structures and the pathological fusion of fragments of self- and object-representations, so that fantastic, new units are created in the process. Stage 2 in the development of internalized object relations comes to an end when the self-image and the object-image have been differentiated in a stable way within the core "good" self-object representation. I mentioned before that the primary, undifferentiated "good" self-object representation is built up under the influence of pleasurable, gratifying experiences involving the infant and his mother. Simultaneously with the development of this "good" self-object representation, another primary, undifferentiated self-object representation is formed, integrating experiences of a frustrating, painful nature: the "bad" self-object representation, centering on a primitive, painful affective tone. It needs to be stressed that the "good" and the "bad" primary intrapsychic structures are organized separately under different affective circumstances, determining two separate constellations of "affective memory" (see also chapter 3)." (pg. 59-61)
  - "**Primitive affect, conceived as the earliest subjective experience of pleasure or unpleasure, thus constitutes the basic organizing element**

bringing together into a common memory trace fixating that experience the primitive perception of bodily states, of activated inborn behavior and the corresponding "external" (environmental) responses "mixed" with it. In short, various inborn physiological, behavioral, affective, and perceptive structures are internalized jointly as a first unit of intrapsychic structure. **Cognition and affect are thus two aspects of the same primary experience**. Although the neurophysiological structures responsible for affective experience and for (cognitive) storage capability of this experience are different, their integration in the earliest affective memory (Arnold, 1970a, 1970b) establishes, in my opinion, a common structure (pleasurable or un-pleasurable primitive experience) out of which cognition and affect will evolve in diverging directions. This has relevance for psychoanalytic instinct theory. Affects gradually differentiate in the context of the development of the undifferentiated self-object representations. The earliest undifferentiated pleasurable affects will evolve into more specific pleasure with oral satiation, excitement of various erotogenic zones, gratification of exploratory behavior, and, above all, with evolving interpersonal experiences (and their intrapsychic derivatives). The same is true with the primitive painful affects, which gradually evolve into anxiety, fear, and rage, as well as the more elaborate and toned down derived affects of the "unpleasure" series. Eventually, in stage 4 of development, when "good" and "bad" self- and object-images are integrated, more complex fusion of various affects will become possible, thereby fostering the higher level development of affects related to depression. Experiences which activate the gratifying self-object representation also activate attention and motivate learning; both gratification and limited frustration (which also activates attention and learning) contribute to gradual differentiation of the self components from the object components in the infant's perception of interaction with its mother. This gradual differentiation is powerfully supported by the maturation of primary autonomous ego functions such as perception and memory and by cognitive developments occurring in the context of the infant-mother relation. In contrast, excessive activation of the "bad" self-object representation under the influence of frustration or deprivation brings on generalized anxiety, whose disorganizing effect interferes with the early differentiation of self and object components. Later, efforts are made to "expel" the "bad" self-object experience, while the "good" self-object representation becomes the nucleus of the ego. The expelling of the "bad" self-object representation to the "periphery" of psychic experience originates a motivated conception of the "out there," but, as a more realistic exploration and perception of the external environment occurs in the context of self-object differentiation in the "good" self-object realm, the "bad" nucleus of self-experience is ascribed to "uncanny," disturbing, or frightening experiences and is subject to later projective mechanisms. Differentiation of the self and the object components of the undifferentiated "good" self-object representation probably begins in the third or fourth month of life and is probably completed between the sixth and the ninth month. The developmental series of "good" self-object representations become the intrapsychic structures originally invested with libido, while the series of "bad" self-object representations become those invested with aggression. From a clinical view-point, one might say that the evolving affect states and affect dispositions actualize, respectively, libidinal and aggressive drive derivatives. From a theoretical viewpoint, this formulation requires further examination of the relationship among psychoanalytic instinct theory, object-relations theory, and the role of affect states, a subject to which I will return in Chapter 3." (pg. 62-64)

- "**Stage 3: Differentiation of Self- from Object-Representations.** This stage begins with the completion of the differentiation of the self-representation from the object-representation within the core "good" self-object representation, and includes the later differentiation of self- from object-representation within the core "bad" self-object representation. It ends with the eventual integration of "good" and "bad" self-representations into an integrated self-concept, and the integration of "good" and "bad" object-representations into "total" object-representations, that is, the achievement of object constancy. This stage begins between the sixth and the eighth month of life and reaches completion between the eighteenth and the thirty-sixth month. This stage, with the exclusion of the differentiation sub-phase, corresponds roughly to the separation-individuation stage of development of Mahler (1972, 1973), who has also stressed that borderline conditions relate to pathological resolution of the rapproachment subphase of separation-individuation. The differentiation of self and object components determines, jointly with the general development of cognitive processes, the establishment of stable ego boundaries; there is not yet an integrated self or an integrated conception of other human beings (so that this is a stage of "part object-relations'). Pathological fixation and/or regression to this stage of development of internalized object relations determines borderline personality organization (Kernberg, 1967). In my work with borderline patients (Chapter 1, 1967, and 1968), I found that they actively sought to separate ego states with opposite affective colorings. What at first seemed to be chaotic manifestations of multiple primitive transference dispositions and an immediate availability of primary process material in consciousness turned out to reflect not a weakness of these patients' defensive structures but a specific primitive defensive organization. This organization was responsible for the fact that they could calmly discuss conscious sexual fantasies regarding their parents, polymorphous sexual interests, primitive forms of aggression, etc., while they became extremely anxious when I attempted to relate material presented within one affective context to material they had presented in a different, usually opposite, affective context. These patients manifested splitting or primitive dissociation as a major defensive operation separating contradictory ego states, along with other, related defenses, such as primitive forms of projection (especially "projective identification"), omnipotence, denial, primitive forms of idealization, and devaluation" (pg. 64-65)
    - "In the development of Stage 3, the recognition of mother marks the beginning of the delimitation of self and nonself, of self and external objects. This delimitation, in turn, permits the building up of different kinds of self-representations and corresponding object-representations under varying circumstances of predominantly pleasurable, libidinally invested or derived affective conditions. In other words, a multiplication of libidinally invested self-representations and object-representations occurs, with a gradual reshaping of the early self-concept in connection with the reshaping of object-representations, which are gradually differentiated from one another. This differentiation powerfully reinforces the perceptual and cognitive developments which differentiate self from nonself. At first, ego boundaries are fluctuating and fragile, and refusion of self-and object-representations of a good (and, gradually, idealized) type can easily occur as an early defense against bad, frustrating, or anxiety-producing situations Jacobson, 1954). Severe frustrations and the consequent predominance of bad self-object representations, which become invested with aggressive drive derivatives, interfere with the development of ego boundaries insofar as they determine excessive defensive refusion of primitive, "all-good" self- and object-representations. Later, self and object components are also differentiated in the area of frustrating, anxiety-producing, or hostile interactions; at first, under these new circumstances, the infant perceives his own hostility as naturally justified by what he experiences as hostility from a "bad" external mother. As self- and object-representations become further differentiated in both libidinally and aggressively invested interactions, ego boundaries expand and consolidate. At first, during Stage 3, good and bad self-representations and good and bad object-representations (at first only representing mother, and then also father, siblings, etc.) coexist without being integrated into a comprehensive self-concept and a comprehensive concept of others, respectively. During this stage the separation of libidinally invested and aggressively invested self- and object-representations becomes strengthened by active utilization of the mechanism of splitting, which is geared to protect the ideal, good relationship with mother from "contamination" by bad self-representations and bad representations of her. Normally, splitting mechanisms gradually decrease; but, under pathological circumstances, splitting may actually increase. The main objective of the defensive constellation centering on splitting in borderline personality organization is to keep separate the aggressively determined and the libidinally determined intrapsychic structures stemming from early object relations. The price the patient pays for this defensive organization is twofold: **the inability to integrate** libidinally and aggressively invested self-representations into a self-concept which more truly reflects the actual self and to integrate libinally invested and aggressively invested object-representations and so to understand in depth other people. Together, these characteristics determine the syndrome of identity diffusion." (pg. 65=67)
- "**Stage 4: Integration of Self-Representations and Object-Representations and Development of Higher Level Intrapsychic Object Relations-Derived**

Structures. This stage begins in the latter part of the third year of life and lasts through the entire oedipal period. It is characterized by the integration of libidinally invested and aggressively invested self-representations into the definite self system and of libidinally invested and aggressively invested object-images into "total" object-representations. Ego, superego, and id, as definite, overall intrapsychic structures, are consolidated in this phase. The typical psychopathology of Stage 4 is represented by the neuroses and the "higher level" of organization of character pathology, particularly hysterical, obsessive-compulsive, and depressive-masochistic characters (Chapter Five). Pathogenic conflicts typically occur between the ego and a relatively well-integrated but excessively strict and punitive superego. One type of character pathology, the narcissistic personality, is characterized by an abnormal condensation of new intrapsychic structures which appear at this stage, along with a regression to the organization of stage 3 (Kernberg, 1970, 1974). **In essence, I have proposed that the structure of narcissistic personalities is characterized by (1) a pathological condensation of real self, ideal self, and ideal object structures; (2) repression and/or dissociation of "bad" self-representations; (3) generalized devaluation of object-representations; and (4) blurring of normal ego-superego boundaries. The end result is the development of a grandiose self (Kohut, 1971) embedded in a defensive organization similar to that of borderline personality organization** (Kernberg, 1974). Cognitive maturation is crucial for the integration of self-representations and object-representations reflecting affectively opposite perceptions and experiences; however, the continuing pathological predominance of primitive defensive operations, particularly splitting, related to severe pregenital conflicts may interfere with integrative processes to such an extent that, in spite of adequate cognitive integration of external objects, the normal integration of object relations at this stage breaks down. The integration of affectively opposite self-representations gives rise to the developmental phase described by Melanie Klein as the "depressive position" (Klein, 1934, 1940), which, according to Winnicott (1955, 1963), is the developmental phase where guilt feelings and concern appear. I disagree with Melanie Klein's timetable for this developmental phase, with her assumption of superego functions in the first year of life, and with other metapsychological assumptions of hers to which I will come back later. Earlier (Chapter 1, 1972), I outlined how this integration of opposite self-representations brings about a general deepening and broadening of affective potentials, a modulation of affects, and particularly a broadening and deepening of the capacity for guilt feelings, which is later utilized by the developing superego. I also stressed how, in contrast to the new, more realistic self- and object-representations, there develop other representations of an ideal self and an ideal object reflecting in fantasy the now "lost" ideal state of the "all good" self- and object-representations. The ideal self represents a wishful, ideal state of the self which would make the individual acceptable to, close to, and, in the last resort, symbolically re-fused with the ideal object (the un-harmed, all loving, all forgiving early mother image)." (pg. 67-68)

- "I have suggested that all these integrative processes reduce the utilization of splitting mechanisms and that, some time in the third year of life, repression (reinforced by related mechanisms such as isolation, undoing, and reaction formation) becomes the main defensive operation of the ego. Insofar as the operation of repression from now on separates id from ego, one might say that the id as a psychic structure (Hartmann, et al., 1946) comes into existence only at this point. This formulation implies the differentiation of the id out of a common matrix from which ego and id develop (Hartmann, 1950); the id now integrates functions which previously existed "separately" or, rather, as part of early, mutually dissociated or split systems of internalized object relations. Thus, primitive aggressive and libidinal drive derivatives or their respective affective states have access to consciousness before the integration of the id. Primary process thinking (or, rather, primitive cognitive processes intimately linked with primitive affect states) was previously expressed in the context of affect-determined "linkages" of self-and/or object-representations under the sway of pleasure and unpleasure tensions without regard to reality. It is only now, after repression sets in as a major defensive operation, that the id integrates these functions." (pg. 69)

- "**The earliest superego structure derives from the internalization of fantastically hostile, highly unrealistic object-images reflecting "expelled," projected, and reintrojected "bad" self-object representations.** These images probably originate at a time when self- and object-representations are already differentiated in the area of "good" self- and object-representations and reflect primitive efforts of the infant to protect the good relationship with the idealized mother by turning the aggressively invested images of her (fused with the respective self-images) against himself. These early, sadistically determined superego forerunners probably correspond to Melanie Klein's primitive, sadistic superego and to Fairbairn's anti-libidinal object. The stronger the pregenital frustration and aggression, the more predominant are these sadistic superego forerunners. The second superego structure is derived from the ego's ideal self and ideal object representations (which have been mentioned before as coming into operation at the time of the integration of libidinal and aggressive self- and object-representations). The condensation of such magical, wishful, ideal self and ideal object representations constitutes the kernel of the ego ideal. The sadistically determined superego forerunners and the early ego ideal formation (which probably reaches the height of its development early in stage 4) are then integrated. Thus, the superego has to repeat the process that has already started in the ego, namely, the integration of internalized object relations of libidinal and aggressive characteristics. When this step in superego integration is achieved, a "toning down" of the absolute, fantastic nature of primitive idealization (the early ego ideal and of the sadistic forerunners within the superego occurs, along with a decrease in the processes of projection of such sadistic and idealized superego nuclei. The decrease of these projective processes (which were previously utilized as a protective device against excessive pressures from the primitive superego) leads to still another level of superego structures, namely, internalizations of the more realistic demands and prohibitions of the parental figures during the oedipal period of development." (pg. 70-71)
- "In Chapter 1, **I defined introjection, identification, and ego identity as a sequence in the organization of the processes of internalization of object relations**. **I defined ego identity as the overall organization of identifications and introjections under the guiding principle of the synthetic function of the ego. The establishment of ego identity occurs during Stage 4 of development** and includes the integration of self-representations into an integrated self (or self-concept), an overall integration of the inner world of objects derived from the integration of "part" object-representations into "total" object-representations, and the ongoing processes of "confirmation" (Erik-son, 1956). These formulations are largely based upon the work of Erikson (1950, 1956), Hartmann (Hartmann et al., 1946, and Hartmann, 1950) and Sandler and Rosenblatt (1962). Thus, ego identity includes a consolidated self-concept and a consolidated world of object representations." (pg. 72)
- "**Stage 5: Consolidation of Superego and Ego Integration.** Stage 5 begins with the completion of the integration of all the levels of superego. Gradually, the sharp opposition between superego and ego decreases. An integrated superego also fosters further integration and consolidation of ego identity. Here, ego identity continues to evolve by means of an ongoing reshaping of the experiences with external objects in the light of internal object-representations, and of these object-representations in the light of real experiences with others. The self-concept, in turn, undergoes continuous reshaping on the basis of real experiences with others and experiences with the internal world of objects. An integrated self, a stable world of integrated, internalized object-representations, and a realistic self-knowledge reinforce one another. The more integrated the self-representations, the more self-perception in any particular situation corresponds to the total reality of the person's interactions with others. The more integrated the object-representations, the greater the capacity for realistic appreciation of others and reshaping one's internal representations on the basis of such realistic appraisals. A harmonious world of internalized object-representations, including not only significant others from the family and immediate friends but also a social group and a cultural identity, constitutes an ever growing internal world providing love, reconfirmation, support, and guidance within the object relations system of the ego. Such an internal world, in turn, gives depth to the present interaction with others. In periods of crisis, such as loss, abandonment, separation, failure, and loneliness, the individual can temporarily fall back on his internal world; in this way, the intrapsychic and the interpersonal worlds relate to and reinforce each other. In more general terms, **the internal resources that an individual has in the face of conflict and failure are intimately related to the maturity and depth of his internal world of object relations.** Perhaps the most dramatic example of this situation is incurable illness and the prospect of imminent death: persons who have been able to love other human beings in a mature

way retain images of them which provide love and comfort at points of danger, loss, and failure. Clinical observation shows how much trust in one's self and one's goodness is based upon the confirmation of love from internalized good objects. In this regard, **one aspect of regression in the service of the ego is a reactivation in fantasy of past good internalized object-relations which provide "basic trust" to the self.** Basic trust, of course, ultimately derives from the first internalization of a gratifying, reliable mother-representation in relation to a loving, gratified self-representation." (pg. 72-73)

- "[T]he most striking example of failure of normal development of internalized object relations is given by narcissistic personalities who have difficulty evoking not only real people in their past but their own self experiences with such people. The dual absence of libidinally invested, integrated object-representations and of a libidinally invested, integrated self-concept determines the experience of emptiness so characteristic of borderline patients and particularly of narcissistic personalities, regardless of whether they function within the borderline range. Such an experience of emptiness creates for patients a need to focus exclusively on immediate present interpersonal experiences in an effort to understand interpersonal situations. Narcissistic personalities often are aware of their incapacity to judge others and themselves as perceived by others beyond the immediate behavioral cues of the actual interaction (Kernberg, 1970, 1974). " (pg. 73-74)

- "The processes of integration, depersonification, and individualization represent structural outcomes of the internalization of object relations not only in the superego but in the ego as well. I have already referred to the integration of self- and object-representations in the ego as part of the establishment and consolidation of ego identity. Depersonification may also be applied to the "adaptive generalization" (Sutherland, 1966), that is, the attempt to coordinate and integrate our viewpoints with others' in the context of our interpersonal relations under the influence of the need to share thinking and communicate our thoughts and feelings with other people. Thus, general attitudes emerge expressed by generalizations about human life and experience. Individualization includes the gradual replacement of primitive introjections and identifications with partial, sublimatory identifications fitting into the overall concept of the self. **Emotional maturity is reflected in the capacity for discriminating subtle aspects of one's own self and of other people and in an increasing selectivity in accepting and internalizing the qualities of other people. Mature friendships are based on such selectivity and the capacity to combine love with independence and emotional objectivity.** The character structure represents the automatized, predominantly behavioral aspects of ego identity. A reciprocal relationship exists between the self-concept and the character structure: the more integrated the former, the more consistent and harmonious the latter, and, conversely, the more integrated the character structure, the closer the correspondence between the self-concept and the actual behavior and personality as they are experienced by others. The character structure is also under the influence of intrapsychic and actual relations with others; the activation of self and/or object aspects by means of character traits in interacting with others implies the attribution of reciprocal roles to such persons. A rigid, pedantic, obsessive person forces persons with whom he interacts to adopt reciprocal attitudes (of submission to such perfectionism, of angry opposition to it, etc.). Significant others who do not let themselves be forced into such reciprocal roles may, under certain circumstances, influence the individual's character structure: this is, of course, maximally true in the systematic analysis of character in the context of a neutral psychoanalytic relationship. In more general terms, **the internal world not only shapes the perception of the external one but influences, by means of the character structure, the individual's interpersonal field**. Some people have the capacity to bring out the best in others; other people bring out the worst. **Human growth also involves to a great extent the reshaping of the internal world on the basis of interpersonal experience; the deeper the knowledge of the self, the deeper the knowledge of others.** This phenomenon can be seen dramatically in the course of a psychoanalysis, when the distorted images of the past are changed gradually into a more realistic perception of the parents and an understanding in depth of their values and frailties. It is perhaps even more dramatic to see realistic reconstruction of the past occur after working through of the fantastic, highly distorted internal world of patients with borderline conditions." (pg. 74-75)

- "Within this conceptualization, identification is at the same time the major process and its derived structure determining the vicissitudes of internalized object relations. **Introjections may be considered primitive or immature types of identification, while ego identity may be thought of as the supraordinate integration of identifications into a dynamic, unified structure.** In the broadest sense of the term, **identification refers to a modeling of the self after an object.** However, on the basis of the stages of development described, it appears that the modeling of the self after an object is the highly sophisticated, complex outcome of various processes in the intrapsychic and interpersonal fields. First, identification presupposes an actual object relation in which the individual experiences himself as the subject interacting with another person. This relationship may be perceived in more or less fantastic or distorted ways, and it is under the impact of some predominant affective state linking subject and object. Libidinally or aggressively determined affect states constitute the primary motive for the internalization of this relationship, and, as noted before, affects and object relations are integrated as units in the internalization process. Second, the internalization of the experienced interpersonal relation implies the building up of a self-representation and an object-representation linked by an affect disposition within the ego, and, at times, simultaneously within the superego. The shape of these object-and self-representations depends upon previous self- and object-representations and the extent to which such previous representations have been integrated. Thus, for example, an internalization occurring under the predominance of splitting mechanisms will be less discriminative than a later one occurring under an integrated self. Crude, dissociated "imitations" of the object may signal the completion of an identification embedded in a primitive ego structure, in contrast to the subtle, discreet modification of the self-concept with few behavioral manifestations characteristic of identification at a stage of greater ego integration. Third, identification involves a modification of the self-representation under the influence of the object-representation: this phase accords with the definitions of Jacobson 1964) and Sandler et al. (1963). This aspect of identification depends not so much on the nature of the actual object relation and of the perception of self and object that is internalized as upon the extent to which the particular self-representation fits into the individual's overall self-concept. The pressure for radical modification of the self in terms of the object-representation may be greatest when splitting mechanisms are operative and intensive efforts are underway to preserve an ideal state of the self in the face of dissociated, aggressively invested object relations. Fourth, identification involves the modification of ego functions and ego structures, particularly of characterological patterns constituting the behavior aspects of the self under the influence of the internalized object relation. In short, identification processes depend upon the stage of development of internalized object relations and the extent to which ego, superego, and id have crystallized as definite structures. They also involve a sequence of operations which may have various degrees of normal or pathological outcome." (pg. 76-77)

- Chapter 3 - Instincts, Affects, and Object Relations (pg. 85)
  - "I propose that the units of internalized object relations constitute subsystems on the basis of which both drives and the overall psychic structures of ego, superego, and id are organized as integrating systems. Instincts (represented by psychologically organized drive systems) and the overall psychic structures then become component systems of the personality at large, which constitutes the suprasystem, In turn, the units of internalized object relations themselves constitute an integrating system for subsystems represented by inborn perceptive and behavior patterns, affect dis-positions, neurovegetative discharge patterns, and nonspecific arousal mechanisms." (pg. 85)
    - "…I am not proposing a neurophysiological model of the mind or a mechanical model of body-mind equivalence; on the contrary, the general implication of this formulation is that, at one point, neuro-physiologically based functions constitute physiological units or "building blocks" which are integrated into a higher system represented by purely intrapsychic structures, namely, the primitive units of internalized object relations (self-object-affect units) referred to in Chapter 2. These units, in turn, constitute higher level "building blocks" for the hierarchy of purely intrapsychic structures, so that there is no simple mechanistic biological determination of behavior or simple body-mind parallelism involved in this formulation." (pg. 86)

- "**Affect dispositions constitute the primary motivational systems which integrate** the perception of (1) central (pleasurable or unpleasurable) states, (2) physiological discharge phenomena, (3) inborn perceptive and behavior patterns, and (4) environmental responses as they impinge on specialized and general extroceptive and introceptive perceptions. The earliest "self-object-affect" units are, I suggest, constellations of affectively integrated and cognitively stored perceptions of affective, physiological, behavioral, and environmental changes - perceptions within which the "self" and "non-self" components are as yet undifferentiated." (pg. 87)
  - "[T]he affect dispositions of the units of internalized object relations carry out the major organizing function which originally separates "all good" from "all bad" internalized object relations and colors the specific interactions between self and object represented in these internalized self- and object-representations." (pg. 91)
- "As the central nervous system matures, perception of the environment permits the infant to gradually differentiate mother's reciprocal behavior from his own and to arrive at more and more complex perceptions of the self and the object in each affectively colored situation. The baby's response to mother's behavior comes gradually under conscious control, thus modifying, elaborating, and enriching inborn behavior patterns. Pleasurable affects differentiate themselves further, from satiation pleasure to highly sophisticated specific enjoyment linked with gratification of particular erotogenic zones, of exploratory behavior, and eventually of new interpersonal needs; the infant's interpretation of the interpersonal relationship with mother determines new concepts of the self and of the object, including fantasy formation and symbolic interpretation." (pg. 93)
- "The implication of all these formulations for the theory of affect is that affects constitute developmental series of subjective experiences, which start out from the primary undifferentiated states of unpleasure and pleasure, are continuously integrated with corresponding levels of perceptive integration (of neurovegetative and motor discharge phenomena) and cognitive interpretation, and are stored as "affective memory." As affects evolve, their discharge patterns decrease in importance, and the cognitive elements become more elaborated and subtle. Higher level cognitive structures are in a sense emancipated from the original matrix of early experience in which primitive affects and primitive cognitive structures are integrated as primary intrapsychic units. This definition implies (1) the conception of affects as both central states and discharge phenomena, (2) a rejection, on clinical grounds, of the existence of "pure" affects without any cognitive implications (although the cognitive implications of conscious affects may be repressed), and (3) the conception of affects as primary, inborn dispositions to qualitatively specific subjective experiences along the line of pleasure and unpleasure, "located" in the undifferentiated ego-id matrix out of which the early ego - and eventually the organized id, organized ego, and superego - evolve." (pg. 93-94)
- "To summarize, my general proposal is that **affects represent inborn dispositions to a subjective experience in the dimension of pleasure and unpleasure**; that they are activated simultaneously with inborn behavior patterns, which elicit reciprocal environmental (mothering) reactions, and with general arousal, which increases the perception of external and internal stimuli occurring during this interaction; and that all of this leads to the fixation of memory traces in a primitive, "affective memory" constellation or unit incorporating self components, object components, and the affect state itself. Differentiation of affect occurs in the context of the differentiation of internalized object relations; these original units integrate affective and cognitive functions, and affect and cognition at first evolve jointly, only to differentiate much later into specific, higher levels of cognitive functions with relatively little affective participation and higher level affective functions with complex cognitive implications. Pleasurable and painful affects are the major organizers of the series of "good" and "bad" internalized object relations and constitute the major motivational or drive systems which organizes intrapsychic experience. Libido and aggression are not external givens in this development but represent the overall organization of drive systems in the general polarity of "good" and "bad." Affect states first determine the integration of both internalized object relations and the overall drive systems; later, affect states signal the activation of the drive and represent it in the context of the activation of specific internalized object relations. Libido and aggression represent the two overall psychic drives which integrate instinctive components and the other building blocks first consolidated in units of internalized object relations." (pg. 104)

- Chapter 4 - A Historical Overview (pg. 109)
  - "**I have attempted to integrate object-relations theory with psychoanalytic instinct theory and a contemporary ego psychological approach**. Object-relations theory stresses the uniqueness of the individual. It studies the development of a highly individualized self, a person aware of himself and of other human beings, and the development of interpersonal relationships in depth as a major precondition for the fulfillment of personal psychic needs. Object-relations theory, I think, represents a synthesis of a more impersonal psychoanalytic metapsychology, of individual psychology and psychopathology, and of man's transcendence of his biological and psychological development. In this regard, psychoanalytic object-relations theory links psychoanalysis as a science with a humanistic philosophy of man (Wisdom, 1971). Yankelovich and Barrett (1970) stress the need for psychoanalytic science to develop in the direction implied in a psychoanalytic personology. I think that psychoanalytic object-relations theory is moving in that direction. It seems to me that within the recent trends in the development of personality theories, psychoanalysis stands between the mechanistic behavior theories at the one extreme, and the ahistorical, nongenetic existential approaches, at the other. Psychoanalytic object-relations theory reaches out in both directions and attempts to extend the objective, scientific study of the personality without losing sight of the subjective uniqueness of the individual." (pg. 131)
- Chapter 5 - A Psychoanalytic Classification of Character Pathology (pg. 139)
  - "The internalization of object relations represents a crucial organizing factor for both ego and superego development. **Introjections, identifications, and ego identity formation form a progressive sequence in the process of internalization of object relations. The essential components of internalized object relations are self-images, object-images, and specific affect states or dispositions linking each self-image with a corresponding object-image.** Two essential tasks that the early ego has to accomplish in rapid succession are: (1) the differentiation of self-images from object-images; and (2) the integration of self- and object-images built up under the influence of libidinal drive derivatives and their related affects with their corresponding self- and object-images built up under the influence of aggressive drive derivatives and their related affects. The first task is accomplished in part under the influence of the development of the apparatuses of primary autonomy: perception and memory traces help to sort out the origin of stimuli and gradually differentiate self- and object-images. This first task fails to a major extent in the psychoses, in which a pathological fusion between self-and object-images determines a failure in the differentiation of ego boundaries and, therefore, in the differentiation of self from nonself. In the lower level of organization of character pathology, that is, borderline personality organization, differentiation of self- from object-images is sufficient to permit the establishment of integrated ego boundaries and a concomitant differentiation between self and others. The second task, however (of integration of libidinally determined and aggressively determined self- and object-images), fails to a great extent in borderline patients, mainly because of the pathological predominance of pregenital aggression. The resulting lack of synthesis of contradictory self- and object-images interferes with the integration of the self concept and with the establishment of "total" object relations and object constancy. The need to preserve the "good" self-and "good" object-images and good external objects in the presence of dangerous "all bad" self- and object-images leads to a defensive division of the ego, in which what was at first a simple defect in integration is used actively to keep "good" and "bad" self- and object-images apart. This is, in essence, **the mechanism of splitting, an essential defensive operation of the borderline personality organization**. It is reinforced by subsidiary defensive operations (especially projective mechanisms) and thus determines an overall ego organization different from the intermediate and higher levels of organization of character and ego development, where repression and related mechanisms replace splitting and its subsidiary mechanisms." (pg. 148-149)
    - ""All good" and "all bad" self- and object-images seriously interfere with superego integration because they create fantastic ideals of power, greatness, and perfection rather than the more realistic demands and goals of an ego ideal constructed under the influence of more integrated,

toned down ideal self- and object-images. Projection of "bad" self- and object-images determines, through reintrojection of distorted experiences of the frustrating and punishing aspects of the parents, a pathological predominance of sadistic superego forerunners and a subsequent incapacity to integrate the idealized superego components with the sadistically threatening ones. All of this leads to a lack of superego integration and a concomitant tendency to reproject superego nuclei. Thus, dissociative or splitting processes in the ego are reinforced by the absence of the normal integrative contribution of the superego, and contradictory internalized demands, together with the insufficiency of the ego's repressive mechanisms, contribute to the establishment of contradictory, instinctually infiltrated, pathological character traits. This development is maximal at the lower level of organization of character pathology but to some extent also is present at the intermediate level of organization." (pg. 150)

    - "In contrast, when "good" and "bad" internalized object relations (involving self-images, object-images, ideal self-images, ideal object-images) are so integrated that an integrated self concept and a related integrated "representational world" develops, a stable ego identity is achieved. At this point, a central ego core is protected from unacceptable drive derivatives by a stable repressive barrier, and the defensive character traits that develop have the characteristics of reaction formations or inhibitory traits. The development of this level of integration within the ego also creates the precondition for the integration of the sadistically determined superego forerunners with the ego ideal and the subsequent capacity to internalize the realistic, demanding, and prohibitive aspects of the parents. All of this fosters further superego integration and, eventually, depersonification and abstraction within the superego. The superego may now act as a higher level organizer of the ego, providing further pressures for a harmonious integration of any remaining contradictory trends within the ego. The toning down of such an integrated, more realistically determined superego permits a more flexible management of instinctual drive derivatives on the ego's part, with the appearance of sublimatory character traits. At the higher level of organization of character pathology, the integration of the superego is still excessively under the influence of sadistic forerunners, to the extent that the superego, although well integrated, remains harsh and excessively demanding. Repressive and sublimatory handling of pregenital drive derivatives, especially of pregenital aggression, is effective to the extent that there is less infiltration of genital drive derivatives by pre-genital, especially aggressive trends, and the oedipal-genital level of development clearly predominates. At this, the higher level of organization of character pathology, excessive severity of the superego centers on excessive prohibition and/or conflicts around infantile sexuality. Object constancy, a capacity for stable and deep object relations, and a stable ego identity have been reached at this level. **Normality represents a further (and final) progression along this continuum, with a well-integrated, less severe and punitive super-ego, realistic superego demands, an ego ideal and ego goals which permit an overall harmony in dealing with the external world**, as well as with instinctual needs. The predominance of sublimatory character traits reflects such an optimum expression of instinctual needs, of adaptive and sublimatory integration of pregenital trends under the primacy of genitality, in the context of mature, adult object relations. A firm repressive barrier against a residuum of un-acceptable, infantile instinctual needs is complemented by a large sector of a conflict-free, flexibly functioning ego and the capacity to suppress some realistically ungratifiable needs without excessive stress." (pg. 150-151)

- Chapter 6 - Transference and Countertransference in the Treatment of Borderline Patients (pg. 161)
    - "Integration of self and objects, and thus of the entire world of internalized object relations, is a major strategic aim in the treatment of patients with borderline personality organization. Integration of affects with their related fantasied or real human relations involving the patient and the significant object is another aspect of this work. The patient's affect dispositions reflect the libidinal or aggressive investment of certain internalized object relations, and the integration of split-off, fragmented affect states is a corollary of the integration of split-off, fragmented internalized object relations." (pg. 165)
- Chapter 7 - Barriers to Falling and Remaining in Love (pg. 184)
    - See text
- Chapter 8 - Mature Love: Prerequisites and Characteristics (pg. 215)
    - See text
- Chapter 9 - Toward an Integrative Theory of Hospital Treatment (pg. 241)
    - "I will briefly summarize the main aspects of psychoanalytic object-relations theory as presented in Chapters 1, 2, and 5. This theory proposes, in essence, that **the basic units of the intrapsychic structures are constellations of self-images, object-images, and affect-dispositions which reflect particular internalized object-relations represented by such self-object-affect units. These units of internalized object relations coalesce into more complex psychic structures (such as the ideal self and ideal objects), and these structures, in turn, finally give the ego, the superego, and the id their definite forms.** The earliest intrapsychic units of this kind are undifferentiated self-object representations linked with primitive, overwhelming affect dispositions of either a pleasurable or a painful, frightening nature (Jacobson, 1964). All pleasurable internalized experiences condense into a primitive self-object representation determining the ego core; all unpleasurable ones also condense and are then first "expelled" (as a primitive "non-me") and later projected. These are the earliest libidinally and aggressively invested internalized object relations. At a later stage of development, self- and object representations are sorted out from each other in both pleasurable and painful constellations. This separation of self- from object-representations and the maturation and development of perceptive and cognitive functions influence each other and contribute to the delimitation of boundaries between self and outside world (ego boundary). The next stage of development consists of an integration of libidinally and aggressively invested self-representations culminating in an integrated self-concept and an integration of object-representations (originally of a multiple, primitive, fantastic kind) into constellations of object-representations resembling ever more closely-and permitting the realistic perception of-real, external objects (parental figures, siblings, etc.). The integration of self-representations brings about a contrast between a realistic perception of the self (real self) and idealized fantasy formations of the self (which, in turn, integrate into the ideal self. Integration of realistic object-representations contrasts real object-representations with idealized ones representing parental figures of a magical, all-need-gratifying kind (ideal objects). A condensation of the ideal self and ideal objects determines the ego ideal, which will form part of the superego. A remnant of primitive, condensed self-object images invested with aggression and projected outside determine persecutory parental images because they distort the perception of early frustrating experiences into persecutory fantasies. Internalization of such persecuting, primitively conceived objects (particularly of the parental forbidding and punishing functions) determines sadistic forerunners of the superego. The ego ideal and these sadistic forerunners become integrated as the early superego. Later they expand with internalization of more realistic parental demands and prohibitions Jacobson, 1964). The integrated self-concept and the related increasingly realistic, libidinally invested object-representations together constitute ego identity, a basic organizer of the ego. Thus, the self (or integrated self-concept) becomes the center of the world of internalized object relations, a world constituted by the self plus the totality of object-representations. The self is part of the ego; that part of the ego not related to the world of internalized object relations is represented by the totality of nonpersonified ego functions and structures. Ego integration establishes a firm repressive barrier against internalized self-and object-images linked with intolerable or forbidden sexual and aggressive needs, for which the id acts as the consolidating reservoir. Thus, psychic development culminates in the establishment of the definite structures of the mind as described by Freud (ego, superego, and id). This theory of intrapsychic structure has important consequences for the conceptualization of structural intrapsychic change and the role of hospital treatment in achieving such structural change. First, the substructures which jointly determine the over-all psychic structures are no longer to be viewed simply as impulse-defense configurations but rather as dynamic structures, each involving an impulse-defense configuration in the context of an internalized object relation. Second, structural change occurring after consolidation of an integrated superego, ego, and id is radically different from structural change in patients who have not achieved such integration. In the case of neurotic patients and patients with neurotic character pathology, where ego, id, and superego

are integrated (although involved in pathogenic conflicts and defensive operations), the activation of any particular object relation within the treatment situation simultaneously expresses conflicts between these over-all intrapsychic structures. The defensive mechanisms in these conflicts center on repression and related mechanisms (the classical mechanisms of defense of the ego, superego, and id). Under these circumstances, much preliminary interpretive work needs to be done if the patient is to reach the point of structural change, because defensive operations (such as pathological character traits) are secondarily integrated into and protected by the over-all psychic structure involved. In addition, because of the abstraction and depersonification of internalized object relations within the ego and the superego, reactivation of these relations in the therapeutic situation takes time." (pg. 242-244)

- "Introjection represents the most primitive type of internalization of the self-, object-, and affect-components of the basic intrapsychic units mentioned before. Identification represents a higher-level introjection, within which both self- and object-representations are more elaborate, delimited, and precise; the affect disposition linking the self- and object-representations is more toned down, differentiated, less diffuse and intense than in the case of introjection. Identification presupposes a higher level of development of the perceptive and cognitive abilities of the child, to the point of recognizing the role aspects of interpersonal interaction. Role implies a socially recognized function carried out by the object or by both participants in the interaction." (pg. 249)

c. Further Readings:
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