Object Relations in Psychoanalysis, by J. Greenberg & S. Mitchell

a. People / Organizations:
   - .
b. Quotes:
   - .
c. General Notes:
   - Introduction (pg. 1)
     - "Communication among the various "schools" is minimal. Their adherents often attempt to bring order to conceptual complexity by declaring one position to be the only "true psychoanalysis," rendering unnecessary any attempt at integration, synthesis, or comparison with other points of view. This leads to a costly clarity. To collapse psychoanalysis around a particular approach or a specific mode of interpreting psychodynamic content is to lose the diversity that has made it a vital if difficult discipline. The resulting confusion among theories and premature closure within them has led many clinicians to abandon formal theories altogether, concentrating instead on what they consider the uniqueness of each analytic encounter and on pragmatic technical advice for dealing with their patients. This threatens to deprive psychoanalysis of the exciting interplay between theory and practice that has sustained it over the ninety years of its history." (pg. 1)
       - "**The common "landscape" of psychoanalysis today consists of an increasing focus on people's interactions with others, that is, on the problem of object relations.**" (pg. 2)
         - "**The early development of psychoanalytic theory was built around the concept of drive. Freud's research took him into what he regarded as the "depths" of human experience, the impulses that were manifestations of man's biological nature, demands generated by the body which provide the energy for, and the goals of, all mental activity.** He did not consider relations with the external world and other people unimportant, but his investigation of drives and their vicissitudes seemed more important, more pressing. In later works, when Freud did take up the problem of the "ego" and its relations to the external world and other people, it was by no means apparent how to position, how to set those processes and issues within his theory of drives. Object relations had to be accounted for; their origins, significance, and fate were by no means automatically provided for and encompassed within the earlier drive theory." (pg. 3)
       - "The second, more radical strategy for dealing with object relations has been to replace the drive theory model with a fundamentally different conceptual framework in which relations with others constitute the fundamental building blocks of mental life. The creation, or re-creation, of specific modes of relatedness with others replaces drive discharge as the force motivating human behavior. The clearest expression of this strategy came during the 1940s in the work of Harry Stack Sullivan and W. R. D. Fairbairn." (pg. 3-4)
     - "Different schools of psychoanalytic theory have developed out of different intellectual traditions, are based on vastly divergent philosophical and methodological assumptions, and employ different languages. Each theory is an intricate network of concepts which has developed through an internal progression particular to that theory, often in isolation from other psychoanalytic schools of thought." (pg. 5)
   - Part 1 - Origins (pg. 7)
     - Chapter 1 - Object Relations and Psychoanalytic Models (pg. 9)
       - "**The daily work of the psychoanalyst is intimately bound up with his patients' relations with other people**. Like everybody else, patients spend a good deal of their time talking about people. Even when their associations run toward concerns somewhat divorced from the mainstream of social intercourse - to dreams, fantasies, symptoms, and so on - the presence of others can always be inferred. Moreover, the patient in analysis is talking to someone; his communication is shaped by his understanding of and relation with the person he is talking to. All theories of psychoanalysis recognize this." (pg. 9)
         - "In this sense, **all psychoanalytic knowledge must begin with the individual's relations with others**" (pg. 9)
           - "The concept of transference suggests that the "object" of the patient's experience (be it analyst, friend, lover, even parent) is at best an amended version of the actual other person involved. People react to and interact with not only an actual other but also an internal other, a psychic representation of a person which in itself has the power to influence both the individual's affective states and his overt behavioral reactions." (pg. 10)
       - "**The term "object relations theory," in its broadest sense, refers to attempts within psychoanalysis to...confront the potentially confounding observation that people live simultaneously in an external and an internal world, and that the relationship between the two ranges from the most fluid intermingling to the most rigid separation.** The term thus designates theories, or aspects of theories, **concerned with exploring the relationship between real, external people and internal images and residues of relations with them, and the significance of these residues for psychic functioning.** Approaches to these problems constitute the major focus of psychoanalytic theorizing over the past several decades." (pg. 11-12)
       - "**Psychoanalysis is, by its very nature, an interpretive discipline**" (pg. 14)
         - "The very nature of psychoanalytic practice as a collaborative inquiry into the patient's life presupposes that something is missing in the patient's experience of himself. Whether this is conceptualized as being the result of repression (Freud), inattention (Sullivan), disclaimed action (Schafer), self-deception (Fromm), or bad faith (Sartre), the assumption is that some salient aspects of the patient's reality, some crucial dimension of meaning, is absent in his account of his own experience, whether or not the patient is aware of it (Ricoeur, 1970)." (pg. 15)
         - "Psychoanalytic theories provide interpretive possibilities aimed at supplying missing dimensions in the patient's account of himself. Each theory selects from the complexity of life certain aspects or dimensions which are understood to lie at the center of human concerns, coloring much of the seemingly diffuse and variegated aspects of the patient's experience. This dimension provides content for interpretations, a reservoir of meanings within which the clinical material can be understood. The basic concepts within each psychoanalytic theory become the warp and woof out of which the complex tapestry of human experience is woven." (pg. 15)
       - "**Psychoanalytic theories operate as models reflecting metaphysical commitments** because they are based upon untestable premises concerning four fundamental issues. The first issue, the approach to which shapes many other aspects of the theory, concerns the basic unit of analysis." (pg. 19)
         - "First, *motivation*: What do people want? What are the prevailing and underlying goals of human activity? Second, *development*: in the transformation from the relatively unformed infant to the relatively patterned adult, what are the crucial events? Third, *structure*: What gives an individual his or her distinctive shape, governing the regularity of behavior, events, and relationships within an individual life? What mediates between past events and present experience and behavior?" (pg. 19)
       - "The most significant tension in the history of psychoanalytic ideas has been the dialectic between the original Freudian model, which takes as its starting point the instinctual drives, and an alternative comprehensive model initiated in the work of Fairbairn and Sullivan, which evolves structure solely from the individual's relations with other people. Accordingly, we designate the original model **the drive/structure model** and

the alternative perspective **the relational / structure model**." (pg. 20)

- Chapter 2 - Sigmund Freud: The Drive/Structure Model (pg. 21)
  - "**Freud's fundamental vision of the human condition is embodied in what we have called the drive/structure model. As the term implies, the core concept of the model is the idea of drive**. In Freud's most widely used definition, drive is a concept on the frontier between the psychic and the somatic, an endogenous source of stimulation which impinges on the mind by virtue of the mind's connection with the body. It is a "demand made upon the mind for work," the activator of the psychic apparatus (1905a, 1915a). Freud implied at times that drive is to be understood as a quasi-physiological quantity, which exercises force mechanistically within the mind." (pg. 21)
    - "Psychoanalytic metapsychology is the attempt to take apart the psychic machine, to figure out the forces and counterforces that operate within it." (pg. 22)
      - "No observer of human behavior can fail to notice that people act on the basis of the meaning which they attribute to their experience of themselves and of the world around them." (pg. 23)
  - "The very principles Freud thought explanatory in the mechanistic sense also provide an interpretive thrust; his theory of mechanism is a theory of meaning. The drives in this sense embody Freud's understanding of our elemental passions; they represent the fundamental human urges. Seen in this way, the drives are not only the mechanisms of the mind, they are also its contents. Because our focus is principally on these mental contents, throughout this book we stress Freud's theory of meaning." (pg. 23)
  - "**Freud's psychoanalytic theorizing can be divided into three phases.** During the first, which lasted from his adoption of Breuer's cathartic method in the late 1880s until 1905, he worked with concepts of affect and of defense in a way that shares some of the sensibilities of the relational/structure model and which at times bears a striking resemblance to contemporary perspectives (see Rapaport, 1958). The second phase begins with his public abandonment of the seduction theory (Freud, 1905a, 1906). Between 1905 and 1910 he developed and articulated many of the concepts which define the drive/ structure model; by 1910, with concepts which were never to change, it was firmly in place. Freud introduced the third phase with his paper on the "Two principles of mental functioning" (1911a). From this point on, much of his work was devoted to integrating relational concepts into the established structure of the drive model. These changes were often initiated in response to dissents, particularly those of Adler and Jung." (pg. 24-25)
- The Constancy Principle, Affect Theory, and the Defense Model (pg. 25)
  - "Freud's formulation of the constancy principle reflects the influence of now outmoded neurological conceptions (the nervous system seeks to rid itself of all tension) and the influence of hydraulic metaphors (the mind is constructed like a machine driven by the flow of energic forces). It is not one of the most palatable elements of the drive model." (pg. 25)
    - "Simply put, **the constancy principle suggests that what matters most to people is to rid ourselves of stimulation**. It both depends upon and reinforces the most basic assumption of the drive/structure model: that there is such a thing as a discrete individual who can be treated, both theoretically and clinically, as a closed energy system. Tensions build up within this system and must be discharged by it. If one channel is dammed up so that discharge through it is prevented, another must be found. The more "open" systems of the relational model neither require nor can support the constancy principle." (pg. 25-26)
  - "The constancy principle has never been popular with psychoanalysts. It accords poorly with many of our observations, including the observation that people often seek out states of excitement and consider them pleasurable. Freud himself was not entirely comfortable with his formulation; throughout his life he reworked its place within his theory. However, it is clear that the tendency to quiescence remained as a central motivational force throughout the many transformations of his theoretical perspective." (pg. 26)
- The Wish Model (pg. 28)
  - "**Wishes are desires to reestablish situations**, but the situations are desirable only because they once satisfied an internally produced need. The need itself, however, is unspecific as to content: Freud is explicit in noting that only the earliest of the "exigencies of life" which require satisfaction derive from the major somatic needs. The wish model gives us great latitude of interpretive possibility; we are quite free to fill in the need which the wish is designed to satisfy. The need may be sexual, or destructive, or self-preservative, or it may be a need for security or for emotional warmth." (pg. 29)
- The Advent of the Drive/Structure Model (pg. 30)
  - "**Drive is an energy source, the activator of the psychic apparatus.**" (pg. 30)
- The Nature and Formation of the Object (pg. 37)
  - "Freud's use of the object concept is inherently connected to the concept of drive." (pg. 38)
  - "From this we can develop a good picture of Freud's view of the evolution of object relations. At the beginnings of life the sexual drive as a unified, organized motivational force has not yet come into existence; the infant is a creature of independently operating component drives. As these partial sexual drives, through their anaclitic relationship with the self-preservative drives, are carried outside of the infant's own body (as autoerotism is gradually replaced), the infant accrues a set of satisfying and frustrating experiences. These experiences, particularly the satisfying ones, lead him to form an image of what satisfaction is like. The association of these satisfactions with the conditions under which they were experienced leads to object formation. The fact that the first object is that of component instincts (partial drives) means that it will be a part object. To the extent that the object is created out of experiences of satisfaction of the oral drive, it will be the orally satisfying part of the relevant person, for example, the mother's breast. If the operative component instinct is the exhibitionistic trend, the object will be the mother-as-looker, not the "whole" mother as she would be defined by the objective observer. Throughout his writings Freud makes it clear that the nature of the object relationship that a person is reporting is contingent upon the active drive. Visions of the mother as poisoner reflect aspects of the relationship which are colored by orality, while reports of the father as seducer are, correspondingly, a function less of his behavior in reality than of the oedipal impulses which governed the patient's relationship with him (see Freud, 1933, p. 120). The libidinal phases provide precisely the content of which we have spoken, which, in this case, is the content of the object relation-ship. **For Freud, as for most psychoanalytic theorists, the benchmark of successful development is the ability to establish consistent relationships with a whole object.** Within the terms of the drive/structure model, formation of the whole object depends upon the integration of the discrete currents of childhood sexual impulses (each of which has generated its own part object) into a single current of genital sexuality which can, by its nature, cathect a whole object." (pg. 41-42)
    - "For relational model theorists, the achievement of whole object relationships is generally construed in perceptual terms; the task is to overcome the forces that have led to the separation of early experiences and thus to the splitting of both object and self-representations. This allows the individual to forge a unity that is a more or less accurate image of the real person. Once this unity is formed, the direction of a variety of feelings and impulses toward the same person becomes possible, indeed, almost automatic. Genital sexuality, viewed in these terms, is a natural expression of the relationship achieved. In the drive model this explanation is reversed. The crucial developmental achievement is the integration of the early component instincts and erotogenic zones under the primacy of the genitals. If, and only if, this is achieved will the constant object be formed, and the object itself is simply a natural consequence of the organization of the components into a unified sexual instinct." (pg. 42)

- "**Because within the drive model the object is the creation of drive, object relations remain a function of drive.**" (pg. 42)
  - "The drive/structure model, like other models, by positing a clearly defined hermeneutic system, directs our attention to certain aspects of a situation and away from others. Although in this respect the examples we have just cited are particularly glaring, **the focus Freud maintains on the instinctual roots of object relations** can often lead to valuable theoretical and therapeutic insights about the way in which relationships with others are shaped by endogenously arising needs. This approach to the nature and formation of the object is another major aspect of Freud's theory that never changed." (pg. 43)
- The Fundamental Premises of the Drive/Structure Model and Their Application (pg. 43)
  - "Psychoanalytic models are broad theories that attempt to interpret a wide range of existing data. The strength of a model, however, lies in its flexibility, its expandability. The existence of a strong model leads to the generation of new information, and the success of the model depends on its ability to encompass within its fundamental premises explanations of the new phenomena. The relationship between a model and the data of a science is reciprocal, and no model can be viable if it cannot account for phenomena beyond those which led to its initial formulation." (pg. 44-45)
  - "Freud addresses the question of social ties in a number of publications. In *Totem and Taboo* (1912-13) he applied the principles of his individual psychology to the organization of primitive societies, tracing many of their practices to efforts to control unconscious hostility, incestuous strivings, and ambivalence. In this work and in the much later *Civilization and Its Discontents* (1930) Freud argues that society itself is founded on man's need to renounce his innate instinctual tendencies. Thus, society, like the structure ego, is a secondary derivative of drive: it comes into being as a way to allow a certain amount of drive gratification and an even greater amount of control" (pg. 46)

- Chapter 3 - Sigmund Freud: The Strategy of Accomodation (pg. 50)
  - The Nature of Drive and the Constancy Principle: Changing Views (pg. 56)
    - See text
  - The Role of Anxiety and the Late Affect Theory (pg. 64)
    - See text
  - Developmental History, the Structural Model, and Object Relations Theory (pg. 67)
    - See text
- Chapter 4 - Interpersonal Psychoanalysis (pg. 79)
  - "**Interpersonal Psychoanalysis does not constitute a unified, integral theory, as does classical Freudian drive theory. It is instead a set of different approaches to theory and clinical practice held together by shared underlying assumptions and premises, drawing in common on what we have characterized as the relational/structure model.** The key figures in this movement - Harry Stack Sullivan, Erich Fromm, Karen Horney, Clara Thompson, and Frieda Fromm-Reichmann - knew each other and worked together, and their individual contributions reflect considerable cross-fertilization. They began at a common starting point: a conviction that classical drive theory was fundamentally wrong in its basic premises concerning human motivation, the nature of experience, and difficulties in living and, therefore, that drive theory provides an inadequate and essentially misleading foundation for psychoanalytic theorizing and clinical technique. They also shared a common belief that classical Freudian theory underemphasized the larger social and cultural context which must figure prominently in any theory attempting to account for the origins, development, and warpings of personality. This emphasis on cultural contributions to personality sets them apart from the other major source of the relational/ structure model - the British school of object relations theory." (pg. 79-80)
    - "The interpersonal tradition has been classified as "culturalist" and re-presented, particularly by its critics, as essentially "sociological," viewing the individual as a passive vehicle for cultural values, a blank slate on which social norms are written (Sugarman, 1977; Guntrip, 1961). This charge is common among defenders of the drive/structure model, for whom the spatial metaphor of a psyche filled with energy derived from drives, pushing from underneath, is presumed. **Within the drive/structure model, social reality constitutes an overlay, a veneer superimposed upon the deeper, more "natural" fundaments of the psyche constituted by the drives. Any theory omitting or replacing the drives as the underlying motivational principle and, in addition, emphasizing the importance of personal and social relations with others is, from this point of view, superficial by definition, concerned with the "surface" areas of the personality, lacking "depth."** The interpersonal tradition has been accused of failing to do justice to human passions, the deepest individual motivations and conflicts, viewing the individual as merely a cultural product. This constitutes a serious misreading. Sullivan, Fromm, and Horney all portray the human experience as fraught with deep, intense passions. The content of these passions and conflicts, however, is not understood to derive from drive pressure and regulation, but from shifting and competing configurations composed of relations between the self and others, real and imagined." (pg. 80)
  - "**Pragmatism, in its broadest terms, was a reaction to the lofty, immaterial abstractions characteristic of nineteenth-century European metaphysics. The pragmatists argue that philosophy should concern itself with lived experience, practical reality, life as it is sensed and felt.**" (pg. 82)
  - "**Sullivan attempted to demonstrate that schizophrenic phenonema were not random products of neurological deterioration, but conveyed meaning**, in the same way that Freud had demonstrated the meaning of neurotic symptoms twenty years earlier." (pg. 84)
    - "Schizophrenia is not a process emerging from within the individual organism: it is a reaction to processes and events taking place between the individual and his environment, the latter consisting of both the significant persons with whom the patient interacts and the larger social and cultural values which they transmit." (pg. 84)
      - "It became clear to him that the salient dimension of schizophrenic pathology, underlying its exotic and bizarre surface, was a severe disturbance in the capacity to relate to other people, and that this disturbance was a product not of an irreversible biological process, but of the history of the patient's interactions with significant others. Schizophrenic phenomena, he argued, are difficult to comprehend only when they are examined apart from the interpersonal context from which they derive and take their meaning. **Actual relations with others, past and present, are the ground from which schizophrenia arises**. And Sullivan came increasingly to feel that all milder maladjustments as well were the result of disorder in the patient's relationship with one or more members of the family group. **Schizophrenia reflects a fundamental disorder or "warp" in the basic organization of the personality, constituting a "disaster to self-esteem." Recovery from it, Sullivan emphasized, is contingent not upon insight alone but on the fundamental reorganization of the personality, entailing the incorporation of previously unintegrated experiences into the self.**" (pg. 84-85)
  - "He anticipates later contributions of Klein, Fairbairn, and others by pointing out the frequency with which sexual wishes and conflicts are the vehicle for other, often earlier, infantile thoughts and impulses involving dependency longings (1925a, pp. 92-93); he suggests that dreams express not only "latent" content but the character structure of the dreamer; he adds to the technique of "free association" the "careful use of questions," which would become the hallmark of his later contributions to analytic technique; he anticipates Fairbairn by redefining the Oedipus complex as a product of a "segregation" of bad impressions onto one parent and good ones onto the other (1972, p. 144)." (pg. 86)
  - "**Sullivan accuses Freud of cultural myopia: he mistakes his own cultural context for the universal human condition** and assumes, as did Kraepelin, a misleading and impossible "objectivity," leaving out the "social and cultural aspects of the thinker's opinion-formation" (1931, p.

276). Fourth, Sullivan repeatedly expresses concerns about the dangers not of Freud's work per se but of what might be termed Freudianism — the establishment of his views as dogma, demanding devotional fealty and claiming comprehensive answers to all issues. He decries the "scholasticism of certain psychoanalytically inclined psychiatrists" (1931, p. 274), the "quest for certainty" in the use of psychoanalytic formulations, the cultish snobbery of the appeal to esoteric knowledge among psychoanalysts aspiring to the "society of the faithful" (1948, p. 261), and the "rabid disciple of the New Knowledge" (1972, p. 350)." (pg. 87)

- "We believe that Sullivan does provide a theory, and that the theory has been at least as important within the development of psychoanalytic ideas as the methodology. He provides not only a critique of traditional methodology and a different way of seeing the data but also a markedly and pervasively different vision of human experience. What Sullivan sees is different, organized differently, understood differently. The principles upon which his new vision is based are not inherent or observable in the data per se; they are brought to the data, as are Freud's drive model concepts, in an effort to make the data meaningful and understandable." (pg. 88)

- ""**The field of Psychiatry is the field of interpersonal relations — a personality can never be isolated from the complex of interpersonal relations in which the person lives and has his being"** (1940, p. 10). This deceptively simple statement is the basis for Sullivan's approach and contains important epistemological, metaphysical, and methodological implications. **All knowledge of another person, he suggests, is mediated through interaction: we come to know another by observing what he does, by observing ourselves in interaction with him, and by listening to his reports of his interactions and experiences. In that sense, the data-gatherer is never simply an objective reporter, but always a "participant-observer." "Personality is made manifest in interpersonal situations, and not otherwise"** (1938a, p. 32). Personality, Sullivan argues, is not an entity, a concrete structure that can be perceived, known, and measured. Personality is by definition a temporal phenomenon, a patterning of experiences and interactions over time, and the only way in which personality can be known is through the medium of interpersonal interactions. Sullivan's placing the study of personality within the interpersonal field presumes a larger metaphysical vision, drawn from Whitehead and based on the principle that life is process and flux, a never-static, continual series of energy transformations. Sullivan suggests that "the ultimate reality in the universe is energy" (1953, p. 102). Thus, on metaphysical as well as on methodological grounds, he objected to the metaphor and language of structure in psychoanalytic theorizing, the generation of concepts presumed to reflect intrapsychic "quasi-entities" such as the superego, ego-structures, introjects, and so on. There are no "structures," he argued, only patterns of energy transformations - structure is energy." (pg. 90-91)
  - "Human experience consists of patterns of processes, not "concrete, substantial mechanisms" (1950a, p. 324). Likewise, Sullivan views psychopathology not in terms of disease "entities," but in terms of "syndromes," characteristic patterns of integrating relations with others, "processes of living." **A person is what he does, and everything he does which is knowable is done within the interpersonal field.** Persons are motivated by "needs," separable, in Sullivan's system, into two broad categories: needs for satisfactions, and needs for security. The relative balance between these needs is the key factor in determining emotional richness and health versus constrictive difficulties in living. **Both sets of needs operate in the interpersonal field and are intrinsically concerned with relations between the self and others.**" (pg. 91)
    - "The satisfaction of needs requires an exchange between the organism and the environment, and these exchanges are localized at what Sullivan calls "zones of interaction," which operate as the "end station in the necessary varieties of communal existence" (1953, p. 64)." (pg. 92)
      - "The primary function of the zones of interaction, however, is to provide a channel to the other, to facilitate the interpersonal integrations necessary for the satisfaction of needs, operating as integrating tendencies." (pg. 92-93)
    - "Various needs develop and draw one into contact with others in whom complementary needs are evoked, resulting in successful interpersonal integrations." (pg. 93)

- "**We have suggested that in Freud's drive/structure theory the infant creates the object as an extrapolation and realization of features inherent in the demands of component drives themselves. In Sullivan's relational/structure theory the infant discovers the object or, rather, discovers himself in relation to his objects.** According to Sullivan's account of the phenomenology of the infant's experience, the dawning of self-consciousness is precipitated by the first discrimination of two global states: a rhythmic oscillation between tensions and euphoria ("good mother"), and recurring, terrifying bouts of anxiety ("bad mother"). These terms refer not to a distinct "other," differentiated from the self, but to two diffuse and undifferentiated states of being in which images of self and images of others are fused. Thus, the infant begins to become aware of himself by discovering two types of interactions he finds himself immersed in. Sometimes he participates in interpersonal integrations triggered by some felt need, which provokes a complementary need in the caretaker, leading to a successful integration and resolution. Other times he participates in interpersonal disintegrations, triggered by anxiety in the caretaker. Only gradually do the various components of these global states - the respective characteristics and contributions of the caretakers and the infant - become teased apart and perceived somewhat separately. In Sullivan's view, the actual features of the caretakers as people have an enormous impact on the child, both before and after they are apprehended and articulated. Parental character is the medium within which the child's personality is structured. The distribution of anxiety-free and anxiety-filled areas of functioning in the caretakers sets the context within which the child comes to experience him- or herself, and the subtleties of parental responsiveness interfuse all aspects of the child's self-awareness. The infant in Sullivan's system has no psychological existence prior to his or her embeddedness in interactions with the caretakers and discovers him- or herself as well as the "object" through a complex developmental process." (pg. 94-95)
- "During the 1930s Sullivan's formulations concerning the self became more specific, and he began to distinguish between the self and the personality. **Personality refers to the entire functioning of the person, and is describable in terms of the predominant patterns of behavior and experience. Self refers to a particular organization of experience within the personality, constituted by images and ideas concerning the person's experience of himself. One's personality is what one is; one's self is what one takes oneself to be."** (pg. 96)
  - "Thus, the self, in Sullivan's use of the term, serves a negative and preservative function: it protects the rest of the personality from the threat of anxiety and preserves a sense of security in which satisfactions and pleasures may be enjoyed. **Life is lived, in Sullivan's vision, in the broad dialectic between needs for satisfaction and the need for security. Experiences entailing needs for satisfaction are essentially "selfless," requiring no particular self-reflexiveness, self-aggrandizement, or self-organization. Life based on the satisfaction of needs simply flows. Anxiety constantly interrupts this flow, and, because of our phobic terror of anxiety, a legacy from early childhood, anxiety arouses the need for security. The pursuit of security is carried out and pervaded by the operations of the self. The self steers attention away from anxiety emerging in the flow of life by creating an illusory sense of power and control over life. All security operations start out with the sense of "I," and the "power of I" imparts a sense of false domination.**" (pg. 99)
    - "Sullivan describes the workings of the self in various ways in different places throughout his work ("our proud self-consciousness"; "the noisy self"). They all reflect the narcissistic, fantastic quality which makes it possible for the self to reduce anxiety. "**Each of us comes to be possessed of a self which he esteems and cherishes, shelters from questioning and criticism, and expands by commendation, all without much regard to his objectively observable performances, which include contradictions and gross inconsistencies"** (1938a, p. 35). The central aim in the pursuit of security is to bolster and protect this "cherished self." Thus, there is continual tension between the pursuit of satisfactions and the pursuit of security. The former leads toward simple, constructive

integrations with others and a joyful exercise of functions; the latter leads toward disintegration, nonconstructive integrations with others, and self. absorbed fantasy and illusion. "Any interpersonal situation is thus prone to stir conflict between the drive to reaffirm the importance of the self, and some other drive for satisfaction by way of cooperation" (1972, p. 72). The pursuit of security, if unchecked and unattended, crowds out the joyful pursuit of satisfactions: "the content of consciousness pertaining to the pursuit of satisfaction and the enjoyment of life is at best marginal. It is one's prestige, one's status, the importance which people feel one is entitled to ... that dominate awareness" (1950a, p. 219). Thus, Sullivan felt, the pursuit of security in its various forms and through its various operations, becomes the supervalent motivational principle in most people. Security operations usurp and warp interpersonal situations, making the satisfaction of needs peripheral at best. Mental health can be measured in terms of the balance between the pursuit of satisfactions and the pursuit of security: "this business of whether one is getting more or less anxious is in a large sense the basic influence which determines interpersonal relations — that is, it is not the motor, it does not call interpersonal relations into being, but it more or less directs the course of their development" (1953, p. 160)." (pg. 100)

- "**The basic units in Sullivan's interpersonal theory are the interpersonal field and the relational configurations that derive from it. The individual psyche, in this view, is a part and reflection of a larger whole, and is inconceivable outside of a social matrix. To grasp the nature of experience one must consider it within that environing medium**. One may study a plant by separating it from the soil, sunlight, water, carbon dioxide, and other features of the environment in which it lives and is in perpetual exchange. Useful data may emerge from such a study, but they are incomprehensible unless viewed in the context of the plant's necessary environment. The very tissues constituting the plant have been drawn from the environment and cannot be understood apart from it. Likewise, the very stuff of experience, the ingredients of individual functioning is composed of relations with others, past and present, real and imagined. The separation of a "personality" from its network of interpersonal configurations is merely a verbal trick, an art of "perverted ingenuity" (1930, p. 258). The human organism, Sullivan stresses over and over, can only be grasped within the "organism-environment complex" and is therefore incapable of "definitive description in isolation" (1950a, p. 220). **Personality, or the patterning of interpersonal situations, develops from and is composed of relations with others, and is made manifest only in the context of an interpersonal relationship**: "everything that can be found in the human mind has been put there by interpersonal relations, excepting only the capabilities to receive and elaborate the relevant experiences. This statement is also intended to be the antithesis of any doctrine of human instincts" (1950b, p. 302)." (pg. 101)
  - "The distinction between the drive/structure underpinnings of Freudian theory and the relational/structure underpinnings of Sullivanian theory concerns the basic constituents of experience, the difference between a theory of mind composed of drive-derivatives and a theory of mind composed of relational configurations. Sullivan's theory has also been compared to classical theory on the basis of the distinction between an "interpersonal" versus an "intrapsychic" approach. This distinction, important in its own right, does not parallel, but is secondarily related to the more basic distinction between the drive/structure and relational/structure models. Whereas the latter distinction concerns constituents, the distinction between intrapsychic and interpersonal theories concerns the origin of those constituents of experience and the predominant sphere of inquiry into their functioning." (pg. 101)
    - "**Drive/structure model theories are necessarily intrapsychic - the drives by definition originate within the individual mind; the obvious focus of inquiry into drive-derived processes is within the fantasies, wishes, and impulses of the individual. Relational/ structure model theories can be either intrapsychic or interpersonal in focus**. Some theories within this model view relational configurations as built-in to the human mind prior to experience. Klein, like Freud, sees life as unfolding from the inside outward, but in her theory it is primitive, universal, internally arising object relations (instead of drives) that emerge, clash with social reality, and are then blocked, channeled, and contained. Her focus of inquiry, as we shall see, is likewise intrapsychic, on fantasies, wishes, fleeting and shifting impulses. Other theories within the relational/ structure model view relational configurations as derivative of actual experiences with others and are hence interpersonal as well as relational. In Sullivan's view, we are born, develop, and live in the context of relations with others, and our experience is composed of and concerned with the patterning of those relations. His focus of inquiry emphasized the interpersonal, what people do with each other. Fairbairn, as we shall see, developed a third version of the relational/structure model in which an interpersonal theory of the origin of relational patterns is combined with an intrapsychic focus on internal fantasies and structures." (pg. 102)
    - "Within the drive/structure model, psychic structure is a product of patterns of drive discharge and regulation. The coloring and texture of the individual personality are contingent upon these predominant patterns of drive gratification and defense. In Sullivan's system, the self is organized around relational configurations: the child shapes, patterns, and distorts his own experiences, behavior, and self-perception to maintain the best possible relatedness with significant others; painful, anxiety-provoking aspects of early relations with significant others are unavoidably structured into the self, which is composed of a collection of prominent "me-you" patterns loosely held together by a set of rationalizations and illusions. Early experience is organized into relational patterns; these are subsequently employed by the self-system in the pursuit of security. The self-system maintains its strategies of safety and control, anticipating that new experience with others will always repeat the relational patterns of the past (foresight)." (pg. 103)
- "**Fromm's broad goal throughout his work [was] the integration of Freud's psychodynamic theory of the unconscious with Karl Marx's theory of history and social criticism**" (pg. 105)
  - "Fromm's synthesis rests on the premise that the inner life of each individual draws its content from the cultural and historical context in which he lives. Social values and processes are instituted and perpetuated by each of us in our struggle to fashion a solution to the problems posed by the human condition. An essential connection between psychodynamic understanding and social criticism is thus the basis for Fromm's version of the relational model." (pg. 105-106)
    - "Fromm, like Sullivan and Horney, felt that the major weakness of Freud's psychoanalytic theory was failure to place his observations within a larger view of history and cultural evolution. He argues (1970) that **Freud's central insights concern the importance of hypocrisy.** Freud's patients thought of themselves as —and to a large extent acted like —the proper Victorian ladies and gentlemen their society asked them to be. Underneath this "false consciousness" Freud discovered all sorts of sexual and aggressive fantasies and motives dominating their internal life. For Fromm, Freud's salient discovery was of man's capacity for distorting the reality of his own experience to conform to socially established norms." (pg. 106)
      - "**Freud had unearthed the extraordinary extent to which people distort their naturally evolving experiences to accommodate themselves to their human environment, the family and culture into which they are born. Vast areas of experience are disowned by all people through the process of socialization, and the loss of this experience is subsequently rationalized and covered over through complex processes of repression, self-deception, "bad faith,"** or, in Schafer's (1976) recent language, "disclaimed action." Why is so much given up? Freud had understood the necessity for repression as residing in the fundamentally antisocial nature of human passions. People are bestial, driven by dark and inhumane motives; integration into any ongoing society necessitates the control, renunciation, and transformation of these motives." (pg. 107)
- "In Fromm's view, the lifeline of the individual follows a similar progression. It is only before birth that the human organism is at one with nature, literally embedded within the maternal environment. Through birth, each individual is expelled from this paradisical harmony into a

world in which he has no apparent place. Thus, the central feature of the human condition is that, once born, each individual is fundamentally alone. The slowly dawning realization of this separateness is the salient dimension of the development of human consciousness. This realization is difficult and frightening. With no inborn program for living, life offers a dizzying freedom and anxiety-filled sense of isolation. Each individual attempts to overcome this state by trying to reestablish the attachments and involvements with others which were once his by virtue of his embeddedness within his mother's body and nurturing care." (pg. 108)

- Part 2 - Alternatives (pg. 117)
  - Chapter 5 - Melanie Klein (pg. 119)
    - Phases of Klein's Theory (pg. 121)
      - "**Play serves a central function in the child's psychic economy, Klein felt, representing an enactment of the child's deepest unconscious wishes and fears.** Although sometimes the child plays by himself, often the therapist is enlisted and assigned parts - now the naughty child punished by the patient, now the loving parent rewarding the patient, and so on. By observing and interpreting the articulation and assignment of these roles, Klein was able to help the child work through various conflicts, relationships with others, and disparate identifications." (pg. 121)
      - "In this final phase, as Klein works toward a synthesis of her earlier contributions, she envisions life as a struggle between the integration created by love and reparation, on the one hand, and the splitting, disintegration, and spoiling created by hatred and intense envy, on the other. **Holding the object together, in its good and bad aspects, is painfully difficult:** depressive anxiety and guilt must be faced, and the limits of one's love and the reality of ambivalence must be acknowledged. An abundance of hate makes the wholeness of the other difficult to sustain and necessitates swings into paranoid-schizoid mechanisms, in which good and bad are split, resulting in disintegration and depletion. **Klein's final vision of the human condition is of man struggling toward the integration of himself and his experience of others despite the suffering it necessarily entails, against the pull toward fragmentation created by his own destructiveness and envy.**" (pg. 130)
    - The Origin and Nature of the Object (pg. 130)
      - "Klein depicts the mental life of the child and the adult as consisting of a complex tapestry of phantasied relations between the self and others, both in the external world and within the imaginary world of internal objects." (pg. 130)
      - "For Klein the drives possess, by virtue of their very nature as desire, inherent, a priori images of the outside world, which are sought for gratification, either in love or destruction." (pg. 131)
        - "Klein's claim that the content of objects is inherent in the organism and created independently of the outside world rests on three different formulations: objects are inherent in desire in the form of constitutional, universal knowledge and images; objects are created immediately to "deflect" the death instinct from self-destruction; objects are conjured up to explain the phenomenology of the child's earliest sensations." pg. 133)
    - Major Metapsychological Shift: The Nature of the Drives (pg. 136)
      - "**The central conflict in human experience, for Klein, is between love and hate, between the caring preservation and the malicious destruction of others**. Love and hate are already object-related and therefore have an unmediated connection to social reality." (pg. 143)
    - Contributions and Limitations of Klein's System (pg. 144)
      - "Klein was responsible for many important theoretical and clinical innovations. She was a key figure in the shift in emphasis within the psychoanalytic literature to the study of the earliest relationship between the infant and the mother before the full development of the oedipal constellation in later childhood. Her discovery of early introjects and identifications, her expanded appreciation of phantasy, and her development of the concepts of internal objects and the internal object world provided powerful clinical tools for the psychoanalytic investigation of these earliest object relations. Her formulations concerning primitive persecutory anxieties, early defenses dominated by splitting and its elaborations, and depressive anxiety and reparation have contributed greatly to the study of dynamic processes within psychotic, neurotic, and normal mental functioning. Her development of play technique and her incisive descriptions of the insidious workings of greed and envy and their centrality in establishing the most intransigent resistances in the psychoanalytic situation have greatly added to the range and efficacy of psychoanalytic technique. Klein's key place in the history of psychoanalytic ideas derives not only from these specific contributions but also from her role in shifting broad, metapsychological perspective. She places object relations at the center of her theoretical and clinical formulations. The organization and content of object relations, particularly relations with the fluid and complex world of internal objects, are the central determinants of experience and behavior." (pg. 145)
        - "Drives are no longer directionless, tension-producing stimuli which become secondarily attached to objects serving as the vehicle for their gratification." (pg. 145)
          - "Drives for Klein contain objects as a constitutive part of their nature; libido and aggression are inherently directional longings aimed at specific eidetic images. It is in this sense that the frequent characterization of Klein as an "id" psychologist, in contrast to the ego psychology of the American Freudian school deriving from Hartmann and A. Freud, is fundamentally misleading. The ego in her system is underdeveloped, because the drives, in Klein, contain many of the properties carried by the concept of the "ego" in ego psychology. Drives for her are not discrete quantities of energy arising from specific body tensions but passionate feelings of love and hate directed toward others and utilizing the body as a vehicle of expression. **Drives, for Klein, are relationships.**" (pg. 146)
      - "All the problematic areas within Klein's system derive in one way or another from her transitional position within the history of psychoanalytic ideas. Klein has two concerns: on the one hand, she provides powerful and incisive descriptions of the fundamental organizations of object relations and emotional life; on the other hand, she wants to preserve the notion that all significant constituents of mental life are internally given. This dual focus makes it necessary for her to account for the presence of complex relational constellations within very early developmental phases. Her adherence to the concept of the death instinct, her presupposition of extensive constitutional knowledge and imagery, and her attribution to the infant of elaborate cognitive capacities at or shortly before birth are the three areas within her theory most persistently challenged by critics. These three principles combine to serve Klein's dual purpose. Early cognitive resources and a priori knowledge are employed by the ego to ward off the threat to survival posed by the death instinct, generating both good and bad object images and early defensive organizations. The world of object relations is thus invented under the threat of internal pressures. In our opinion, Klein's depiction of the basic organizations of early object relations does not stand or fall with the premise of constitutionality and the controversial areas within her work which support that premise. Her depiction of early object relations provide powerful tools for understanding the psychodynamics of older children and adults, whether or not they accurately portray the early months of the newborn's experience." (pg. 147-148)
        - "But the simple dichotomy does not work. Klein's ill-fated attempt to force the complexity of her account of internal object relations into the drive/structure framework of classical structural theory is largely responsible for her failure to bridge the gap between her depiction of phantasy and a compelling account of patterned, structured character-formation." (pg. 150)
  - Chapter 6 - W. R. D. Fairbairn (pg. 151)

- Theory of Motivation (pg. 153)
  - "**At the center of Fairbairn's broad and varied contributions lies his critique and reformulation of the classical theory of motivation - the drive theory**. The basic motivational unit within drive theory is the impulse. Impulses are derivatives of drive tensions; they provide the energy which fuels all activities of the psychic apparatus. Fairbairn pointed out that although Freud's later work stressed the functioning of the ego and the superego, the more social dimensions of the personality, and that although Klein's work had elaborated a complex theory of internal objects, the source of motivational energy for both classical and Kleinian theory remained the instinctual impulse. The psychology of the ego and its objects had been superimposed upon the earlier psychology of impulses. Fairbairn argued that the basic assumptions upon which the drive theory rests are erroneous and misleading; in the broadest sense he saw his work as entailing a "reinterpretation of Freud's views on the basis of a differing set of underlying scientific principles" (1946, p. 149). The first step in this reinterpretation was the "recasting and reorientation of the libido theory" (1941, p. 28)." (pg. 153)
    - "**Within Freud's system the most salient and constant characteristic of the functioning of the psychic apparatus is its propulsion toward tension-regulation, otherwise known as the pleasure principle**. **The ultimate goal of all impulses is a reduction in bodily tension, experienced as pleasure. The original impulse has no direction - it is a quantum of tension waiting to be reduced**. The most pliable and interchangeable aspect of the impulse is the object. Impulses become directed toward external objects only when these objects present themselves and prove useful in reducing tension. **Fairbairn focused his disagreement with drive theory on two basic principles: libido is not pleasure-seeking but object-seeking; and impulse is inseparable from structure.** The first of these can be understood as an extension of Klein's emendations of drive theory. Klein argued that objects were not added onto impulses secondarily through experience but were built into the impulses from the start. For her, despite the subtle and covert changes in the nature of the concept of drive, the fundamental aim of the impulse is still ostensibly pleasure — the object is merely a means toward that end. Fairbairn reverses this means/end relationship. He argues that the object is not only built into the impulse from the start, but that the main characteristic of libidinal energy is its object-seeking quality. Pleasure is not the end goal of the impulse, but a means to its real end - relations with another." (pg. 153-154)
    - "The second and closely related principle upon which Fairbairn rests his revision of libido theory is the notion that energy and structure are inseparable. For Freud the impulses are packets of energy distinct and separate from the ego, the agency which, along with the superego, uses the energy for various physical and psychical activities. The assumption that energy is separable from structure underlies Freud's distinction between different psychic agencies in his structural model — a structureless id, with directionless energy, and an ego with processes and mechanisms for using energy, but with no energy of its own. Fairbairn argues that this separation of energy from structure derives from a nineteenth-century physics world view in which the universe is conceived of as a "conglomeration of inert, immutable and indivisible particles to which motion was imparted by a fixed quantity of energy separate from the particles themselves" (1944, p. 127). This separation of structure from function, of mass from energy, is not at all consistent with twentieth-century physics, in which mass and energy have been demonstrated to be one and the same. In this sense, Freud's motivational theory is seen as anachronistic in its basic assumptions of the properties of matter and energy." (pg. 155)
  - "**Hence there is no separation of ego from id**. There is no pool of directionless energy which becomes secondarily oriented toward objects. E**go structures have energy —are energy - and that energy is structured and directed toward objects from the start.** Impulses cannot be separated from these structures and the object relations which they enable the ego to establish. The only meaningful use of the term "impulses," Fairbairn argues, is to describe the activities, the dynamic aspects, of such structures (1944, p. 88)." (pg. 155)
  - "What Fairbairn is suggesting, however, is really a fundamentally different view of human motivation, meaning, and values. According to the classical drive/ structure model, the human infant is born fundamentally unrelated to others, seeking tension-reduction; he becomes related to others only secondarily, because of their utility in reducing his tensions, providing him pleasure. **Fairbairn suggests that the infant is oriented toward others from the beginning,** and that his relation-seeking has adaptive roots in his biological survival. Newborn animals of other species demonstrate various preprogrammed, instinctive behaviors bonding them to their mothers. The human infant lacks most of these stereotyped, preprogrammed patterns. **Fairbairn argues that the human infant is just as oriented toward reality, the mother, as are lower animals, but that without the preprogrammed instinctive behaviors,** his path to the mother is more "roughly charted" (1946, p. 140). The apparent chaos and random behavior of the early months does not reflect a primary "narcissistic" or autoerotic stage in which the infant is not directed toward objects for fulfilling his needs. The apparent randomness simply reflects inexperience. Without built-in patterns, Fairbairn reasoned, it takes the human infant time to learn how to make contact and organize his relations with his mother." (pg. 155-156)
    - "**He is suggesting that human experience and behavior derive fundamentally from the search for and maintenance of contacts with others...Psychopathology is understood not as deriving from conflicts over pleasure-seeking impulses, but as reflective of disturbances and interferences in relations with others.** The analytic process is understood not as consisting of a resolution of unconscious conflict over pleasure-seeking impulses, but as a process through which the capacity for making direct and full contact with real other human beings is restored. Thus, the change in theoretical principles of motivation that Fairbairn is proposing is not trivial; it provides a different conceptual framework for viewing the entirety of human experience." (pg. 156)
- Theory of Development (pg. 160)
  - "**In Fairbairn's view the central feature of emotional development is a natural, maturational sequence of relations to others**. Psychopathology is characterized by disturbances in this natural sequence of relations, a proliferation of relations with compensatory internal objects, and a consequent internal fragmentation." (pg. 160)
- Psychic Structuralization (pg. 163)
  - "In 1944 Fairbairn began to work out the implications for psychoanalytic structural theory of his innovations in motivational and developmental theory. **He envisions a unitary, integral ego with its own libidinal energy, seeking relations with real external objects. If these relations are satisfactory, the ego remains integral and whole. Unsatisfactory relations with natural, external objects necessitate the establishment by the ego of compensatory internal objects.** The splitting of the ego is a consequence of this proliferation of internal objects, since different portions of the ego remain related to different internal objects. This attachment and devotion by the ego to its internal objects causes a fragmentation of the original, integral ego." (pg. 163)
    - "…in Freudian structural theory…"ego" refers to a set of functions, including the regulation of drive energies coming from the id and the negotiation of the demands and interests of the id with those of the superego and the outside world." (pg. 163)
    - "Fairbairn's use of "ego," when compared to contemporary writers within the Freudian tradition, is much closer to their use of the term "self" in a functional sense" (pg. 163)
  - "**In Fairbairn's view the relationship to the mother has two fundamental features: a gratifying component and an ungratifying component.** The ungratifying aspect is further separable since it consists of not just rejection, but rejection following some sense of hope or promise. Thus, **the child has three different experiences of mother: gratifying mother; enticing mother; and depriving mother**. As the

original relationship to the real, external mother becomes unsatisfactory, it is internalized. The result, however, is not a single internal relationship, but three, corresponding to the three features of the external relationship with the mother. **The three internal objects which are separated out Fairbairn terms: the ideal object (the gratifying aspects of the mother); the exciting object (the promising and enticing aspects of the mother); and the rejecting object (the depriving, withholding aspects of the mother)**. As each of these features of the mother is internalized and established as an internal object, a piece of the outer-directed, integral ego is split off from its original unity and bound up in an internal object relationship with it. The piece of the ego that remains bound to and identified with the exciting object, which is, therefore, perpetually seeking and longing for the enticing promise of relatedness, Fairbairn terms the "libidinal ego." The piece of the ego that remains bound to and identified with the "rejecting object" and is therefore hostile and derisive toward any possible contact or gratification, Fairbairn terms the "anti-libidinal ego" (an earlier term for this structure was the "internal saboteur"). The remainder of the original ego, which Fairbairn terms the "central ego," is bound to and identified with the "ideal object," the comforting and gratifying aspects of the relationship with the mother. The central ego is also that part of the ego which is still available for relations with real people in the external world. **An essential principle in Fairbairn's structural system is that ego and object are inseparable**. To be of importance, an object must have a piece of the ego attached to it. **An object with no corresponding portion of the ego is emotionally irrelevant. The ego is unthinkable except as bound up with objects. It grows through relations with objects, both real and internal,** like a plant through contact with soil, water, and sunlight. Objects are necessary for the ego to survive and flourish. An objectless ego is a contradiction in terms, much in the way Sullivan argued the impossibility of a "personality" outside an interpersonal field. As aspects of the original, unsatisfying relations with the mother are split off and internalized, pieces of the original, integral ego are diverted from their original direction toward real, external people and follow them inside. These split-off portions of the ego (the libidinal ego and the anti-libidinal ego), which Fairbairn calls "subsidiary egos," are unavailable for real object relations and remain bound up with the compensatory internal objects. The exciting object and the rejecting object are "bad" objects, in Fairbairn's sense of the term, in that they are ungratifying. The ego maintains relations with these bad internal objects in an effort to control them and to preserve its relations with the real mother uncontaminated by frustration, rage, and ungratified longings. As noted earlier, the child also internalizes a good object, the "ideal object," which is composed of those features of the mother that remain after the overexciting and over-rejecting portions are separated out. The internalization of this object is the result of a secondary development which Fairbairn terms the "moral defense." The central ego strives to live up to the ideals of the ideal object. The assumption of the central ego is that, if these ideals are met, relatedness and contact will be forth-coming; this striving for moral perfection serves as a distraction and defense against the cathexis of the "bad" internal objects by the subsidiary egos. The residue of the central ego, following the splitting off of the subsidiary egos and the central ego's defensive cathexis of its own internal object (the ideal object), is employed in the service of relations with real people in the external world. **Psychopathology results from this fragmentation of the ego and the devotion of the resulting portions of the ego to their internal objects at the expense of relations with real people."** (pg. 164-165)

- "Fairbairn's account of the relations among the internal objects and their corresponding subsidiary egos becomes quite intricate and detailed, and it is possible to consider only the highlights. Freud's dual motivational principles of libido and aggression have been replaced by a single motivational principle - libido - and a powerful reaction to libidinal frustration - an "anti-libidinal" factor. The "libidinal ego" is that part of the child's original ego which has not given up the unsatisfied longings and demands of infantile dependence. It is the repository of hope and, in its attachment to the exciting object, remains bound to images of unfulfilled promises, enticements, and potentials for contact with the mother that were never brought to fruition. The libidinal ego longs for union with the exciting object, as an internal object relation, because the longing for real gratification from the real mother has become too painful. The libidinal ego, therefore, remains in a perpetual, deprived relationship with the exciting object. The promise is kept alive, but fulfillment is impossible. The anti-libidinal ego is the part of the ego that becomes the repository for all the hatred and destructiveness which accumulate as a consequence of the frustration of libidinal longing. The anti-libidinal ego is attached to and identified with the rejecting object, the aspect of the mother experienced as depriving and withholding. The anti-libidinal ego represents the part of the ego which, because it was not gratified by the enticements of the mother, identifies with her depriving and withholding features. Much of the rage contained in the anti-libidinal ego is directed toward the exciting object -the promises and enticements of the mother. Another target of this rage is the libidinal ego, because of its identification with the exciting object. The anti-libidinal ego hates the libidinal ego for its hope, for continuing to perpetuate the belief that the promises of the mother may yet be fulfilled. The anti-libidinal ego continually attacks the exciting object for its false promises, and the libidinal ego for its naive hope and devotion. These internal attacks by the anti-libidinal ego are responsible for self-destructive, self-punitive aspects of psychopathology. The anti-libidinal ego is the enemy of hope, particularly of hope for anything meaningful with other people. It hates and punishes the libidinal ego for any attempts to get something from others, and it hates the other person who offers the possibility of relatedness. Thus, in the psychoanalytic situation, a period of increased contact between a severely disturbed patient and the analyst is often followed by venomous hatred by the patient, of himself and of the analyst. In Fairbairn's terms, this is the anti-libidinal ego punishing the libidinal ego and the exciting object —both the subject and object of possible relatedness." (pg. 165-166)

□ "Fairbairn's structural theory, a relational/structure theory, differs in several distinct and innovative ways from classical Freudian structural theory, a drive/structure theory. The latter locates conflict as taking place among the functions represented by the id, ego, and superego. The superego is fueled by instinctual impulses organized around internalized images of parental figures, while the id is understood to be the source of impulses derived from drive tensions. The ego negotiates among the demands for impulse gratification from the id, the guiding and prohibiting impact of the internalized aspects of the parents in the superego, and the requirements of the outside world. **Thus, within the classical model the basic format for understanding human conflicts is a struggle between impersonal impulses or bodily tensions, on the one hand, and internal objects also fueled by instinctual tensions, on the other.** The ego serves as an arbitrator with no clearly defined interests of its own, apart from achieving relative internal harmony and good standing with the outside world. In Fairbairn's model all the major protagonists in internal struggles are essentially relational units, composed of a portion of the ego and a portion of the child's relations to the parents, experienced as an internal object. Conflict takes place among these three ego-object components (libidinal ego/ exciting object; anti-libidinal ego/rejecting object; central ego/ideal object). Eliminating the anthropomorphization and reification inherent in both models sharpens the differences between them. **The essential struggle in the classical Freudian model involves conflicts stemming from the person's instinctual impulses, some of these being mediated through internal representation of his early relations with his parents. The essential struggle in Fairbairn's model involves the person's irreconcilable loyalties in his longings for and identifications with various features of his significant others, in the outside world and as they have been internalized in an effort to control them. The problem for Freud is the inherent opposition among instinctual aims and between instinctual aims and social reality; the problem for Fairbairn is that the person cannot maintain the integrity and wholeness of his experience of himself within his necessary relations with others and is forced to fragment himself to maintain contact and devotion to the irreconcilable features of those relations.**" (pg. 166-167)

- Theory of Psychopathology (pg. 169)
  - "As we have seen, in his later work Fairbairn argues that the ego is universally split, resulting in the "basic endopsychic situation." This splitting of the ego into libidinal ego, anti-libidinal ego, and central ego underlies all psychopathology." (pg. 172)
  - "Fairbairn felt that his own view of libido as object-seeking provided a much more economical explanation for this characteristic feature of psychopathology. **The essential striving of the child is not for pleasure but for contact**. **He needs the other**. If the other is available for gratifying, pleasurable exchange, the child will enter into pleasurable activities. If the parent offers only painful, unfulfilling contacts, the child does not abandon the parent to search for more pleasurable opportunities. The child needs the parent, so he integrates his relations with him on a suffering, masochistic basis. Fairbairn felt the child attempts to protect what is gratifying and control what is not gratifying in the relationship with the parent by establishing compensatory internal object relations. It is in the "obstinate attachment" (1944, p. 117) of the libidinal ego to the exciting object that the child preserves his hopes for fuller, more satisfying contact with the parent. The emptier the real exchange, the greater his devotion to the promising yet depriving features of his parents which he has internalized and seeks within. In addition, he preserves his childhood terror that if he disengages himself from these internal objects, he will find himself totally alone. It is the experience of these internal object relations and the projection of them onto the outside world that produces pathological suffering within human experience. Love objects are selected for or made into withholders or deprivers so as to personify the exciting object, promising, but never fulfilling. Defeat is orchestrated again and again to perpetuate the longing and need of the libidinal ego for the fulfillment of the promise of the exciting object. Success is equated with a betrayal of that promise, as if the libidinal ego had no need of it anymore, and hence threatens to rupture those internal ties. Depression, terror, and futility represent the ego's identifications with "bad" aspects of the parents which could not be reached through real exchange with the parents in the external world and thus were taken inside. Psychopathology persists, old pain returns, destructive patterns of integrating relations with others and experiencing life are perpetuated - because beneath the pain and the self-defeating relations and organizations of experience lie ancient internal attachments and allegiances to early significant others. The re-creation of the sorrow, suffering, and defeat are forms of renewal of and devotion to these ties. Reluctance to betray these attachments through new relations and allegiances impedes constructive change in living and results in a central and often the most intransigent resistance in psychoanalysis." (pg. 173-174)
- Klein and Fairbairn (pg. 174)
  - "For Klein, the internal object world is a natural, inevitable, and continual accompaniment of all experience. Internal objects are established at the beginning of psychological life and become the major content of phantasy. The internal object world for Klein is the source both of life's greatest horrors and of its deepest comforts. For Fairbairn, internal objects are neither primary nor inevitable (theoretically). They are compensatory substitutes for unsatisfactory relations with real, external objects, the "natural," primary objects of libido. For him, relations with internal objects are inherently masochistic. Bad internal objects are persistent temptors and persecutors; good internal objects do not offer real gratification, merely a refuge from relations with bad internal objects." (pg. 175)
- Fairbairn and Sullivan (pg. 177)
  - "Sullivan and Fairbairn differ in many ways - in intellectual ancestry, use of language, philosophy of science, and sensibility. **Sullivan's work is distinctively American: pragmatic, operationally oriented, focused on what people do. He eschewed speculations about processes inside the mind, hidden from public view. Fairbairn's intellectual roots go back to Greek and European philosophy, with their fascination with the abstract**. His immediate psychoanalytic forebear was Melanie Klein, whose theory is rich and loose in speculations about internal psychic processes. Fairbairn focused on events and structures inside the mind, and he developed a complex internal psychic morphology. Nevertheless, Sullivan and Fairbairn developed a grasp of the nature and the constituents of human experience which is strikingly similar in fundamentals in areas crucial for psychoanalytic models. Both Sullivan and Fairbairn object to the focus on the person, the psyche within classical psychoanalytic theorizing, arguing that this establishes an artificial and misleading basis for viewing human experience, rending it from its relational setting. Sullivan suggests that one cannot understand a personality in isolation. The only meaningful context for grasping the fundamentals of human experience is what he termed the "interpersonal field." Fairbairn likewise argues that it is conceptually meaningless to speak of a person outside the context of the history of the person's relations with others, that it is "impossible to gain any adequate conception of the nature of an individual organism if it is considered apart from its relationships to its natural objects; for it is only in its relationships to these objects that its true nature is displayed" (1946, p. 139). For both theorists the concept of "drives" is an artifact, a consequence of the isolation of the person from his relational context, from which his experience and behavior take their meaning." (pg. 177)
    - "Although different in language, tone, and clinical application, the interpersonal theory of Sullivan and the object relations theory of Fairbairn overlap in basic premises; taken together, they constitute the purest expression of the relational model. **For both Fairbairn and Sullivan the personality itself is understood to derive from the residues of exchanges with others.** Objects are no longer merely targets or inhibitors of drive; they no longer function merely vis-à-vis discharge processes. **Relations with objects, internal and external, constitute the primary dynamic processes within mental life and are built into the very texture of psychic structure.** The striving toward the establishment and maintenance of relations with others becomes a motivational force (the activity of the individual is not to be understood as instigated by the need to discharge drive, but as a movement toward a specific mode of relatedness with another person) as well as the major constituent of the "stuff" of psychic structure. In the relational model, drives as Freud defined them drop out entirely. Their role in motivation, development, psychic structure, and psychopathology is assumed by relations with others, real and imaginary." (pg. 178-179)
- Limitations of Fairbairn's System (pg. 179)
  - See text
- Afterward: The Relational/Structural Models of Balint and Bowlby (pg. 181)
  - See text

○ Chapter 7 - D. W. Winnicott and Harry Guntrip (pg. 188)
  - "**Klein and Fairbairn were system-builders**. Each constructed a broad and novel vision of human experience and difficulties: Klein, in her slowly evolving, piece-by-piece redefinition and refocusing of Freudian theory; Fairbairn, in his dramatic refutation of Freud's work. **Winnicott and Guntrip, by contrast, were concerned with single issues.** Both declared allegiance to prior traditions: for Winnicott, his own personal blend of Freudian and Kleinian thought; for Guntrip, Fairbairn's recently fashioned object relations theory. Yet each felt that the tradition he emulated had omitted one crucial area of concern and attempted to correct that oversight." (pg. 188)
- D. W. Winnicott (pg. 188)
  - "These formal characteristics of Winnicott's writing — his elusive mode of presentation and his absorption yet transformation of theoretical predecessors — parallel **his central thematic interest: the delicate and intricate dialectic between contact and differentiation. Almost all his contributions center around what he depicts as the continually hazardous struggle of the self for an individuated existence which at the same time allows for intimate contact with others**. Winnicott's depiction of the healthy self rests upon one of his many paradoxes — through separation, nothing is lost, but rather something is gained and preserved…" (pg. 189-190)

- "**Almost all of his major contributions concerned the conditions making possible the child's awareness of himself as a being separate from other people,** and he approaches this problem from different angles, through different formulations, and in different contexts." (pg. 191)

- "**Once hallucinatory omnipotence is firmly established, it is necessary for the child to learn the reality of the world outside his control and to experience the limits of his powers. What makes this learning possible is the mother's failure, little by little, to shape the world according to the infant's demands.** As the mother recovers from her maternal preoccupation and becomes interested once again in other areas of her life, the child is forced to come to terms with what he cannot do, cannot create, cannot make happen. These harsh realities are assuaged by a push within the child toward separateness. Thus, the mother's ego coverage and responsiveness decrease in fine syncrony with an increase in the exercise of active ego functions on the part of the infant. As the infant matures, the mother does not actualize his wishes so much as receive and respond to his gestures. **An increasingly greater differentiation and interaction characterizes their relationship.**" (pg. 193)
  - "The early mother who materializes the infant's passive hallucinatory wish gradually gives way to the mother who responds to needs which are now actually expressed through gestures and signals. **The mother's "graduated failure of adaptation" (1949a, p. 246) is essential to the development of separation, differentiation, and realization**. Winnicott suggests that deficiencies in maternal care, more specifically the failure to provide a perfect environment and its graduated withdrawal, have a debilitating impact on the emotional development of the child." (pg. 193-194)
- "The infant's personal existence is rooted both in his formless states and in his omnipotent creative gestures. Ideally, the mother is the medium for formlessness and the instrument of omnipotence. Any interference with these functions is experienced by the infant as an "impingement." Something from the outside is making claims on him, demanding a response. He is wrenched from his quiescent state and forced to respond, or he is compelled to abandon his own wishes, to accept prematurely the feeble and unrealistic nature of his own demands, and to mold himself to what is provided for him. The major consequence of prolonged impingement is fragmentation of the infant's experience. Out of necessity he becomes prematurely and compulsively attuned to the claims and requests of others. He cannot allow himself the experience of formless quiescence, since he must be prepared to respond to what is asked of and provided for him. He loses touch with his own spontaneous needs and gestures, as these bear no relation to the way his mother experiences him and what she offers him. **Winnicott characterizes the resulting fragmentation as a split between a "true self," which becomes detached and atrophied, and a "false self on a compliant basis."** The "true self," the source of spontaneous needs, images, and gestures, goes into hiding, avoiding at all costs the possibility of expression without being seen or responded to, the equivalence of complete psychic annihilation. The "false self" provides an illusion of personal existence whose content is fashioned out of maternal expectations and claims. The child becomes the mother's image of him. The "false self" comes to take over in some sense the caretaking functions which the environment has failed to provide. The "false self" covertly protects the integrity of the "true self"; it functions "to hide the true Self, which it does by compliance with environmental demands" (1960b, P. 147). The false self draws on cognitive functions in its anticipations of and reactions to environmental impingements, resulting in an overactivity of mind and a separation of cognitive processes from any affective of somatic grounding (1949b, pp. 191-192). Winnicott regards the formation of "transitional objects" as another aspect of this larger process entailing the development of the person. The most important dimension of transitional phenomena is not the objects themselves, but the nature of the relationship to the objects, representing a developmental way station between hallucinatory omnipotence and the recognition of objective reality. **The emergence of the person entails a movement from a state of illusory omnipotence, in which the infant, through the mother's facilitation, feels he creates and controls all features of the world he lives in, to a state of objective perception, in which the infant accepts the limits of his powers and becomes aware of the independent existence of others.** The move between these states is not a one-way, linear progression; both children and adults continually vacillate between them. Winnicott contrasts these two different states starkly with each other: solipsistic subjectivity with objective perception; the inner world with the world of outer reality; the world of "subjective objects" over which one has total control with the world of separate and independent others. **Relations with transitional objects constitute a third, intermediary, and transitional realm between these two worlds.**" (pg. 194-195)"
  - "**The transitional object is neither under magical control (like hallucinations and fantasies) nor outside control (like the real mother). Transitional experience lies somewhere between "primary creativity and objective perception based on reality-testing**" (1951, p. 239). Because of this ambiguous and paradoxical status, **transitional objects help the baby negotiate the gradual shift from the experience of himself as the center of a totally subjective world to the sense of himself as a person among other persons**. Transitional experiencing is not merely a developmental interlude, but remains a cherished and highly valuable realm within healthy adult experience. It is here we can let our thoughts wander, concerned neither with their logic and validity in the real world nor with the threat that our musings will lead us into a totally subjective, solipsistic realm, causing us to lose the real world altogether. Transitional experience is rooted in the capacity of the child to play; in adult form it is expressed as a capacity to play with one's fantasies, ideas, and the world's possibilities in a way that continually allows for the surprising, the original, and the new. In transitional experience, we maintain access to the most private wellspring of our thoughts and imagery, without being held accountable for them in the clear and harsh light of objective reality." (pg. 195-196)
- "**In Winnicott's theory, the earliest object relations consist of interactions between developmental needs within the child and maternal provisions offered by the mother, entirely separate from drive gratification**. He does not challenge the drive concept directly, but he crowds it out, relegating it to a peripheral and secondary status. According to Winnicott, the child needs relatedness with the mother. This need for contact consists of a built-in orientation and anticipation rather than a set of specific a priori images of the kind Klein had suggested; there is a readiness and expectancy rather than an object itself. Play "enables the baby to find the mother" (1948a, p. 165), and, despite his reluctance to align himself with Fairbairn's work, Winnicott speaks of a "drive that could be called object-seeking" (1956b, p. 314). The infant needs the maternal provisions which define good-enough mothering including: an initial perfectly responsive facilitation of his needs and gestures; a nonintrusive "holding" and mirroring environment throughout quiescent states; the collusive agreement to respect transitional objects; survival, despite the intensity of the infant's needs; and the failure to retaliate against the destructive features of object-usage. Winnicott differentiates the need for these maternal provisions from instinctual wishes: "a need is either met or not met, and the effect is not the same as that of satisfaction and frustration of an id impulse" (1956a, p. 301)." (pg. 198)

- Harry Guntrip (pg. 209)
  - See text
- The Relational Model in Perspective (pg. 219)
  - "Psychoanalytic theory is not simply additive; it consists of a collection of uniquely fashioned crystallizations of ideas and data, often overlapping, but with different centers and organizational principles." (pg. 219-220)
    - "The authors we have considered in "The British School" do not constitute a "school" by virtue of subscribing to a set of shared beliefs, but, like a school of painters, by virtue of a shared set of problems and sensibilities. The most fundamental common problem

addressed by these theorists, as well as by theorists within the American interpersonal school, is the transformation of psychoanalytic metapsychology from a theoretical framework based on drives to a framework which makes relations with others, real and imagined, the conceptual and interpretive hub. The various versions of the relational/structure model share a common set of assumptions which set them apart from earlier drive/structure theory: the unit of study of psychoanalysis is not the individual, but the relational matrix constituted by the individual in interaction with significant others. The stuff of personality and the patterns that characterize psychopathological functioning are formed from that relational field. While physiological needs, bodily events, temperament, and other biological factors significantly affect human experience and behavior, they operate within the context of an interactive matrix and are subsumed by the preeminent motivational thrust toward the establishment and maintenance of relations with others. Each major theorist of the British school made important contributions to the movement of psychoanalytic theory from the drive/structure model to the relational/structure model. The nature and the style of presentation of these contributions, however, vary considerably; they begin with a common starting point and arrive at a common destination, but each covered the intermediate conceptual expanse differently." (pg. 220)

- Part 3 - Accomodation (pg. 231)
  - Chapter 8 - Heinz Hartmann (pg. 233)
    - "**A theory of object relations, if it is not to be phantasmagoric and mythological, must include constructs which provide for a relationship between the individual and external reality. Reality is the field within which people and things exist, and for the individual to know his objects he must have access to it.** Accounting for this knowledge is a requirement for any theory that would attribute significance to relations with other people. To the extent that this influence is understood as operating from the earliest developmental eras, ties to reality must be understood as existing from the beginning of life. **Reality is thus a necessary constituent of a psychoanalytic theory of object relations. It is not, however, a sufficient one.** A focus on external reality exclusively can lead to a theory that is reductionistically behavioral rather than psychoanalytic. Psychoanalysis is distinguished from other psychologies by its requirement for additional explanatory concepts to account for an inner world of process and experience through which relationships with other people are mediated and exert their influence. Freud's concept of instinctual drive was designed to serve just this theoretical function. The relationship between a theory which takes account of reality and one which grants primary importance to object relations is further complicated by the fact that to speak of reality is not necessarily to grant particular importance to the people who exist within it. The world can be approached with broad strokes, as embodying the conditions required for human growth and survival. People in this view are relevant only insofar as they are the carriers of some of the necessary conditions; many aspects of object relations thus remain at the theoretical periphery. This is the case with the drive/structure model as Freud left it. Because motivation was understood as originating in internal processes (drives and their vicissitudes), the objects themselves entered the system only in relation to these, as facilitators, inhibitors, or targets. Despite his recognition that the prolonged period of helplessness of the human infant results in a heightened attachment to caretaking figures, Freud saw this attachment as evolving secondarily from the child's need for the conditions which caretakers can provide (Bowlby, 1958). Involvement with objects remains secondary throughout life, because the quality of the relationship itself continues to derive primarily from the demands of the operative drive. Even in this limited sense, psychoanalysis was a long time in granting reality any substantial role in its theory of personality or of psychopathology. Once Freud discovered that his patient's account of childhood seductions were untrue, he renounced his interest in real events in favor or explanatory concepts predicated on fantasy and on endogenously determined instinctual processes. Mental life was understood as originating with drive demands; the psychic apparatus functioned, under the sway of the pleasure principle, only insofar as drive pressed toward discharge. Freud's definition of drive as a "demand made upon the mind for work" (1905a, 1915a) indicates that all behavior (ranging from diffuse motor discharge to rational action, from highly evolved technical thinking to dreams and neurotic symptoms) is motivated by the press of drive. The drives and their topographic realm, the system Ucs., occupied the interest of psychoanalytic theorists for many years. Consciousness, as one among several organs of perception, had a limited explanatory role in the system. Reality was of little interest, since the system Ucs. (and, in the structural model, the id) was understood as that part of the psychic apparatus most sheltered from the external world (see Arlow and Brenner, 1964)." (pg. 233-234)
    - "Our purpose is to consider his work from one point of view only: his contribution to modifying the drive/structure model to accommodate new information about the role of object relations. Seen from this angle, Hartmann appears as a transitional figure. Throughout his writings his concern is to provide a more significant and more immediate theoretical place for reality, and many of his modifications of and additions to existing theory are best understood in this light. The body of his work has the effect of modifying each of the classical metapsychological points of view to enhance the role of reality and of its spokesman, the ego, in the determination of human motivation. Nevertheless, Hartmann's commitment to the drive model is unwavering. As a result, his observations of the dynamic significance of object relationships are often accompanied by warnings not to overemphasize their impact as compared with that of other aspects of growth and development. His approach to reality represents a balance between the need for theoretical preservation and the need to encompass newly emerging data. Reality, painted in broad strokes, consists of a set of conditions, an ecological system with which the organism must interact." (pg. 236)
    - Psychoanalysis: A General Psychology (pg. 238)
      - See text
    - Psychoanalysis Redefined (pg. 240)
      - See text
    - Motivation and Reality (pg. 244)
      - See text
    - The Environment (pg. 248)
      - See text
    - Pleasure and Reality (pg. 250)
      - See text
    - Structural and Economic Considerations (pg. 256)
      - See text
  - Chapter 9 - Margaret Mahler (pg. 270)
    - "**The inner experience of the human infant, although it must forever elude direct observation, is by general consensus unorganized and chaotic**. The child is born into a world perhaps best characterized by William James's phrase as a "blooming, buzzing confusion." He begins life in an environment that envelops him, one that he is only minimally capable of understanding or transforming. Psychoanalysts have characterized this early stage of life in different terms, as autoerotism (Freud, 1914a); primary narcissism (Freud, 1914a; Hartmann, 1950); absolute dependence (Fairbairn, 1952); and embeddedness (Schachtel, 1959). Each of these terms derives from a complex set of theoretical premises. Each addresses the phenomenon of an unorganized, undifferentiated individual living in a turbulent and unpatterned

world. Within a relatively short time, the infant becomes a child with a unique personality. He is an individual living in a world that, within limits, he has already structured in ways that make it comprehensible to him. He experiences in his own way; he reacts in his own way; he acts in his own way. He has, in short, become a person. **The task of the psychoanalytic developmental theorist is to chart the infant's path from formlessness to form.** In common with all mapmaking attempts, certain choices must be made a priori. The cartographer must choose among mapping political boundaries, topographical features, climate, transportation facilities, and so on." (pg. 270)

- From Autism to Individuation (pg. 274)
  - See text
- Mahler and Hartmann (pg. 281)
  - See text
- Symbiosis and Drive: A study in Accomodation (pg. 285)
  - See text
- Mahler as a Transitional Theorist (pg. 297)
  - See text

- Chapter 10 - Edith Jacobson and Otto Kernberg (pg. 304)
  - The "Self" and the "Object World"
    - See text
  - From Narcissism to Identity Formation (pg. 311)
    - See text
  - Affects, Pleasure, and Psyhoeconomic Laws (pg. 317)
    - See text
  - The Elusive "Third Drive" of the Ego Psychologists (pg. 322)
    - See text
  - Otto Kernberg (pg. 327)
    - See text

- Part 4 - Implications (pg. 348)
  - Chapter 11 - Mixed Model Strategies: Heinz Kohut and Joseph Sandler (pg. 351)
    - Heinz Kohut (pg.352)
      - "**The self as a theoretical structure is not involved with instinctual expression; rather, it seeks relatedness.**" (pg. 362)
    - Joseph Sandler's Mixing of Models (pg. 372)
      - "As the child gets to know himself and the world in which he lives, Sandler suggests, he develops relatively stable ways of representing his experience to himself. These are not simply perceptions, which are fleeting and imply no enduring impression. Nor are they simply memories of discrete experiences. Representations are organized compilations of past experiences, relatively enduring impressions, constellations of perceptions and images, which the child culls from his various experiences and which in turn provide for the child a kind of cognitive map, a subjective landscape within which he can locate and evoke the cast of characters and events within the drama of his experience. It would be impossible even to begin to speak of the internalization of objects, Sandler suggests, without the establishment of representations of objects. The parents cannot be "taken in" in any respect until after they are grasped, perceived, and subjectively maintained. It is not only objects, however, which are maintained as representations. The child develops, Sandler argues, all sorts of representations, including representations of himself in various respects, his body, and his experience of drive pressure and affects. Thus, **self and object representations, culled from a multitude of impressions, constitute a network of concepts and enduring images, a "representational world" which provides the basic organizational framework for the child's experience**. At first Sandler used the concept of the representational world generally within the framework of Freud's structural model. Although the concept granted increasingly greater prominence to object relations, they remain throughout the derivative of drives. The construction of the representational world, Sandler suggests, is the product of ego functions. The representational world itself is not active; it has no motivational properties. Self and object representations are drawn by the ego out of experience, and in turn are used by the ego as a "set of indications which guides the ego to appropriate adaptive or defensive activity" (Sandler and Rosenblatt, 1962, p. 136). The self representation is an organization within the representational world. Id impulses become associated with self and object representations, through experience. Impulses make themselves known through wishes, and wishes become associated, through gratifying experiences, with various self and object images. All wishes, Sandler argues, involve self and object representations, as well as some anticipated interaction between self and object. (The influence of Klein and Fairbairn is apparent here.) One never sees a drive aim simply seeking gratification. All drive aims seek gratification through wishes, and all wishes involve fantasies of self and other in a "wished for interaction." Object relations serve the function of drive gratification; what is gratified is not simply a bodily tension, but a wish consisting of images of self and other involved in specific, fantasied relational configurations. Thus, drive gratification, in Sandler's system, is inherently object-related. The search for objects in general and the search for need-satisfying objects can be regarded as essentially the same." (pg. 373-374)
  - Chapter 12 - Diagnosis and Technique (pg. 379)
    - See text

d. Further Readings:
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